
PROEFSCHRIFT

Ter verkrijging van
de graad van Doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden
op gezag van de Rector Magnificus Dr. D.D. Breimer,
hoogleraar in de faculteit der Wiskunde en
Natuurwetenschappen en die der Geneeskunde,
volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties
te verdedigen op woensdag 18 januari 2006
klokke 14.15

door

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Geboren te Roma, Lesotho,
in 1969
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Acknowledgements
I acknowledge with gratitude financial support from the National Research Foundation (RSA), South Africa-Netherlands Research Programme on Alternatives in Development, Research School for Asian African and Amerindian Studies (Leiden) and the Study Fund Foundation for South African Students (Amsterdam) which enabled me to undertake this study. The views expressed in this dissertation are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of my sponsors.

I would also like to thank Janneke Jansen and Willem Stoetzer for the translation of the Abstract into Dutch.
Abstract
Focussing on AAS le Fleur I (1867-1941), the Griqua, and post-apartheid Khoe-San revivalism, the dissertation examines changes in the articulation of Khoe-San identities in South Africa. It shows the significance of shifting political, cultural and ideological power relations on the articulation of Khoe-San identities, and by extension on the subjectivities of ethno-‘racial’ underclasses. It shows the complexity of Griqua subjectivities (and socio-political behaviour) generated and reshaped in intercultural environments and subjected to multiple and contending discourses, manifested acutely in AAS le Fleur. Whilst colonial somatic and cultural discrimination engendered distancing from Khoe-Sanness and the assumption of alternative (Christian, Bastaard and Coloured) identities, the emergence of Griqua polities and identities in the early 1800s allowed for the maintenance of an awareness of a Khoekhoe indigenous heritage. Broader socio-political and legislative developments influenced the configuration and reconfiguration of elements in Griqua identities, with different elements of their heritage tending to be emphasized under different historical periods and political regimes. Discrimination against ‘Natives’ under White regimes encouraged Griqua to affirm that they had partial non-indigenous origin, to locate the Griqua category within the Coloured category suggesting distance from ‘Nativeness’ and proximity to Whiteness, whilst varying acknowledgments having some Khoekhoe heritage. However, the official consolidation of the association of the Griqua and Coloured categories allowed Griqua nationalists to ambivalently disassociate the Griqua category from Colouredness during apartheid (1948-1994) and to promote Griqua ethno-national specificity. With the ending of apartheid, and the attendant reconfiguration of political, cultural and ideological relations, the Coloured category lost much of the psychological, socio-economic, ideological and political value it previously conferred, further inclining Griqua and some Coloureds to distance themselves from a Coloured identity; to (re)affirm an indigenous heritage; and to promote Khoe-San identities engendering and conferring the geographic rootedness, sense of belonging, sense of entitlement and ownership, group security, self-esteem, and ethno-cultural specificity, legitimacy and unity they desired.
What have we got for our fathers’ sacrifices?
Yes, ours is a cruel history. Here might is right.
AAS le Fleur I, 1927¹

¹Griqua and Coloured People’s Opinion, 18 February 1927.
Chapter 1: Introduction

In the aftermath of the 1994 democratic change in South Africa, a relatively small but growing number of people previously categorized officially as Coloured, started to promote a Khoe-San indigenous and First Nation identity – manifesting a process of psychological, cultural and socio-political repositioning within the national and international order. The affirmation of a Khoekhoe (or ‘Hottentot’) and San (or ‘Bushman’) heritage was a rarity prior to 1994. There were however individuals who continued to openly acknowledge and/or affirm their Khoekhoe and San indigenous origins and identities, for example, individuals from the Griqua, Kalahari San and Nama Khoekhoe communities. After the 1994 democratic change, Khoekhoe and San identities were increasingly promoted. An overarching Khoe-San identity was also promoted at the same time, marking thus the appropriation of a term originating in the academy. These identity re-articulations were attended with aspirations for unity, government recognition, constitutional accommodation and empowerment. This dissertation explores changes in the articulation of Khoe-San identities and the contexts of specific identity articulation and re-articulation. The dissertation focus on Griqua identity and the Griqua under the Griqua National Conference (GNC), established in 1920 by Andrew Abraham Stockenström le Fleur I (1867-1941) who positioned himself with a measure of success as heir of Griqua Chief Adam Kok III (1811-1875). The GNC played a prominent role within the Griqua socio-political landscape prior to 1994. The Kranshoek based GNC also played a significant role in the post-1994 Khoe-San revivalism. The Griqua and the GNC thus provide a useful avenue for the exploration of the articulation and re-articulation of Khoe-San identities prior to and after the 1994 democratic change.

Dealing with Griqua identities and the post-apartheid Khoe-San resurgence, the dissertation explores the way in which certain sections of Khoekhoe descent have historically related to their Khoekhoe past in articulating a group identity. Focussing particularly on the Griqua the dissertation also examine how people appropriating an ethnic identity (i.e. an identity engendering a sense of peopleness) imputing them a Khoekhoe heritage, without themselves necessarily being of Khoekhoe descent, have related to the Khoekhoe past in articulating a group identity. The dissertation also examines how Griqua have located themselves socially and politically in articulating a group identity. Given the multiple ethnic heritages of Griqua and post-apartheid Khoe-San identity claimants, the exploration of their identity articulations necessarily take into account the way they related to their to their multiple ethnic heritages. The dissertation also necessarily explore the way in which Griqua and post-apartheid Khoe-San identity claimants related to non-Griqua and non-Khoe-San group categories that were crucial for defining or distinguishing Griquanness and post-apartheid Khoe-Sanness. Given the prominence of the GNC in the Griqua and Khoe-San socio-political landscape, both before and after 1994, a study of the GNC is essential for understanding Griqua and South African Khoe-San identity politics. To understand the socio-political conduct of the GNC, a study of its founder, Andrew Abraham Stockenström le Fleur I, is essential. To understand Le Fleur and his influence on the orientation of Griqua under the GNC, it is essential to understand his behaviour and ideas as they were shaped and transformed from the late 1800s onwards, particularly since his ascent in Griqua politics in East Griqualand in 1894. With the articulation of Griqua identities explored in the context of changing power relations between socio-cultural assemblages, the dissertation shows how different socio-political landscapes in South Africa fostered particular relations between cultures, discourses, ideologies affecting subjective orientations and identity articulations. The dissertation shows general identity shifts and cultural, discursive and ideological orientation and reorientation engendered by shifting political landscapes. The dissertation also shows contextual shifts in identity articulation engendered by changes within specific political orders.

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1 The GNC split in two organizations bearing the same name in 1969. The head office of the bigger faction (referred to as the Kranshoek based GNC in this study) remained at Kranshoek (in Plettenberg Bay) where Paramount Chief Andrew AS le Fleur II, the head of the faction, also resided until his death in 2004. A le Fleur was succeeded by his son Allan. The head office of the smaller faction (referred to as the Knysna based GNC) was moved to The Grags (near Plettenberg Bay). The head of this faction, Eric le Fleur, who assumed the title of volkspresident, resided in Knysna. After his death in 1989 E le Fleur was succeeded by his oldest son, Anthony.
Population terms

European (or White) domination and cultural chauvinism in South Africa generated and invested population categories with negative and disparaging connotations. Categories like ‘Bantu’, ‘Bushman’, ‘Hottentot’ and ‘Native’ became associated with inferiority and primitivism. As such these categories became offensive, inclining some people to use alternative terms. Thus, some preferred to use ‘African’ instead of ‘Bantu’ or ‘Native’, as suggested in the name shift of the South African Native National Congress (formed in 1912) to African National Congress in 1923. Sensitive scholars preferred to use ‘Khoikhoi’ instead of ‘Hottentot’ and ‘San’ instead of ‘Bushman’.

Though intentions of scholars were noble, the association of the ‘Bantu’ and ‘Native’ categories and the substitution of these two terms with ‘African’, invested the term ‘African’ with an exclusivity that was liable to ironically reinforce the ethno-‘racial’ order that some wished to subvert. Just like the association of the ‘Coloured’ category with people who were neither Bantu-speaking nor White during the 1900s could obscure the multiple deployments of the category in the 1800s, the substitution of ‘Bantu’, ‘Native’, and ‘African’ had a potential to obscure the multiple historical meanings and ambiguity of the ‘Native’ category (as shown in subsequent chapters).

Scholarly substitution of ‘Bantu’/‘Native’ with an unqualified African category (invested with exclusiveness) made Khoi-San categories and Khoi-San descendants as well as people from other ethno-cultural backgrounds not absorbed into Bantu-speaking communities liable to be excluded from the African category. The category of African is used in this study to embrace all people indigenous to Africa. Where there is a need, a distinction is made, for example, between Khoi-San and Bantu-speaking Africans.

The 1994 democratic transition contributed to a rethinking of what it meant to be African in South Africa. Some of those who were excluded from the general deployment of the term ‘African’ prior to 1994 became more open to use it self-referentially after the 1994 democratic change. There term ‘African’ was steadily detached from exclusive association with Bantu-speakers. The term also became somewhat detached from exclusive association with people considered to be indigenous to Africa. Being African was becoming steadily associated with geographic location. The steady tendency to use the African category inclusively was exemplified by Deputy President Thabo Mbeki’s “I am an African” speech on the occasion of the adoption of a new constitution for South Africa on 8 May 1996:

I am an African. I owe my being to the Khoi and the San … . I am formed of the migrants who left Europe to find a new home on our native land. … In my veins courses the blood of the Malay slaves who came from the East. … I am the grandchild of the warrior men and women that Hintsa and Sekhukhune led, the patriots that Cetshwayo and Mphapu took to battle, the soldiers Moshoeshoe and Ngungunyane taught never to dishonour the cause of freedom. … I come of those who were transported from India and China … . Being part of all these people, and in the knowledge that none dare contest that assertion, I shall claim that I am an African! We are assembled here today to mark their victory in acquiring and exercising their right to formulate their own definition of what it means to be African. The Constitution whose adoption we celebrate constitutes an unequivocal statement that we refuse to accept that our Africanness shall be defined by our race, colour, gender or historical origins.

The impetus to use the African category more broadly was also exemplified by the media projection of Mark Shuttleworth, a White South African, as the “first African in space” after journeying into space on a Russian rocket in April 2002. Though there was growth in the use of ‘African’ in an inclusive sense, during the first

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decade after the 1994 democratic transition the category was still used much in a restricted sense, as reflected in the population census of 1996 which distinguished between “African/Black”, “Coloured”, “Indian/Asian”, and “White”.4 The use of the term “Black African” in the 2001 census reflected a perception that there were ‘Africans’ who were not ‘Black’ and that it was problematic to restrict the category of ‘African’ to Bantu-speakers.5 The term ‘Black’ has been used in diverse ways throughout the history of South Africa. It was at times used in reference to all people not considered White. It was also used in a more restricted sense to refer to especially Bantu-speaking Africans. During the course of the twentieth century the term was used very much in a restricted sense by government officials and members of the public. The emergence of the ideology Black Consciousness in the late 1960s encouraged a more inclusive use of the term amongst subordinated communities.6 Although post-1994 (African National Congress) government officials often used ‘Black’ in reference to all people considered not White,7 the censuses of 1996 and 2001 also reflected an inclination amongst government official to use the term in a restricted sense.

Offensive categories like ‘Hottentot’ and ‘Bushman’ are used in inverted commas in this study. Alternative terms like Khoekhoe and San or Khoe-San are also used. The term ‘Khoe-San’ is a variation of ‘Khoisan’ or ‘Khoi-San’/’Khoisan’. Like ‘Khoisan’, it reflects the view amongst some academics and some people who identity themselves as Khoekhoe and San that although the Khoekhoe and the San have a shared ancestry and some cultural commonalities, there were differences in language, culture, livelihoods and identity between the two warranting separate terms to designate them, granting that there was some mobility between livelihoods, languages, cultures and identities. The term ‘Khoe-San’ (or KhoeSan/KhoiSan) also reflects the view or ideal amongst some who identify themselves as Khoekhoe and San that the San should not be subordinated to, or subsumed within the Khoekhoe politically and linguistically (as in Khoisan or Khoesan). Those San who reject the “the idea of the Khoisan people, terming it a political ploy by non-San-speaking people” particularly the Cape Khoekhoe, Nama and the Griqua, “to continue subjugating their unique culture”,8 would also be inclined to reject the term Khoe-San. Differential marginalization between Khoe-San, and the relative privileged socio-economic and educational position of many Khoekhoe in relation to San, and concern about San domination by Khoekhoe, together with attempts (by San activists and White led San developmental agencies) at maximizing international developmental funding for the San – projected as ultra-marginalized and exploited – encouraged the use of ‘Khoe and San’ instead of ‘Khoe-San’ (or Khoisan).

The term ‘Khoisan’ (or rather ‘Koisan’) was coined around 1928 by Leonard Schultze as a collective category for the early southern African hunter-gathering and herding peoples. ‘Khoekhoe’ in Nama, is regarded as a more accurate linguistic rendering than ‘Khoi khoi’. ‘San’ is used by many scholars to refer to the early inhabitants of southern Africa who spoke click languages and lived by hunting and gathering in contradistinction to Khoe-speaking herders. Hunter-gathering communities tended to be referred to as San by Khoekhoe herders. Hunter-gathering communities, which spoke other than a Khoe language, did not historically refer to themselves as San but used more narrow group names in reference to themselves. ‘San’ had a plurality of meaning (in Nama). It could historically be used to refer to people who lived by foraging, to people with a low socio-economic or lineage status or to robbers. People who lived by hunting and gathering tended to be referred to as ‘Bushmen’ by White colonists whilst herders tended to be referred to as ‘Hottentots’. Some people reject the term ‘San’ and prefer to be called ‘Bushmen’. Translated from Nama the singular ‘Khoe’ suggests ‘man’, ‘human’ or ‘person’. Combined Khoekhoe suggest ‘men of men’ or ‘people’.

6 The shifting meaning of ‘Black’ is, to some extent, reflected in subsequent chapters.
8 Mail & Guardian, 26 April, 2001.
Khoekhoe from the Cape peninsula used a dialectical variant of the Nama Khoekhoe in referring to themselves, as suggested, for example by Jan Riebeeck’s rendering of their self-designation as ‘Quena’ in the 1650s.9

**Literature review**

Although much has been written on the Griqua,10 very few studies deal directly with Griqua identity. Exceptions are, for example, the 198011 and 198312 government inquiries into the Griqua and Pearl L Waldman’s 2001 PhD thesis on Griqua “political and socio-cultural identity in the Northern Cape”.13 Although studies by Martin Legassick14 and Robert Ross15 do not deal directly with Griqua identity, they reveal well characteristic Griqua socio-cultural and political ambiguity as manifested in the 1800s – stemming much from their emergence in a colonial intercultural juncture. The government inquiries of 1980 and 1983 reveal much about Griqua identities during the 1970s and 1980s but not much about the preceding articulation of Griqua identities. Foucsing much on Griquatown, Waldman’s study16 shows the potential of in-depth localized studies in revealing regional specificities in the articulation of Griqua identities. Being anthropological, Waldman’s study does understandably not adequately reveal the ambivalent historical relation of the Griqua and Coloured categories as well as Griqua contribution to their official classification as Coloured prior to 1994. Although giving an account of post-apartheid Griqua factionalism and alliances within the Griqua socio-political landscape, as well as alliances between Griqua and old and neo-Khoe-San organizations, Waldman does not examine post-apartheid Griqua and Khoi-San politics of indigeneity.

Texts on post-apartheid Khoi-San by Henry Bredekamp,17 Nigel Crawhall18 and Richard Lee19 do shed some light on post-apartheid Khoi-San politics of indigeneity. They all link Khoi-San identity politics to the South

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11 Mentz Report.

12 PC 2/1983.

13 Waldman: “Griqua conundrum”.

14 Legassick: “The Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana, and the missionaries”.

15 Ross: *Adam Kok’s Griquas*.

16 Waldman: “Griqua conundrum”.


African democratic transition and the international First Nation indigenous rights movement. Whilst informative, these texts engage fairly superficially with the dynamics and politics of post-apartheid Khoe-San identities. They do not deal with intra-Khoe-San politics.

The time-span of this study allows for an appreciation of the historical complexity and shifts in the articulation of Griqua identities. The dissertation also presents the first full-scale and in-depth academic study of AAS le Fleur I. A much shorter account on Le Fleur was submitted in 1980 to the Interdepartmental Committee of Inquiry into the Identity of the Griquas (Menz inquiry).Christopher Saunders and Robert Edgar presented a short informative study on Le Fleur in 1983. Henry Bredekamp also availed a short account of Le Fleur in 2003. Some of the factual claims in these texts can be adapted by being set against this dissertation. These short accounts do not explore Le Fleur’s engagement with, and deployment of Griqua and Coloured identity categories. They also engage inadequately with claims about Le Fleur made by his contemporaries, particularly the rumours of his seditious activities. The study submitted to the Mentz committee in particular is somewhat marred by an uncritical usage of claims about Le Fleur made by his contemporaries. An understanding of the complexity of Le Fleur is much enhanced by an in-depth full-scale study.

Although the engagement with the post-apartheid Khoe-San resurgence in this dissertation offers an academic study that is more in-depth than previous ones dealing with the resurgence, much can still be explored about the resurgence, especially from a comparative perspective. The understanding of Le Fleur, Griqua identities, and the post-apartheid Khoe-San resurgence, might also be enhanced through a psychological investigation.

Operative concepts
The 1990-1993 process of transition to a democratic order not only allowed for the re-articulation of group identities but also created space for scholars to engage anew with ethnicity in South Africa. Whilst anti-apartheid scholars were somewhat inclined to project ethnic identities as colonial and apartheid impositions, not wishing to provide support for apartheid ethno-racial segmentation, after 1990 these scholars became more open to explore the agency of historically subordinate people in the development of their ethnic identities. Postcolonial theory also opened scholars to the agency of marginalized groups in the constitution of their identities, the (potential) fluidity and openness of identity, as well as the function of discourse in the constitution of identities. The conception of identity and the deployment of discourse in

24 Whilst subordinated people comprised those who were not White, academics (whether pro- or anti-apartheid) were predominantly White during apartheid.
25 This was especially the case in regard to Coloured identity.
27 For poststructuralist and postcolonial inspired engagements with identity in South Africa, see e.g. Stuart Douglas: “Reflections on state intervention and the Schmidtsdrift Bushmen”; Zimitri Erasmus and Edgar Pieters: “Conceptualising Coloured identities in the Western Cape Province of South Africa”, in Mai Palmberg (ed.): National identity and
Postcolonial theory reflect the influence of postmodernism and poststructuralism – stressing the plurality and instability of meaning (and subjecthood or identity) and the mediation of reality through discourse. Poststructuralism and postcolonialism also encourage the exploration of group identities and politics of the colonized/subordinated in terms of their location between “dominant discourses and resistance discourses”, as exemplified by Thiven Reddy:

The politics and collective identities of the subaltern involves negotiating between these two sets of discourses. The subjective position they assume depends on the balance of political forces in the ongoing struggles between the dominant and themselves. Their location between dominant and resistance discourses manifests itself in at times contradictory but always complex subjectivity.28

As shown in subsequent chapters, the Griqua and Khoe-San were influenced by a multiplicity of discourses, some of which might be described as ‘dominant’, ‘resistant’ or ‘oppositional’ making for divergent and often ambiguous socio-cultural and political positioning. In taking into consideration the impact of divergent discourses, as well as the agency of Griqua and post-apartheid Khoe-San identity claimants in the development of their identities, this study manifests scholarly shifts in the exploration of South African ethnic identities. The study assumes that identity creation is dialogical and potentially conflictual.

This study has been varyingly influenced, at a conceptual level, by postcolonial and poststructuralist derived ideas. Notions of co-existence/co-presence and fusion (of opposites, differences), entanglement, disentanglement (of ideas, values, cultures) and ambivalence (stemming from the articulation of differing cultures, discourses and ideologies) have influenced the writer’s thinking on Griqua and Khoe-San identity articulation within different socio-political orders. Whilst different discourses, ideologies and identities may contend for specific socio-political and cultural orders, different socio-political orders themselves foster particular relations between cultures, discourses, ideologies impacting in turn on the articulation of identities. Shifting political landscapes or power relations may, depending on social location of subjects foster cultural, discursive, ideological and identity reorientation, consolidation, disentanglement, entanglement or re-entanglement.

Poststructuralism and postcolonialism
Varyingly influenced by poststructuralism and postcolonialism, this study may thus be drawing on, appropriating and deploying enabling and disabling or limiting qualities of these intellectual currents. A brief reflection on these intellectual currents might thus be useful in locating this study intellectually.

Poststructuralism is intimately associated with deconstruction and postmodernism. There may be much similarity between postmodernism, poststructuralism and postcolonialism but also significant differences, as elaborated by Bill Aschroft: “The postmodern project of deconstructing the master discourses of European Enlightenment is much like the post-colonial task of dismantling the discursive effects of European imperialism”. Both can “be seen to be discursive elaborations of postmodernity. This is because Enlightenment humanism (the target of postmodernism) and European imperialism (the target of post-colonial transformation) are both strategic, and interconnected, features of modernity”. The two are however very different elaborations of postmodernity, because only one – the post-colonial – challenges the essential Eurocentrism of modernity itself. While one replaces the human individual with the discursive notion of a


subject, the other emphasizes the material context and worldliness of cultural texts. While one operates within Eurocentrism, the other undermines it. While one finds itself drawn into the unproductive possibilities of the play of the sign, the other emphasizes the political function of signification. While one emphasizes the existence of reality effects, the other emphasizes the urgent material consequences of those effects.\(^\text{29}\)

Postcolonialism or postcolonial thinking (or at least some post-colonial strands) engages with the ways in which colonized peoples appropriated and transformed colonial cultural power to empower themselves; it points to the composite cultures produced and transformed by colonized peoples within the context of colonialism. Postcolonialism can itself be viewed as an interfused theoretical complex drawing on various intellectual traditions and transforming appropriated ideas for the development transformative critiques (i.e. critiques aimed at fostering change) of colonialism or neo-colonialism.\(^\text{30}\)

The ideas and thinking on which postcolonialism draws, may, like the theoretical complex itself, be products of inter-cultural, inter-epistemic and inter-discursive articulation brought about through colonialism. In the words of Robert Young:

> Such a theory has tended to layer and combine a heterogeneous array of western and non-western thought, to draw on theoretical positions that are already irredeemably a mixture of the two ... The kinds of theory from which postcolonial critique has developed are ... derived from earlier founding moments of anti-colonial thought, which was itself a hybrid construction. The theory and practice of postcolonialism has ... a long history of varied genealogies ... . As a result, postcolonial theory produces a curiously fragmented and hybrid theoretical language that mirrors and repeats the changing forms of a central object of its analytic experience: conflictual cultural interaction.\(^\text{31}\)

Postcolonialism, it seems, “layer and combine a heterogeneous array of western and non-western thought” disproportionately. It appears that postcolonialism combine very much Western derived thinking and language, particularly poststructuralism, with the emancipative aspirations of those subjected to Western forms of control and domination, in much the same way as currents like liberalism and Marxism have been appropriated and re-deployed or adapted for the emancipative goals of the colonized, with the substance of the thinking remaining very much Western derived. Some scholars take it for granted that postcolonialism draws heavily on Western/European derived intellectual trends like Marxism, psychoanalysis and poststructuralism and that it is as such in the main a Western inspired way of thinking (in part a re-radicalization of postmodernism) deployed in Western academies for Western orientated academics; that its deployment manifest intellectual dependency on the West; that postcolonialism is thus a re-manifestation of Western intellectual and cultural ‘imperialism’ even if used for subverting other manifestations of Western (intellectual, cultural, political or economic) ‘imperialism’.\(^\text{32}\) Some scholars view post-colonialism not merely as a re-manifestation of Western intellectual domination but also as being favourable for Western or capitalist economic domination. In the words of E San Juan:

> Hybridity, heterogenous and discrepant lifestyles, local knowledges, cyborgs, borderland scripts – such slogans tend to obfuscate the power of transnational ideology and practice of consumerism and its dehumanizing effects. Postcolonial discourse generated in “First World” academies turns out to be one more product of flexible, post-Fordist capitalism, not its antithesis”.\(^\text{33}\)


\(^\text{32}\) See e.g. Michael Dutton, Sanjay Seth and Leela Gandhi: “Postcolonial discernment or was that deceit”, Postcolonial Studies, 2, 1 (1999).

Situating postcolonialism “within the framework of the structural crisis of international capitalism”, and lamenting the “reduction of political economy” and the “facts of exploitation across the categories of race, gender and class, to the status of discourse and intertextuality”, San Juan reasons that by “ignoring or discounting the actual efforts of “Third World” communities to survive the havoc of global imperialism, postcolonial critics and their subtle stratagems only serve the interests of the global status quo, in particular the asymmetry between North and South”. He also reason that the “textualism” of postcolonialism “void the history of people’s resistance to imperialism” and “liquidate popular memory”.34

Scholars may however stand in varying relations to postmodernism and poststructuralism, appropriating and deploying such thought to varying degrees and thus potentially vary in their Western dependency and (over-)determination. In as much as the operation of currents like liberalism, Marxism, postmodernism, poststructuralism and postcolonialism in a South African or broader African context may be manifestations of the reconfiguration of Western cultural and intellectual and ‘imperialism’, they might nevertheless also be usefully appropriated and redeployed.

**Discourse**

Given the operation of the notion of discourse in this study, the delimitation of its use many be useful. In deploying the term discourse through the dissertation, for example, in reference to segregation, apartheid or First Nation rights, the writer has in mind practice implicated and value imbued ways of thinking locating entities in particular ways and positing particular relations for them. Thus conceived discourses are implicated in the production, reproduction or transformation of identities and social relations.

As inspired by a Foucauldian kind of thinking, discourses may be conceived as practice-implicated ensembles of interconnected concepts and statements (regulated through codes and assumptions) shaping the way subjects or objects are conceived. Assumptions and codes conditioning the formation concepts and statements may be varyingly discernable. That is, some may be fairly easily discernable and others not. With culture conceived as symbolic ensembles (or ensembles of meaning), discourses can be seen as products (or permutations) of culture. As ensembles of symbolic expressions (concepts and statements), discourses could be modes of knowledge manifested in representation or communication (e.g. talking or writing), constituted in the context of specific conditions or specific practices (e.g. imperialism, colonialism, anti-colonialism, legal practice, medical practice). Constituted in the context of specific conditions or specific practices, discourses are subject to power relations, power struggles and ideology.35 Power struggles can occur both in and between discourses. The appropriation and articulation of discursive elements may be influenced by the social location of subjects.36

**Discourse and ideology**

A discourse may be similar to an ideology in comprising of interconnected statements or beliefs that serves the interest of a particular group or class. A discourse is however not necessarily reducible to particular class interests; it does not necessarily have inherent political or ‘ideological’ values. The same discourse may be used by groups with different, even contradictory interests.37 For example, although the practice of segregation ultimately served to sustain White domination, segregation thinking (also manifested in this study in Griqua thinking, particularly in AAS le Fleur I’s promotion of Griqua-Coloured resettlement schemes) was also offered by some of its proponents as a means of benefiting ethno-‘racial’ underclasses socially, economically and culturally. Segregation discourse was, as such, deployed for divergent political or

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34 San Juan: *Beyond postcolonial theory*, pp. 3, 7, 22.
36 Fairclough: *Discourse and social change*, pp. 28-9, 56.
ideological ends. Ideologies can thus operate as threads within a wider discourse. “[D]ifferent types of discourse in different social domains or institutional settings may come to be politically or ideologically ‘invested’ in particular ways. This implies that types of discourse may also come to be invested in different ways – they may come to be ‘reinvested’”. Ideologies may be (continually) built into various dimensions of discursive practices and so contribute to the production, reproduction or transformation of relations of domination.

**Discursive demarcation**

A discourse may, as like culture, be divisible into segments or levels and thus into discursive strands or sub-discourses according to different orientations within a discourse. The demarcation of a discourse or of discursive levels and strands may ultimately depend upon the objectives and analytical tools used. As Norman Fairclough puts it, “there is not, and could not be, a determinate list of genres, styles or discourses … . We are constantly faced with what often appear to be rather arbitrary decisions (influenced by the point of departure of one’s analysis) about whether something is or is not a separate instance of one of these types”.

A discourse may be merged into another in a complex way. One discourse could also be contained within the matrix of another. Different discourses (or elements from them), could, as suggested in the study of AAS le Fleur, be variously combined or used alternatively by subjects. Different discourses could be combined under particular social conditions to produce a new, complex discourse. Inspired by historical Griqua aspirations for landownership and independence, Le Fleur, for example, combined, amongst others, elements from Christianity, ‘racial’, nationalist and self-help discourses/ideologies in his attempt to forge Griqua-Coloured nationhood. His Christianity was shaped in contestation with contemporary missionaries and the practice and teachings in mainstream churches. He challenged bio-racist elements from the ‘racial’ discourse that he selectively appropriated and combined with his Christianity. His Christianity was infused with a pragmatism that drew much on the discourse of self-help and self-reliance. Whilst Le Fleur accepted that there were ‘races’ or ‘race-’nations and attached positive value to cultivation of racialized consciousness and pride, drawing on his theology he was moved to reject the belief that Griqua or Coloureds were inferior to Whites. Le Fleur instead advocated Griqua-Coloured self-reliance and pride. His theology located the Griqua as significant entity within a Biblically inspired worldview. Thus, Le Fleur attempted to cultivate positive Griqua-Coloured self-representations that were inspired by old Griqua ideals and selectively appropriated elements from dominant and dominating discursive strands to enhance the psychological and social-economic conditions of Griqua and Coloureds. Le Fleur was involved in the development of a discourse drawing on elements from different discourses and traditions. Through his appropriation and adaptation of elements from colonial culture and from different discourses, Le Fleur contributed to the development of a Griqua culture with varying elements from Khoekhoe and Western culture. Le Fleur thus manifested multi-discursive appropriation, conditioning as well as a measure of distancing from discourses that he appropriated in forging and promoting his vision of Griqua-Coloured nationhood. He was both affected by operative discourses but at the same time also contested certain discursive values.

**Discourse, agency and change**

The determination or influence of discourses is something that subjects may not usually be aware of. Subjects might be inclined to perceive themselves as the source of their thinking and conduct which may be very much effects of discourse. As suggested above, subjects may however varyingly contest and distance themselves from, and influence operative discourses and related practices.

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38 Fairclough: *Discourse and social change*, p. 67.
39 Fairclough: *Discourse and social change*, pp. 87-8.
40 Fairclough: *Discourse and social change*, p. 125.
41 Fairclough: *Discourse and social change*, pp. 4, 118.
42 Fairclough: *Discourse and social change*, p. 32.
Subjects are ideologically positioned, but they are also capable of acting creatively to make their own connections between the diverse practices and ideologies to which they are exposed, and to restructure positioning practices and structures. The balance between the subject as ideological ‘effect’, and the subject as active agent, is a variable which depends upon social conditions such as the relative stability of relations of domination. The capacity for discursive distancing and transformation is reflected in, and shaped by the existence of multiple and contending discourses and ideologies. Individuals may be subject to various (conflicting, overlapping or intersecting) discourses and ideologies giving them a composite character, as exemplified by Le Fleur. Shaping by divergent and contending discourses can generate confusion, uncertainty and ambivalence. The shaping of individuals by multiple discourses and ideologies also engender views and outlooks that are both a repository of the diverse effects of past discursive and ideological struggles, and a constant target for restructuring in ongoing struggles. The dissertation shows, for example, the effects of pro-establishment and anti-establishment discourses on Griqua identity articulation, political positioning and the expression of longstanding Griqua ideals. It shows how longstanding Griqua aspiration for land, valorising past semi-independent Griqua polities associated with Griqua land ownership, was renegotiated in the context of segregation, apartheid and post-apartheid socio-political orders.

The dissertation assumes that a dialectical potential inheres between subjectivity, discourse and the social order (structure). “Subjects are in part positioned and constituted in discourse, but they also engage in practice which contests and restructures the discursive structures (orders of discourse) which position them”. Itself shaped by the social world, discourse is also implicated in the constitution of society (social objects, social subjects, social relations).

On the one hand, discourse is shaped and constrained by social structure in the widest sense and at all levels: by class and other social relations at a societal level, by the relations specific to particular institutions such as law or education, by systems of classification, by various norms and conventions of both a discursive and non-discursive nature, and so forth. On the other hand discourse is socially constitutive. “Discourse contributes to the constitution of all those dimensions of social structure which directly or indirectly shape and constrain it; its own norms and conventions, as well as the relations, identities and institution which lie behind them.” Discourse contributes both to the reproduction of society (social identities, social relationships, systems of knowledge and belief) and to the transformation of society. Embedded in material practices, and implicated in social reproduction and contestation, discourses would be constantly subjected to transformative influences. Discourses may be “unstable equilibria, consisting of elements which are internally heterogeneous … the boundaries between which are constantly open to being redrawn as orders of discourse are articulated and disarticulated and rearticulated in the course of hegemonic struggle”. The outcomes of struggles may be re-articulations of the orders of discourse or relations between discourses. The relation between elements within a discourse could be rearticulated. Relations between sub-discourses within a broader discourse could also be rearticulated. The boundaries between elements may shift between relatively strong or relatively weak. Change may take place at different levels of discourse. Relations between

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43 Fairclough: *Discourse and social change*, p. 91.
44 Fairclough: *Discourse and social change*, pp. 90, 92-3.
45 Fairclough: *Discourse and social change*, p. 123.
46 Fairclough: *Discourse and social change*, pp. 64, 66.
47 Fairclough: *Discourse and social change*, p. 65.
48 Fairclough: *Discourse and social change*, pp. 28-9, 35-6, 55.
49 Fairclough: *Discourse and social change*, pp. 40-1, 54.
50 Fairclough: *Discourse and social change*, p. 70.
discursive terms may be reorganized. At a more fundamental level the rules of statement formation and
classification schemes may also be transformed.\textsuperscript{51}

Chapter outline

The dissertation reflects the complexity of Khoe-San subjectivities (and socio-political behaviour) generated
and reshaped in intercultural environments and subjected to multiple and contending discourses, manifested
acutely in AAS le Fleur. Whilst the major part of the dissertation deals with the period between 1894 and
2004, the background chapter considers the preceding period. 1894 marks the ascent of Le Fleur in Griqua
politics. Ending in 2004 the study covers the first 10 post-apartheid years of democracy. As such the
dissertation also covers the 1995–2004 United Nation’s International Decade of the World’s Indigenous
People. Both processes had a significant influence on Khoe-San revivalism.

The central argument in the dissertation is that the articulation of Griqua identities and Griqua socio-political
positioning was significantly shaped by the African-European inter-cultural socio-political juncture in which
Griqua were constituted and ongoing and changing cultural, political, discursive and ideological power
relations. Emerging at an African and European colonial cultural juncture, the multi-cultural and multi-
discursive constitution of the Griqua (and their identities) generated composite Griqua subjectivities, opening
them to a multiplicity of socio-political directions giving rise to ambivalence that has characterized Griqua
politics. White domination and discrimination against those officially categorized as ‘Native’, inclined Griqua
to distance themselves from the ‘Native’ category, notably from the late 1880s. Discrimination against
‘Natives’ inclined Griqua to emphasize having mixed ‘racial’ descent and being related culturally and
biologically to Whites, and, notably from the 1890s, to locate themselves as Coloureds conceived as a ‘mixed-
race’. Griqua remained, however, varying ambivalent to the Coloured category. This ambivalence resulted
much from the fact that the Coloured category allowed them socio-political and economic privileges
conferred on Coloureds but lacked the ethno-national quality of the Griqua category. With Griqua firmly
located officially as Coloured, and with benefits envisaged from affirming a separate Griqua identity within
the context of apartheid, Griqua nationalists (or separatists) campaigned for the separation of the Griqua
category from the Coloured category, notably from the 1970s. With the ending of apartheid, and the attendant
reconfiguration of political, cultural and ideological relations, the Coloured category lost much of the
psychological, socio-economic, ideological and political value it previously conferred, further inclining
Griqua and some Coloureds to reject a Coloured identity; to (re)affirm an indigenous heritage; and to promote
Khoe-San identities engendering and conferring the geographic rootedness, sense of belonging, sense of
entitlement and ownership, group security, self-esteem, and ethno-cultural specificity, legitimacy and unity
they desired.

Through the deployment of the notions of discourse and multi-discursivity, the study shows the composite
nature of the subjectivities of ethno-‘racial’ underclasses subjected to contending and conflicting discourses
manifested very much in Le Fleur. Le Fleur was imbued, at the same time, with pro- and anti-establishment
values and thinking and manifested both anti-establishment and pro-establishment behaviour. The same
tendencies were also manifested, in less dramatic form, in Griqua during the apartheid period, with White
domination tending to tip the scale of contending discourses in favour of White supremacy values, thinking
(at least in so far as Griqua leaders were concerned). The ending of apartheid destabilized the relation
between opposing values, thinking and behaviour. The study of Le Fleur shows how he personified South
African socio-political history, manifesting through his life divergent influences shaping South Africans and
different tendencies associated with different socio-political constituencies. Le Fleur is thus very useful for
understanding the subjectivities of Griqua and Coloureds as well as other population segments that were
marginalized before 1994.

This is also a study of conservatism amongst subordinated communities, exemplified through the Griqua under apartheid, with Griqua leaders consistently operating within constitutional parameters and repeatedly projecting themselves as loyal subjects. The location of the Griqua at the edge of Colouredness made many vulnerable to be classified as ‘Native’. Discrimination against ‘Natives’, Griqua liability to be classed as ‘Native’, their precarious social location, together with their varying appropriation of White supremacy values, inclined Griqua leaders to de-emphasize Griqua associations with ‘Natives’ and Bantu-speakers; to emphasise their loyalty to the government, and to even express support to government policies. Many Griqua leaders expressed support of aspects of apartheid. However, Griqua leaders were also varyingly subjected to contending apartheid and anti-apartheid discourses resulting in divergent positioning to apartheid.

The exploration of the post-apartheid Khoe-San revivalism is suggestive of broader subjective reorientations amongst South Africans after the 1994 democratic transition. Most of the neo-Khoe-San were from Coloured communities. Very few Coloureds actually joined neo-Khoe-San organizations in the first post-apartheid decade. The number of neo-Khoe-San involved in neo-Khoe-San organizations could obscure the significance of the revivalism. The revivalism reflected subjective shifts extending beyond those who joined Khoe-San organizations or who identified themselves as Khoe-San. It suggested a wider but differential reorientation amongst Coloureds in regard to Khoe-Sannes and Africanness. It also suggested a wide but differential reorientation amongst South Africans to Africanness.

Whilst the dissertation is presented as a study of Khoe-San and Griqua identities, it might be more appropriately conceived as a study of Griqua and Khoe-San identities mediated very much through their representatives or leaders, who were usually male. Much of the sources used result from the interaction of Griqua leaders and government officials, as well as interaction between Griqua leaders themselves. The study of the post-apartheid Khoe-San identities is also very much mediated through activities and representations of Khoe-San leaders.

The dissertation comprise three interconnected parts. Part 1 (chapters 2-6) focus on AAS le Fleur I. Part 2 (chapters 7-10) deals with the Griqua under apartheid. Part 3 (chapters 11-13) deals with the post-apartheid Khoe-San revivalism.

Chapter 2 deals with Griqua pre-history, the emergence of the Griqua and their migration to East Griqualand (Nomansland). The account of early Khoe-San identities and the emergence of the Griqua allows for some appreciation of early shifts in the articulation of Khoe-San identities. It is argued that Griqua identity was initially in the main polity based, the identity at first coalescing around Griqua captaincies and membership of semi-independent Griqua polities, that is, being a Griqua burgher. The polity basis of Griquanness facilitated the varying incorporation of outsiders such as Bastaards, Korana, San, and other Khoe-San descendants, as well as Bantu-speaking Africans and former slaves and their descendants, allowing thus, at varying stages, for dissected or multiple and identities. Though initially primarily a polity related identity, a quasi-ethnic or genealogical dimension was however suggested from the onset of the re-adoption of the Griqua name in 1813.

Chapter 3 deals with Griqua identity articulation and politics in East Griqualand in the context of the 1890s land claim agitations, focusing especially on AAS le Fleur. In providing a background to ethno-‘racial’ differentiation and the ambiguity and tenuousness of trans-ethnic alliances amongst the underclasses the chapter also shows how the terms ‘Native’ and ‘Aboriginal’ were by the 1880s being redefined and increasingly associated with notions of purity, by Whites as well as by Griqua who thereby attempted to show that they could not by virtue of the purported infusion of ‘European blood’ be categorized as ‘Native’, in a

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52 Membership of Khoe-San organizations linked to the National Khoisan Council involved in negotiations with the DCD (Department of Constitutional Development, renamed the Department of Provincial and Local Government) on constitutional accommodation in 1999, is indicated in the DCD’s ‘Status Quo Report’ of 2000. The availability of the report to the general public was delayed.
context in which those categorized as ‘Native’ were being increasingly subjected to restrictive measures. The chapter shows how socio-political ambivalence and contradictions amongst subordinated communities in East Griqualand in general, and amongst the Griqua in particular, were dramatized in Le Fleur. Seen in the 1890s by many amongst subordinated communities in East Griqualand as the heir of Chief Adam Kok III and as a leader through whom lost land and independence would be restored, Le Fleur, like a number of his Griqua contemporaries, displayed both aspirations for differentiation and unity of Griqua and Bantu-speakers and manifested both compliance and rebellious tendencies towards colonial authorities.

Chapter 4 examines Le Fleur’s activities in the years following his release from Breakwater prison in 1903. The chapter shows how Le Fleur, who was imbued with Griqua ideals for landownership and independence that articulated from the early 1900s with nationalist, self-reliance and segregation discourses, had to negotiate between identity categories that he could use in the promotion of his self-improvement and ethno-building schemes. The chapter also shows how Le Fleur’s identity options were influenced by ethno-‘racial’ discourses and his locational shifts between Griqua and Coloured environments.

Chapter 5 shows the significance of Le Fleur’s farming resettlements in his attempt between 1920 and 1941 to unify and reform Coloureds as Griqua into ordered law abiding, self-reliant and proud ethno-national Christian subjects. His resettlements schemes manifested the reworking of the Griqua ideal of independence of landownership in the context of White domination and segregation. Striving to promote ordered and loyal Griqua subjects, Le Fleur attempted to channel the aspirations of his adherents along constitutional lines, thus suppressing rebelliousness that readily emerged amongst the underclasses during the 1920s.

Chapter 6 explores Le Fleur’s peculiar Griqua-Coloured ethno-nationalism and its promotion in and through Griqua National Conference and the Griqua Independent Church of South Africa. It also explores Le Fleur’s ambivalent association of the Griqua and Coloured categories in his ethno-national project. The chapter shows that it was especially through the belief that Le Fleur’s had supernatural abilities and that he was a mediator between God and human beings, that he was able to impress people with his visions of an alternative existence and to retain his followers, despite setbacks. The chapter also shows that whilst Le Fleur resolved to turn Coloureds into Griqua, he also reinforced the association the Coloured and Griqua category thus contributing to the distancing of Griquaness from ‘Nativeness’ during a period when Griqua were liable to be categorized as ‘Native’, and to be subjected to attendant restrictions.

Chapter 7 deals with the general orientation of Griqua, particularly their leaders, during the apartheid period. Griqua ethno-national aspirations articulated by Griqua leaders; their demonstrated loyalty to the government, and their identification with aspects of apartheid, made the government sensitive to their identity concerns, thus reinforcing their loyalty. With the Griqua category firmly linked officially with the Coloured category, some Griqua leaders became more open to attempt to have the category applied officially as a distinct category separate from the Coloured one, without the measure of fear of the pre-1950 period of being consequently slotted into the ‘Native’ category. Although Griqua identity and Griqua socio-political positioning by Griqua leaders often fell in line with apartheid discourse, Griqua nationalist leaders being inclined to affirm support to apartheid ethno-national and ‘racial’ segmentation, interaction and inter-marriages with Coloureds and people of Bantu-speaking origin led to inter-ethnic movement and attendant multiple identities and shifts between identities that undermined apartheid ethno-‘racial’ segmentation.

Chapter 8 focuses on the involvement of Griqua leaders in Coloured political parties from 1965. It is argued that intra-Griqua divergences and rivalry manifested themselves in organizational alliances, with rivals attempting to bolster their positions by associating with contending political parties. The participation of Griqua leaders in Coloured political parties in turn subjected them to contending apartheid and anti-apartheid discourses that varyingly influenced their social, economic and political expressions (in public) – which were consistently within constitutional parameters.
Chapter 9 focuses on official inquiries into the Griqua during the early 1980s. The chapter shows how the articulation of Griqua identities and Griqua representations of their past during the early 1980s were manifested and at the same time influenced by government inquiries into the Griqua established during a period of constitutional change. Prospects of social and economic upliftment and acquisition of land contributed to the reaffirmation of the specificity of the Griqua as a distinct ethnic group with its own culture, religion and historical land.

Chapter 10 examines the behaviour of Griqua leaders in light of the 1984 Coloured House of Representative elections and their post-election political orientation. The chapter shows how shared concern across Griqua factions about domination in the Coloured tri-cameral representative body prepared the ground for a brief Griqua political unity forged in light of the 1984 House of Representative elections. Failure at securing the desired representation in the tri-cameral parliament reinforced disillusionment with the new constitutional order and encouraged the re-manifestation of factional differences which have characterized the Griqua socio-political landscape.

Dealing with the post-apartheid Griqua resurgence, chapter 11 shows how concerns about the present and future generated by the 1994 democratic transition encouraged a rethinking of the past; a shift in the relation of elements historically associated with Griquaness (or a shift in the emphasis of these elements), and the development of identity representations that were potentially empowering in the new order. The changed constitutional and political environment opened the Griqua to develop an indigenous identity drawing on previously marginal indigenous elements or associations of the Griqua category which were further reinforced by an international indigenous or First Nation indigenous rights discourse that was deployed to exert pressure on the government to deal with their demands.

Dealing with the post-apartheid neo-Khoe-San chapter 12 shows both the impact of the changed constitutional order and the response of Griqua and other Khoe-San from longstanding communities to the neo-Khoe-San resurgence. It is argued that whilst neo-Khoe-San disassociated themselves from a Coloured category, neo-Khoe-San identities manifested attempts at finding identity terms that were useful for the promotion of Coloured socio-economic, political and psychological concerns and that these concerns delimited the articulation of neo-Khoe-San identities, tying them to Colouredness at the same time as the affirmation of Khoe-San identities challenged a Coloured identity.

Chapter 13 explores a series of conferences and public events on the Khoe-San from 1996 to 2002 revealing an unfolding Khoe-San revivalism. These arenas manifested aspirations for Khoe-San cooperation and unity as well as tensions and rivalry between Khoe-San groupings and leaders. In providing for Khoe-San identity performances, public forums became crucial in activating interest in Khoe-San particularly through the mediation of the media, and thus contributed to Khoe-San revivalism. These forums varyingly manifested the articulation of narrow ethnic and broader trans-ethnic and nation-building dynamics, with Khoe-Sannness at times expressed in a manner that challenged (broader government initiated) nation-building, and at other times in a manner that accorded with nation-building, reflecting thus a shifting differential ambivalent location of Khoe-San identity claimants in the post-apartheid democratic order.
PART ONE

ANDREW ABRAHAM STOCKENSTRÖM LE FLEUR I
Chapter 2: Early Khoe-San and the emergence of the Griqua

The spot where the Cape stands and all about it has been the land of our forefathers; there they have pastured their cattle and sheep in peace and freedom, and had it not been for the Christian [i.e. European] men we would be to this day in that country. ... It is the fault of the Christians that we are not at this day in our own land. We can no longer go to the land of our forefathers with our cattle and sheep; the people have seized all our grass and springs; where then shall we go? We cannot reside between heaven and earth. If we could go to the moon we would fly there, in order to be free of the Christian men and see [sic] there for land: but that is too far.

(Letter “by an Oppressed Griqua”, Philippolis, 14 August 18301)

Dealing with early Khoe-San group identities, this chapter shows the basis of their fluidity and the transformations that occurred as a result of interaction between peoples with different economic strategies, leading up to the African-European colonial intercultural juncture in which the Griqua emerged and the eventual migration of Adam Kok III and his followers to Nomansland (East Griqualand). The shift to East Griqualand provides a background for the examination of Andrew Abraham Stockenström le Fleur I (from chapter 3), the most prominent Griqua leader of the twentieth century. Le Fleur augmented the Griqua population and provided an important organizational basis that contributed to the post-apartheid Khoe-San resurgence. The section on the emergence of the Griqua and the migration to Nomansland focus much on Griqua interaction with Khoe-San, Bantu-speaking Africans and Whites. It also explores the effect of Griqua appropriation of colonial culture and values on their interaction with those who were not Griqua. The appropriation of colonial culture and values and their ascendance within Griqua polities had a decisive impact of Griqua interaction with non-Griqua, influencing attempts at overlordship over Khoe-San and Bantu-speaking Africans and contributed to Griqua awe of colonial authorities and to the conservatism that characterized Griqua communities after Griqua polities lost their semi-independence in the late 1800s. It is argued in this chapter that Griqua identity was initially in the main polity based, the identity at first coalescing around Griqua captaincies and membership of semi-independent Griqua polities, that is, being a Griqua burgher. The polity basis of Griquaness facilitated the varying incorporation of outsiders such as Bastaards, Khoe-Sans, as well as Bantu-speaking Africans, former slaves and their descendants, allowing thus, at varying stages, for dissected or multiple identities. Though initially primarily a polity related identity, a quasi-ethnic or genealogical dimension was however suggested from the onset of the re-adoption of the Griqua name in 1813.

Griqua pre-history reflects the multiplicity and fluidity of identities of pre-colonial and early colonial hunter-gathering and herding groups of southern Africa. Broader and relatively more stable group identities were fostered through the encounter with ‘outsiders’, colonial dislocation, categorizations and colonial administrative and literary technologies. ‘San’ hunter-gatherers with ‘click’ languages are viewed as the earliest human inhabitants of southern Africa. The San’s hunter-gathering survival strategies influenced the size of groups, their mobility, social fluidity, group relations, ownership and socio-political organization. Early San hunter-gathering groups were organized in loose kin-based ‘bands’, usually consisting of an extended family of a few married brothers and sisters and their parents. Although San groups retained their identity in relation to neighbouring groups, individuals could move between groups. Among the /Xam, individuals could apparently decide to live with any band in which there was a known relative. Such fluidity may have varied from band to band, from region to region and between periods. Several bands may have amalgamated during periods when food resources, particularly water, were favourable and then split up again when resources declined; segments may have been forced to hunt and gather separately when food

was scarce, to stick together in separate bands to protect and manage their water resources in times of scarcity, and to come together when food was plentiful.²

Wide geographic dispersal promoted San cultural and linguistic differentiation. Because of the wide distribution, isolation and diversification of groups, San hunter-gatherers did not have an overarching group identity. The introduction of herding to some Khoe-speaking San in vicinity of northern Botswana, generated profound socio-cultural changes. The transformation of these ‘San’ who called themselves, with some linguistic variation, Khoekhoe, into herders and their subsequent spread across southern Africa about 2000 years ago is strongly suggested by linguistic, cosmological and theological similarities, and commonalities in kinship classification and pottery between San hunter-gatherers of northern Botswana and Namibia and Khoekhoe herders from Etosha in Namibia to the eastern Cape. The Khoe language was spoken across a wide geographic area with only minor variation. The degree of Khoekhoe linguistic homogeneity suggests their relative late dispersal. Khoekhoe-speaking herders were much more aware of their cultural and historic commonalities than San hunter-gatherer groups were.³ Khoekhoe pastoral economy encouraged the splitting of (larger) groups. Splitting generated a complex network of genealogically linked groups with shifting boundaries, loyalties and perceptions of ‘groupness’.

Khoe-San societies, like other societies, consisted of spiralling or overlapping units or groupings. The smallest social unit was the family. Logically, the next biggest unit would be the extended family or the clan, followed by a network of related clans, commonly called the ‘tribe’ by anthropologists. The tribe could be ethnic-like or part of an ethnic-like network of related tribes. Early Khoekhoe and San were not as totalities ethnic groups, to the extent that an ethnic group is conceptualized as a network of individuals regarding themselves as a ‘people’ on the basis of purported common attributes, for example, a common geography, ancestry, culture or/and history. Conflating ethnos with culture and actual (objective) similarities, Richard Elphick erroneously suggested that the Khoekhoe, as a whole, were an ethnic group. He preferred to avoid referring to hunter-gatherers by the “ethnic name” suggested by “San”, reasoning that they could not be regarded as an ethnic group because of their cultural and economic differences:

It is appropriate to use the ethnic name “Khoikhoi” because Khoikhoi were a relatively homogenous group of peoples with common origins, common language (divided into dialects), common culture, and common economic aspirations. This, however, was not the case with the “San” who were extremely heterogeneous linguistically, culturally, and economically. Partly for this reason, I have avoided giving them a generic, ethnic name and have dispensed entirely with “San” and “Bushmen” except when referred to the usage of others.⁴

My use of the term Khoekhoe and San is not meant to suggest that these communities constituted two different ethnic groups or nations. Colonialism did, however, encourage broad categories of ‘Hottentot’ and ‘Bushman’ encouraging broader ethnic-like identification amongst the Khoekhoe and San. The twentieth century academic combination of ‘Khoikhoi’ and ‘San’ in ‘Khoisan’ also contributed to the development of an overarching Khoe-San identity, notably after 1994.

⁴ Elphick: Khoikhoi, p. xxi.
Elphick showed that the Cape Khoekhoe regarded themselves as genealogically unrelated to the Namaqua Khoekhoe. They never linked the Namaqua “genealogically with the Cape tribes, and they dwelt on the fact that Namaqua had strange weapons, clothing, crafts, and speech ... some Cape Khoikhoi even denied that Namaqua were Khoikhoi at all”.

Thus, the historical Khoekhoe comprised for Elphick one ethnic group on the basis of their objective or external commonalities, even if Kho-speakers did not regard themselves as a totality or a people. Elphick also showed that the Khoekhoe category was not used by Kho-speakers as a generic category for all Kho-speakers. It may, however, have been used to refer to all Kho-speakers who could be linked genealogically, culturally and linguistically. It appears that there was some sense of relatedness and peopleness amongst western Cape and eastern Cape Khoekhoe that would make these groups, as a whole, ethnic-like. There was a tendency amongst western and eastern Cape Khoekhoe to regard certain groups as having overarching authority, at least symbolic, based on genealogical seniority.

However, the Khoekhoe, like the San, were not as a whole an ethnic group or a nation because Khoekhoe groups did not regard all actual Khoekhoe (speaking) groups as comprising a totality or people at the onset of European settlement at the Cape.

Although there was subjective differentiation between the Namaqua and western Cape Khoekhoe, both emerged from the same genealogical, linguistic or cultural ensemble. The relation between the Namaqua and western Cape Khoekhoe exemplified the inherent potential in Khoekhoe pastoral society for segments of larger groups to separate and the differentiation that could ensue. “Virtually all tribes were ex-clans which had established their independence from their parent tribe”.

Some groups or tribes were also political entities having a measure of political autonomy. There was also a potential for sub-groups in such political totalities to split and to become politically autonomous. This may have been the case with the two Cochoqua groups of the mid-1600s. Gonnema, leader of one Cochoqua group recognized the genealogical seniority of Oedasoa, leader of the other Cochoqua group, but the two groups were virtually politically autonomous. The two groups may have been tribal segments of one group that was in the process of differentiation. The two groups were not clearly differentiated tribes although differentiation may have been taking place between them.

The Khoekhoe were not as broad related groups or ethnic totalities, politically organized. Political organization tended to be based on segments of an ethnic group, that is, tribes or clans. The tribe was often the largest political formation amongst the Khoekhoe. The boundaries of political allegiance at times crossed ethnic (or ethnic-like) boundaries, thus uniting people from different ethnic groups in a political alliance that brought them into conflict with those to whom they were ethnically linked. The #Kxhari-Griqua (or Little Griqua) were apparently genealogically and linguistically closely related to the western Cape Khoekhoe and were at some stage subordinates and herders of the Cochoqua under Oedesoa. Yet the #Kxhari-Griqua appears to have allied themselves for a while with the Namaqua for protection against Cochoqua after they refused to return stock belonging to them (Cochoqua).

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5 Elphick: Khoikhoi, pp. 20-1.
6 Elphick: Khoikhoi, p. 20.
8 Elphick: Khoikhoi, p. 49.
9 Le Roux: “Hottentotstamme”, p. 49.
10 Elphick: Khoikhoi, p. 13.
Interaction: hunter-gatherers, herders and agro-pastoralists

It seems as if the arrival of Khoe-speaking herders and Bantu-speaking agro-pastoralists in regions occupied by hunter-gatherers generated a spectrum of relations between hunter-gatherers and these food producers. Power capacity of groups most probably influenced the nature of initial relations between people from different groups. Relatively small numbers of incoming groups probably encouraged amicable relations. The numerical growth of immigrants might have made conflict more likely. Some regions may have been marked by relations of conflict and other regions by cooperation and close relations. Some regions may have been marked by relations of conflict at some periods and by cooperation at other periods. The arrival of herders and agro-pastoralists in regions inhabited by hunter-gatherers could both induce the disruption of hunter-gatherer communities and networks and provide new economic and social opportunities, such as trade and exchange and the interchange of ritual and social expertise.

Some San maintained their identity and ‘traditional’ hunter-gathering survival strategies. Some became herders. The transformation of San into Khoekhoe herders was probably more likely for individuals than for groups. Some hunter-gatherers retreated into areas that were out of reach of, or undesirable for herders and agro-pastoralists, for example, mountain and desert areas. Others continued to occupy sites situated in areas that were favourable to the herders and agro-pastoralists and interacted with them, exchanging goods and services. Some San hunter-gatherer groups may have remained relatively independent of herders and agro-pastoralists and may not have been much influenced by these groups.

The Gonaqua and Gqunukhwebe exemplified the possibility for multidirectional social, economic, cultural, religious, linguistic and identity movement between Bantu-speaking and Khoe-San communities. A number of Xhosa (or Xhosa-speakers) were varyingly incorporated into the society of the most westerly located Khoekhoe, notably the Gonaqua. Some Khoekhoe also became incorporated into Xhosa society. Whilst some Xhosa incorporated into Khoekhoe society became Khoekhoe (at least to some degree) others were later reincorporated into the Xhosa polity, notably the Gqunukhwebe who were formerly part of the Gonaqua chiefdom headed by Khwane. The Gonaqua tended to be darker than other Khoekhoe. Many wore cloaks of cattle hide instead of sheep skin traditionally worn by Khoekhoe. The Gonaqua language also apparently came to incorporate elements from the Xhosa language. There were also apparently linguistic differences between Gonaqua located more easterly and the more westerly situated Khoekhoe. Thus, all

17 Martin Hall found archaeological evidence in the eastern Cape indicating that hunters continued to occupy sites situated in areas which were favourable to agro-pastoralists with whom they established cordial exchange relations (Ibid., p. 87).
Gonaqua were not equally influenced by the Xhosa, just as all Xhosa were not equally influenced by the Khoekhoe.19

Where close relations and exchanges developed, power relations and status perceptions most probably shaped the nature and direction of exchanges. Herders and agro-pastoralists tended to see themselves as superior (mere) hunter-gatherers.20 Status differentials and inequality may have manifested themselves in unequal incorporation and uneven marriage exchanges and social and cultural influence. The ratio of influence may have varied between groups, contexts and periods. In cases of close interaction the tendency may have been for groups with weaker power and (perceived) lower statuses to shed more of their cultures, ancestral identities and social practises, and to appropriate more of the cultures and identities of stronger groups than the other way around.21 The entry of Europeans (or Whites) into southern Africa had the most severe implication for the survival of San and Khoekhoe communities, identities and cultures. Euro-Dutch appropriation of Khoisan land and livestock since 1652, led to conflict, societal rupture, population displacement, reorganisation of indigenous groups, acculturation and cultural loss, and the development of new beliefs, values, attitudes, practices and identities.

Although most Khoi-San communities became dislocated and much of their traditional identities and cultures erased after the arrival of Europeans at the Cape in 1652, Khoi-San descendants located far from the colonial centre at Cape Town, particularly those in the northern Cape and beyond, were able to varyingly maintain their traditional identities, languages, beliefs and cultural practices which came to be varyingly fused with cultural elements derived from European and Bantu-speaking African communities.

**Emergence of the Griqua, 1800 –1880**

The emergence of Griqua polities and identity in the early 1800s allowed for the maintenance of an awareness of a Khoekhoe indigenous heritage and the development of Griqua communities in which elements from traditional Khoekhoe cultures and traditions were varyingly maintained and fused with cultural elements and sensibilities derived from the colony. Broader socio-political, legal and constitutional developments influenced the configuration and reconfiguration of elements in Griqua identities, cultures and livelihoods, with specific elements being emphasized under different historical periods and political regimes. The multicultural and multi-discursive constitution of the Griqua opened them to a multiplicity of socio-political directions giving rise to ambivalence that has characterized Griqua politics.

#Khxari and Gri G(u)riqua

Those who came to identify themselves as Griqua in the early 1800s were of heterogeneous origin, that is, Khoekhoe, San, slave, southern Bantu-speaking African, with mixtures of Khoekhoe-European, and Khoekhoe-slave. As the 19th century revived term of Griqua was an adaptation of ‘Chariguriqua’/‘Grigriqua’, or a re-signification of the old Griqua term in these names, people who came to identify themselves as Griqua from the early 1800s onwards would associate, to some extent, with the indigenous Cape Khoekhoe, even through they might not themselves have stemmed from the Khoekhoe cluster from whom the new Griqua name was derived. Although implied in the name, the association with the Khoekhoe would be varyingly articulated under different socio-political circumstances, and become especially emphasized after the 1994 democratic change in South Africa.

A number of those who identified themselves as Griqua in the early 1800s had a direct link with the ‘Chariguriqua’/‘Grigriqua’ and many neo-Griqua descendants would, through a process of intra-Griqua mixing over generations, come to have actual ancestral links with the ‘Chariguriqua’/‘Grigriqua’. The same

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21 Elphick: Khoikhoi, pp. 36-7.
process of inter-Griqua mixing would also diffuse ancestral links with other ethnic heritages of Griqua people. The different heritages would varyingly influence the articulation of Griqua identities. Even though a process of multi-ancestral diffusion would occur within Griqua communities, the diffusion would not be even. Within the Griqua landscape a cultural and somatic geographic variation would be discernable. In regard to the Khoe-San heritage, some areas would be characterized by a stronger concentration than others.

The Khoekhoe segment from whom the 19th century Griqua derived their name comprised two groups referred to by the Dutch in the 1650s and 1660s as the ‘Great Chariguriqua’ and the ‘Little Chariguriqua’ or by some other variation of these words. A similar contrast applied to the Nama Khoekhoe; a distinction was made between the Little Namaqua and the Great Namaqua. Since ‘#khxari’ means little in the old Cape Khoekhoe (#khari in Nama), the reference by the Dutch to ‘Little Chariguriqua’ (i.e. Little Little ‘Guriqua’) and ‘Great Chariguriqua’ (i.e. Great Little ‘Guriqua’) appears, as Elphick and G Nienaber suggested, linguistically problematic; it suggests the linguistic limitation of colonists. Given that ‘kái’ and ‘gei’ meant ‘great’, in the Khoekhoe language, the names of the groups might have been something like #Khxari-Guriqua (Little Guriqua) and Kái or Gei-Guriqua (Great Guriqua).

By the 1670s, when the societal rupture of the ‘Little Chariguriqua’ would have been extensive, the term ‘Chariguriqua’ was being displaced by the term ‘Griquiriqua’, with a distinction at times made between ‘Little Griquiriqua’ and ‘Great Griquiriqua’. ‘Gri’, or ‘geri’ in words like ‘Gerigriqua’, were apparently variations of the old Cape Khoekhoe ‘gei’ or derivatives of related terms like ‘geri’. Although the confusing juxtaposition of ‘little’ and ‘great’ in these group names might have been much an effect of the linguistic limitations of colonists, the placing of these words might also have partly reflected a complex repetitive process of splitting in which old an group name was retained but qualified. For the sake of clarity a distinction will simply be made between the Little and Great Griqua (or Little and Great Guriqua).

As the ‘qua’ in Khoekhoe group names suggests ‘people’, ‘G(u)riqua’ in #Khxari or Gri-G(u)riqua would have referred to the G(u)ri people or the people of G(u)ri. Many Khoekhoe groups assumed the name of an honoured leader or assumed ancestor. The articulation of the name of the leader in group names was, like the rest of the name, subject to modification. That the Little and Great G(u)rigqua assumed the name of an honoured leader was suggested in 1813 when the followers of the Koks and Barends’ indicated that the majority of them were descendants of a person called ‘Griqua’ when they decided to identify themselves as ‘Griqua’. The possible honoured leader’s name (Guri or some other variation) may in that instance have been conflated with the group (‘Griqua’), either by the followers of the Koks and Barends or the missionary who recorded the event.

During Dutch Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) rule the Little and Great Griqua inhabited the area northwest of Cape Town. The Little Griqua dwelled south of the Great Berg River, that is, in the vicinity of (what became) Moorreesburg and Malmesbury. The Great Griqua dwelled in the region between the northern side of the Great Berg River, the Olifants River further north and the Kouebokkeveld and the Cederberg in the east, that is, in the vicinity of Piketberg and Ebenhaeser. The Little Griqua thus frequented an area closer to Cape Town. The Little Griqua appears to have been at one stage subordinates and herders of the Cochoqua under Oedesoa. They apparently allied themselves for a while with the

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Namaqua for protection against the Cochoqua after they refused to return stock belonging to the Cochoqua. Oedesoas consequently regarded them as rebels.

The Little and Great Griqua were cautious about the VOC and engaged much less in trade with VOC than the Khoekhoe groups in the Cape peninsula did. VOC officials developed a negative perception about the Little and Great Griqua, particularly the former located closest to Cape Town. VOC engagement with the Great Griqua was even more limited than with the Little Griqua. However a party of “Grigriquase Hottentotten” visited the VOC fort in Cape Town in 1687 and presented a gift of six young oxen to the Commander and requested a friendship treaty with the Company. The ‘Grigriqua’, did not subsequently conduct themselves in a manner that would endear them to the Company, particularly by providing refuge to a number of escaped colonial slaves.

Located closer to the colonial centre at Cape Town, the Little Griqua were subjected first to colonial pressures and consequent societal rupture that may have been further exacerbated by intra-Khoekhoe conflict and war. The decline in the references to the Little Griqua suggests a process of dislocation that they were subjected to. The term ‘Chariguriqua’ appears to have been rarely used in colonial documents by the 1670s, if used at all. The term ‘Grigriqua’ was itself in declining usage in colonial documents towards the end of the 1700s. The declining usage of ‘Grigriqua’ in colonial documents also suggests the dislocation of the ‘Grigriqua’, the less prominent use of the name by those of ‘Grigriqua’ origin, the assumption of other names by the ‘Grigriqua’, for example, ‘Bastaard’, or the broader ‘Hottentot’ category as well as the application of other terms like ‘Bastaard’ or ‘Hottentot’ by colonists themselves in reference to those of ‘Grigriqua’ origin.

The Little and Great Griqua were subjected to the same colonial pressures that affected other Khoe-San communities. Dislocated first, Khoekhoe from the Little Griqua might have been incorporated into other communities, including the Great Griqua. Some would have attached themselves to wealthier persons, who might have been Khoekhoe, European, or of Khoe-European or slave descent. In this way they would have been exposed to new cultural practices and values and might themselves imbue their cultural attributes to those they encountered.

**Land, culture and identity**

As it was the case with other Cape Khoe-San communities, the encounter of the Little and Great Griqua with colonialism significantly influenced their subsistence strategies, identities and culture. The maintenance of old subsistence strategies depended much on access to adequate livestock and land for herding and hunting. Access to adequate resources increased subsistence options of the Khoe-San and their descendants. As long as they had livestock and access to adequate land individuals or groups could opt (to continue) to pursue nomadic herding, hunting, gathering or raiding survival strategies. Those within the colonial realm lacking livestock or access to adequate land might become labourers. Others might move beyond colonial boundaries to pursue alternative livelihoods. Groupings with colonial resources such as guns and horses could attempt to establish themselves beyond colonial boundaries as aristocracies over groups further inland as Jonker Afrikaner and his followers did in regard to the Herero. Khoe-San could opt to model themselves on the colonizers and adopt their economic practices.

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Elements of colonial culture were introduced varyingly by different persons to the traditional Khoe-San, for example, by runaway slaves, Khoe-San descendants with prior links with the colony, Dutch-speaking semi-nomadic farmers (trekboers) and missionaries. The Little and Great Griqua came into contact with people who were not White – who had prior links with the colony and the trekboers – who were inclined to pursue modes of existence beyond colonial boundaries that were at least partly modelled on those of the colonizers, notably the trekboers. The Little and Great Griqua who attached themselves to Adam Kok I thus became involved in subsistence strategies that were varyingly influenced by elements of old Khoe-San as well as trekboer subsistence strategies, and later by modes of existence promoted by the missionaries. However, the different purveyors of colonial culture were also varyingly open to imbibe traditional elements of Khoe-San culture. This evidently applied to those who attached themselves to Adam Kok.

Adam Kok I

Being presumably of slave origin, Adam Kok I’s role as a Khoekhoe leader in the late 1700s manifested the openness of Khoekhoe society to certain categories of people, particularly resourceful ones, within Khoekhoe societies penetrated by colonialism. Kok’s role also reflected a process of Khoekhoe social dislocation that made it possible for him to play the role that he did play amongst the Khoekhoe. Adam Kok’s father was, according to his (Adam’s) grandson Adam Kok II, a slave.33 It is not clear whether Kok was himself a slave or whether he was merely the son of a slave. With his father having been a slave, his mother could well have been a Khoekhoe, given Kok’s later facility with the Khoekhoe world and his later status as an officially recognized ‘Hottentot’ kaptynt.

Kok was able to acquire colonial burgher status and grazing rights from the VOC for the farm Stinkfontein immediately north of the Piketberg. Kok (apparently) held the farm from 1751 until 1771 when he lost it to a White person. He managed to acquire a large amount of stock. A number of Gri-Griqua still dwelled in the vicinity of Piketberg in the mid-1700s. An assortment of people whose existence was made precarious by White colonists attached themselves to Kok, notably Gri-Griqua Khoekhoe and Bastaards. After leaving Stinkfontein farm in 1771 Kok and his followers moved further north and settled in the Kamiesberg in Little Namaqualand near the Gariep (Orange) River. By the 1790s Kok and his followers were dwelling for varying periods near the Gariep.34 The increase in Kok’s Khoekhoe followers enhanced his colonial reputation as a Khoekhoe (or ‘Hottentot’) leader. Kok was eventually “appointed Chief of the party … by the Dutch Government … and … received a captain’s staff” 35 in acknowledgement of his status as a government recognized captain. The official designation of Adam Kok as a chief underscored the preponderance of Khoekhoe descendants amongst his followers.

‘Hottentots’, Bastaards & ‘Hottentot-Bastaards’

Adam Kok and others of slave origin, Bastaards as well as Khoe-San who had earlier contact with the colony or White Dutch speaking semi-nomadic farmers, introduced elements of European culture, together with European and slave somatic elements amongst Khoe-San communities located further from the colonial centre. The association of the Koks, former slaves, and Bastaards with the more distant Khoe-San in turn led to the inscription of (more) Khoe-San elements on them. The subsistence strategies of Adam Kok and his followers also reflected the varying inscriptions of the colonial and Khoe-San worlds on them. From their base in the Kamiesberg the group undertook regular exploration, hunting and trading trips into the interior and across the Gariep, making contact with San, Korana and Tlhaping. They became part of

33 See statement of Adam Kok to Dr Andrew Smith in Andrew Smith: Andrew Smith’s journal of his expedition into the interior of South Africa, 1834-36 (Cape Town: AA Balkema, 1975), pp. 183-4; Statement reproduced in Schoeman: Griqua captaincy, pp. 249-250.
35 Statement of Adam Kok II to Dr Andrew Smith, in Smith: Andrew Smith’s journal, pp. 183-4.
trading networks exchanging items from outside the colony for colonial products like guns and ammunition.  

The growing self-identification of the following of Kok as ‘Bastaard’ reflected the extent to which they had become influenced by colonial modes of valuation. Their growing self-identification as Bastaard also suggests that the followers of Kok were themselves extending colonial sensibilities and modes of valuation further into the interior. Individuals of Gri-Griqua origin also came to increasingly use the term ‘Bastaard’ in reference to themselves. Colonists were also inclined to refer to the followers of Adam Kok as ‘Bastaards’. The fact that variations of the term ‘Khxari’ or ‘Gri-Griqua’ were very rarely used in colonial documents by the 1770s and that Khoekhoe descendants in the vicinity where these communities used to dwell were referred to as ‘Hottentots’, ‘Bastaards’ or ‘Hottentot-Bastaards’ suggests that the names ‘Khxari/Gri-Griqua’ were no longer in general usage and that other categories were used more prominently.

Whilst colonialism led to the fragmentation of Khoe-San communities and the erosion of traditional Khoe-San cultures and identities, the application of the categories of ‘Bushman’ and ‘Hottentot’ by colonists and the subsequent self-referential usage of these categories fostered an overarching group identity within the Khoekhoe and San population. San who were incorporated into the colonial labour force were also liable to be categorized as ‘Hottentot’ and to thus develop a ‘Hottentot’ identity. San captured at a young age by White led militias (or commandos) and forced into the colonial labour system, particularly as servants on farms in the interior, were especially liable to lose their ancestral San identities and to assume a ‘Hottentot’ identity. However, the association of ‘Hottentot’ and ‘Bushman’ categories with inferiority and primitivism inclined many Khoe-San descendants to use alternative categories in referring to themselves.

Many Khoe-San descendants found Christian and Bastaard identities attractive as they were associated with higher status relative to ‘Bushman’ and ‘Hottentot’ categories – in terms of the colonial value system. Bastaard and Christian identities allowed Khoe-San descendants to affirm a superior status that suggested proximity to Europeans and colonial culture, and at the same time, distance from a Khoe-San heritage, as suggested by Burchell’s 1812 account of Van Roye and Corne, two of his servants accompanying him during his travels:

> none were more lazy than these two; and they seemed to consider themselves as hired only to ride along with me for the gratification of their own curiosity to see the country. They had done, literally, no work since the day when they first entered my service; yet, on account of their being Christenmensch, they rated themselves so high, that they actually regarded it as degrading, to do the same work as a Hottentot. They carried this ignorant mischievous pride so far, as to deny all knowledge of the Hottentot language; which, with respect to Van Roye, I knew certainly to be an untruth, and always believed the other to be better acquainted with it than he pretended. It was disgusting, though ridiculous, to hear these two woolly-headed men, call their companions, Hottentots, as an appellation of inferiority good enough for Heathens, and proper for making these sensible of the superiority of Christians. This unbecoming spirit was frequently the cause of broils and discords …

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37 Schoeman: *Griqua captaincy*, p. 10.
38 Nienaber: *Khoekhoense stamname*, pp. 443-9. Nienaber cites a rare instance in which the term “Giriqua” was used by Lichtenstein in reference to people at who were at Rietfontein mission station between 1804 and 1805. Lichtenstein, however, generally used the term “Bastardhottentotten” in reference to the people later called Griqua. Ibid., p. 449.
The co-presence of Khoekhoe and Bastards among the followers of the Koks led to Whites describing them as a whole variously as ‘Bastards’, ‘Hottentots’, ‘mixed-Hottentots’ or ‘Hottentot-Bastards’.\textsuperscript{41} The Bastard category strongly suggested part European descent, whilst the ‘Hottentoty-Bastard’ category was initially mainly used to refer to individuals of Khoekhoe-slave\textsuperscript{42} descent. Terms used in reference to the followers of the Koks were also used loosely and interchangeably.\textsuperscript{43} Thus, although suggesting at least partial non-Khoekhoe ancestry, the term Bastard could also be used to include people who did not necessarily have European or slave ancestry.

**Klaarwater**

Missionaries played an important mediatory role in the reconfiguration of the identities and culture of the followers of the Koks. The emergence of the (neo-)Griqua shows the ambivalent socio-political role (or use) of Christianity and missionaries. In regard to Khoe-San identities and cultures, the emergence of the (neo-)Griqua shows how the missionaries could be involved in the both their erasure and maintenance.

In 1801 London Missionary Society (LMS) missionaries were encouraged by ‘Bastards’ dwelling along the Gariep who visited the Zak River Mission Station (founded in 1799 for San), to move further into the interior and to undertake evangelization beyond the Gariep River. William Anderson and Cornelius Kramer subsequently undertook mission work among the followers of Cornelius Kok I, the heir of Adam Kok I, and Barend Barends (son of Klaas Barends from a daughter of Adam Kok I). Encouraged by Anderson and Kramer, the group moved to Klaarwater in 1804 where the missionaries set up a mission.\textsuperscript{44} By 1809 the population of Klaarwater (later renamed Griquatown) and its out-stations was around 784.\textsuperscript{45} It was reckoned in 1823 that the Griqua population of the settlement and surrounding stations was around 1600 people with 1000 more living at a distance and with the Korana “living among them, or under their influence” numbering at least 1800.\textsuperscript{46}

The population of Klaarwater and its surrounds comprised people from various socio-cultural groupings. There were by 1811 in addition to the Khoekhoe and Bastard followers of the Koks and Barends’ also San, Korana, Sotho and Tswana in the region, thus allowing for diverse socio-cultural exchanges. The Korana, San and the followers of the Koks and Barends’ then lived in traditional (Khoe-San) portable matted houses, including Adam Kok II and Barend Barends who were then both captains at Klaarwater. Kok had authority over one section of the community and Barends over the other.\textsuperscript{37} Korana settlements or kraals were at places intermingled with those of the Tswana. In between settlements of Tswana, Korana and the followers of the Koks and Barends’ were also San kraals. Nomadism contributed much to the interspersion of these communities.\textsuperscript{48}

Close proximity encouraged social, economic, cultural and linguistic exchanges. Those who would be named Griqua from 1813 had a number of Korana and San in their employ during the first few decades of settlement in the region.\textsuperscript{49} Cultural items like clothing were appropriated from different communities.\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{43} Schoeman: *Griqua captaincy*, p. 102.
\textsuperscript{44} Schoeman: *Griqua captaincy*, pp. 17-19.
Individuals learnt languages spoken in neighbouring communities. Adam Kok II himself could speak Tswana. There is some evidence of unions between San women and Korana or other Khoekhoe men and between Tswana men and San women. Burchell encountered substantial marital unions between Korana and Tswana in 1812:

The number of Bachapins who have taken wives from among the Koras, is not small. This seems to be a prevailing custom, with that class who can afford to purchase them, while at the same time the Kora parents prefer foreign husbands for their daughters, because the Bachapins pay them ten oxen, which is more than they can obtain in their own tribe. On the other hand, the Koras, as if to counterbalance this irregularity, are equally unpatriotic in their choice, and often select their wives from among the Bachapins.

Inter-group and trans-ethnic alliances also emerged, for example between some Korana and Tswana, between some San and the followers of the Koks and Barends, and between some Korana and the followers of the Koks and Barends. There were occasions of conflict within and between groups as well occasions of alliances across groups. There was tension and conflict, for example within San communities, as well as conflict between, for example, San–Korana, and Bastaard–San or between Korana and Bastaard/Khoekhoe followers of the Koks and Barends. It would appear that animosities towards the same San by people from other communities could be very high, and that reprisals against the San for appropriated livestock, could be very brutal. Some San communities were, however, allied to Khoekhoe or Griqua communities that might act violently against other San communities. San allies could, and did become enemies.

Inter-ethnic, cross-ethnic and trans-ethnic cooperation was engendered by the practice of cattle raiding and the need for military defence against threatening groups, notably those connected with the Mfecane (violent upheavals and population dislocations in the South African interior) of the 1820s and 1830s. Thus, in 1823 Barend Barends, Adam Kok II and Andries Waterboer formed a commando that together with a commando of Tlhaping and Tlharo, fought an invading force referred to as the “Mantatees” (being thus confused with the followers of the Tlokwa-Sotho regentess MaNthatisi) at Old Dithakong. Waterboer and Cornelius Kok II later again formed a commando comprising Griqua, Korana, San and Tswana.

Much like Khoe-San and Bastaard dependents and non-dependents of Whites could participate with Whites (and later on their own initiative) in attacks and cattle raids on Khoe-San (thus contributing to further Khoe-San societal rupturing and reconfiguration), Sotho, Tswana, Korana and San (dependents and non-dependents of Griqua) could also participate with Griqua in attacks and cattle raids on Sotho, Tswana, Korana, San or even Nguni communities or groups (e.g. Ndebele under Mzilikazi). The ‘Bergenaars’ who left Griquatown in protest to the leadership of Waterboer were joined by Korana and together undertook raids on surrounding communities, including Griqua at Griquatown, Korana, Sotho and Tswana. Bergenaaers

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58 See e.g. Tompson: Travels, Part 1, p. 77.
61 See e.g. Legassick: “The Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana, and the missionaries”, pp. 133-144.
also joined Sotho and Tswana groups and together raided Sotho-Tswana communities. Griqua, Sotho-Tswana and Whites could also take joint action against African communities. In 1837 a Griqua, Rolong and White commando led by Hendrick Potgieter and Gerrit Maritz defeated Mzilikazi. Griqua could also unite with Giqua against other groups, just as Whites were inclined to support other Whites when power relations allowed them to assert their ethno-cultural and somatic preferences. Thus, in the context of heightened social tension in consequence of the arrival of more extremists White Dutch-speaking farmers (or Boers) in Transorangia, ethno-‘racial’ allegiances were reinforced among contending Griqua and White parties, with the more moderate Whites (who had established fairly conciliatory relations with the Philippolis Griqua in the 1830s) joining the extremists Whites, and with Waterboer joining forces with Adam Kok III.63

**Missionaries and change**

Missionaries encountered some difficulty in their attempt to initiate cultural and economic changes among the followers of the Koks and Barends’. Many among these people could apparently not be persuaded by 1811 to adopt Christian marriage rites. “The restrictions which it had been endeavoured to lay upon their former customs, rendered the missionaries rather unpopular; and the law for reducing the number of wives from two, often three, and sometimes four, to one, in a nation consisting of more females than males, did not meet with many advocates in either sex”. The missionaries also had difficulties in the first few decades to persuade the followers of the Koks and Barends’ to pursue a settled mode of existence and to devote themselves to agriculture. Many of these people continued a nomadic livelihood and lived for varying periods in groups around scattered sources of water and grazing. Missionaries encountered even more difficulties in trying to transform Korana and San in the vicinity of Klaarwater. Korana and San who lived in the Klaarwater district supposedly showed no desire to receive the least instruction from the missionaries, nor did they attend their meetings, but continued to remove from place to place as “a wild independent people”.

The development of communities around mission settlements not only encouraged shifts in economic and cultural practices but also altered the bases of power and influence, thus generating power contestation in Griqua polities. The Bastaard-Khoekhoe society was initially organized on a loose clan structure. Community influence was to a large extent exerted through networks that were closely linked to the Kok and Barends families. However, association with the missionaries and Christianity could enable individuals to become influential regardless of their linkages to old networks of power. Andries Waterboer is a notable example. Reputed to be of San descent, he was baptised in 1808 and appointed as a “native” mission agent in 1814. He was also a “native [school] teacher”. He developed a relationship with LMS missionaries that contributed much to his ascent in Griqua politics, notably in 1820. However, individuals who could draw on traditional sources of power could also reinforce their power through drawing on new bases of power. Among the early converts to Christianity were also individuals from leading proto-Griqua families like the Koks and Barends’. Barend Barends was baptised in 1807, became a deacon in 1813 and was appointed as a LMS “native agent” in 1814.

Power contestation in Griqua communities was compounded by the missionary intervention in Griqua politics and administration. Cornelius Kok I and a number of his followers resented the increasing administrative role of missionaries. Cornelius eventually transferred his captainship to his eldest son, Adam

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63 Ross: *Griquas*, pp. 30-1, 57-61.
67 Ross: *Griquas*, p.15.
69 Ross: *Griquas*, p.15.
Kok II, around 1805 as an act of protest against increasing administrative control of the missionaries and moved to the Kamiesberg.\(^{70}\) Despite resentment from among the followers of the Koks and Barends’ against missionaries, the benefits they accrued from their presence allowed the missionaries to play an important role in the emergence of Griqua polities, the re-adoption of the Griqua name (in modified form) and the subsequent development of a (neo-)Griqua identity.

**Re-adoption of Griqua name and development of a (neo-)Griqua identity**

On 6 August 1813 the Reverend John Campbell, on his visit to Klaarwater, indicated to the “principal persons” of the settlement “the offensiveness of the word [“Bastard”] to an English or Dutch ear”. They then “resolved to assume some other name. On consulting among themselves, they found the majority were descended from a person of the name of Griqua, and they resolved [t]hereafter to be called Griquas”.\(^{71}\)

The community also agreed, at Campbell’s initiative, to codify laws; that “judges or magistrates chosen” should “put them into execution”, and that “their two Captains, or Chiefs, should continue to act as commanders in the things requiring public safety against foreign attacks”. The “whole people” not only resolved that they “should be called Griquas, instead of Bastard or Hottentots”, but that “the place [should be] called Griqua-town, instead of Klaarwater”.\(^{72}\) The name Griqualand was also applied to the region of Griqua settlement soon after the re-adoption of the Griqua name.\(^{73}\) Thus, the term ‘Griqua’, derived from \#Khxari/Gri-G(u)riqua resurfaced in 1813 and would be a functional category till into the 21st century. In contrast to the modification that pre-colonial Khoe-San names were subjected to, the Griqua name became fixed in writing and through Griqua statehood.

Revived in the context of emerging Griqua polities (or chiefdoms), the Griqua name came to signify being a follower of a Griqua captain (or chief) and being a member of a Griqua polity headed by a Griqua captain, that is, being a burgher. Initially articulated in contexts of developing Griqua polities, the Griqua category could embrace individuals from disparate ethnic backgrounds. Although being initially in the main polity related, a quasi-ethnic dimension was suggested from the onset of the re-adoption of the Griqua name, as suggested by the perception among the followers of the Koks and Barends’ (on the occasion of the re-adoption of the name) that most were descendant from a person called Griqua. That is, despite the multiple ethnic heritages of the new Griqua, there was nevertheless a perception of a shared narrow Khoekhoe ancestry that would influence, at various stages, notions of genuine Griquaness.

Although the re-assumption of the Griqua name might have had a levelling effect, prior identities and statuses persisted, and some, like Bastaard, were in tension with the Griqua category. Some people preferred the Bastaard category above the Griqua category, or to be called Bastaards instead of Griqua. Even five decades after the re-adoption of the Griqua name there was still some protestation against its usage in the place of Bastaard.\(^{74}\) Some former slaves who joined the Griqua also maintained an ‘Apprentice’ identity into the late 1800s.\(^{75}\) Real or purported discrimination on the basis of origin also served to sustain identities that individuals assumed before they moved into the Griqua landscape.\(^{76}\)

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\(^{71}\) Campbell: *Travel*, p. 252.

\(^{72}\) Campbell: *Travels*, p. 253.

\(^{73}\) Campbell: *Travels*, pp. 256, 262, 281.

\(^{74}\) See Nienaber, pp. 174, 442, citing Frisch-visit of the 1860s.

\(^{75}\) See Schoeman: *Griqua captaincy*, p. 107.

\(^{76}\) See e.g. G 58-79, *Report of a commission appointed to inquire into causes of the recent outbreak in Griqualand East* (Cape Town: Saul Solomon & Co. Printers, 1879), pp. 13, 17, on ‘Apprentice’ and ‘Bastaard’ dissatisfaction with Griqua rule and oppression.
However, the political dimension of Griqua identity, that is, identification based on allegiance to a Griqua captain or membership of a Griqua polity, facilitated the accommodation of ‘outsiders’ as Griqua. Many who were not Griqua would have been incorporated first as Griqua-dependents and later as full members. Many who moved into Griqua polities for the sanctuary they provided were also liable to become full members. It was reckoned in 1813 that there were 1266 Griqua in Griquatown and its outposts and 1341 Korana “who consider[d] themselves connected with Griquas, for the sake of protection”. People like these Korana were liable to develop a Griqua identity based on their association with Griqua in the settlement and their identification with the polity. Those Korana who were less exposed to colonial culture than many of the Griqua, would in turn reintroduce aspects of traditional Khoekhoe cultures and values into the Griqua settlement, contributing thus to tension between traditionalist and Westernized Griqua, at the same time as they were subjected to mission and colonial culture in the Griqua settlement. This process was manifested by the ‘Bergenaars’ who rejected the leadership of the pro-missionary Captain Andries Waterboer and allied themselves to Korana groups along the Gariep, Vaal and Harts Rivers and began raiding surrounding communities, in cluding those at Griquatown.

Sotho and Tswana who moved into Griqua settlements, particularly in consequence of *Mfecane* upheavals, would similarly be liable to develop a Griqua identity through their association with Griqua in the settlement and through their allegiance to Griqua captains. A number of these Sotho and Tswana became Griqua burghers and identified themselves as Tswana or Sotho ‘Griqua burghers’. The Sotho and Tswana would also be subjected to colonial culture in Griqua settlements just as they might at the same time introduce elements of Sotho-Tswana culture into Griqua settlements.

Thus, people of Bantu-speaking, slave, Khoe-San and part-European descent could move into Griqua polities, be subjected to Griqua rule, and be liable to assume a Griqua identity on the basis of their association with Griqua polities and the acquisition of burgher status. However, Griquaness also came to assume a proto-racialized, dimension that reflected, and, in some ways, reinforced broader process of colonial ethno-‘racial’ formation. The articulation of Griqua identity reflected the multi-cultural constitution of the Griqua. The socio-cultural effects of the multi-cultural constitution of the Griqua could both reinforce and disrupt processes of colonial ethno-‘racial’ formation.

**Griqua identity, Khoekhoe tradition, mission ideals and colonial culture**

At the onset of the re-adoption of the Griqua name the Griqua diverged in regard subsistence strategies, thus allowing the identity itself to be associated with divergent subsistence strategies and attendant cultural manifestations. Economic activities and cultural products possessed by individuals such as housing and clothing reflected, to an extent, the divergent socio-economic and cultural ideals of the Griqua. However, a missionary inspired subsistence strategy, with its attendant cultural attributes, became ascendant and, together with the broader ensemble of appropriated colonial culture and values, significantly influenced Griqua socio-cultural and political orientations.

Missionaries encouraged the Griqua to become Christians and to pursue a sedentary mode of existence. The missionaries introduced typical values of mission Christianity such as frugality, monogamy, individuality and settled agriculture to the community. Some Griqua learnt to read and write. The growing association

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78 Campbell: *Travels*, p. 256.
79 See e.g. Schoeman: *Griqua captaincy*, p. 32.
80 Cape Town Archives, Chief Magistrate, East Griqualand (CMK) 5/15, see e.g. Statements of Rauyampa, (p. 67) Klaas Makoalo (p. 70), and Jan Zwaartboy (p. 71), all dated 27 December 1894.
81 On incorporation of people of different ethnic background into Griqua polities see also Legassick: “The Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana, and the missionaries”, pp. 195-200, 216.
82 Ross: *Griquas*, p.15.
with Christianity was accompanied by a growth in agricultural practice and changes in type of dwellings from portable reed huts to mud or stone houses. Older economic strategies of hunting and herding continued, however, to be practiced into the 1850s when agricultural practice and sheep farming had reached a significant extent. Cattle raiding remained for long a part of Griqua culture. Attempting to build up an income derived from commercial activities connected with the Cape economy, the Griqua acted as intermediaries in the ivory trade with the interior Bantu-speakers; they traded in cattle, and bred sheep and horses. Wealth acquired through trade was used to acquire, for example, firearms and ammunition, agricultural equipment like ploughs and wagons as well as European clothing.

The Griqua adoption of a Christian identity and acquisition of European commodities also reflected an attempt at gaining respect from, and social equality with Whites. A growing number of Griqua, especially the more recent immigrants from the colony, associated themselves with Christianity, though some might only have been nominal Christians. A Christian identity allowed many to assert a status that they were denied in the colony. Christianity became an important component of Griqua identity and “a prime means of acculturation”. However, not all Griqua became believing Christians and many who regarded themselves as Christians were not regarded as such by church authorities. Although social pressures against behaviour that was contrary to Christian prescriptions increased, some people could not reconcile themselves with some of Christian inspired prescriptions like monogamy and limitations on alcohol consumption; some opted to avoid the church; others moved elsewhere where they could engage more freely in contrarian behaviour.

As suggested before, the transition from old survival strategies to livelihoods inspired by missionaries generated leadership tension and conflict that was exacerbated by the domineering tendencies of missionaries. Trade, Christianity, and the ability to read and write, allowed for the development of new bases of status and influence that weakened the old captains’ authority. Influence in the Church could be turned into political influence. The ability to read and write became crucial in government. The ascent of Andries Waterboer exemplified the possibilities allowed by new power bases in Griqua polities. Adam Kok II who was not as pliable as the missionaries hoped he would be, together with Barend Barends, fell out of favour with the missionaries as well as with a number of Griqua. A number of Griqua became displeased with the leadership of Kok and Barends. Both were accused of neglecting their duty. The result was that Waterboer who was well regarded by the missionaries, was, with their support, elected as the successor of Adam Kok II in December 1820. The election of Waterboer and his strict rule in turn generated animosity against him by traditionalists who preferred a pastoral and raiding subsistence strategy.

Adam subsequently moved to Knoffelvallei (later called Campbell) where his brother Cornelius Kok II, together with their father Cornelius Kok I were then living. Barends moved to Danielskuil and in 1823 to Boetsap in the vicinity of the Harts River. Griqua traditionalists disillusioned with Waterboer’s strict rule left Griquatown shortly after his ascent to power. Soon called ‘Bergenaars’, these traditionalists became notorious for cattle raiding.

Missionaries contributed both to a measure of stability in Griqua society but also at the same time ironically contributed to factionalism that would characterize Griqua history. Missionaries promoted a settled mode of existence and the formalization of regulations and laws governing Griqua society, thus fostering stability. The Koks and Barends’ families and their followers valued the presence of missionaries in Griqua polities for the access that they facilitated to colonial resources and trade networks. However, missionary intervention in Griqua government also generated tension between them and Griqua chiefs, their supporters and those favouring a raiding and nomadic mode of life. Tension also emerged between Griqua chiefs and

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83 Schoeman: *Griqua captaincy*, pp. 120-4.
84 Ross: *Griquas*, pp. 10, 15-6, 19.
Griqua resenting their rule, notably Andries Waterboer, the missionary protégé. After his election as chief at Griquatown, Waterboer sought to use both missionaries and the colonial government to bolster his attempts at becoming the principal Griqua leader and to establish hegemony over surrounding African communities. Thus, Waterboer’s chieftainship generated tension between himself and Cornelius Kok II, Adam Kok II, Barend Barends and their followers, which was further fuelled by his (Waterboer’s) hegemonic attempts. Even though there was much tension between Griqua factions, there were also attempts at resolving differences and establishing cooperation. Both the tendencies towards fragmentation and cooperation became characteristic of Griqua politics. Both these tendencies, together with tensions between subsistence were re-enacted at Philippolis.

**Griqua of Philippolis**

In 1824 Adam Kok II left Campbell, moved across the Vaal River and settled in an area along the Riet River. There were among the Griqua followers of Adam Kok at that stage also Bergenaars, many Korana and a number of Tswana. In 1825 Adam Kok met the Reverend John Phillip, the superintendent of LMS mission stations, in the vicinity of the Lower Riet River and requested permission to settle with his people in the region of the LMS Philippolis mission station. Philip subsequently approved on the condition that Kok would protect the San (for whom the mission was originally established in 1822) from Dutch-speaking White farmers who were then troubling the San. Philip thought that Adam Kok had influence over the Bergenaars and hoped that he could use him to end Griqua dissentions and to instil stability within Griqua settlements.

The mission station became the centre of Adam Kok’s captaincy. However, a fission based on divergent economic and cultural ideals manifested itself. There was, in addition, a struggle between old mission inhabitants and the Griqua who came with Adam Kok. Adam Kok’s adherents might have included Christians but they did not have a strong allegiance to the church or the mission and were disinclined to accept the authority of LMS missionaries. Adam Kok was formally elected captain in October 1825. A memorial with 100 names requesting that he be formally appointed was then sent to the Cape governor, reflecting thus the ambiguous or partial autonomy of Griqua polities. The election was duly approved by the British authorities on 10 January 1826. However, a portion of the Bergenaars withdrew their allegiance and moved to the Gariep River.

**Philippolis leadership struggle**

After Adam’s death in 1835, a leadership struggle developed between his two sons, Abraham and Adam Kok III. Opposing economic and cultural ideals played into the leadership struggle. The more Westernized faction and the missionaries supported Adam Kok, who was literate and had experience as a Raad member and as ‘provisional captain’ in the absence of his father. Traditionalists like former Bergenaars supported the older Abraham, who was illiterate and pursued a more traditional lifestyle. In an election held in 1836 Abraham received 168 votes and Adam only 68.

Abraham, however, became unpopular soon after his election, his reign being subsequently short-lived. Abraham was rebuked by the new missionary, Theophilus Atkinson, and some of the Griqua for his involvement in an attack on Mzilikazi with Cornelius Kok II and Barend Barends in 1837. Abraham, however, disassociated himself from those among his people who went on the commando even though he gave them written permission to go. On being subsequently rejected by both the pro and anti-commando

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86 See e.g. Legassick: “The Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana, and the missionaries”, chapters 10 -11 (pp. 480-583).
groupings, Abraham withdrew to the Modder River. Late in 1837, in the absence of Abraham, a large portion of the Philippolis community elected Adam as captain. Adam Kok and Waterboer subsequently entered into an alliance. Abraham, on the other hand, formed an alliance with his uncle Cornelius Kok II at Campbell who was in strife with Waterboer. Abraham attempted to raid Philippolis outposts with the help of Cornelius. Skirmishes between the Abraham and Adam camps were, however, dissolved later in 1838 through the mediation of Waterboer.

**Interaction at Philippolis: Griqua and others**

The Griqua’s location in regard to colonial and missionary values impacted both on intra-Griqua relations and on relations with non-Griqua. The appropriation of colonial culture and values and their ascendace within Griqua polities had a significant impact of Griqua interaction with those who were not Griqua, influencing attempts at overlordship over Khoe-San and Bantu-speakers. Access to colonial products, notably guns and ammunition, enabled the Griqua to exert some power over these communities. Communities in the vicinity of Philippolis included Bastaards, a few Korana, San and a number of Sotho and Tswana. The Bastaards merged quickly with the Griqua. Griqua treatment of the San, on the other hand, tended to be brutal and exploitative.

Although they were supposed to provide protection to the San, the Griqua themselves behaved oppressively towards them, apparently reducing them to labourers or driving them out. The San were apparently forced to move about 75 km east near the confluence of the Caledon and Gariep rivers where a new mission station, subsequently called Bethulie, was set up for them. Many of those who were not under missionary protection were attacked and killed. The Griqua also justified the killing of women and children on the ground that “the children grow up to mischief and all the women breed them”. Attacks on the San, which might have been partly motivated by informal slavery, peaked around 1830.

Although Griqua relations with Sotho, Tswana and Korana were marked by their desire for domination, they were not marked by the brutality shown to the San. The Griqua in particular attempted to subjugate Korana raiders of the Transgariep who constituted a major threat to the stability of the Philippolis polity in the 1820s. Some Korana became indistinguishable from Griqua. A number of Bantu-speakers, particularly Sotho and Tswana, who were displaced through Mfecane upheavals in the 1820s also came to live at or near Philippolis directly under Griqua rule. They were apparently in the main labourers or squatters unlikely to receiveburgher rights or to play any significant role in political, economic or military life of the polity. Most Sotho refugees returned to the Caledon River after stability was restored in that region by Moshoeshoe in the 1830s. Many Tswana remained at Philippolis and its surrounds.

The most serious threat to the viability of the Griqua polities was the presence White farmers. In September 1824 the upper Gariep River became the northern boundary of the Cape Colony, thus bringing the region of official White settlement closer to Philippolis. In November 1825 Andries Stockenström, the landdrost of Graaff-Reinet, allowed trekboers to move across the river temporarily to obtain grazing during a period of drought. In subsequent years a large number of White farmers settled on a semi-permanent basis in the

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92 Schoeman: *Griqua captaincy*, pp. 90-93.
94 Ross: *Griquas*, pp. 24-5.
Philippolis area and near the Riet and Caledon rivers. White farmers who moved into Griqua territory even argued that the land belonged to the “Bosjesmen” and that they therefore had the right to occupy it.

In contrast to their relations with other Khoe-San communities and with Bantu-speaking communities, the Griqua pursued relations with White farmers that were not marked by a desire for overlordship. The Griqua leadership were, however, disturbed by early White treks in the vicinity of Philippolis. By January 1829 Adam Kok and his Raad protested formally to the Cape governor about the presence of White farmers in Philippolis.99 Tension between the White farmers and the Griqua were, however, still relatively mild in the 1830s. A small number of White farmers who had set up houses near Philippolis did become involved in land disputes but the Griqua developed fairly conciliatory relations with most White farmers in the vicinity of Philippolis during the 1830s. Conciliatory relations were facilitated by the initial spatial division, with Whites living in the north in the valleys of the Riet, Modder and Vet rivers. The initial suspicion that the Griqua had of the White farmers diminished. Disputes between the Griqua and White farmers abated. With more cordial relations established Griqua started to lease farms on an increasing scale to White farmers.

Land arrangements assumed a more formal nature when the Philippolis government made a treaty with the White community in which permission was granted to Griqua to lease land to Whites, thus sanctioning what had already taken place. The treaty declared that the “colonist” or White farmers in Philippolis retained their own colonial laws. The treaty also affirmed the ultimate authority of the Griqua over land.100 While Griqua could lease land to Whites they were prohibited by a 1838 law from selling it to them.101 The relatively courteous treatment of White Dutch-speaking farmers by Griqua leaders, in contrast to their treatment of San, Koranna and Bantu-speakers, was, in part, encouraged by the power capacity of Whites and the ascendance of colonial and mission values within Griqua communities engendering a measure of identification with White Dutch-speaking farmers who were emulated religiously, economically and culturally by some Griqua.

**Ascendance and hegemony of Christian norms**

Although the religious, cultural and economic ideals of the more Western orientated Griqua became entrenched within Griqua captancies, Griqua material culture remained very composite. Most of the population remained spread over the countryside and lived much in a traditional manner in large extended families on their cattle and sheep farms near fountains. Kolbe estimated in 1834 that there were 700 adults with 50 000 sheep, 40 000 goats, 7000 cattle and 920 horses at Philippolis. Many Griqua still lived in the traditional portable matted (maatjie) houses of the Khoe-San. Those with the means were, however, beginning to build more permanent clay houses. European clothing was replacing buckskin leather. Griqua retained for a longer time strings of beads round their necks, particularly the women.102

The increase in church attendance, especially formal church membership, suggested a growing association between Griqua identity and Christianity. Sunday service attendance at the Philippolis church grew steadily over the years, averaging around 25 in 1828, 160-280 in 1832, 250-300 in 1837, 700-800 in 1844. Church services appear to have been looked on by the attendants to a large extent as social gatherings and do not necessarily reflect the commitment of the Griqua to Christian religious tenets. The numbers of formal church members were much less than the numbers of people attending services. There were only 52 formal church members by January 1838 but the number grew steadily in subsequent years. There were by September 1840 133 formal church members, by December 1840 181 and 218 by August 1841.103

99 Schoeman: *Griqua captaincy*, pp. 64-7.
100 Ross: *Griquas*, pp. 30-3.
103 Schoeman: *Griqua captaincy*, p. 127.
The identification with Christianity was also facilitated by some Griqua leaders. Griqua captains and some other leading Griqua figures became Christians at an early stage of the Griqua polities, as indicated before. Philippolis became officially a Christian polity. The Philippolis Raad produced laws and regulations for the polity that reflected the deepening inscription of Christian prescriptions on the polity. Even though Captain Adam Kok II and many of his councillors were not members of the church in 1833, a law was passed in that year “[t]hat in God’s House prayers are to be said every Sabbath for the Captain and the Raad, that they may” conduct “themselves according to the laws in the fear of God”. It was recommended that “each person shall pray in the house for the Government and the country”.104 The Raad had also sanctioned, by the 1840s, an already accepted practice by laying down that Griqua marriage was to be monogamous, and that those who took a second wife or husband would be considered to have committed adultery and be liable for both divorce and punishment.105

Despite the diverse origins of people in Griqua polities, a sense of peopleliness and nationhood strongly linked to Christianess was forged that was carried over into East Griqualand, and drawn on by Griqua after the demise of Griqua polities as a source of pride and idealised frame of reference. Thus, in 1843 Hendrik Hendrickze, a member of the Philippolis Raad, affirmed “that we … are a people this day”. Hendrickze also affirmed that “[w]e are a Christian nation”.106

A measure of success in emulating Whites culturally and economically was suggested in a lecture in Cape Town in 1855 by Edward Solomon, who would, however, as their missionary until 1857, be inclined to stress Griqua success in emulating Whites:

Taken as a whole, the Griqua tribe will now amount to from 8000 to 10000 souls, and it is decidedly the furthest advanced in civilization of all those connected with the Hottentot race. …

[M]any of the Griquas, are endeavouring to obtain [woollen sheep] … and for this purpose are devoting all the money they can raise. Some of them now have flocks varying from 500 to 1500, and many of the people are anxious to increase the number and improve the breed of their sheep. This is one proof of the position we [missionaries] have advanced, that the Griquas are the most civilized portion of the Hottentot race. …

The more respectable and advanced of the Griqua occupy European houses, wear European clothing, and live upon food similar to that consumed by Europeans. They are engaged in pastoral pursuits, many of them having fire arms, their own personal property, admirably adopted for the purpose. They possess a considerable number of good Colonial-made wagons. … Altogether the Griquas must have about three hundred wagons in their possession … .

They have an increasing desire for knowledge, and are anxious that their children should receive a higher education than any with which they have been privileged … .

All these are encouraging signs of advancement in civilization … .107

Although White cultural elements increased within Griqua settlements, traditional Khoekhoe elements were retained. Thus, repositories of Khoekhoe cultures and traditions articulated with mission inspired ideals of settlement and production that stood in a hegemonic relation to traditional pastoral, hunting and raiding ideals. Although the absorption of colonial and Christian attributes engendered a sense of superiority in many Griqua, many Whites viewed Griqua cultural attainments with amusement.108

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104 Quoted in Schoeman: *Griqua captaincy*, p. 127; See also Ross: *Griquas*, p. 41.
106 Schoeman: *Griqua captaincy*, p. 163.
107 Quoted in Schoeman: *Griqua captaincy*, pp. 219-20.
attainment did not generate the kind of White respect and equality that many Griqua desired. The increasing presence of Whites in the vicinity of Philippolis in the 1840s and 1850s encouraged them to express their prejudices against the Griqua more openly.

**Philippolis sovereignty crisis – 1840s & 1850s**

The events of the 1840s and 1850s that significantly affected Griqua land ownership and semi-autonomy were to be revisited by later Griqua generations who were aggrieved with Griqua dispossession and with the impoverishment of the Griqua during their own times. Conciliatory relations with White farmers established in the 1830s started to break down by the 1840s with the increasing inflow of more Whites beyond the Gariep River, particularly republicans led by Jan Mocke and Jan Kock who had resisted the British takeover of Natal in 1842. The republicans lived mainly around the Modder River or in the Winburg region.

**Napier treaty, 1843**

The Griqua leadership hoped, in the face of the inflow of Dutch-speaking Whites, that they would be able to maintain their semi-independence through allegiance to colonial authorities\(^{109}\) that they attempted to consolidate through treaties. A treaty was concluded with Sir George Napier in November 1843. In return for £100 per annum, a grant of £50 per annum to the LMS for education, and ‘100 stand of arms and ammunition’, Adam Kok was to guard his boundary coterminous with the Cape colony against incursions from beyond and “cooperate … with the colonial government in preserving peace and extending Civilization to the native tribes”.\(^{110}\)

**Maitland treaty, 1846**

In consequence of Governor Sir Peregrine Maitland’s attempt to work out a solution to the problem between the Griqua and White farmers, a treaty was signed in February 1846\(^{111}\) that divided Philippolis into an area north of the Riet River in which land could be leased (*huurbaar* or alienable territory) to Whites and a southern area in which land could not be leased (*onhuurbaar* or inalienable territory), sold or occupied by Whites. Leases in the leasable area were not to exceed 40 years. The Griqua, however, contributed to the weakening of their semi-independence by leasing farms to Whites in the unleasable area in contravention of the treaty.\(^{112}\)

**Harry Smith, 1848**

Maitland’s successor, Sir Harry Smith introduced measures that were even more threatening to Griqua semi-independence. On 28 January 1848 Smith forced Kok to sign an agreement in terms of which the Griqua were to retain the farms in the unleasable territory after the leases had expired, once they had paid for the improvements that White farmers had carried out. Farms in the alienable territory that were leased for forty years or more were to be leased permanently in return for perpetual annual payments by the colonial government to the Griqua chief and the owners of the farms. The chief would receive £200 whilst £100 was to be divided among the owners. Forty-two farms were leased for forty years (or more) in the leasable territory and were thus alienated through this arrangement.\(^{113}\) In practice the British administrators treated all (58) farms that were leased in the alienable territory as if they were leased for forty years.

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\(^{110}\) Quoted in Ross: *Griquas*, pp. 37, 54.

\(^{111}\) Ross: *Griquas*, pp. 57-61.


A number of English businessmen and colonial officials in Bloemfontein had by then developed interests in Griqua land that significantly impacted on the receptivity of colonial authorities to the concerns of the Griqua. Eighty-eight farms from the alienable territory that were not leased were lost to the Griqua when they were distributed amongst Dutch-speaking White farmers and British speculators. Valuations of improvements on farms in the inalienable territory were too high for the Griqua to pay. The Griqua were thus deprived of additional land.\textsuperscript{114}

**George Clerk & Orange Free State republic, 1854**

The final blow to Griqua semi-autonomy came during the 1850s with preparations to grant the Dutch-speaking Whites of the Orange River Sovereignty their independence – after Smith had proclaimed British sovereignty over the territory between the Gariep and the Vaal rivers, including the territory of Adam Kok, on 3 February 1848. By now the Griqua were no longer considered useful for maintaining order beyond the colonial boundary. White Dutch-speaking farmers had become problematic for the colonial government to control. Colonial officials were inclined to establish influence over these White farmers by appeasing them at the expense of the Griqua.

Through the Bloemfontein Convention of 23 February 1854 Dutch-speaking Whites of the Orange River Sovereignty were granted self-government. The Republic of the Orange Free State thus came into being with Bloemfontein as its capital. Clerk had entered secret agreements with the Boers, with one agreement providing that any land purchased by Whites from the Griqua would fall under the Free State government and that the Free State government had authority over the leasable territory. The Free State government subsequently issued Free State titles to Boers who leased Griqua farms.\textsuperscript{115}

Reflecting in 1927 on the events that unfolded in Philippolis between 1840 and 1860, Andrew Abraham Stockenström le Fleur I, who positioned himself as the heir of Adam Kok III wrote:

[H]ere [at Philippolis] was the place where by one stroke of the pen the freedom of the Griquas was taken away … here thanklessness surpasses all history of any civilized nation; here the mightiest power committed the darkest crime in African History. … What have we got for our fathers’ sacrifices. Yes, ours is a cruel History. Here might is right.\textsuperscript{116}

**Nomansland**

There was a strong feeling among the Philippolis Griqua by the end of the 1850s that they could no longer maintain their independence in Philippolis and that they should rather move to another area. Reflecting back in 1875 on factors inducing Griqua to trek (in a manner that revealed Griqua self-identification as ‘Natives’ prior to the 1880s) Adam Kok stated:

My reason for coming to this country [Nomansland] was that I saw no chance of my being able to stand as a Native against the Boers. I was surrounded by white men, and after long consideration I came to this conclusion: It was no longer right for me to remain where I was in that situation.\textsuperscript{117}

Treks were suggested to a few places. Adam Kok apparently responded positively to a proposal by Sir George Grey, the governor and high commissioner (on his visit to Philippolis in August 1858\textsuperscript{118}), that the Griqua should sell their remaining land to the Orange Free State government and move to Nomansland, a

\textsuperscript{114} Ross: *Griqua*, pp. 81-4, 91.
\textsuperscript{115} Dower: *Griqualand East*, pp. 9-11; Ross: *Griqua*, pp. 87-9; Schoeman: *Griqua captaincy*, p. 215.
\textsuperscript{116} *Griqua and Coloured People’s Opinion*, 18 February 1927.
\textsuperscript{117} Statement to 1875 Commission on 1 October 1875, G 37-76, *Report of a commission appointed to inquire into the affairs of the territory of Griqualand East* [1875 Land Commission] (Cape Town; Saul Solomon & Company Printers, 1876), p. 190.
\textsuperscript{118} Schoeman: *Griqua captaincy*, p. 234.
territory east of the Drakensberg. Nomansland was then thinly populated, partly due to the Mfecane upheaval and sour grazing, but was claimed by the Mpondo Chief Faku. Grey apparently hoped that the Griqua would bring stability to the area, prepare the land for later White settlement, and thus aid the annexation of the country between the Cape colony and Natal.

In 1859 a Griqua commission, together with over a hundred men, went to explore the suitability of Nomansland. Acting for Grey, Walter Currie, Commandant of the Frontier Mounted Police, guided the Commission and negotiated with Faku who agreed to surrender the “vacant” northern section of the country that was acknowledged to be his. Faku had earlier ceded the land between the Mtamvuna and the Mzimkulu rivers (which included the main part of the area that the Griqua considered trekking to) to Natal in 1850. The Griqua commission to Nomansland returned to Philippolis with a positive report. Most Griqua burghers of Philippolis agreed in 1860 to go to Nomansland. Kok subsequently entered into negotiations with the Cape government in regard to the boundaries of the land they would occupy and in regard to their status when they got there. On 1 August 1860 Grey set conditions for Griqua occupation in Nomansland. Kok was to administer justice among his people under laws, rules and regulations as enforced in Philippolis. Grey would guarantee possession of each Griqua farm against all British subjects. Grey also wanted the Griqua to go to Nomansland as British subjects.

**Ambiguous status – departure**

Grey informed Kok that if he went to Nomansland he should do so as a British subject. Kok, however, told Grey that he first had to bring the matter to his Raad before he could agree. Opposition was expressed to the condition set by Grey when Kok informed the Griqua, a number of whom though that it was a merely a proposal. Whilst at Hanglip before the trek across the Drakensberg, Kok received a letter from Grey stating that if he did not go to Nomansland as a British subject he should not go at all. It appears that some of the Griqua thought that they went to Nomansland as British subjects whilst others thought otherwise. Official discussions around the status of the Griqua in the new territory continued after the trek.

In preparation for the trek, farms, the church, school and parsonage were sold. A deed of sale was signed on 26 December 1861 in terms of which all remaining Griqua government land was acquired by the Orange Free State for the sum of £4000. An estimated 2000 people, comprising Griqua and some Tlhaping and

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119 Christopher Saunders: “Introduction”, in Dower: *Griqualand East*, p. xiii
121 In 1875 Adam III Kok wrote to the 1875 Land Commission in East Griqualand that from being a barren wild, this [country] is now a cultivated and civilized territory, and I might fairly ask, would the [Colonial] Government be in as able a position to-day to propose the annexation of this and the adjoining territories if I had not come here; and, even further, would Government be in that position at all? I know it was part of Sir G. Grey’s policy to place me here for that purpose, and I am glad that my assistance has been given to the spread of civilization in this part of South Africa. But Sir G. Grey’s intention was that my people should possess and enjoy the land.
123 G 37-76, Statement of Adam Kok, 1 October 1875, p. 195.
126 G 37-76, p. 194.
128 G 37-76, Statement of Adam Kok, 1 October 1875, p. 195.
130 Dower: *Griqualand East*, pp. 13; Ross: *Griquas*, p. 94.
Rolong – a number of whom were Griqua burghers, others being servants\textsuperscript{131} – trekked along with their ox-wagons and donkey carts to Nomansland across the Drakensberg in 1861, a number of people having already trekked as far as Hanglip, a mountain near the Gariep River in 1860. The Griqua lost many of their wagons on the trek whilst Sothos and mountain San raided many of their livestock. They were consequently quite impoverished when they reached Berg Vijftig (later called Mount Currie) in 1863. Semi-permanent dwellings of wood or mud were built at the settlement at Mount Currie where the Griqua settled for nine years until 1872 when they moved to a new town named Kokstad near the Mzimhlava River.\textsuperscript{132}

**Inhabitants**

By the 1870s individuals and communities of various backgrounds were in East Griqualand, thus making it somewhat like Griqualand West in the heterogeneity of the population and providing for similar socio-political and economic relations and identity permutations. There were by then, according to the report of the 1875 Land Commission “Europeans”, “Griquas”, “[d]escendants of Slaves and Apprentices”, “Hottentots”, “Basutos” and “Kafirs” in the territory.

In the 1870s East Griqualand was bounded in the north-west by the Drakensberg; in the east by the Ingowane and Umzimkulu rivers bounding the region from the Natal colony, and in the south by Pondoland. Sothos were mainly located between the Kenigha and Umzimvubu rivers in the north-west near the Drakensberg and Ntlangwinis in the east between the Umzimkulu River and the Zuurberg.\textsuperscript{133} Most Griqua resided in the Mount Currie district.

A number of Khoekhoe descendants and Bantu-speakers attached themselves to the Griqua in East Griqualand. The Griqua also attracted White traders. Many Khoekhoe descendants from the eastern Cape, especially former small farmers of the Kat River settlement, emigrated to East Griqualand. Many of those who moved to the region had well assimilated White socio-cultural elements and were regarded by Whites as the most progressive section of the population. They apparently found it difficult to be accorded immediate unqualified burgher rights or privileges, or to gain official positions.\textsuperscript{134} “Apprentices” (slave descendants) in particular complained much about their oppression by the Griqua.\textsuperscript{135} Resentment was caused due to the perception that influence was concentrated in certain families; that there was discrimination against, for example, “Apprentices” and “Bastaards”, and that “Griquas proper had privileges which the others had not”, for example, in regard to land grants, justice and influence.\textsuperscript{136} There was a feeling among those who came to the region with Kok that they should have a greater claim for land than those who came from the colony.\textsuperscript{137} However, the granting of burgher status by Adam Kok to Khoesan and slave descendants arriving from the colony allowed them to be regarded as Griqua.

Some Khoekhoe like Smith Pommer managed to establish deep links with Griqua segments and to develop significant influence over them. Born in the Kat River, Pommer “boasted that his blood was Hottentot without admixture, and that he took active part in the [Kat River] rebellion of 1850”.\textsuperscript{138} The influence of Pommer over the Griqua might have facilitated the incorporation of Khoekhoe who were under his

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\textsuperscript{131} CMK 5/15, pp. 67, 70-1; National Archives, Secretary of Native Affairs (NTS), 79, 1/15, Proceedings of the Court of the Magistrate of Mount Currie in case of Trustees of Griqua church properties vs George Abrahams and others, 1914; See also testimony of Cornelius de Bruin, Griqua Headman between 1898 and 1925 in Griqua and Coloured People’s Opinion, 27 March 1926.

\textsuperscript{132} Dower: Griqualand East, p. 12; Ross: Griquas, pp. 94-105, 122; Schoeman: Griqua captaincy, pp. 237, 240-3; Kokstad Advertiser, 2 February 1889.

\textsuperscript{133} G 37-76, pp. 90-1.

\textsuperscript{134} Ross: Griquas, p. 109.

\textsuperscript{135} G 58-79, p. 73.


\textsuperscript{137} G 58-79, p. 186.

\textsuperscript{138} G 58-79, p. 19.
leadership before the arrival of the Griqua in the region. Pommer had managed, prior to the arrival of the Griqua in the region, to establish shifting associations and alliances with Bantu-speaking leaders and communities in the surrounds. He could use his prior associations with, and influence over some Bantu-speakers, to increase his stature among the Griqua and to influence Griqua politics. His stature amongst the Griqua was manifested in the 1878 rebellion (dealt with further below).

Whilst Bantu-speakers could be varyingly incorporated into Griqua society, the process was even more difficult for them than for Khoekhoe or slave descendants. It was very unlikely for a Bantu-speaking African to assume the position in Griqua society that ‘outsiders’ like Pommer could attain. A few of the Sotho-Tswana might manage to get some position of junior authority, for example Jan Julie who was a field cornet under the Griqua government.140 Relations between Griqua and Bantu-speakers in East Griqualand mirrored in some ways earlier relations between Griqua and Bantu-speakers at Philippolis. Most of the Bantu-speaking communities in the region were, like the Griqua, recent immigrants. By 1860 Ntlangwinis and Bhacas had established themselves in Umzimkulu. Sothos, including Hlubi groups, moved from across the Drakensberg to establish themselves at Matatiele.141

A variety of relations were established with Bantu-speaking communities, some being conflictual and others being more amicable. Some amicable relations could become hostile. On their way to Nomansland the Griqua suffered heavy losses of livestock (cattle and horses), many of which were apparently sold in Natal and amongst the people of Faku. Kok and his followers suspected that Pushuli (the brother of Sotho Paramount Chief Moshoeshoe) and Nehemia Moshoeshoe (a son of Paramount Moshoeshoe), were behind the stealing.142 An ambiguous relation subsequently unfolded between Kok and Nehemia.

After the Griqua had crossed the Drakensberg in 1862 on their way to Nomansland, they rested for a few months near the Kenigha River in a tract of land then occupied by Nehemia Moshoeshoe, a short distance from Matatiele where Nehemia was based.143 Whilst at the Kenigha, Kok sought to obtain food from neighbouring communities in order to replenish his people before they trekked further. Kok also requested Nehemia to allow some of his men [Kok’s] to shoot some game on his land.144 Nehemia and his people apparently provided some of Kok’s people with food.145 However, Bhaca Chief Makaula, from Mount

139 G 58-79, pp. 19-20, 73, 98. The precariousness of alliances in the region suggested in the 1878 rebellion, in which Pommer featured significantly, mirrored aspects of Pommer’s own past. Pommer lived for some time after the 1851Kat River rebellion in Lesotho with his followers, comprising Khoekhoe as well as a few Bantu-speakers, who made several raids into the Orange River Sovereignty and also raided Sotho kraals. He married a “Bastard” woman whilst his sister married a Sotho man. Pommer however again fled from Lesotho to Venyani in the colony. Whilst in the colony he became involved in disputes between Pandomise, Tembu and Mpondo communities, aligning himself with one group against another. Horse thefts by his subjects against well-disposed Bhacas under Dushani who was located near Pommer lead to fighting between their communities. Pommer found his way into Natal and sometime later establish friendship with Sidoi who was then an outlaw in the Cape Colony from Natal. Pommer appears to have managed to restore relations between himself and Sotho Chief Nehemia Moshoeshoe – which had become hostile in consequence of stealing by Pommer’s people from Sothos. Nehemia and his people provided Pommer and his followers with food and refuge after they encountered difficulty. The arrival of the Griqua in 1862 in Nomansland allowed Pommer to consolidate his power base. He managed to develop such influence among the Griqua that many regarded him as a likely successor of Adam Kok III. G 58-79, pp. 19-20, 73, 98; See also G 37-76, pp. 100, 131-2.
142 G 37-76, pp. 124, 213-5.
143 G 37-76, pp. 57, 199.
144 G 37-76, p. 199.
Frere\textsuperscript{146} in the south stated in 1875 that before the Griqua came into the country, Nehemia invited him to assist him in attacking the Griqua whilst they were still making a road, but that he declined. On meeting Makaula, Adam Kok supposedly expressed his gladness to meet him on friendly terms as he heard from Nehemia that the Bhaca were about to attack him as soon as he moved across the Drakensberg. Makaula also asserted that Nehemia again invited him around 1873 to fight the Griqua, claiming that “[a]ll this country belongs to me [Nehemia]” but that he (Makaula) again declined to support him.\textsuperscript{147} Adam Kok also received information from Chief Sidoi, an ally and friend of Smith Pommer,\textsuperscript{148} that Nehemia endeavoured to persuade Mpondo Chief Umqikela to assist him to drive the Griqua out of the country, and that he proposed that Umqikela should attack them on the lower side and that he would, with the assistance of his father’s people, attack them on the upper side.\textsuperscript{149}

Not long after the Griqua had encamped near the Kenihga River, Nehemia asked them to depart because their horses were damaging his “gardens”. The Griqua subsequently moved to Berg Vijftig. Regular cattle and horse stealing and counter stealing occurred between the subjects of Kok and Nehemia which made for much hostility between the two communities.\textsuperscript{150} Livestock thefts also generated conflict between Griqua and Mpondo.\textsuperscript{151} The ethnic dimension of conflicts was however undercut by the trans-ethnic dimension of the stealing and counter stealing. Many of the subjects of Kok involved in cattle stealing against Nehemia’s subjects were themselves Sotho and Tswana subjects of Kok, a number of whom came with him from Philippolis.\textsuperscript{152} A number of Sothos also attached themselves to Kok after he arrived in Nomansland, some of whom were fugitives from Nehemia and other Sotho leaders.\textsuperscript{153} The Sothos who attached themselves to the Griqua were liable to be called ‘Griqua’, either by the Griqua themselves, or by Sothos under Nehemia, as happened with Sama, a subject of Nehemia whose association with the Griqua started after Nehemia asked him and a few other Sotho men to accompany Kok (after Kok had requested Nehemia for a resting place following their crossing of the Drakensberg). Some of these Sotho went into the service of Kok.\textsuperscript{154} Sama’s association with Kok ironically angered Nehemia, who, on one occasion, sent Qutya, another Sotho, to take Sama’s gun. On doing this, Qutya told Sama that he was one of Adam Kok’s people and was willing to go anywhere Kok sent him.\textsuperscript{155} Some of the Sotho who became subjects of Kok later detached themselves from the Griqua.\textsuperscript{156}

Even though individuals of Bantu-speaking origin might have called others of Bantu-speaking origin ‘Griqua’ on the basis of their association with the Griqua, they also had other more ancestral, somatic and cultural based conceptions of Griquaness that pointed to various dimensions of Griquaness as perceived by Griqua and Bantu-speaking Africans. Nehemia Moshoeshoe stated in the 1860s that the Griqua were “Bushmen and Korannas, and afraid to follow up our things”, that is, to retake their stolen cattle from the Sotho.\textsuperscript{157}

Perceptions of difference amongst Africans influenced the content that was given to colonial population categories. Although Adam Kok referred to himself before the 1875 Land Commission as a ‘Native’,\textsuperscript{158} the

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{146} G 58-79, p. 3. \\
\textsuperscript{147} G 37-76, pp. 61-2. \\
\textsuperscript{148} G 58-79, p. 20. \\
\textsuperscript{149} G 37-76, pp. 57, 255-6. \\
\textsuperscript{150} G 37-76, pp. 57, 199-201, 252-3. \\
\textsuperscript{151} G 37-76, p. 69. \\
\textsuperscript{152} See e.g. G 37-76, pp. 63, 101. \\
\textsuperscript{153} G 37-76, pp. 106, 115, 242, 248, 251. \\
\textsuperscript{154} G 37-76, pp. 209, 234. \\
\textsuperscript{155} G 37-76, p. 20. \\
\textsuperscript{156} G 37-76, p. 212. \\
\textsuperscript{157} Statement of Philander Gouws, 4 October 1875, G 37-76, p. 220. \\
\textsuperscript{158} Statement to 1875 Land Commission on 1 October 1875, G. 37-76, p. 190.
\end{flushright}
category was apparently already being redefined and used differently amongst Africans. Chief Lehana distinguished before the same Commission between “a Griqua and a native” who brought him a message from Adam Kok.\(^\text{159}\) It appears that the category of ‘Native’ was by the 1870s already being separated from Griquaness even though Griqua like Adam Kok might still have called themselves ‘Natives’. The negotiation of the meaning of the category of ‘Native’ amongst Africans suggested broader socio-cultural and ethno-‘racial’ self-positioning that could both impact on, and be influenced by official and legal deployment of population categories.

Griqua repression of (other) African communities and discrimination against non-Griqua would encourage differentiation and discord between Griqua and non-Griqua that could be undercut by alliances. In part through establishing alliances with some Bantu-speaking leaders, the Griqua established a loose hegemony over a number of small Bantu-speaking communities in the region\(^\text{160}\) that allowed their government to gain significant revenue through taxation. A hut tax was, for example, levied in designated locations for Bantu-speakers, with approximately 43% of Griqua revenue coming from the hut tax by 1874. Some of the Bantu-speaking communities that attached themselves to the Griqua did so in order to use them against other Bantu-speaking communities.

The Griqua had relatively little difficulty controlling more recent Bantu-speaking arrivals in the region in contrast to those more distantly located who had lived in the surrounds of East Griqualand much longer, for example, the Bhaca under Makaula located around Mount Frere in the south. Troubles with Makaula around cattle stealing led to a successful Mfengu supported Griqua attack on him in 1871 led by ‘Rooi’ Jan Pienaar. The Griqua party burned many Bhaca huts, supposedly killed fifty men, and took a number of Bhaca as prisoners. Around 1400 cattle, 500 horses and 1700 sheep were captured.\(^\text{161}\) Makaula was given a fine of several hundred cattle. The subsequent distribution of Bhaca cattle in turn generated further discord.\(^\text{162}\)

Ambiguity in relations with Bantu-speakers was also manifested in the allocation of land. Farms were given to a number of Rolong and Tlhaping who came with Adam Kok to the region. A number of the Bantu-speakers who arrived later were also rewarded with farms for faithful service. However, on 2 August 1868 the Volksraad passed a resolution that farms were not to be granted to “Kafirs” or Bantu-speakers. The resolution was not, however, strictly adhered to.\(^\text{163}\)

A few White traders also became involved with the Griqua in the early period, notably Donald Strachan and Charles G Brisley, whose names would feature much during later Griqua land grievances. Strachan and Brisley acquired burgher rights and apparently found it much easier to be appointed to official positions than recent immigrants who were not White. Strachan, who lived near the Mzimkulu River before the Griqua arrival, became a magistrate and a veldkornet for the Umzimkulu district. Brisley traded at the laager at Mount Currie and became secretary of Adam Kok’s government\(^\text{164}\) from 1867 to 1874.\(^\text{165}\) A number of people, however, resented the growing influence of Brisley over the Griqua government, notably Smith Pommer.\(^\text{166}\)

\(\text{159}\) Statement to 1875 Commission, [day not indicated], G 37-76, p. 115.
\(\text{161}\) Ross: *Griquas*, pp. 118-121; Saunders: “Notes”, p. 145.
\(\text{162}\) Dower: *Griqualand East*, p. 43.
\(\text{163}\) CMK 5/16, pp. 231,163.
\(\text{164}\) Ross: *Griquas*, pp. 106, 114.
\(\text{165}\) G 58-79, p. 164.
\(\text{166}\) See Dower: *Griqualand East*, pp. 33-4, 59.
Traditional Khoekhoe culture in Nomansland

Although there were strong tendencies among the Griqua to become like the Whites culturally, some aspects of traditional Khoekhoe culture that were practiced in Philippolis were also carried into East Griqualand. Edward Dower noted a *maatjie huis* that was still used some time after the trek by an old widow who refused to live in another type of house. A number of Griqua also spoke a Khoekhoe dialect. Adam Kok’s wife, “Lady Kok,” could, according to Walter Stanford, speak the Dutch language quite well but preferred to speak “the Hottentot language.” According to Dower, she “spoke the old Griqua tongue to perfection” with a few of her female attendants who “were able to understand and speak with her.” A number of men who went to Klein Klaas’ house after Captain Blyth had held a meeting with the Griqua shortly after his arrival in Kokstad in 1876 “spoke in Griqua.” However, very little of traditional Khoekhoe culture was reproduced in the region as time passed. The Griqua from East Griqualand came to represent one of the most Westernized Griqua segments. Griqua introduction of practices modelled on colonial ones facilitated the extension of colonial control over East Griqualand. Growing colonial influence ultimately led to the marginalization of Griqua and Bantu-speaking communities by Whites which in turn encouraged rather tenuous alliances against the new White rulers.

Ambiguous autonomy

Just as it was with Griqua captaincies in Griqualand West, the Griqua stood in an ambiguous relation to the colonial government, treated at times as if they were independent and at other times as if they were British subjects. Although there appears to have been some uncertainty amongst Griqua about their status, the perception that they were not British subjects tended to be reinforced by the unwillingness of the British to assist the Griqua after they approached colonial government officials with their problems. When Kok visited Philip Woodhouse (who had replaced George Grey as colonial governor) in 1866, explaining the difficulties Griqua had with Mpondos and other communities owing to cattle stealing, reminding Woodhouse of the settlement conditions concluded with Grey, believing he was an ally of the British by treaty, he was told to endeavour to remain in peace with neighbouring communities, and to manage as best as he could. Kok was informed that he would not be interfered with by the colonial government and that he must look entirely to his own resources for his protection as he was entirely independent of the Cape government.

The autonomy of the Griqua was ultimately determined by contenting White interest groups. Pressure for the annexation East Griqualand was increased in the 1870s by White settlers and colonial administrators. White settlers desired Griqua-owned land whilst colonial administrators were much concerned with the maintenance of order in the Transkei. As with the events of the 1840s and 1850s in Philippolis, the events of the mid-1870s and early 1880s pertaining to Griqua autonomy and land ownership generated lingering grievance amongst successive Griqua generations.

Cape administrative takeover

On 16 October 1874 Governor Sir Henry Barkly informed the Griqua in Kokstad that the colonial government would take over the administration of the affairs of East Griqualand. Annexation of the

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167 Dower: *Griqualand East*, p. 5.
168 Dower: *Griqualand East*, p. 57.
170 Dower: *Griqualand East*, p. 57.
country would, however, only be formally affected in 1879.\textsuperscript{175} In terms of the 1874 administrative takeover, the British resident for Transkei, JM Orpen, would carry out the government of the country under instruction. The country would be administered as part of the Transkeian Territories. Titles to land were to remain in their present position until the colonial government confirmed them after an inquiry.\textsuperscript{176} Whilst many Griqua were shocked and angered by the announcement by the Cape governor, Reverend William Dower, their minister, whose views on colonial control of East Griqualand differed much with those of many of the Griqua,\textsuperscript{177} was delighted by the announcement. For him the extension of British administration meant progress:

> It put a stop, almost at once, to a good deal of objectionable favouritism and nepotism, and some hoary mal-practices, which sprang more from the miserable weakness of the central authority than from any actual and intentional dishonesty. People who valued justice, equality, impartiality, and fair play, breathed more freely. This act increased, at once, and by fourfold, the value of every foot of land in the territory: it opened the door for capital and industry. Did the Griquas view it in that light? By no means. To hint at the benefits likely to follow the “annexation” was to be regarded as a traitor to their “self-standigheid”. They became sullen and irritated. Even those who had secretly longed for the change had cried out bitterly against the way in which it had been effected. The “oorneming” – “annexation” created a new grievance … . The head and front of the offending lay in this, that they had not been consulted. … They had been “taken over like so many cattle or sheep.” They were not livestock, “or Kaffirs”, or “onbeschafed”, or “helots”, but Burghers of a state”, “a people”, “a natie”. … To use of all lofty titles, which in the more enlightened, excite a smile, they had become thoroughly accustomed, and felt no incongruity in the use of them. … Certain it is that annexation had saved them from civil strife, and opened opportunities otherwise unattainable. But these people were blinded by prejudice, ignorance, and pride.\textsuperscript{178}

Some Griqua views appear to have been in some respects in line with those of Dower. Although many opposed administrative takeover, some appear to have favoured it. It was especially those people who felt oppressed or marginalized in East Griqualand who expressed approval administrative takeover.\textsuperscript{179}

Subsequent to the announcement of the takeover Adam Kok sent a deputation to Cape Town, comprising Donald Strachan and Charles Brisley, to engage with the colonial government on the conditions of colonial administration.\textsuperscript{180} Kok did not inform the general Griqua people nor the Raad about the purpose of their departure.\textsuperscript{181} Although Kok might have hoped that Strachan and Brisley would attempt to secure Griqua power in the region, direct colonial control held in benefits for them that disinclined them from attempting to secure Griqua control in East Griqualand. Strachan and Brisley acquired a substantial amount of land before the administrative takeover. “Annexation meant to them immediate wealth”. Securing Griqua control or the “retrocession” that many Griqua might favoured “would defer that wealth by deferring the certain rise in the value of land”.\textsuperscript{182}

Griqua attempts at curbing the erosion of their power met little success. Much resentment was generated through the entrenchment of colonial power, especially through the allocation of land by colonial officials. Whites also invoked racial ideology in justifying the marginalization of Africans. Many Whites reasoned that the Griqua were in decline. In the Standard and Mail of 5 March 1875, the Griqua were represented as

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{175} Saunders: “Notes”, p. 149.
  \item \textsuperscript{176} Ross: Griquas, pp.126-4; Dower: Griqualand East, pp. 46, 51-52.
  \item \textsuperscript{177} See e.g. G 58-79, pp. 73, 187, 195.
  \item \textsuperscript{178} Dower: Griqualand East, pp. 52-53.
  \item \textsuperscript{179} See e.g. G 37-76, p. 90.
  \item \textsuperscript{180} G 58-79, pp. 6, 154.
  \item \textsuperscript{181} G 58-79, pp. 170, 197, 202.
  \item \textsuperscript{182} Dower: Griqualand East, p. 71.
\end{itemize}
“an utterly hopeless race, and a set of rascals”. The representation in the Standard and Mail reflected for Adam Kok the betrayal of the Griqua by the British.\textsuperscript{183}

Although the Griqua thought that they had brought ‘civilization’ to the region, administrative takeover was itself projected as bringing in just rule by a ‘civilized’ form government to the region, and those Griqua who did not favour it were portrayed as opponents of a ‘civilized’ form government.\textsuperscript{184} The ensuing Griqua marginalization encouraged some of them to join forces amongst themselves and to establish alliances with Bantu-speakers against the colonists. Alliances between Griqua and Bantu-speakers were, however, also undermined through Griqua attempts at having segments of them removed from certain portions of land.

\textbf{1875 Land Commission}

Orpen’s successor, TA Cumming, who became the first resident magistrate of Kokstad, arrived in Kokstad on 25 March 1875 to exercise joint jurisdiction with Adam Kok. In June 1875 Charles Griffith, Samuel Probart and Thomas Cumming were commissioned to enquire into the bona-fides of all land transaction by the Griqua government, and to investigate the claims of those who had not yet received their grants of land. Edward Barker became secretary of the Land Commission. There were subsequently many applications for farms and erven. The report of the Commission was to form the basis of the government’s dealings in regard to the allocation of farms and erven.\textsuperscript{185}

A number of guiding principles were set for the Commission: (i) The land claims of all bona-fide title-holders were to be first provided for, and then (ii) the claims based on certificates. (iii) The aggregate acreage of locations “for the use of Kaffir and Basuto tribes” were to be maintained more or less as they were when granted by the Griqua chief and his government. (iv) The balance of land that remained was to be distributed among (a) landless burghers who trekked over the mountain, (b) their adult sons, and (c) Griqua and other residents who had done public service.

The Griqua apparently assented to all these principles of land distribution “except, the third, which became … a great bone of contention between them and the Government”. The Griqua claimed that all the land in the “Basuto and Kaffir” locations should have been reserved for distribution amongst themselves and their children.\textsuperscript{186}

\textbf{Kok’s death}

Adam Kok was concerned about the threat to Griqua land ownership and attempted to secure Griqua land ownership on the basis of earlier agreements with the colonial government.\textsuperscript{187} The little influence that the Griqua could exert on the colonial government was lessened even further with the death of Adam Kok on 30 December 1875 after an accident whilst travelling on a cart.\textsuperscript{188} According to Dower, with “[t]he death of the Chief, and the burial with him of all hopes of a return to the old position, … [s]everal [of his followers] found the bottom knocked out of all their cherished hope of advancement”.\textsuperscript{189} Three days after Kok’s death the Griqua Raad temporarily elected Cornelius van der Westhuizen, a longstanding councillor, as provisional kaptyn.\textsuperscript{190} Van der Westhuizen’s election was opposed by members of the Committee of

\textsuperscript{183} G. 37-76, p. 74.
\textsuperscript{184} See e.g. G 37-76, p. 90.
\textsuperscript{185} Dower: Griqualand East, pp. 55, 73-4. By the time of the appointment of the Commission in 1875, 345 titles had been issued for farms in East Griqualand. G 37-76, p. 43.
\textsuperscript{186} Dower: Griqualand East, p. 74.
\textsuperscript{187} See Adam Kok, Kokstad to CD Griffiths, JA Probart, TA Cumming, 30 August 1875 in G 37-76, pp. 74-6.
\textsuperscript{188} Dower: Griqualand East, pp. 75-6.
\textsuperscript{189} Dower: Griqualand East, p. 85.
\textsuperscript{190} Dower: Griqualand East, pp. 58-9, 82; G 58-79, pp. 160, 166.
Twelve (appointed in 1874 to deal with the predicament generated by administrative takeover at a meeting where 160 Griqua signed a memorial to the colonial government critical of the control of their country by the Cape colony).

Van der Westhuizen was denied official recognition as Kok’s successor and was not allowed a role in the administration of the territory. Some of those who protested against Van der Westhuizen’s election wanted a permanent chief to be appointed. Members of the Raad and the Committee of Twelve managed to establish cooperative relations and a joint stance against the administrative takeover shortly after Adam Kok’s death. The Committee of Twelve and the Raad did however not exist for long after the death of Adam Kok. The termination of Griqua self-governance made the Griqua Raad redundant. The existence of the Committee of Twelve, on the other hand, was brought to an end by the authoritarian Captain Blyth after his arrival in Kokstad in 1876.

Griqua land woes were exacerbated when the Cape government released them from interdicts against the sale of land to foreigners. The sale of land increased rapidly in the period after the death of Kok. Many farms were bought or claimed as payment for debt by White traders and speculators. A delay in the issuing of the report of the Land Commission increased tension that was further raised by the arrival in February 1876 of F Watermeyer, St v Erskine and CC Henkel who were to begin a general survey of the country. Many Griqua felt that the colonial government was acting wrongly by introducing radical changes allegedly in variance with its undertaking to manage the affairs of East Griqualand without introducing extensive change. Many among the Griqua also thought that the colonial government exceeded its rights and broke its promises by commencing with a general survey without the consent of the people. Rumours also emerged at this time about hostility and intrigue in which Smith Pommer’s name featured prominently. Pommer, who was based at Riet Vlei, was suspected to be scheming with Chief Sidoi.

**Captain Blyth**

A climate of heightened tension significantly influenced the way in which TA Cumming’s successor, Captain Math Blyth, dealt with the Griqua on and after his arrival at Kokstad.

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192 This memorial followed another memorial formulated soon after the announcement of an administrative takeover but before TA Cumming was positioned at Kokstad as British Resident. By the time the second memorial was drawn up TA Cumming was at Kokstad, having replaced Orpen as British Resident. The first memorial or petition was given to the Griqua government. The second memorial was first given to Captain Kok and then to Cumming who was requested to give it to the colonial government. See Statement of Piet Bezuidenhout before Commission into 1878 rebellion, G 58-79, pp. 154-6, 197.
193 The petitioners wanted the takeover to be reconsidered; they also wanted land extensions and farms in the “locations” of Bantu-speakers to be given to the Griqua, and that those who came “over the mountains” with Adam Kok to have greater privileges than others under the new regime. G 58-79, pp. 6, 30-1, 127, 133-5, 155-8, 182.
196 See statement of Adam Smith, G 58-79, 198.
198 Ross: *Griquas*, p. 129.
200 Before members of the 1875 Land Commission made available their report (in 1876) they recommended that the government send a qualified surveyor to map out the whole country, who would made correct diagrams of land already allotted and of the land still to be allotted. G 37-76, pp. 42-3.
Blyth came to Kokstad with the military spirit which said: “I’ll make these upsetting Griqua fellows knuckle down, you’ll see.” The Griquas on the other hand met him saying to themselves: “Does this fire-eater think that he is to order us about and deal with us as if we were Kaffirs?”

Blyth arrived in Kokstad on 27 March 1876 with an escort of 100 Cape Mounted Rifles with the intention of establishing order in the region. On approaching Kokstad he was informed that “there was a very disaffected spirit amongst the Griquas, who were almost ripe for anything”. In his attempt to instil order amongst the Griqua, Blyth further fuelled Griqua discord. He considered the Committee of Twelve a treasonable body fomenting rebelliousness and prohibited its meetings when he arrived in Kokstad. Blyth also requested the key for the magazine on his arrival, informing the Griqua that he wanted to put his ammunition wagon into it. After an apparently drunken William Kok subsequently attempted to snatch a gun from a policeman Blyth ordered that Griqua houses suspected of having guns be searched, causing much unhappiness in the process.

The arrival of Blyth disturbed some of the established social relations and etiquette. His arrival in East Griqualand thus had implications for relations between various socio-cultural segments in the region. In the words of Adam Smith before the Commission into the 1878 East Griqualand rebellion:

I consider that there was a strong feeling against Captain Blyth, because he appeared to take more notice and pay more respect to Kafirs than to Griquas. I had also noticed since Captain Blyth came that there is quite a difference in the intimacy of the Griquas with the white residents, the white people keeping themselves at a distance from the Griquas which caused offence. I have noticed that if Griquas were conversing in the street that Captain Blyth expected you to leave off talking and salute him as he passed [sic], or if that was not done it gave offence.

**1878 rebellion**

Much dissatisfaction was caused by the 1875 Commission and colonial surveyors who began to work in 1876. There was a perception that the 1875 Land Commission rejected good claims and entertained bad ones. A number of Griqua felt that the surveyors were not impartial. A number of Griqua who felt that they were treated unfairly by colonial officials considered taking up arms. Resentment reached a high point in the rebellion of 1878 that was activated by a verbal confrontation between Lodewyk Kok and an English storekeeper named Pringle at his store on 20 February 1878. Lodewyk’s brother, Adam ‘Muis’, came to his assistance during the quarrel. Both of them were arrested. Adam and Lodewyk were each released on £10 bail and summoned to appear before the Kokstad court on Monday 25 February. Adam, however, absconded to Pondoland. Instead of being tried for actions in relation to the Pringle affair, Lodewyk was charged for creating a disturbance and for allegedly having used treasonable speech two weeks before in Matatiele where an effort was supposedly made to “enlist the Basutos in an enterprize against the British Government”. The jury of twelve Griqua found him guilty. Lodewyk was sentenced to six months imprisonment. A warrant was issued on the same day for the arrest of Adam.

After absconding Adam met with Smith Pommer and considered the action to be taken against colonial authorities. The two met again on 12 April near Kokstad, Adam arriving with 94 Mpondo. Prior to this

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202 Dower: *Griqualand East*, p. 86.
206 G. 58-79, pp. 30-3, 64-5, 74.
207 G 58-79, p. 201.
210 G 58-79, pp. 6, 33-4, 146-7, 190.
meeting, groups of rebels seized some cattle and property of some Whites at the instruction of Adam and Pommer. Pommer had by then also cut telegraph lines and detained two Whites, taking from them items like guns, ammunition and livestock, including horses. In anticipation of a revolt led by Adam and Pommer, White inhabitants of Kokstad were ordered to go into laager.

On Saturday 13 April the rebels set up camp on Mount Currie where the old Griqua laager used to be. Those who gathered at the location of the old laager totalled, according to Blyth,211 around 500 people comprising Griqua, Mpondo and other Bantu-speaking Africans. Pommer apparently demanded a meeting with Blyth who took the gathering as a challenge to his authority. Blyth had with him Cape Mounted Rifles as well as a number of Sotho, Fingo and Bhaca. There were also about 80 Griqua at Blyth’s disposal, many of whom had sons, brothers, cousins and even some fathers among the followers of Adam and Pommer. Some of the Griqua who were with Blyth included former Griqua government officials and Raad members.212 Most of the rebels were young men.213

On 14 April Blyth commanded an attack on the rebel camp. The Mpondo quickly gave themselves up without resisting. A number of Griqua, including Adam, were killed in the subsequent skirmish. The rest of the rebels fled in the direction of Mpondoland. The colonial forces encountered the rebels on 17 April in the Ingeli Mountains where Pommer and twenty-two others, were killed. Eight people on the side of the colonial government were also killed.214

In May 131 rebels were shipped to Cape Town via Durban to be tried. They were, however, returned after the Supreme Court declared that the Colonial government had no legal right to detain them as they were not regarded as British subjects. The rebels were subsequently tried in East Griqualand for various offences under Griqua law. Those found to have merely shared in the outbreak were dismissed with a caution. Those who found guilty of assault, robbery and theft were punished.215

In the year following the rebellion East Griqualand was formally annexed.216 The challenges of the Griqua increased after annexation. Griqua and Bantu-speakers were increasingly marginalized economically and politically with the increase of Whites who established mechanisms to secure their influence and interests. White farming associations were formed after 1882. White interests were also articulated through the Kokstad Advertiser established in 1882.217 Whites also organized themselves politically and developed shared interest in the establishment of local municipal government for their benefit.218

Ethno-‘racial’ cooperation amongst Whites and the marginalization of other communities in turn encouraged ethno-‘racial’ as well as trans-ethnic alliances amongst marginalized communities. Elsewhere in the Cape individuals with a similar socio-historical background as the Griqua thought about the development of mechanisms that would promote their interests and stem the tide of colonial restrictions. Individuals explored in this context, inter alia, the necessity of unity and joint action amongst the “coloured

_211_ For Blyth’s account of rebellion see, G. 58-79, pp. 63-7.
_213_ Ross: Griquas, p. 131.
_216_ Although an Annexation Act for East Griqualand was already passed in 1877 the region became technically part of the Cape Colony on 1 October 1879 through an annexation proclamation issued on 17 September 1879 under the Annexation Act. Saunders: “Notes”, p. 149.
_217_ The Kokstad Advertiser was initially owned by ‘Yankee’ Wood, “a Negro citizen of the U.S.A.” and at the onset edited by a Scottish man. Their association with the paper was brief. Kokstad Advertiser, 14 March 1963, p. 6.
_218_ Kokstad Advertiser, 7 April, 24 June, 1 December 1882; 10 November 1883.
classes” and an overarching name and organization for them; the establishment of a newspaper to promote their interests; the utility of missionaries, and factors that curbed “coloured” prosperity. An attempt was made to include the Griqua in these broader moves. In 1884 the Reverends Van Rooyen and Cameron of Uitenhage invited the Griqua of East Griqualand to send representatives to a conference that was to be held in Port Elizabeth to commemorate the emancipation of slaves in 1834 and at the same time to consider means of promoting the welfare of the “coloured classes”. The aims of the conference were formulated as follows:

1. – In commemoration of the Emancipation of slaves in this Colony, and on celebrating the Jubilee thereof, we propose to hold a general meeting for the promotion of the following objects.
2. – A more general and closer union among the coloured classes, who have hitherto been more or less separated by unimportant distinction.
3. – To decide on a name which may supersede the various names by which the coloured classes are called.
4. – To consider the advisability of starting a public paper suited especially to the coloured classes, in which they may give expression to their views, and by which they may place themselves before the public as occasion may require.
5. – To consider the good which has resulted from Missionary influence, and whether great results might not follow the use of other collateral means.
6. – To consider what are the causes which have prevented the prosperity of the coloured classes in the past.
7. – To promote an association with a head centre and branches in different towns and villages for the furtherance of union, self-dependence, and temperance.
8. – To insist on the necessity of faithfully educating our children, and of availing ourselves of the facilities offered by Government for training them as artisans.

Manifesting the socio-historical location of the organizers and the social categories they might have targeted, the organizers of the meeting indicated that opportunity would be “taken at the meeting to express our deep and sincere loyalty to Her Majesty our beloved Queen, and our gratitude to the English nation for the Emancipation of the slaves of the Colony in the year 1834”. Meetings were held by Griqua on 23 and 30 December 1884 to consider the invitation. Reverend Dower, APD Smith, Fred Werner and W Kok dissuaded the Griqua from sending representatives to the meeting. It appears that confusion about the political connections of the organizers of the conference with the “Africander Bond” influenced Griqua rejection of the invitation.  

The invitation to the above meeting connects the Griqua to a broader process of identity negotiation and positioning in the colony in which particular meaning was being imputed to categories like ‘Coloured’, ‘Griqua’, and ‘Native’. Whilst the Coloured category was used much as a general category to include all people not considered European/White before the 1890s, as reflected in the population censuses of 1865, 1875, 1880, and 1875, the occasion of the conference, that is, the commemoration of the emancipation of slaves, suggest that the meaning of Coloured in the proposition of “closer union among the coloured classes” was already being relatively narrowly delimited by the 1880s as a self-referential category to exclude Bantu-speaking Africans who were never formally enslaved. Bantu-speakers were also contributing to the ascent of the restricted sense of the Coloured category. The association of the Coloured category with a slave heritage was affirmed in Invo Zabantsundu (Black Opinion) in response to the promotion of the conference of Van Rooyen and Cameron:

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219 Kokstad Advertiser, 10 January 1885, p. 2.
221 G 42-76, Results of a census of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, taken on the night of Sunday, the 7th March, 1875. Part 1 – Summaries (Cape Town: Saul Solomon and Co. Printers, 1877), p. 3.
222 Kokstad Advertiser, 10 January 1885, p. 2.
In the progress of the Coloured people … may be seen an instance of a people who have been, ever since the emancipation, endeavouring to force their way into the pale of European society, but the circumstances … have rendered the attempt futile; and we hail this harking back upon lines which alone can make them a society conscious of its independence and vitality.  

It seems there was a special impetus for using the Coloured category self-referentially in a restricted sense in places with significant numbers of Bantu-speakers and ethno-‘racial’ discrimination, for example, East Griqualand and more broadly in the eastern districts of the Cape colony, or in places experiencing a significant increase in Bantu-speakers, for example the Western Cape from the 1870s. Biological racism; White discrimination against those not considered White, especially ‘Natives’; attempts at averting discrimination and the erosion of privileges; the associations of ‘Nativeness’ with inferiority and primitiveness; and tension generated by labour competition, all encouraged internal differentiation amongst the ethno-‘racial’ underclasses, distancing from associations with ‘Nativeness’, and the self-referential deployment of the Coloured category in a restricted sense fostering the ethnification of the designated people.

Although the ‘Coloured’ and ‘Native’ categories were becoming more exclusive, they were by 1885 still used relatively loosely. The category of ‘Coloured’ could still include those considered ‘Native’. The category of ‘Native’ could also include those considered ‘Griqua’ and ‘Coloured’. For example, Smith is reported to have questioned at the above meeting “how such a confederation could benefit either the Griquas or any other natives in the Colony”. In pointing out the impracticalities of the proposals of Van Rooyen and Cameron, Dower reasoned that the “wide diversity of feeling and language and the distances separating the various tribes of natives would render any amalgamation of the kind proposed impossible, whilst the first difficulty which presented itself with regard to the establishment of a paper would be what language it should be published in”. Although Griqua leaders did not respond positively to the invitation from Van Rooyen and Cameron, their objectives foreshadowed the twentieth century objectives and activities Andrew Abraham Stockenström le Fleur I who arrived in East Griqualand with his family in 1885 at the age 17.

Conclusion

The fluidity of early Khoe-San group identities encouraged much by nomadism and related group splitting was interrupted by the disruption of traditional survival strategies with the onset of European settlement. Colonialism spurned broader categories of ‘Hottentot’ and ‘Bushman’ contributing to broader identification amongst Khoe-San descendants. Categorized as ‘Hottentot’, San incorporated into the colonial labour force were also liable to assume a ‘Hottentot’ identity. The inferior social status conferred on ‘Hottentots’ and ‘Bushmen’ inclined many Khoe-San descendants to assume alternative Christian and Bastaard identities.

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224 For example, the 1891 census figures for the population of East Griqualand were: “European or White” 4 150, “Malay” 4, “Hottentot” 286, “Fingo” 40 976, “Kaffir and Bechuana” 102 884, and “Mixed and Other” 4 327. The Griqua were included in the “Mixed and Other” category. The figures for Port Elizabeth were: “European or White” 13 939, “Malay” 900, “Hottentot” 851, “Fingo” 990, “Kaffir and Bechuana” 3 455, and “Mixed and Other” 5 273. The figures for Uitenhage were: “European or White” 7 185, “Malay” 194, “Hottentot” 1 621, “Fingo” 1 885, “Kaffir and Bechuana” 6 903, and “Mixed and Other” 3 159. The figures for the Cape Town region were: “European or White” 48 544, “Malay” 11 105, “Hottentot” 514, “Fingo” 100, “Kaffir and Bechuana” 1 107, and “Mixed and Other” 35 913. G 6-92, pp. 18-9.
226 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 10 January 1885, p. 2.
The emergence of the Griqua exemplified the socio-cultural and identity dislocation and reconfiguration resulting from colonialism. The polity basis of Griqua identity also allowed Khoekhoe descendants and other people of diverse backgrounds incorporated into Griqua polities to develop and retain a varying association with the indigenous Khoekhoe. Griqua polities were relatively open to the extent that people of diverse socio-cultural backgrounds could move into them, be subjected to Griqua rule, and be liable to associate with the Griqua and acquire a Griqua identity derived from burgher status and identification with Griqua polities. Incorporation was, however, not equal. Those of Khoekhoe, slave and part-European descent had a greater chance for full incorporation than those of Bantu-speaking origin, reflecting thus the impact of colonial values on Griqua polities and on their relations with others. Despite the diverse origins of the Griqua, a sense of peopleness and nationhood strongly linked to Christianness was forged in Griqua polities and (as shown in subsequent chapters) drawn on by Griqua after the demise of Griqua polities as source of pride and an idealized frame of reference. Early political divergences within Griqua communities led to the emergence of separate polities under different captains. Separate captaincies provided different locales and leadership bases around which specific Griqua identities could develop.
Chapter 3: Griqua land struggle in East Griqualand (1894-1898)

Positioned as heir of Chief Adam Kok III, Andrew Abraham Stockenström le Fleur assumed a significant role in Griqua politics from 1894 and became the most prominent Griqua leader of the twentieth century, with an enduring impact on Griqua identity politics. His activities between 1894 and 1898 in East Griqualand had a decisive influence on his twentieth century activities. This chapter explores his formative period; his engagement in land claims politics in East Griqualand between 1894 and 1898 and the ethnic and trans-ethnic politicking this entailed. Through Le Fleur, the chapter shows the varied and ambiguous nature of Griqua engagement with the colonial world and colonial culture, much influenced by their constitution in an African-European colonial inter-cultural juncture. Le Fleur was subjected to divergent and contradictory social forces. He was influenced by the African-European inter-cultural colonial location and people around him but also impacted on his socio-political environment and those around him. His socio-political orientation was much shaped within a Griqua environment. He in turn had a significant influence on Griqua politics and identities from 1894 and, as shown in subsequent chapters, even after his death in 1941 into the early post-apartheid period through the Griqua National Conference (GNC) established in 1920. The GNC had a significant influence on post-apartheid Khoe-San revivalism. This chapter and subsequent ones on Le Fleur are thus also a study of the dialectic between the individual (Le Fleur), and collectives (Griqua, Bantu-speaking Africans and Coloureds), varying influencing each other as they attempted to shape their socio-political and economic environment. In providing a background to ethno-'racial' differentiation and the ambiguity and tenuousness of trans-ethnic alliances amongst ethno-'racial' underclasses, the chapter also shows how the terms ‘Native’ and ‘Aboriginal’ were by the late 1880s being redefined and steadily associated with notions of purity by Whites as well as by Griqua who thereby attempted to show that they could not by virtue of the purported infusion of ‘European blood’ be categorized as ‘Native’, in a context in which those categorized as ‘Native’ were being increasingly subjected to restrictive measures. The chapter also shows the early linking of the Griqua and Coloured categories and their de-linking from the ‘Native’ category by Griqua people.

The period between 1894 and 1898 in which Andrew le Fleur assumed a prominent position in East Griqualand was one of heightened discontent against White colonists. Socio-economic and political grievances were compounded by environmental crises. Shared marginalization and oppression led to attempts at alliances that were at the same time undermined through ethno-'racial' differentiation, discrimination, distrust and suspicion – amongst subordinated communities themselves. Socio-political ambivalence and contradictions amongst subordinated communities were manifested sharply in Le Fleur. Le Fleur came to be seen by many amongst subordinated communities in East Griqualand as heir of Adam Kok III and as a leader through whom lost land and independence would be restored. However, Le Fleur, like his contemporaries, displayed both aspirations for differentiation and unity of Griqua and Bantu-speakers and manifested tendencies that both complied with and challenged the colonial order, suggesting thus the articulation of, and movement between opposing discourses, that is, ethnic and trans-ethnic discourses, and discourses promoting constitutional conduct and those promoting rebellion. Alliance politics and tendencies towards compliance or rebellion in East Griqualand were much influenced by the responsiveness of colonial authorities to concerns of subordinated communities. Shifts in Le Fleur’s own strategies between 1894 and 1898 were also influenced by his chieftainship aspirations and his association with members of the Griqua Committee and the Committee’s relations to Bantu-speakers – which were themselves much the shaped by the response of the government to Griqua concerns. Le Fleur’s own aspiration to be heir of Adam Kok III and the stature that he developed served to make him a channel for the articulation of the social grievances of the underclasses, leading him to become involved in an abortive rebellion in December 1897 that led to his decisive break with conventional protest politics and trans-ethnic alliances. Still reflecting the influence of the Griqua ideal for land ownership and his shaping in a Griqua environment, Le Fleur would, in the twentieth century, again attempt to attain land-ownership for the Griqua, as well as for ‘Coloureds’ more generally, albeit, as a loyal citizen, in terms of market principles, and beyond traditional Griqua areas; and, in the process of doing so, Le Fleur would influence significantly the articulation of Griqua identities and Griqua socio-political positioning in the twentieth century.
Although Le Fleur’s main concern during much of his life would be national, economic, moral and spiritual upliftment of Griqua and Coloureds, particularly Coloureds of Khoe-San and Afro-European descent, his early focus in the late 1890s was, however, on Griqua land claims in East Griqualand and reflected his geographical location and contextual influences. However, in both his more local (pre-1898) and national (post-1903) phases of activism, land acquisition would be central. Le Fleur’s approach to colonial authorities would also change over time, shifting from diplomacy to rebellion between 1894 and 1898, and reverting to diplomacy from 1903 until his death in 1941.

Background
Andrew Abraham Stockenström le Fleur was born on 2 July 1867 in Herschel near Aliwal North, but grew up in Rouxville in the Orange Free State where the Le Fleur family received burgher treatment. Andrew’s father, Abraham le Fleur, was apparently born in Uitenhage in the eastern Cape around 1826, possibly round about the year his father of French descent arrived in Port Elizabeth. Abraham’s mother was of Madagascan origin. Andrew also suggested a Khoekhoe heritage by stating that he stemmed out of the Outeniqua branch. Abraham apparently had a fairly good education that would allow him later to serve as secretary for Adam Kok III in Philippolis and to play a significant role in Griqua politics in East Griqualand from the mid-1880s. It was ultimately through his father’s association with the Griqua leadership, first at Philippolis and later in East Griqualand, that Andrew le Fleur would become involved in Griqua politics from the mid-1890s.

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1 Le Fleur was apparently named Andrew Stockenström after the colonial official Andries Stockenström whom his father, Abraham le Fleur, allegedly served as a body guard. Griqua manuscript, p. 9. Writer, title and date not known. The manuscript consulted has first 8 of 50 pages missing. Suggesting a measure of intimacy with the Le Fleur Griqua, this manuscript drew on Griqua oral history and texts by AAS le Fleur I.


3 Griqua manuscript, p. 9.

4 Thomas le Fleur, Andrew’s brother, cited in the Cape Times, 10 December 1920 and Kokstad Advertiser, 17 December 1920 during the preliminary examination into charges of fraud against Andrew in regard to the 1917 Griqua trek to Touws River. Accounts related to Le Fleur’s case in the Kokstad Advertiser are largely reproductions from the Cape Times. Thomas was at times reported to have stated that his father was a French missionary (Cape Times, 24 September 1921; Kokstad Advertiser, 30 September 1921) and at other times that his grandfather was a French missionary (Kokstad Advertiser, 14 October 1921; Tembuland News, 7 October 1921). Thomas might have meant that his grandfather was a missionary, and not his father. His father was certainly not a missionary. There is, however, no evidence forthcoming to support the view that his grandfather was a missionary, or evidence of a missionary with the Le Fleur surname operating in South Africa around the 1820s.

5 “Le Fleur wrote: “Ek wat uit die Outenikwa tak spruit moes ingeroep word” . LC, Miscellaneous file, AAS le Fleur: “Aan die Griekwa volk”, “Piesangs Rivier”, Plettenberg Baai, 12 September 1940. Le Fleur might merely have referred to the geographical origin of his parents. The word “tak” suggests, however, something more than just geography (Ibid). Andrew’s brother, Thomas, claimed that their mother was a titled Scottish Lady from Graaff-Reinet. Thomas might have had an inclination towards grandeur that made him liable to embellish the past. He also claimed, for example, that after Adam Kok III’s death, his widow came with a large following to his family’s residence in Rouxville and informed his father that it was the “King’s” wish that the son of his former secretary, Abraham Le Fleur, should succeed him. “I [Thomas] declined the honour, but my brother was willing to accept it. Accordingly we trekked to Griqualand in 1885, and Andrew was duly elected” (Kokstad Advertiser, 14 October 1921; Tembuland News, 7 October 1921). Their mother, referred to as Annie Reed (LC, Item 9.4, EMS le Fleur: “Griekwa Volksgeskiedenis”, p. 1) might have been of part Khoekhoe descent.

6 Griqua manuscript, p. 9.
Abraham le Fleur

Before Abraham le Fleur became a ‘respectable’ associate of Adam Kok III, he appears, somewhat like Smith Pommer and a number of his Griqua contemporaries, to have had a venturesome streak that led him, on occasion, to collide with colonial law officials. Abraham arrived in Philippolis in 1856 as a fugitive from the colony accused of theft and forgery.

Abraham was accused of having forged a promissory note in Port Elizabeth on 26 February 1856, thereby attempting to defraud Isaac Jukkei ("a Malay Priest") who would supposedly pay the money stated in the note, or for otherwise attempting to defraud Henry Selby to whom Abraham handed over the note. The promissory note stated that Jukkei would pay Abraham ten pounds sixteen shillings and three pence sterling (£10 16s. 3d) three months after the stated date of 26 February 1856. Abraham was also accused of stealing a horse, saddle and bridle from Joseph Charles Hess, a merchant in Port Elizabeth on, or around 24 March 1856 with which he made his escape to Philippolis. Abraham appears to have collided with law officials even before 1856. Reverend William Dower claimed to have discovered an 1850 warrant for the arrest of Abraham le Fleur that he used to silence him during his (Abraham's) land claim agitations in the 1880s. Abraham himself stated in 1860 that he was separated "upwards of nine years" from his "wife, home and friends" based in Port Elizabeth.

Shortly after his arrival at Philippolis, Abraham recommenced his trade as a carpenter that he previously undertook in Port Elizabeth. He managed to "accumulate a considerable sum of money" and, through his agent Richard Harvey, returned the saddle and bridle belonging to Hess. Abraham also gave his agent amount £40 pounds meant for Hess, £40 pounds being the value put on Hess’ horse. Abraham also remitted money to his wife to pay for the promissory note that he gave to Henry Selby.

Abraham served as secretary for Adam Kok III in Philippolis between 1858 and 1859 and was part of the 1859 Griqua commission that went Nomansland (later called East Griqualand) to investigate the viability of the Philippolis Griqua establishing themselves there.

Abraham was arrested and jailed in February 1860 while on a visit to Graaff-Reinet. By then Abraham had resolved to deal more openly with colonial law officials. After being let out on bail Abraham returned to Philippolis to settle his affairs and then returned to undergo a preparatory examination in Port Elizabeth. After being finally committed for trial he again returned to Philippolis to settle his affairs. Abraham then returned to undergo trial before the Circuit Court in Port Elizabeth. On 1 October 1860 Abraham was found guilty on the charge of theft, to which he pleaded not guilty. He was given a sentence of 9 months. Due to

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7 See chapter 2, f.n. 139.
8 Cape Town Archives, Colonial Office (CO), 4115 (101); Cape Supreme Court (CSC) 1/2/1/68, 11; CSC 1/2/1/68, 12.
9 William Dower: The early annals of Kokstad and Griqualand East (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1978), p. 122. If Abraham le Fleur was already a fugitive from 1850 then it is unlikely (though not impossible) that he would have been a body-guard of the the colonial official Andries Stockenström, at least not in the 1850s, as is claimed in Le Fleur Griqua oral tradition. See e.g. LC, Item 9.4, EMS le Fleur: "Griekwa Volksgeskiedenis", p. 1; Griqua manuscript., p. 9; Henry Bredekamp: “The dead bones of Adam Kok”, in Annari van der Merwe and Paul Faber (eds.): Group portrait South Africa: Nine family histories (Cape Town: Kwela Books, 2003), p. 134.
10 CO 4115, 101.
11 CO, 4115, 101; CSC 1/2/1/68, 11; CSC 1/2/1/68, 12.
12 Kokstad Advertiser, 4 October 1890.
an error in the indictment for fraud, the charge was withdrawn. Abraham petitioned Governor George Grey for his release soon after his imprisonment at Port Alfred Convict Station.

Abraham did not, after his release, move to, or participate in the trek to Nomansland. Abraham later settled in Herschel where Andrew was born 1867, his elder brother Thomas having been born earlier in the same region. The family later settled in Rouxville in the Free State until 1885. Although the Le Fleur’s “received Burg[h]er treatment from the Dutch people as free as themselves” they recognized that they were “a different race”, reflecting thus the significance of somatic features in the Orange Free State and the Cape colony in the late 1800s.

Move to East Griqualand
The Le Fleur family moved to East Griqualand in 1885 after Adam Kok III’s widow, Margarete, requested the parents to do so whilst passing Rouxville on her return from a yearlong visit to her daughter, Magrieta Waterboer (married to Captain Waterboer) in Griquatown between 1883 and 1884.

Andrew suggested in his old age in 1938 that he had an idealized vision of the Griqua in East Griqualand prior to his family’s migration but that it was shattered on his arrival there in 1885. He was disheartened when he arrived in Kokstad on 13 June 1885 and found that the Griqua were not, as he envisaged, a proud people with self-government. “I went expecting to find a council of Griquas with Captain Ita Kok at their head”, with the Griqua being “proud as a people”. It “broke my heart’s imagination” to see that the Griqua “had nothing but a church and were out cast [and with] no status as a people”. The Le Fleurs settled at Matatiele located about 60 kilometers west of Kokstad.

By the time the Le Fleurs arrived in East Griqualand there was much despondency in the region generated by colonial control and land loss, both in Philippolis and in East Griqualand. White racism was also being explicitly articulated to support the marginalization of Griqua and Bantu-speakers. Abraham le Fleur quickly became involved in regional politics and land claims, thereby shaping the sensibilities of his children, particularly Andrew.

As would be the case with Andrew, much of Abraham’s political agitation centred on land restitution, and, as such, Abraham became preoccupied with historical Griqua concerns and grievances. There was much talk and complain about the “Forty years money” from around 1870 which, according to Dower, abated somewhat with the establishment of colonial administration in East Griqualand in 1874 and in the aftermath of the Sotho (or Gun) War of 1880-1. Griqua land claims and agitation for the “Forty years money” were renewed after the arrival of Abraham le Fleur in 1885. According to Dower, Abraham le Fleur “create[d] a

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14 CSC 1/2/168, 11; CSC 1/2/168, 12.
15 CO 4115, 101.
17 LC, File 9, Draft cuts & biography sub-file, AAS le Fleur: “History of 1884 … to 1938”; CO 4216, L13, Abraham le Fleur, Rouxville to Colonial Secretary and Prime Minister , Cape of Good Hope, 17 February 1881.
18 Kokstad Advertiser, 2 February 1889.
19 LC, File 9, Draft cuts & biography sub-file, AAS le Fleur: “History of 1884 … to 1938”.
22 Dower: Griqualand East, p. 119.
spirit of expectancy” amongst the Griqua that “forty years after the date of the Smith Treaty,” (that is in 1888), the Griquas would either recover the possession of hundreds of farms in the O.F.S., approximately three million of acres, or the Imperial Government would have to compensate for the loss. Dower felt that it was futile to demand redress and discouraged the Griqua from pursuing the matter. Abraham le Fleur, on the other hand,

spoke with confidence about compelling Government to restore or compensate. ... He preached persistently his crusade of Retrocession or Compensation. He vaguely hinted that I, being a white man – would naturally take the view favouring the white man. He advocated no abatement or abandonment of their claims, he urged united and firm action, even to the extent of an appeal to the Queen herself by a Griqua deputation, and, all else failing, occasionally hinted at the display of force.

Dower claimed that he managed to silence Abraham’s agitation for the ‘Forty years money’ after he threatened to provide law officials with an 1850 warrant for his arrest on the charge of horse stealing in the Colesburg region if he persisted with his agitation. Dower also claimed that “there was peace and quite” till after his (Dower’s) departure from Kokstad in 1890. Abraham indeed played a prominent role in Griqua politics after his arrival in 1885. Dower was, however, inclined to exaggerate his role in Griqua politics, to the extent that it appears as if there were no other leading Griqua active during the period. Dower was inclined to emphasize the role of Abraham due to his disapproval of the role played by his son Andrew in the 1890s, particularly in the aborted rebellion of December 1897:

[T]he son, took up his father’s old song, and renewed the agitation. ... The father had been bad enough, the son was worse. The father contented himself with words, speeches, despatches, protests, memorials, lectures, threats; the son prepared for action.

Although Abraham might have been silenced somewhat in the late 1880s, he was, however, active in the politics of East Griqualand in the 1890s, after Dower had departed, but was to be indeed eclipsed by Andrew in the mid-1890s.

**Representation: local and national government**

By the time the Le Fleur family arrived in East Griqualand and became involved in regional politics, the economic and political situation of the Griqua and Bantu-speakers had become much more precarious than before. The number of Whites with landed property had increased significantly to allow them to dictate local socio-political affairs. Griqua and Bantu-speakers were marginalized when democratic elements were introduced in the colonial administration of the region. The Griqua were thwarted from fielding Griqua candidates for municipal and parliamentary representation and were thus constrained to choose between White candidates. The Griqua vote thus became valuable to some White candidates who presented themselves in positive light to that constituency. For example, Louis F Zietsman, a Kokstad based attorney who stood as a candidate in the parliamentary elections of 1888, undertook in his election campaign to “obtain for the Griquas certain privileges and concessions” in accordance with agreements [between Adam Kok III and the colonial government]. He also undertook to institute land claims on behalf of the Griqua. Zietsman also attempted to win over Bantu-speaking voters.

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23 See chapter 2 for further information on the Smith treaty.
24 Dower: *Griqualand East*, pp. 119-120.
27 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 26 July 1893.
28 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 3 December 1887.
29 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 7 January 1888. Despite Griqua support, Zietsman failed to be elected as the parliamentary representative of East Griqualand in 1888. Sir James Sivewright who was opposed by the *Kokstad Advertiser* because he was a member of the Afrikaner Bond (which generated tension between English and Dutch-speaking Whites), was
There were by the 1891 a sufficient number of Whites with landed property to get a proposal approved for the establishment a municipality in Kokstad. The increase of Whites and the ascendance and effect of White supremacist values in East Griqualand was manifested when White voters were urged in the Kokstad Advertiser just before the 1892 elections for the envisaged six member municipal council, to “do their best to be present to record their votes, in order to withstand” the attempt of the Griqua “to place three coloured men upon the Board” so that they (Whites) could prevent “Kokstad becoming the laughing-stock – the ridicule of South Africa – by allowing Griquas to sit upon the Board”. The Griqua decided, however, to abandon the idea of fielding their own Griqua candidates and resolved instead to vote for one of the White candidates. Reflecting (informal) Griqua constrain to support White candidates in regard to parliamentary representation, Abraham le Fleur, president of the Griqua, Coloured and Native United Association of East Griqualand, endorsed Zietsman as candidate for the 1894 parliamentary elections.

White attitudes to the Griqua and Bantu-speakers were varyingly influenced by scientific racism that legitimised socio-political marginalization and exclusions based on purported biological differences between racialized populations. James Sivewright, a member of the Afrikaner Bond, who campaigned for re-election as the parliamentary representative for East Griqualand in 1894 articulated common recycled racist ideas during his election campaign with much approval from his audience:

[T]he greatest political problem which the dwellers in South Africa have to face is the relative positions which the black and white races of the country are to occupy towards each other. … Nature never intended that the two races should coalesce. I cannot conceive that it was ever the intention of the Maker of the Universe that the white and black race of South Africa should be a brown one – (hear, hear). For although the offspring of such a union in very exceptional cases leaves little to be desired, still as a general rule there will be found combined in them the vices of both races without the virtues of either – (cheers and laughter). And not only is this the case so far their moral qualities are concerned, but nature seems to have physically set her seal against intermarriage of the black and white. The half-caste of the first generation is not infrequently a fair physical specimen, but in the second generation you get the Quadroon, sickly and weak, with signs of decay clearly manifest; whilst before the Octroon stage is reached, the type is decidedly sickly and puny; and I have been informed that the fourth generation of such a union is absolutely unknown – the breed has flickered out. … [W]e assume that the white race is superior to the black, and if, so, when the increase of population goes on even faster than it is doing now, through the cessation of wars, the disappearance, through the advance of medical science, of epidemics, the jostle for existence will come, and the inferior race will be bound to make way for the superior (hear, hear).

Sivewright’s successful re-election reflected the ideological weight that the ethno-racially marginalized communities had to deal with in the region and the prospects for the restitution of lost Griqua land.

Cooperation: Griqua and Bantu-speakers

Present realities and future prospects encouraged cooperation among ethno-racially marginalized communities. Sharing common concerns, a number of Griqua and Bantu-speakers were by the early 1890s involved in the Griqua, Coloured and Native United Association of East Griqualand led by Abraham Le
Fleur. A number of Bantu-speaking chiefs had some association with the organization.\(^{36}\) The Association opposed the implementation of repressive and exploitative measures and implicated the parliamentary representative of East Griqualand, James Sivewright, in the passing of repressive legislation in parliament. The Association, for example, argued that the “Location Act” “was one of the most oppressive Acts ever passed” by parliament “as it … [was] an act next door to slavery”.

>[A] Native in the Colony under that Act is liable to pay a licence if he should hire a farm and live on it; he is subjected, first of all, to pay rent, then hut tax, and, lastly, he or the European owner, has to pay a licence to Government for the body and person of the Native living there.\(^{37}\)

The name “Griqua, Coloured and Native United Association of East Griqualand” suggested a process of differentiation between ‘Griqua’, ‘Coloured’ and ‘Native’. The Griqua and Coloured categories were increasingly disassociated from the ‘Native category’ by the 1890s. Whilst the Coloured category was much used in reference to people who were considered not to be European or White before the 1890s, as reflected in official population censuses of 1865,\(^{38}\) and 1875,\(^{39}\) by the 1890s the term was increasingly used in reference to people considered to be neither White nor from Bantu-speaking African communities. The category was, however, still used as an inclusive category in the 1891 census.\(^{40}\) There is evidence of the term Coloured already being used in a restricted sense excluding Bantu-speakers by some Whites by the early 1870s.\(^{41}\) There is also evidence of the category being used self-referentially in a restricted sense in the 1880s.\(^{42}\) An increasing self-referential use of the category in an exclusive sense is especially notable in the 1890s.\(^{43}\) Thus, two alternative usages of the term ‘Coloured’ coexisted with the sense excluding Bantu-speakers being increasingly used in the late 1800s.\(^{44}\)

The name “Griqua, Coloured and Native United Association of East Griqualand” also reflected an attempt at promoting cooperation between Griqua, Coloured and Bantu-speakers. The name suggested prior ethno-‘racial’ differentiation and an attempt at bringing those so distinguished in a united body. It thus reflected an attempt at unity that was not only based on conceptions of difference but also reinforced them even as it attempted to forge inter-ethnic or trans-ethnic cooperation. Differentiation was further reinforced through attempts by Griqua to prevent restrictions imposed on ‘Natives’ being imposed on them. From the late 1880s, Griqua increasingly disassociated themselves from a ‘Native’ category.

\(^{36}\) Kokstad Advertiser, 16 August 1893, p. 6; 13 September 1893.

\(^{37}\) Kokstad Advertiser, 16 August 1893, p. 6.


\(^{39}\) G 42-76, Results of a census of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, taken on the night of Sunday, the 7th March, 1875. Part 1 – Summaries (Cape Town: Saul Solomon and Co. Printers, 1877), p. 3.

\(^{40}\) G 6-92, Results of a census of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, as on the night of Sunday, the 5th April, 1891 (Cape Town: WA Richards & Sons, Government Printers, 1892), p. xvii.


\(^{42}\) Kokstad Advertiser, 10 January 1885, p. 2. For content of relevant article see also chapter 2, note 219.

\(^{43}\) Bickford-Smith: Ethnic pride and racial prejudice in Victorian Cape Town, p. 201.

\(^{44}\) As Ian Goldin indicated, by the first decade of the twentieth century, the restricted sense of Coloured had eclipsed the wider sense of the category, as exemplified in the 1904 census. G 19-1905, pp. xxxi-xxxvii; Ian Goldin: Making race: The politics and economics of Coloured identity in South Africa (Cape Town: Maskew Miller Longman, 1987), p. 13.

Both the restricted and inclusive senses of Coloured were used in the 1891 population census, with the dominant sense being the one which included all people who were not considered White. G 6-92, pp. i, xvii.
Legislation, identity and differentiation: Griqua and Bantu-speakers

Whilst some Griqua found common cause with Bantu-speaking Africans they were at the same time concerned about being slotted officially together with Bantu-speakers as ‘Native’ and being thus subjected to laws and regulations applicable to ‘Natives’. Numerous laws were passed in the course of the 19th and 20th century imposing restrictions and liabilities on those considered ‘Native’, thus providing an incentive for Griqua to disassociate themselves from the ‘Native’ category and to locate the Griqua category within a restricted Coloured category.

Griqua concerns about being slotted as ‘Native’ were raised particularly after a person was charged on 3 July 1889 in Kokstad for contravening sections 4 and 5 of Transkeian Proclamation No. 154 of (8 October) 1885, by selling liquor to a ‘Native’ who did not have a permit to purchase the liquor. This ‘Native’ claimed to be a Griqua. The main issue in the case was whether the person to whom liquor was sold was, as a Griqua, a ‘Native’ in the terms of the proclamation. The resident magistrate, who was able to judge “by appearance” whether the person to whom liquor was sold was to be a ‘Native’ or not, convicted the accused and fined him £10. An appeal was subsequently lodged against the decision of the resident magistrate and decided upon in the Supreme Court on 9 August 1889. The appellant’s counsel questioned in the appeal whether the person to whom the liquor was sold was a ‘Native’ in terms of the applicable legislation. His counsel indicated that in terms of the applicable legislation, ‘Native’ meant “aboriginal natives” or “native inhabitants” and could not apply to Griqua who were “half-breeds” and who spoke the ordinary Colonial Dutch and had no language of their own. The chief justice reasoned, however, that the Griqua were “a Hottentot tribe” and that “the infusion of white blood” into the “tribe” was “not sufficient to take them out of the category of natives” and (supposed) that in “the only Statute in which the Griqua are mentioned, namely, Ordinance 2 of 1837, they are classed with Kafirs, Bushmen, Bechuanas and other native tribes”. The appeal was dismissed and the decision of the resident magistrate upheld.

Before the appeal was decided upon, a meeting was held on 6 July 1889 in Kokstad “to consider the matter of the Griquas being classed as Natives”, thus reflecting a concern that would preoccupy the Griqua well into the 20th century. The meeting was reported to have been attended by nearly all the Griqua in Kokstad. The sale of liquor was apparently a minor affair “to which the bulk of the people would pay very little attention”. The special Griqua concern was being placed under the same restrictions that applied to ‘Natives’. They were thus consequently driven to emphasize how different they were from ‘Natives’ and how much they were like the Whites – who were repeatedly using ‘race’ as a basis of exclusion.

The threat of being categorized as ‘Native’ made it important for the Griqua to emphasize their biological proximity to Whites and their past White cultural achievements, and to even de-emphasize the Khoekhoe heritage suggested in their name. One speaker explained at the above meeting that the Griqua were all either descendants of freed slaves or Whites. They were governed under a “civilized” form of government when they became an independent people. When they came to this country they came as British subjects; they maintained a form of government during their stay in the region founded upon the same principles as that of the Cape colony. They built towns, issued absolute titles and grants for landed property, “thus showing that they never lived under tribal tenure, but as free burghers”. When the country was taken over by the colonial

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45 For example, the 1884 Native Locations Act (No. 37) was devised for the “more effectual supervision of Native Locations, and for the more easy collection of Hut-tax” imposed on ‘Natives’. The 1883 Liquor Act (No. 28) limited the issuing of liquor licences in ‘Native locations’.

46 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 24 August 1889, p. 2; *Queen v Ellis*, 1889, SC [Supreme Court Reports, Cape of Good Hope] [Vol. VII], pp. 68-9. Proclamation 154 provided that no spirit be sold to any ‘Native’ not being a chief, petty chief or councillor unless he had a permit signed by a magistrate or justice of the peace.

47 *Queen v Ellis*, SC, 1889, pp. 68-9; *Kokstad Advertiser*, 24 August 1889, p. 2. Apart from Ordinance 2 of 1837, Griqua were also referred to as ‘Native’ in Ordinance 49 of 1828.
government they were supposed to enjoy the same privileges as before. A resolution, proposed by Abraham le Fleur was passed “that this meeting strongly protests against Griquas being classed as Natives”.

There were also Whites who felt that the Griqua could not be regarded as ‘Natives’ as they were a ‘mixed-race’ descended from freed slaves, ‘Hottentots’, Bastards and Europeans. A confluence of perception around Griqua identity thus developed between the Griqua and some Whites. After the decision of the Kokstad resident magistrate was upheld in the Supreme Court, it was mentioned in the Kokstad Advertiser that

the rule now laid down by the Supreme Court is absurd and untenable. Whatever race the term “Griqua” may have been applied to, we have now only to deal with those who are distinguished by that name, and it is well known that at the present time they are a mixed race, tracing their origin to the Freed Slaves, Prentjies, Hottentots and Bastards, with a more or less large admixture of European blood. … Their language is Cape Dutch, and they have adopted European manners and customs. Previous to their being taken over by the Colonial Government, in 1874, they enjoyed self-government, their form of law being based upon that of the Colony, with a few variations …

Andrew le Fleur’s sensibilities would thus have been initially shaped in a region marked by much despondency over land loss, socio-political marginalization, as well as contradictory socio-political relations within subordinated communities – that were also manifested in his own father. Categories of ‘Native’ and ‘Aboriginal’ were also being redefined and invested with purity, by Whites as well as by sections of the underclasses (e.g. ‘Hottentots’, ‘Kafirs’ and Griqua), who thereby attempted to show that they could not by virtue of the purported infusion of European or non-‘Native’ ‘blood’ be categorized as ‘Native’.

Through his father’s involvement in Griqua affairs and his location in a Griqua environment Andrew le Fleur would have been imbued with Griqua aspirations and ideals. His father’s involvement in Griqua politics and land claims contributed to Andrew’s keen social, economic and political sensibilities that were enhanced by his education. His education and his understanding of colonial politics would later make him useful as a Griqua agent. Andrew also developed a keen religious sensibility that would play a huge role in his twentieth century activities. He suggested himself in his 20th century writings that he already had supernatural experiences before he assumed a prominent leadership position in the Griqua community. From his own twentieth century accounts of his early life it appears that he came to believe that God worked through him and revealed certain future events to him; that already in his youth he developed a sense of historical calling. He claimed that he was called (“ingeroep”) “by God Almighty on the Mountain of Manyane [or Manyane] above Matatiele in East Griqualand on 9 May 1889, to redeem the Griqua Volk”.

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Op die 9de Mei 1889, was Andrew le Fleur besig in die veld om sy vader se esels te soek. Hy het alreeds drie dae lank gesoek en skielik praat daar ’n stem met hom en roep hom drie maal. Andrew : Andrew : Andrew : Dit is die here God wat met jou praat, Gaan versamel die dieoie bene van Adam Kok en roep hulle as een

48 Kokstad Advertiser, 13 July 1889, p. 3.
49 Kokstad Advertiser, 24 August 1889, p. 2. See also Kokstad Advertiser, 4 January 1890.
50 See e.g. Rex v Nelson, 1911 EDL [Supreme Court Reports, Eastern Districts Local Division], pp. 35-41.
51 E.g. Rex v Willet, 1902, SC [Supreme Court Reports, Vol. XIX], pp. 168-171; Rex v Levenson, 1911, CPD [South African Law Reports, Cape Provincial Division], pp. 903-7.
52 Queen v Ellis, 1889, SC, pp. 68-9; Rex vs Niekerk and Others, 1912, CPD, pp. 580-5.
53 It is emphasized in the Griqua manuscript (p. 9) that Abraham le Fleur imparted his political expertise to his sons, especially to Andrew.
54 “Toe ek ingeroep was, deur God Almagtig op die Berg van Manyane bokant Matatiele in Griekwaland Oos op die 9de Mei 1889, om die Griekwa Volk te verlos”. LC, File 9, Draft cuts & biography sub-file: AAS le Fleur: “Geskiedenis 1894 tot 1940” (Piesangs-Rivier, 13 September 1940).
volk, sodat hulle vir jou 'n volk word en Ek vir hulle 'n God wees. Andrew staan verstom, maar die stem praat verder: "Kyk die twee esels wat jy soek is net anderkant hierdie koppie, gaan sê aan jou vader wat ek jou beveel het en sê aan hom dat Lady Kok moreoggend om 8.v.m. sal sterwe. Hierdie twee bewyse sal jou en jou vader oortuig dat dit die Here is wat met jou gespreek het. Sodat die woord van Esegiel vervul word (Esegiel 37: 21) En sê vir hulle, so spreek die Here, Here. Kyk Ek gaan die kindes van Israel haal, tussen die nasies uit waarheen hulle getrek het, en Ek sal hulle laat kom van alle kante en hulle bring in hulle land. Esegiel 37 vers 27 : En my tarbernakel sal oor hulle wees, en Ek sal vir hulle 'n God wees en hulle vir my 'n volk wees. Andrew het die esels gevind en soos aan hom gesê was en het ook aan sy Vader vertel wat die Here met hom gespreek het. Abraham het dadelik die esels ingespan en vertrek na Kokstad om te sien of hierdie woorde waaragtig is. Hulle vind Lady Kok nog gesond en hulle het ook die aand oorgebly en terwyl hulle nog die volgende oggend koffie drink, oorval 'n naarheid Lady Kok en klokslag agtuur blaas sy haar laaste asem uit. Hier was dan die getuienis dat dit God was, wat gespreek het met sy Kneg wat Hy geroep het [sic].\[55\]

**Entry into Griqua politics – 1894**

By the early 1890s Andrew and his brother Thomas were partners in a Matatiele based wagon builders and blacksmithing concern named Le Fleur Brothers.\[56\] Andrew entered the Griqua political landscape as a Griqua representative early in 1894. On 24 February 1894 he resigned as a partner in Le Fleur Brothers,\[57\] and devoted himself to the redressing of Griqua land claims. He suggested (in the 20\hyp{}th century) that he had already been involved in the investigation of Griqua land transference – affected after 1874 in East Griqualand – as a Griqua representative by January 1894.\[58\] A number of Griqua appointed Le Fleur through the course of 1894 as their agent, authorizing him to make representations to the government on their behalf in regard to their land claims and land losses.\[59\] Le Fleur did extensive investigation on land transference from the period of Adam Kok III in East Griqualand, studying for example, court records, Land Board books, and *Volks Raad* books.\[60\]

By the beginning of February 1894 Le Fleur had taken statements of Griqua land claimants and requested Chief Magistrate Walter Stanford to help the claimants to have their claims recognized and their land granted. Many of those claims were previously presented to former colonial officials and the 1875 Land Commission. Some had certificates for land issued by Adam Kok III but were never granted land. Some claimed that their land was turned into Bantu-speaking locations after colonial control was established over East Griqualand. Some claimants complained that their land was reduced after surveys were undertaken by colonial officials and wanted their land to be enlarged. Some claimed that their farms were sold to Whites without their permission. Some claimed to have been deprived of land after the 1878 Griqua rebellion. Some claimed that the 1875 Commission rejected valid claims. Others claimed that they never received grants that were approved by the 1875 Commission.\[61\]

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\[56\] The Le Fleur brothers obtained much of their material on credit from Kokstad based Victor Dold & Co, providing their fixed and removable property as security. By January 1892 the brothers owed Dold & Co two hundred pounds sterling (£ 200). Cape Town Archives, Registrar, Deeds Office (DOC) 4/1/297, 163, Mortgage bond, Thomas Frederick Maxwell le Fleur and Andrew Abraham Stockenstroom [sic] le Fleur, 11 January 1892.


\[58\] LC, File 9, Draft cuts & biography sub-file: AAS le Fleur: “Geskiedenis 1894 tot 1940; [AAS le Fleur:] “What I omitted” (undated).

\[59\] LC, Item 1, Records of Correspondence by AAS le Fleur.

\[60\] LC, Item 1, Records of Correspondence, p. 52.

\[61\] See Le Fleur’s correspondence to the Chief Magistrate Walter Stanford between February and September 1894 in Cape Town Archives, Chief Magistrate, East Griqualand (CMK) 1/141, Letters received from Le Fleur, 1894 March – December; CMK 1/142, Letters from Le Fleur, February 1894 – November 1896.
Le Fleur addressed the premier of colony, Cecil Rhodes, on his April 1894 visit to East Griqualand, on behalf the Griqua. On the occasion a Griqua deputation brought before the premier three different types of claims: (a) claims to grants of erven (plots) in Kokstad, (b) claims to a grant for mission land or school plots in lieu of Sema’s Kraal or Makoba’s Location that the Griqua claimed to have been deprived of, and (c) claims for farms. The premier subsequently instructed Chief Magistrate Walter Stanford to inquire into these claims.

1894 land claims inquiry
Although rivalries emerged amongst those agitating for Griqua land claims, there was early in 1894 a measure of cooperation between those who were linked to contending factions, thus manifesting a historical characteristic of the Griqua political landscape marked by factionalism as well as a desire for cooperation and unity. On 31 July 1894 a commission of inquiry was begun into Griqua land claims, in accordance with the instruction of the premier. Present at the first meeting were commissioners WE Stanford and LF Zietsman representing the Kokstad municipal council, as well as the Griqua Erven Committee chaired by Cornelius Gabriel de Bruin. A number of the members of the Erven Committee present at the opening of the inquiry, were also members of the Griqua Political Association (GPA) led by De Bruin. Members of the GPA would, as more senior actors in Griqua affairs, compared to Le Fleur, be somewhat inclined to resent his attempts to project himself as the pre-eminent Griqua representative. Le Fleur and his father became involved in a rival faction that formed the ‘Griqua Committee’.

The inquiry of July 1894 was supposed to first deal with claims to erven in Kokstad, then with claims in regard to ‘Makoba’s Location’ and finally with claims for farms. The issue of land had the potential to generate tension between White colonists and ethno-‘racially’ marginalized communities. Land claims, like those pertaining to Makoba’s location, also had the potential to generate tension within marginalized communities. Claims for farms could also cause tension between those who came with Adam Kok III to Nomansland in 1862-3 and those who arrived later from the colony.

Stanford indicated at the above inquiry meeting that the issue of Makoba’s location had already been investigated before and that Bantu-speakers in that location would not – as many Griqua wished – be removed after years of occupation. An inquiry was, however, later held into claims by Griqua to Sema’s Kraal, a piece of land in Makoba’s location where Adam Kok III had established a school.

62 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 18 April 1894.
63 CMK 5/16, [CMK to Secretary, Prime Minister, Cape Town, 6 December 1894], pp. 128-136.
64 CMK 5/16, [CMK to Secretary, Prime Minister, Cape Town, 6 December 1894], p. 1.
65 Also referred to as the Committee of Griqua People (*Kokstad Advertiser*, 28 June 1895) and the Griqua People’s Committee. *Kokstad Advertiser*, 21 January 1898.
66 CMK 5/16 [Minutes of Inquiry at Kokstad by Walter Ernest Mortimer Stanford … into claims to land set up by Griquas, 1894], pp. 1-2, 6, 116.
Around 360 claims for *erven*[^68] in Kokstad and Rietvlei were considered during the inquiry. In making their claims for *erven* Griqua witnesses indicated that Adam Kok III invited people from the colony to join him and that he promised that they would have equal rights to *erven*, but that those who came with Kok should have preference in regard to the granting of farms.[^70] The commission recommended that 122 *erven* be granted. The Griqua claims were, however, not legally compelling in Stanford’s view.[^71] On concluding the inquiry into *erven* in August 1894 Stanford told the Griqua that he would submit a report to the government with recommendations and advised them not to be extravagant in their expectations. Reflecting the weight that Griqua placed on what was decided during the reign of Kok and official desire to tamper that weight, Stanford also told them that Kok would, if he was still alive, have bound himself to the colonial government and that a resolution passed by his *Raad* was not irrevocable.[^72]

Reports of the inquiries into *erven* and Sema’s Kraal were submitted to the Native Affairs department respectively on 30 October and 7 November 1894, thus leaving the claims for farms still to be dealt with. Claims for farms were, however, critical to the Griqua and impatience and suspicion developed among some of them in regard to Stanford’s willingness to deal with those claims. Andrew le Fleur came under the impression that the inquiry was closed and therefore contemplated raising the matter with the premier, but Stanford, who had already decided that an inquiry into farm claims would not deal with those rejected by the 1875 Commission, dissuaded Le Fleur from doing so after informing him that the inquiry was not closed. Le Fleur was also aggrieved that Stanford did not forward all the claims that he presented to the government. Stanford, on the other hand, intended only to forward claims to the government after having inquired into them.[^73]

Le Fleur left early in September for Cape Town[^74] where he expressed his concerns to the colonial government, making representations to John Frost the secretary for Land and Mines and Agriculture[^76] and James Rose Innes the secretary for Native Affairs early in October,[^77] and to Gordon Sprigg the treasurer general[^78] in mid-September. As a result of Le Fleur’s representations Stanford was instructed to investigate every claim. The commission of inquiry into Griqua land claims was subsequently resumed on 17 December 1894 and every claimant was required to appear in person.[^80] On Le Fleur’s return from Cape

[^68]: CMK 5/16, CMK to Under Secretary, Native Affairs, Cape Town, 30 October 1894, pp. 116-8.

[^69]: CMK 5/16, pp.81, 82, 111.

[^70]: CMK 5/16, pp. 4-8.

[^71]: After the Kokstad municipality had approved the commission’s recommendations, Stanford told the secretary for Native Affairs that “[t]he claims of the Griquas are not of such a nature that under present conditions they could enforce them in a court of law. These people are however entitled to favourable consideration from Government”. CMK 5/16, CMK to Under Secretary, Native Affairs, Cape Town, 30 Oct 1894, pp. 116-8.

[^72]: CMK 5/16, p. 65.

[^73]: CMK 5/16 [CMK to Under Secretary, Native Affairs, Cape Town, 30 Oct 1894], pp. 116-8.

[^74]: CMK 1/141, A le Fleur, Kokstad, to WE Stanford, CMK, 3 September 1894.

[^75]: Kokstad Advertiser, 4 March 1898, p. 4.

[^76]: CMK 1/141, AAS le Fleur, Cape Town, to J Frost, Secretary for Land and Mines and Agriculture, Cape Town, 1 October 1894.

[^77]: CMK 1/141, A AS le Fleur, Cape Town, to J Rose Innes, the Under Secretary for Native Affairs, Cape Town, [2?] October 1894.

[^78]: CMK 1/141, AAS le Fleur, Cape Town, to G Sprigg, Treasurer General, Cape Town, 17 November 1894.


[^80]: CMK 5/15, p. 1; Kokstad Advertiser 21 December 1894.
Town Stanford also instructed him that a committee be appointed to assist him [Le Fleur] with the land claims. A committee was apparently appointed at a public meeting on 18 December comprising members of the Griqua Committee. The Griqua committee was thus reinserted in the Griqua land inquiry. Le Fleur claimed in 1898 that he was “employed by the Griqua Committee as their agent on 11 December, 1894”.

**Intra-Griqua tension**

As there was a common Griqua concern about the restoration of lost land, the issue of land could unite the Griqua. Leadership tussles might in this way be put in abeyance, as when Andrew le Fleur acted as agent of aspirant leaders like Cornelius de Bruin and Adam Smith. Rivalries, however, cropped up with the re-assumption of the Griqua land claims inquiry on 17 December 1894. The re-assumption of the inquiry on the 17th was well attended by members of the Griqua Political Association.

Le Fleur objected to the role played by members of the GPA, notably its president, De Bruin, and for a while, refused to work with the Commission:

> Mr. Stanford went and dealt with people [of the Griqua Political Association] who were not appointed by the Griquas to attend at the inquiry and were acting with men whose Powers of Attorney were in my hands … so … I refused to appear before that officer who … I consider acted wrong.

A member of the GPA indicated in the *Kokstad Advertiser* that Le Fleur wanted “to show … the public that he is the person who had to discuss with the Chief Magistrate the land claims” and that he “pretended” to be “a leading man of the Griquas”. Le Fleur eventually decided to attend the inquiry after the government requested him and the Griqua to be present.

**Alliance politics: Griqua and Bantu-speakers**

Unwillingness on the part of colonial officials to meet Griqua land claims increased Griqua discontent, influenced alliance strategies within marginalized communities, and even inclined some to opt to gain access to land through unconstitutional means. Members of the Griqua Committee were moved to steer away from sectional claims – that encouraged divisions; they were inclined to articulate broader interests fostering cooperation between Griqua and Bantu-speakers. There were also attempts on the part of colonial officials to encourage differentiation between Griqua and Bantu-speakers. This applied to the 1894 inquiry into land claims.

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81 Statement of Andrew le Fleur during preliminary examination in 1898 sedition case. *Kokstad Advertiser*, 4 March 1898, p. 4.
82 CMK 1/141, AAS le Fleur, Kokstad, to W Stanford, CMK, 20 December 1894.
83 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 11 March 1898, p. 5. Reflecting back on developments of 1894 in the twentieth century, Le Fleur might have been inclined to embellish the past. He claimed that he was “elected by the Griqua people as the successor [of Captain Adam Kok III] and appointed by the Cape Government to inquire into the Griqua grievances”, and to “have held the position [as the successor of Adam Kok] ever since”. National Archives, Pretoria, Governor General (GG) 1571, 50/1558, “Short history by Capt. Le Fleur”. The “Short History” must, on the basis of its content, have been written after 1924. On Le Fleur’s election claim, see also *Griqua and Coloured People’s Opinion*, 16 January 1925. Andrew’s brother, Thomas, also claimed in the twentieth century that Andrew was elected as Chief by Griqua councillors (*Tembuland News*, 7 October 1921).
84 What most probably happened during the 1890s was that Le Fleur’s aspiration as a Griqua leader and heir of Adam Kok III was sustained and supported by his adherents, some members of the former Griqua *Raad*, and some members of the Griqua Committee, as well as through his 1896 marriage to Rachel Kok, a descendant of Adam Kok I.
85 Present at the resumption of the inquiry were “GC de Bruin (Chairman of Griqua Political Association), F Werner, Andrew Booysen, Lucas Basson, WL Kok all members of the Griqua Political Association, also […] Uys, Ludovick Kok & W van Rooyen. CMK 5/15, p.1.
86 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 11 January 1895.
The Griqua Committee brought some Bantu-speakers during one of the early sittings after the re-
assumption of the inquiry into Griqua land claims, and “put forward a claim on their behalf”. According to Andrew le Fleur’s own calculated account, the chief magistrate then drew the attention of the Griqua Committee to a resolution of the Griqua Raad of August 1868 “excluding Natives, such as Kaffirs and others, from individual grants of land save except the locations”. The chief magistrate wanted the Griqua Committee to adhere to the resolution of the Raad and requested that a resolution be passed giving the Committee’s opinion on that decision. Le Fleur proposed at a meeting that they stand by the resolution. However, the Committee, and in particular the chairman Ludovick Kok and its secretary Adam Smith, said that Le Fleur “wished to create discord between the Kaffirs and Griquas”. About 8 days later the Griqua Committee called a “general meeting of Natives and Griquas” to “censure” Le Fleur for his proposal, and to “pass a resolution” that if he “did not adhere to the wishes of the people and the committee” he should “forfeit all the claim he had on the committee for the moneys expended on their behalf, and any reward for … [his] labour”.

A number of the claims presented before Stanford were indeed those of Bantu-speakers. The claims investigated included those of “original burghers” as well as those who came into the country after 1863; those of who claimed to have been denied land for taking part in the 1878 rebellion; those of former members of the Volksraad and Field Cornets who argued that they were entitled under Kok for second farms; those who occupied land without title; those who did not receive full-sized farms and wanted extensions. Those making representations as, or in regard to “original burghers” claimed on the basis of the ‘general promise of Adam Kok’ that burghers and their sons would get land, with a number of these claims made on behalf of relatives.

A number of the Bantu-speaking claimants were Tlhaping and Rolong who came with Adam Kok III to Nomansland. Others arrived later from surrounding places. The incorporation of Bantu-speakers into the land claims campaign undercut the ethno-‘racial’ segmentalism of Griqua politics and represented an alternative ideal of land ownership and restitution in the region that was not exclusively Griqua (an ideal that would be especially reflected in attempts during 1896-1897 at forging trans-ethnic cooperation and revolt against the colonial order). Claims of Bantu-speakers were much like those of Griqua who were not of Bantu-speaking origin. Some claimed to have been granted field cornet certificates for farms under Adam Kok III that they presented to the 1875 Commission but not the actual farms. Some claimed to have been granted farms by Adam Kok but not the certificates for them. Some claimed farms on behalf of their fathers’ estates. Many of the Bantu-speaking claimants had also presented their claims before the 1875 Commission and Captain Blyth. In some instances Bantu-speakers could also claim, like the Griqua, to have been deprived of land when locations were provided by colonial officials to some Bantu-speakers.

Stanford concluded the inquiry for farms on 20 May 1895, with 349 claims having been investigated. Reasoning that the Griqua lacked capacity to hold on to farms, Stanford recommended that those with good claims be given allotments instead of farms:

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87 For Stanford’s own account see Kokstad Advertiser, 19 March 1897, p. 3.
88 Statement by AAS le Fleur during the preliminary examination (on Wednesday 2 March) in 1898 sedition case. Le Fleur attempted to show that he was not as central in the attempted rebellion as others have portrayed him and that there were other people in the Griqua Committee who supported joint action by Griqua and Bantu-speakers (Kokstad Advertiser, 4 March 1898, p. 4). The “complete statement” of Le Fleur of 2-3 March 1898, revealing the history of his land-claim activities, was printed in the Supplement to Kokstad Advertiser of 11 March 1898, pp. 5-6, “owing to its being regarded [as] of some historical importance, and as “the latter portion” was not “publish[ed] last week”.
89 CMK 5/15, See proceedings of December 1894 – January 1895; CMK 5/16, Stanford to Under Secretary, Native Affairs, 3 Oct 1895, p. 178.
90 CMK 5/15, see proceedings of December 1894.
91 CMK 5/16 [Stanford to Under Secretary, Native Affairs, 3 Oct 1895], p. 178.
Free grants of land will simply bring us back after a while to the present position. What is wanted is to place the people on land of which they cannot dispose and which by inheritance would go to one member of the family. This means allotments upon the lines of the Glen Grey Act.  

Stanford felt that there was adequate land in Umzimkulu and Matatiele for allotments for each of the successful claimants. Griqua representatives were disappointed by Stanford’s recommendation. Le Fleur and his associates decided to reject Stanford’s recommendation. De Bruin and the GPA also rejected the recommendation. Stanford hoped, however, that the Griqua would “themselves recognise that the only way of conferring real benefit is to protect them from themselves by allotments which they cannot sell”. About two weeks after Stanford made his proposal to the Griqua, the Griqua Committee passed resolutions that they would not accept the proposal, and that they would ask the British imperial government to annex the territory if the colonial government did not meet their land claims.

**Reports to J Frost, Secretary for Lands, Mines and Agriculture**

Dissatisfied with Stanford’s treatment of Griqua land claims, Le Fleur once again decided to bypass him and to present Griqua claims to higher government officials. Le Fleur forwarded his own reports on the land claims inquiry to John Frost, secretary for Lands, Mines and Agriculture, in September, October and December 1895.

Le Fleur outlined the injustices the Griqua suffered after 1874 in his reports to Frost. The reports showed that he concerned himself with longstanding grievances and that he sought evidence for longstanding Griqua perceptions of wrongdoing on the part of colonial officials. Thus, Le Fleur, in many respects, reiterated old Griqua arguments for which he attempted to furnish evidence. In presenting his case Le Fleur appealed for justice and emphasized that it was “in the interest of the Colony to maintain and uphold before my fellow coloured brothers, the ruling of Her Majesty’s Colonial Government … laws of justice and equity.”

Implicating government officials like CP Watermeyer (the former surveyor and member of Land Board) and C Brownlee (former chief magistrate and chairman of Land Board), Le Fleur argued that the agreements entered into between Adam Kok III safeguarding Griqua rights to land were flouted by colonial officials, and that a number of malpractices in land transference occurred after 1874 at the hands of corrupt colonial officials to the detriment of the Griqua. The “Griquas suffered at the hands of the various Commissions who set here to investigate into the claims from time to time also the various Chief Magistrates and surveyor and other officers”. Government officials were not inclined to take Griqua claims seriously. “[N]o matter what proof to the correctness of our statements and the validity of our claims, government ruled us with might and not with right as subjects of Her Majesty”. Le Fleur maintained that the “Commissioner’s reports are not reliable evidence … on the rights of Griquas and ought not to be used

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92 CMK 5/16 [Stanford to Under Secretary, Native Affairs, 3 Oct 1895], p. 181. See also pp. 182-9. 
94 CMK 5/16, Stanford to Under Secretary, Native Affairs, 28 Oct 1895 (see pp. 267-9). 
95 Le Fleur, in Kokstad Advertiser, 4 March 1898, p. 4.
96 CMK 5/16 [Stanford to Under Secretary, Native Affairs, 3 Oct 1895], p. 189. 
97 CMK 5/16, Stanford to Under Secretary, Native Affairs, 28 Oct 1895 (see pp. 267-9). 
98 CMK 1/142, AAS le Fleur, Kokstad, to Secretary, Land, Mines and Agriculture, Cape Town, 16 October 1895 (also in LC, Item 1, Records of Correspondence, pp. 62-8). 
99 CMK 5/16, p. 170. 
100 CMK 1/142, Le Fleur to Secretary, Land, Mines and Agriculture, 16 October 1895; also in LC, Item 1, Records of Correspondence, pp. 62-8.
as such", and that the 1875 Land Commission did not recommend the claims of Griqua burghers who were justly entitled to land.

Implicating Watermeyer, Le Fleur argued that the surveyors gave rightful Griqua claimants less than the amount recommended by the Griqua Raad (i.e. around 3000 acres) but gave Whites land in excess of the recommended amount. Le Fleur also pointed out the wrongs of the commission into the 1878 Griqua rebellion. Commissioners, D Strachan and Watermeyer, were for him, not fit to be commissioners in the inquiry of the 1878 rebellion. He argued that Strachan was one of the chief actors in the quelling of the rebellion and was therefore not fit to act as a judge.

Le Fleur also dealt with (Bantu-speaking) locations established after 1874 and insisted:

we do not claim an inch of land in locations made by Capt Kok and we are agreeable with what Capt did. But … Government has no right to take away what was left out for the Griquas. … [W]e claim and demand that Government should remove Macoba [sic] from our property. … [W]e ask Government to take away those natives who was unlawfully placed on our land [by colonial officials] …

Le Fleur attempted to strengthen the claim that Bantu-speakers resided illegitimately in certain parts of East Griqualand, notably the “thousands of Basutos” who were permitted by colonial officials to occupy Matatiele, by appealing to an 1868 Griqua government “proclamation” (or resolution) that barred such occupation. In presenting his case to Frost, Le Fleur also expressed his hope that Government will not … accept such an unwise proposal as made by the Chief Magistrate. Government will see that it […?] is an error to take a man’s full right of 3,000 acres and give it away to others and then give the owner 4 morgen….

Stanford’s response
Stanford attempted to show that Le Fleur’s argumentation was erroneous and dealt with the particularities of the cases that Le Fleur cited. He rejected Le Fleur’s arguments that colonial officials were corrupt. He found particularly “Mr Le Fleur’s attack on the late Mr Watermeyer” as “utterly unjustifiable”:

The records of the Land Board and the manner in which this Country was surveyed speak for themselves, and in all my correspondence with Mr Watermeyer I found him ever ready to give due attention to Griqua and other representations made to him in land matters.

Le Fleur’s insinuations that the late Mr Watermeyer in conducting the survey continually favoured Europeans and despoiled Griquas are an insult to the memory of an honourable minded man. Mr Watermeyer has himself in times past told me how difficult he found it was to satisfy Griqua claimants. Although warned that in certain localities where they had made their selections farms would not run to the extent they desired, an exchange to other parts would be refused. In this respect the Europeans were more sensible and accepted farms wherever land was available.

101 LC, Item 1, Records of Correspondence [AAS le Fleur, Kokstad, J Frost, Secretary for Lands, Mines and Agriculture, Cape Town, 8 September 1895], p. 71.
102 LC, Item 1, Records of Correspondence [Le Fleur to J Frost, 8 September 1895], p. 69.
103 LC, Item 1, Records of Correspondence [Le Fleur to J Frost, 8 September 1895], p. 79.
104 LC, Item 1, Records of Correspondence [Le Fleur to J Frost, 8 September 1895], pp. 69-79.
105 CMK 1/142, Le Fleur to Secretary for Land, Mines and Agriculture, 16 October 1895.
106 CMK 1/142, Le Fleur to Secretary, Land, Mines and Agriculture, 16 October 1895.
107 CMK 1/142, Le Fleur to Secretary, Land, Mines and Agriculture, 16 October 1895.
108 CMK 5/16 [Stanford, Kokstad, to Under Secretary, Native Affairs, Cape Town, 18 October 1895], p. 271.
109 CMK 5/16 [Stanford to Under Secretary, Native Affairs, 28 October 1895], p. 273.
Sanford also rejected a charge that his “predecessor the Honourable C. Brownlee specially favoured a
European purchaser of Boschfontein” as “mere rubbish”.

Le Fleur and Stanford were from two very different interpretative and normative communities and this led
them to deal with Griqua land claims in very different ways. Stanford was inclined to regard the 1875 Land
Commission, the surveys of Watermeyer, the activities of members of the Land Board and preceding
colonial magistrates as honourable and the poverty and landless situation of many Griqua as, in the main,
the result of their own irresponsible behaviour. Le Fleur, on the other hand, regarded colonial officers and
the colonial government as complicit in the land deprivation and impoverishment of the Griqua. Whereas
Le Fleur was inclined to take earlier agreements between Adam Kok III and the colonial government as
well as the decisions and laws of the old Griqua Raad as an appropriate legal basis for dealing with Griqua
land claims, Stanford was inclined to assess the legitimacy of Griqua land claims in terms of the prevalent
colonial legal ideology and to put much less weight on agreements between Adam Kok and the colonial
government or on decisions and laws of the Griqua Raad. Stanford’s values were intertwined with the new
order. Le Fleur’s values were intertwined with the past Griqua order. The divergent interpretative
paradigms influencing Le Fleur and Stanford drew them into conflict.

**Legal action and “dis-annexation”**

Not having received a positive response from Frost since first submitting his reports in September and
October, Le Fleur’s strategy altered; his pronouncements had become a little more forceful by December
1895. Le Fleur now threatened legal action and the repossession of land acquired illegitimately. Le Fleur
attempted to consolidate Griqua land claims by appealing both to old Griqua law and to colonial law. He
reasoned that Captain Kok was supposed to sign transfers in terms of Griqua law but since he died and had
no successor, transfers could thus not be legally transferred. “Therefore, the transfers as a whole is illegal
and we mean to take immediate possession of our land to which the government is in duty bound to support
us, according to the law and undue claims”.

Le Fleur also argued that land transfers to Whites after 1874 were illegal since land was not alienable to
Whites in terms of Griqua law. He also attempted to take advantage of the legal perception that the Griqua
were ‘Natives’. He argued that the transfer of Griqua land to Whites was illegal on the ground that Griqua
were regarded as ‘Natives’ in a Supreme Court case, and as land belonging to ‘Aboriginal Natives’ was
supposed to be non-transferable to Whites:

> [L]et us for a moment review the Griquas who as a native according to the judgement of the Supreme Court
in the case of Regina vs Brant, that the Chief Justice remarked that all the infusion of European blood is out
of the Griquas …. now that being so and the Griqua being fully a native what then is the position of his land,
for we need to have and must act entirely on the laws of the Colony and if we force them the law [sic] we
must find that the transfers in and from Griquas are illegal for we find an act by Parliament passed in 1864
that no land belonging to the aboriginal, native are transferable to Europeans … the Griquas have every right
now under these circumstances to take legal possession of their land, for if the title was issued transferable
[sic], then those titles are a direct breach of law, not only Colonial but Griqua as well. … [W]e are natives and
our laws only allows us to transfer land by special permission of our chief … .

Stanford once again dismissed Le Fleur’s reasoning:

> In the Griqua titles to farms there was no clause prohibiting alienation, and there is no foundation for the
argument used by Le Fleur. His threat that the Griquas will repossess themselves of land which they have

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110 CMK 5/16 [Stanford to Under Secretary, Native Affairs, 28 October 1895], p. 271.
111 LC, Item 1, Records of Correspondence [AAS le Fleur, Kokstad, J Frost, Secretary, Lands, Mines and Agriculture,
Cape Town, 16 December 1895], pp. 85-6.
sold is a new feature in this enquiry and correspondence. That such talk was current amongst some of the people is information which has reached me from time to time, but representative men refrained from using any expression of this kind before me. The attitude now disclosed is certainly mischievous.\textsuperscript{112}

In threatening to take legal action against those who were involved in the illegal transference of Griqua farms, Le Fleur also implicated Walter Stanford in corruption. He claimed to have found evidence that Stanford – in his capacity as Registrar of Deeds in East Griqualand\textsuperscript{113} – together with L Zietsman, were involved in illegal land transference.

By November 1895 Le Fleur claimed that Stanford and Zietsman were involved in irregularities in the transfer of the land of Fortuin Kok to Johannes Komkasie without proper authorization. He demanded that they give an account of transference.\textsuperscript{114} Le Fleur not merely requested an explanation of the exchanges but also informed Zietsman “that Fortuin Kock … intends taking action”.\textsuperscript{115}

Fortuin Kok and Johannes Komkasie supported the accusation that Stanford and Zietsman had acted improperly. Johannes Komkasie purchased 200 acres from Fortuin Kok on 17 April 1886 but subsequently had a problem with Fortuin Kok. Zietsman acted as Komkasie’s agent for the sale. Johannes Komkasie delivered a sworn statement on 10 January 1896 that suggested that he improperly obtained a transfer from Stanford:

\begin{quote}
I had a verbal conversation with Mr Stanford about getting my transfer but at no time signed any papers to effect the same, that was the reason of my surprise when Mr. Stanford came and gave me the transfer, it was still in my possession and should any person appear before the Registrar of Deeds, he did so without my power … .\textsuperscript{116}
\end{quote}

Fortuin Kok likewise delivered a sworn statement in which he admitted that he sold a piece of land to Komkasie but claimed that he did not sign any papers to affect the transfer.\textsuperscript{117} Le Fleur reiterated to Stanford in January that they wanted to know what powers were produced and who produced those [transfer] powers as the deed of transfer was handed to Komkasie by Mr. Stanford and that the powers produced are not those signed by Komkasie nor Fortuin Kok and we want to know if that could be done and who did it and who has appeared in the name of Johannes Komkasie has done so without any power being granted him to do so.

Le Fleur mentioned further that

\begin{quote}
we demand that the men who produced those documents will inform us [about the powers that they used to get the transfer] so as to afford us an opportunity of prosecuting the men.\textsuperscript{118}
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{112} CMK 5/16 [Stanford to Under Secretary, Native Affairs, 20 December 1895], p. 276.
\textsuperscript{114} LC, Item 1, Records of Correspondence [AAS le Fleur, Kokstad, to Stanford, 20 November 1895], p. 60.
\textsuperscript{115} LC, Item 1, Records of Correspondence [AAS le Fleur, Kokstad, to Zietsman & Le Roux, 20 November 1895], p. 61.
\textsuperscript{116} LC, Item 1, Records of Correspondence, pp. 87-8.
\textsuperscript{117} LC, Item 1, Records of Correspondence, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{118} LC, Item 1, Records of Correspondence, p. 87, AAS le Fleur, Kokstad, to CMK, 10 January 1896
\end{flushright}
Another case implicating Stanford was that of Gert Kok. In February 1896 le Fleur accompanied Gert Kok to the resident magistrate of Kokstad, WG Cumming, and found that a piece of land granted to Gert Kok was transferred by JP Wildredge to Charlotte Wildredge and himself [JP Wildredge] without a declaration from Kok that he sold the land. Le Fleur reasoned that “the Registrar of Deeds [i.e. the Chief Magistrate WE Stanford] was not justified in alienating landed property … without power from” from the prior owner. Le Fleur and Gert Kok asked the resident magistrate to bring a charge against JP Wildredge for obtaining a transfer without proper power but the magistrate advised Gert Kok to bring in a civil action. Le Fleur and Gert Kok, declined, as they felt that the transference of landed property without proper authority was a criminal act that should be brought “under the Criminal Code” and subjected to laws as provided by those codes. Le Fleur subsequently appealed to Hercules Robert Robinson, governor of the Cape colony, to appoint an officer to investigate the case. Le Fleur made a written declaration that he had examined the books of the resident magistrate and found no power of transfer or any declaration signed by Gert Kok himself. By stating on that occasion that “I am a coloured man of the age of 28 years”, Le Fleur not only revealed his self-identity as a “coloured” but also suggested that interchangeableness of the categories of Coloured and Griqua.

Further delays by the government in responding to the demands of the Griqua increased their disaffection. By February 1896 the Griqua Committee contemplated a visit in April 1896 to “the Imperial Government on the Griqua question generally as well as to the Colonial Government” in Cape Town. Le Fleur informed Stanford that “the Committee … [members were] anxiously awaiting the reply” and were “ready to proceed to Cape Town as they were “impatient of waiting” as it was “16 months” ago that the inquiry had commenced and over 8 months since it finished”. They wanted to know what the government was “going to recommend”. Le Fleur also claimed in the twentieth century that the resident magistrate told him that he could not, as a “subordinate officer” try his superior but would forward papers pertaining to the case to the attorney general, Thomas Upington. “The reply was from Sir Thomas Upington the case is fully proved and should be taken up, but Mr. Stanford’s position would lower British prestige in the eyes of the Natives. I then placed the case before the Governor Sir Hercules Robison, later made Vic. Rosmead … When this came up both Zietsman and Stanford came to me and asked me to drop this case. They would pay the old man His proper money and they would each give me five hundred pounds as a reward to stay proceeding. I deliberately refuse to compromise such foul thief and fraud. I [put] the case before the [Resident] Magistrate asking for the arrest and put to trial [sic] [of the offenders”].

Lingering dissatisfaction with the unresponsiveness of the colonial government renewed support for the idea of de-linking East Griqualand from the colony. The idea that was also used to exert pressure on the colonial government to meet Griqua land demands. At a meeting on 11 March 1896 the Griqua Committee passed a resolution that a public meeting be held on Tuesday 7 April “to consider the advisability of asking Her Imperial Government to Dis-annex East Griqualand from the Colony and place it under direct control or Imperial Rule, as there is no less than thirty three instances of maladministration on the part of the

119 Reflecting back on his life in the twentieth century, Le Fleur claimed that his discovery of evidence during the enquiry of a “Johannes Kok” [or perhaps Gert or Fortuin Kok] that indicated that Walter E Stanford and L Zietsman were involved in illegal land transference, led to his (Le Fleur) arrest in January 1897. Le Fleur suggested that a deed of sale, drawn up by Zietsman to “Stanford Chief Magistrate … [and ] register [sic] of [deeds] … at Kokstad … constituted one of the biggest frauds … possible … . When this came up both Zietsman and Stanford came to me and asked me to drop this case. They would pay the old man His proper money and they would each give me five hundred pounds as a reward to stay proceeding. I deliberately refuse to compromise such foul thief and fraud. I [put] the case before the [Resident] Magistrate asking for the arrest and put to trial [sic] [of the offenders”].

120 LC, Item 1, Records of Correspondence [Andrew le Fleur, Kokstad, 1896 to Hercules Robert Robinson, Cape Governor and High Commissioner, Cape Town, February 26 February 1896], p. 97 (also in CMK 1/142). CMK 1/142, Declaration by Andrew Abraham Stockenstrom le Fleur, Kokstad, dated 6 February 1896; Andrew le Fleur, Kokstad, to CMK, 17 February 1896.

121 CMK 1/142, Declaration by Andrew Abraham Stockenstrom le Fleur, Kokstad, dated 6 February 1896.

122 CMK 1/142, Andrew le Fleur, Kokstad, to WE Stanford, Kokstad, 28 February 1896.
Government without redress by the authorities and the Government'. The meeting of 7 April did decide to send a deputation to Cape Town with the power to proceed to England. Le Fleur also informed Bantu-speaking chiefs like Sikake and Lerothodi and Paramount Chief Sigcau of Pondoland in mid-April by letter that a delegation would be going to England in May to ask the imperial government to take the country over. Money was subsequently collected amongst Griqua and Bantu-speakers for the visit to Cape Town and England.

The resolve of the Griqua Committee to deal directly with the imperial government was reinforced after the secretary for agriculture supposedly informed the Griqua via the chief magistrate at a public meeting on 30 April 1896 at Matatiele that they had squandered their land rights by selling their farms but were now claiming farms from the government. Attempting again to exert pressure on the colonial government, the Griqua Committee communicated to Premier Sir Gordon Sprigg that it appeared to them to be "fruitless to appeal to the Colonial Government" and that they would now appeal to "Her Majesty’s Government" through the High Commissioner and that they would visit Cape Town on their way to England.

At the same time as they expressed their disillusionment with the colonial government and their intention of visiting the imperial government, Le Fleur and the Griqua Committee hoped that the government might make some concessions to the Griqua, thus accounting for the two pronged approached of Le Fleur and his associates in the Griqua Committee. Members of the Griqua Committee wanted clarity on the part of the government so that they could embark on a decisive path. Le Fleur informed the chief magistrate in June 1896 that it was

> [T]he deputation will first call [at the Secretary for Native Affairs] and if a satisfactory settlement can be arrived [at] the whole case can be settled as I have always said I am in every way to come to an amicable settlement with government …

Although the Griqua Committee had become very disillusioned with the colonial government, there was nevertheless some hope that the government might make some concessions to the Griqua, thus accounting for the two pronged approached of Le Fleur and his associates in the Griqua Committee. Members of the Griqua Committee wanted clarity on the part of the government so that they could embark on a decisive path. Le Fleur informed the chief magistrate in June 1896 that it was

> high time that the Government … declare its own intentions and state plainly whether they are prepared to settle the claims or not for it seems to the men … that there is reason to doubt that Government intend replying … . We are justified in strongly expressing ourselves and taking action to enforce our rights for we … want … what is our just due.

In putting pressure on the government, Le Fleur also suggested to the chief magistrate that he would instruct his supporters in the House of Assembly to put the question of Griqua land claims before the House. Le Fleur and his Griqua associates later decided that it would "serve no good purpose" to go to parliament when the Supreme Court that held jurisdiction over the land claim cases was “open for the redress of lawful grievances”.

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123 LC, Item 1, Records of Correspondence [APD Smith, Secretary, Griqua Committee, Kokstad, to CMK, 12 March 1896], p. 103. CMK 1/142, AAS le Fleur, Kokstad, to Assistant CMK, 12 March 1896.
124 CMK 1/142, AAS le Fleur, Kokstad, to CMK, 10 April 1896.
125 CMK, 5/16, p. 285; Kokstad Advertiser, 12 March 1897, p. 3; 26 March 1897, p. 3.
126 CMK 1/142, AAS le Fleur, Kokstad, to Sir Gordon Sprigg, Prime Minister and Secretary for Native Affairs, Cape Town, 6 May 1896.
127 CMK 1/142, AAS le Fleur, Kokstad, to Stanford, Kokstad, 9 May 1896.
128 CMK 1/142, AAS le Fleur, Kokstad, to Stanford, Kokstad, 1 June 1896.
129 CMK 1/142, AAS le Fleur, Kokstad, to Assistant CMK, WG Cumming, Kokstad, 30 June 1896.
Persisting with his legal threats, Le Fleur demanded on 5 June 1896 a farm in Umzimkulu from the chief magistrate – as a representative as the colonial government – on behalf of Altong, a Tlhaping who came with Adam Kok III to Nomansland. He threatened to institute legal proceedings in the Supreme Court if no assurance was given by 10 AM on 6 June 1896 that the demand would be satisfied. Le Fleur informed the chief magistrate at the end of June that a number of land claim cases would be heard before the Supreme Court in August 1896 and that summons had already been served on the government in regard to two cases. Le Fleur was still threatening in September 1896 to institute legal action in the Supreme Court. The threats appear, however, to have to have subsided by October 1896.

Le Fleur also directed his appeals for land restitution to Joseph Chamberlain, the colonial secretary in August and in so doing cited treaties made with the Griqua that he thought were still legally binding. Foreshadowing his broader national focus and concern with Coloureds in the 20th century, Le Fleur appealed to Lord Rosmead, the colonial governor, in September 1896 “wish[ing] to point out how the Coloured people are used in South Africa”. Le Fleur argued that Cape government was actually dictated by Pretoria (i.e. Dutch-speaking Whites) and not London; that “the Dutch [were] dragging the whole of South Africa away from British rule” and that it would be “useless” “to expect a union of South Africa with the Dutch and [that] anyone attempting such a policy will find himself defeated in the near future”. He reasoned that the “Dutch” were responsible for the denial of the rights of the Griqua: Dutch officials like Jacobus de Wet and Faure disregarded Griqua complaints brought to them during their respective terms as secretary of the Native Affairs department. When the Griqua demanded a settlement of their claims in June 1896 Faure responded by saying that “he did not see his way clear to reopen the rights”. Inviting greater British involvement in South Africa, Le Fleur warned that “unless we are wrested by a strong hand from the Dutch influence we are lost to Great Britain”.

[T]he danger is great and very great and we [“Coloured and Native people”] the lovers of British rule unless supported will have to abandon that policy and support Boer rule instead of British rule. [O]ur warning may be looked up as being premature but will be regretted unless followed and carried out to take us from the Bond influences … .

Already providing justification and a warning of the events that would unfold in 1897, Le Fleur stated that

[w]e are going to do all we can to free ourselves from Dutch Rule for to say we are ruled by England that may be so in a certain sense but in truth we are ruled by the Pretoria Government who hold its able Lieutenants in the Cape Government.

Prefiguring the orientation of his own followers during much of the 20th century, Le Fleur also warned that once Pretoria was in power [w]e will be bound to support its policy for to live in peace … our only course [would be] to join the policy … declaring Pretoria instead of London our government”.

The unsatisfactory response of colonial officials to Griqua land claims had a decisive impact on the strategies of Le Fleur and the Griqua Committee. Animosity between Stanford and Le Fleur increased in consequence of Stanford’s treatment of land claims and Le Fleur subsequently opted to present Griqua land

131 CMK 5/16, pp. 231, 270.
132 CMK 1/142, AAS le Fleur, Kokstad, to Stanford, Kokstad, 5 June 1896.
133 CMK 1/142, AAS le Fleur, Kokstad, to Stanford, Kokstad, 28 June 1896.
134 CMK 5/16, Stanford, Kokstad, to Under Secretary, Native Affairs, Cape Town, 14 September, p. 300.
135 August 1896 petition by AAS le Fleur to Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain attached to CMK 1/142, AAS le Fleur, Kokstad to J Gordon Sprigg, Prime Minister and Secretary for Native Affairs, Cape Town, 6 August 1896.
136 CMK 1/142, AAS le Fleur, Kokstad, to Lord Rosmead, Governor and Commander of Cape Colony, 28 September 1896.
claims to higher officials. Their unsatisfactory response in turn increased Griqua animosity to the colonial government and encouraged armed rebellion.

**Entrenchment of Griqua leadership rivalry**

Strategic shifts encouraged by the unsatisfactory government response also sharpened divisions and divergences between contending Griqua factions. By 1896 Le Fleur was, for example, already casted both by local colonial officials and some Griqua as a troublemaker. Le Fleur and the Griqua Committee’s hardening approach sharpened their divergence from people like Cornelius de Bruin and his associates in the Griqua Political Association.

As suggested before, the increasingly prominent position that Le Fleur assumed in Griqua politics brought tension between himself and other aspirant Griqua leaders, particularly those associated with the GPA. Le Fleur felt that he was the appropriate person to deal with the government on land claims, having been granted the authority to do so by many of the claimants. He therefore resented the role that members of the GPA played in Griqua engagements with the government around land claims. Local government officials, however, preferred to engage with the more government friendly members of the GPA, particularly De Bruin.

The divergences between Le Fleur and De Bruin were acutely manifested in mid-1896. Le Fleur undertook in June 1896 to settle publicly what he considered to be interference in land claims process by De Bruin:

> I thought over your case and must now tell you plainly what I meant and mean to do … [Y]ou see that as I have said you are most unwarrantably interfering with my old clients and by you representing yourself in a wrong light to these men, you may have served on the enquiry but that was not at my instance at all … I will call a public meeting before leaving to discuss your position with the people in general and as you set up a pretence of representing people which I hold powers of Attorney from, I will then have the opportunity of bringing those men to book before the public, you cannot be left any longer carrying on this game and as you are pursuing such a course is most objectionable, you yourself is and has been represented through me … I will call a meeting to discuss your position finally.

The divergence and animosity between Le Fleur and De Bruin were again manifested at a meeting held on 16 July in regard to the distribution of 100 *erwen* availed for the Griqua by the Kokstad municipality. Le Fleur and De Bruin made divergent recommendations. Le Fleur felt that there were men who were not recommended who should have been. He also felt that children of families which had already received two *erwen* should not have been put on the list of recommendations. De Bruin disapproved Le Fleur’s objections. He also argued that children of burghers who came “across the mountain” with Adam Kok should have a stronger right to *erwen* than those “Griquas” who came in afterwards from the colony.

Stanford criticized Le Fleur at the 16 July meeting for accusing government officials like Brownlee and Watermeyer of impropriety in the allocation of farms. He also suggested that Le Fleur was overzealous and an obstructionist:

> If any one attaches importance to the statements of Le Fleur, everything would have to begin again, and the works of the enquiry go for nothing. It is possible to account for Le Fleur’s statements by presuming that in...
the heat of a debate or excitement engendered by overzealousness in the cause, he is carried away by his feelings.\footnote{CMK 5/17.}

The political leanings of Le Fleur and his father brought them in association with people involved in the Griqua Committee having members like Ludovick Kok and Adam PD Smith with more radical inclinations. Ludovick may have conferred a special status on the Committee as a relative of Adam Kok III. Smith, a crafty character, may have been involved in the 1878 rebellion as a background figure, instigating others to take up arms whilst refraining from taking action himself, much as he would apparently do during 1897. Despite the attempt at caricature, Dower’s account may well reveal aspects of Smith:

He took no part in the outbreak \[of 1878\], but he helped materially to create the atmosphere of discontent, which made it possible and easy. He was a “\textit{Kapenaar},” came to the country in 1868 in the humble capacity of cook and valet to the chief. He could speak and write English imperfectly. He was the relative of Adam Muis’s wife, son-in-law of Rev. Hans Bezuidenhout, was closely allied to officers in esse or in posse in Church or State. During Adam Kok’s lifetime he was a \textit{nobody}. After his death he made a bid for popularity and \textit{leadership}. He revelled in Committees, Reports, Memorials and Protests. He was a kind of chronic protestant. He largely helped to keep the political pot boiling, and so contributed to its boiling over. In all fairness to this man, who was the most extraordinary moral mixture I have ever known, I have to record that while he was the best grumbler in the congregation, he was also the most diligent and useful Sunday School Teacher.\footnote{Dower: \textit{Griqualand East}, pp. 99-100.}

Smith generally assumed a conciliatory approach before government officials but apparently assumed a more hostile approach in private. He found in Le Fleur someone that he could use to channel his hostility to the colonial government whilst himself maintaining a cordial posture to the government.\footnote{Cape Town Archives, Chief Magistrate, Transkei (CMT) 3/874/644, CG de Bruin to Resident Magistrate, Kokstad, 28 January 1911.} Le Fleur himself sought to develop an image amongst colonial officials as a leader who was well disposed to the colonial and imperial officials.

Le Fleur’s attempt to position himself as the pre-eminent Griqua leader was complicated by rivals within opposing factions who aspired to be the heirs of Adam Kok. In Le Fleur’s own words: “[G]reat difficulty was experienced by myself, by the action of the various claimants to the chieftainship of East Griqualand. Ludovick Kok was one, so was Gert Kok (Rex), also Mrs Sophia de Vries, [and] Cornelius de Bruin”.\footnote{Kokstad Advertiser, 4 March 1894, p. 4. Cornelius de Bruin denied, however, that he aspired to be chief of the Griqua: “As to my claiming the chieftainship of the Griquas, Le Fleur, when he told the court this, knew that he was speaking a lie … . Le Fleur said I claimed the chieftainship, but he took it, in which he failed”. De Bruin also revealed that Donald Strachan suggested (apparently whilst Le Fleur was in prison in 1897) that the Griqua or the Griqua Political Association should “ask the Government to appoint a headman for the Griquas, and that the man must also be a Griqua who would agree with the authorities and in whom the Griquas could fully rely, and through that headman the Griqua matters generally could be brought before the C.M. and through him to the Government. And as far as I know no one was nominated; and I consider it a very good thing at that time that my friend, Le Fleur, was in goal” (Kokstad Advertiser, 25 March 1898, p. 2). De Bruin’s account does suggest power contestations amongst leading Griqua during the 1890s as well as attempts by government officials like Strachan to intervene in intra-Griqua affairs and to promote leaders that they approved. That De Bruin might actually have aspired to ‘chieftainship’ was suggested by his position as a government sanctioned headman of the Mount Currie Griqua from 1898 and his subsequent unsuccessful attempt to extend his influence beyond Mount Currie. In regard to appointment of De Bruin as headman see National Archives, Pretoria, Secretary of Native Affairs (NTS) 79, 1/15, CMK to Superintendent, Nave Affairs, Cape Town, 19 July 1898; Superintendent, Native Affairs to Prime Minster, 28 July 1899; Acting Secretary, Native Affairs, Cape Town, to De Bruin, Kokstad, 3 May 1904. CMT 3/874/644, De Bruin to Resident Magistrate, Kokstad, 28 January 1911.}
Adam Kok’s heir
Le Fleur’s leadership position was bolstered through his marriage to Rachel Susanna Kok in 1896. Rachel was the daughter of Adam ‘Muis’ Kok who was, until his death in 1878, a potential successor of Adam Kok III. Although beneficial for the consolidation of his influence, Le Fleur might not have married Rachel merely to bolster his claim or aspiration to chieftainship. He claimed in the twentieth century that he was captivated by Rachel after he heard her singing on his birthday on 2 July in 1885. He then decided that if he was to ever to get married, that she would be his wife (“Huis moeder”). Rachel was then 14 years old. Le Fleur demonstrated his love for singing by promoting choir singing among his 20th century followers.

After his marriage to Rachel, Le Fleur claimed, according to Dower, “to be the representative of the Kok family and to sit in the old chief’s seat”. Le Fleur was indeed projecting himself as the heir of Adam Kok III by the mid-1890s. Through his agitations, his marriage to Rachel Kok, and acquisition of Adam Kok III’s staff of office, Le Fleur gained recognition among many Griqua and Bantu-speakers as heir of Adam Kok III. Adam Kok III was himself not merely regarded as a captain or chief but also as a paramount chief, at least some time after his death. Thus, the designations of captain, chief and paramount chief might have been implicit in Le Fleur’s positioning as heir of Adam Kok III.

From constitutionality to rebellion
By the time Le Fleur’s power was entrenched in 1896 he had also reached a critical stage in his relation with the colonial authorities, having attempted a range of measures within constitutional bounds in dealing with Griqua land claims. When Le Fleur entered Griqua politics in 1894 he attempted to advance Griqua land claims through constitutional means and through cooperation with government officials. By 1896 he had become very disillusioned with the colonial government but still manifested hope in the British imperial government.

Le Fleur and his associates sought to win the favour of British government officials and to use such favour as leverage in their struggles with White settlers and the colonial government. The bestowal of praises and the pledging of loyalty became one of the means of eliciting the favour of British officials. By stressing the nobility of the British, Le Fleur and his compatriots acknowledged the difference that the British might have introduced in southern Africa in regard to the treatment of people who were not White. In stressing their nobility they were also urging them to live in line with their noble ideals. For example, in June 1895 the “Committee of Griqua People”, comprising, inter alia, Abraham le Fleur, Andrew le Fleur and LJ Kok, welcomed Governor Sir Hercules Robinson, through Sir James Sivewright, the parliamentary representative for East Griqualand, as follows:

It gives us, as subjects of Her Most Gracious Majesty, great pleasure to think that Her Majesty’s advisors have the full confidence in your Excellency to appoint you to rule this important portion of Her Majesty’s
vast Empire; and we as coloured people, need never regret the appointment, as the past history of your Excellency’s administration still lives in our memories. ... We hope your Excellency’s return this time will be blessed as in the past, and that before you depart from us, which we will regret sincerely, that all may be under one flag and one union – under the rule of that noble people and gracious Queen of whom we are so proud, and to whom every black and coloured race looks for protection, for under that rule is that great blessing – Liberty.\footnote{Kokstad Advertiser, 28 June 1895.}

The hardened position that Andrew le Fleur had assumed by 1896 reinforced the perception and fear that the Griqua were colluding against the government. White settlers feared cooperation of Griqua and Bantu-speakers and in particular a joint uprising. They suspected that seditious activities were going on and that Le Fleur was a key figure in such activities. Although Le Fleur and members of the Griqua Committee had assumed a more hardened position against the colonial government by 1896 they still projected themselves as loyal subjects and attempted to allay the suspicion that they were involved in seditious activities. However, pledges of loyalty could also generate the impression that Le Fleur was a crafty person. Pledges of loyalty were especially prominent in periods when loyalty was suspect. Le Fleur sought to dispel rumours of subversive activities of the Griqua publicly and through personal communication to government officials. He assured Chief Magistrate Stanford in May 1896 that

\begin{quote}
I am as loyal as any man and as you are fully aware that I will always use my influence in keeping the natives, as well as the Griquas down … .
\end{quote}

In a letter to the Kokstad Advertiser in May, Le Fleur likewise mentioned that

\begin{quote}
The Europeans need fear nothing. They are on the safest spot in South Africa at present, for their safety is our safety, and their welfare is our welfare; their prosperity our prosperity, and this is our watchword – “England for ever,” the country that has set us free, and is every day still fighting for our liberty against the world; and for her will we shed our last life’s blood. May she ever reign supreme!\footnote{Kokstad Advertiser, 22 May 1896.}
\end{quote}

The above quotations also reveal the ethno-‘racial’ categories and distinctions made by Griqua (or the ethno-racial underclasses more generally) in East Griqualand in the 1890s. That is, ‘Coloured’ subsumed ‘Griqua’. ‘Native’ was associated with ‘Black’. ‘Griqua’ and ‘Coloured’ were (already) distinguished or disassociated from ‘Native’ and ‘Black’, although a number of Rolong and Tlhaping identified themselves as Griqua burghers.\footnote{CMK 5/15, see e.g. Statements of Rauyampa, (p. 67) Klaas Makoalo (p. 70), and Jan Zwaartboy (p. 71), all dated 27 December 1894.}

Griqua discontent reached a high point after the visit of the Premier Gordon Sprigg to East Griqualand late in November 1896. Le Fleur called a meeting on behalf of the Griqua Committee\footnote{Kokstad Advertiser, 26 March 1897, p. 3; 4 March 1898, p. 4.} just before the one of Sprigg that was attended by Griqua and Bantu-speakers. Le Fleur dealt at the meeting with land claims and invited people to meet again after the public meeting of Sprigg in Kokstad on (or around) 27 November.\footnote{See e.g. CMK 5/20, pp. 17, 18, 21-4.}

Griqua representatives subsequently laid their grievances before Sprigg. Le Fleur delivered a long statement on their land claims and expressed his hope that the premier would look favourably on Griqua claims not yet settled. Sprigg indicated, however, that he would not open the “[land] question” since the chief magistrate had made an investigation and an offer to the Griqua. Sprigg also expressed his support to the proposal of Stanford that those with good claims be granted allotments instead of farms.\footnote{Kokstad Advertiser, 11 December 1896.} Immediately after the meeting with Sprigg a large number of Griqua and Bantu-speakers again met with Le Fleur, as
arranged. Those present included a number of Bantu-speaking chiefs and headman. People were once again encouraged to contribute money for the land claims campaign.

On 17 December 1896 Stanford proposed to Le Fleur that the Griqua should accept land in (“Matabeleland” in) Rhodesia, if the government approved such a move. Stanford also put the proposal to the Griqua Committee on 26 December. According to Stanford, “[n]o Natives were included in this scheme, with the exception of some individual Natives who ranked as Griqua Burghers”. The proposition was, however, opposed by most members of the Griqua Committee but not by Le Fleur and Adam Smith. Thus, although Stanford had assumed a position on land claims that was difficult for the Griqua to accept, he still attempted to pacify them by suggesting that they go to Rhodesia, if the government approved. By then the Griqua Committee had become closely linked with Bantu-speakers in a way that frustrated ethno-racialized government social political approaches. The confluence was apparently very much tactical, with Bantu-speakers in part still being used as leverage for attaining government concessions. For example, Stanford requested the Griqua Committee in December to hold a meeting to consider his suggestion that the Griqua move to Rhodesia. He “distinctly mentioned that the meeting was for Griquas only”. ‘Natives’ were, however, invited to the meeting, despite Stanford’s instruction. At the meeting “Louw Pretorius spoke about the sympathy felt by the Natives for the Griquas, and said it would become more marked in the future”.

According to Le Fleur, on 3 January 1897, members of the Griqua Committee met him at his office and “decided to invite all the Native chiefs in this territory to a meeting, as they objected to … [his] views and the proposal of the Government [about moving to Rhodesia], and they said they would enforce their rights by the support of these chiefs”. The Griqua Committee subsequently invited Griqua and Bantu-speakers to a meeting in Kokstad on 25 January 1897. Members of the Griqua Committee apparently considered the use of force and support by Bantu-speaking chiefs and headmen. According to Le Fleur, after a meeting between himself and (some) members of the Griqua Committee, during which he advised against a warpath, Benjamin Uithalder was sent by the Griqua Committee to

Tell Sicgau that the time has come, as it was agreed between us, to fight. The treaty between us and the Pondos has always stood firm, and the opportunity we now have must not be let slip. On the 25th be prepared. If you hear we have taken action turn the C.M.R. out of your country, as you have said it is your intention to do so.

Whilst members of the Griqua Committee might have used Bantu-speakers as leverage in their land claims campaign, Griqua disillusionment with the colonial government appears, on the other hand, to have afforded an opportunity for some Bantu-speakers to exploit Griqua resentment for their own benefit. The account of Lepula, made in court during the December 1897 rebellion case, is very suggestive in this regard – even though very likely calculated to support Le Fleur’s attempt to deflect responsibility for the aborted rebellion from himself:

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158 Kokstad Advertiser, 4 March 1898, p. 4; CMK 5/20, p. 24.
159 See e.g. CMK 5/20, pp. 21-24.
160 Kokstad Advertiser, 4 March 1898, p. 4.
161 Kokstad Advertiser, 19 March 1897, p. 3.
162 Kokstad Advertiser, 4 March 1898, p. 4.
163 Kokstad Advertiser, 12 March 1897, p. 3; 19 March, p. 3; 26 March 1897, p. 3.
164 Kokstad Advertiser, 19 March 1897, p. 3.
165 I.e. Louw Pretorius, Nicholas van der Westhuizen, Samson Marais, Nicholas Prinsloo and Philander Gouws.
166 Kokstad Advertiser, 4 March 1898, p. 4.
167 Kokstad Advertiser, 12 March 1897, p. 3; 19 March 1897, p. 3.
168 I.e. Louw Pretorius, Nicholas van der Westhuizen, Nicholas Prinsloo and Piet Bezuidenhout.
169 Kokstad Advertiser, 11 March 1898, p. 5 (This issue reproduced article on Le Fleur published on 4 March 1898).
For a long time there was a bad feeling among the Hlangwini and other tribes against the white people about the fencing and other things. The Basutos and myself also had a bad feeling against the white people. These feelings we worked into the land claims of the Griquas. All the Native chiefs used you [Le Fleur] and the Griquas as instruments. I myself personally did that, and it was the general feeling. The Griquas were foolish enough to be led into this – they agreed with you. We wanted you to come out so that you would fight.\(^1\)

The view articulated by Lepula was in line with the view expressed a year before by Donald Strachan, a Justice of the Peace in Umzimkulu in 1897\(^2\) who had “lived among Natives since 1859”:

> The Hlangwinis have always been restless, and have on several occasions, defied the authorities and gone into open rebellion. This state of things has obtained for the last 17 years. I think the Natives were only waiting for a head centre round \([s/c]\) which to gather. Le Fleur had this advantage that he was looked upon as trying to get back Adam Kok’s country for Adam Kok’s people; but even without him I think they would have looked for another head.\(^3\)

Some Bantu-speakers apparently suggested to Griqua at the meeting with Sprigg in November 1896 that it was no use talking to Whites and that they should rather use force.\(^4\) Le Fleur would thus have been exposed to forces from various quarters prompting him in various directions. The rumours that went afloat about him reflected, to some extent, attempts of various people to actualize their aspirations through him.

In January 1897 rumours were spread that hostile activities were taking place and that the ‘Natives’ would arrive armed at the meeting earmarked for 25 January and revolt if the colonial government did not hand over the country. Some said that all chiefs in East Griqualand, as well as chiefs from Pondoland and Lesotho would attend the meeting. Some said people were to bring provisions for three days.\(^5\) The envisaged meeting at Kokstad on Monday 25 January generated “warlike excitement” amongst some of the underclasses.\(^6\) Neither the meeting nor the violent confrontation took place. Le Fleur, who was suspected as the main culprit behind the “scare”, was arrested.

Although there was clearly much dissatisfaction with the colonial government within subordinated communities, it is difficult to fathom what the precise role was of Le Fleur and the Griqua Committee in fostering the rebellious mood of 1896-1897. That they had an influence on the rebellious mood is certain, but the precise role that Le Fleur and the Griqua Committee played is obscured through contradictory after-event accounts in 1897 and 1898\(^7\) in the sedition cases involving Le Fleur. Le Fleur claimed, however, fairly consistently in 1897 and 1898 that he was until late 1897, averse to war, but members of the Griqua Committee who became Crown witnesses during the December 1897 rebellion case suggested otherwise. Although members of the Griqua Committee testified in 1897 that they were very constitutional in their doings, revelations during in 1898 suggested otherwise. There are, however, points of agreements between the accounts of 1897 and 1898 as well as much agreement with what Le Fleur and Crown witnesses had to say.

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\(^1\) Lepula’s statement during 1898 sedition case was in response to a question by Le Fleur. Lepula was an adherent of Le Fleur who testified as a Crown witness. *Supplement to Kokstad Advertiser*, 25 February 1898, p. 6.

\(^2\) CMK 5/20, p. 13.

\(^3\) Statement of Donald Strachan during Le Fleur’s 1897 sedition case, *Kokstad Advertiser*, 12 March 1897, p. 3.


\(^5\) CMK 5/20, p. 14; *Kokstad Advertiser*, 12 March 1897, p. 3.

\(^6\) CMK 5/20, p. 34.

\(^7\) Statements of Le Fleur and members of the Griqua Committee during his 1897 sedition case were calculated to counter allegations that he was behind the rebelliousness manifested in January 1897. In his 1898 sedition case, Le Fleur attempted to counter the allegation that he was the principal person behind the aborted rebellion of December 1897. Le Fleur thus projected himself as having been a moderating force for a long time and suggested that he was much influenced by other members of the Griqua Committee, who exhibited strong rebellious tendencies before December 1897, but who were not charged with sedition.
say, allowing thus for an outline of a probable course of events. The accounts are also suggestive of opposing tendencies that were at work within Le Fleur, among members of the Griqua Committee, within the broader Griqua Community and among the underclasses in general.

Le Fleur claimed on 24 March 1897 during his sedition case: “All I have done I did peaceably and in a constitutional manner”. APD Smith, Ludovick Kok and Louw Pretorius, all members of the Griqua Committee, affirmed that Le Fleur and the Griqua Committee worked in a constitutional manner. Louw Pretorius asserted that “[t]he committee worked constitutionally and had no intention of fighting against the Government”.178 However, Le Fleur suggested on 2 March 1898 that discussions around the use of force and moves towards joint action by Griqua and Bantu-speakers were taking place late in 1896. Members of Griqua Committee, including Le Fleur himself, talked to Bantu-speaking chiefs and assessed the level of support for the use of force against the colonial government. Support for the use of force was found to be high.179 Le Fleur also claimed that he was asked by Ludovick Kok and David Marais (apparently in January 1897) “to write a letter to [Chief] Lerothodi and one to [Chief] Makaula and one to [Chief] Sikake, together with a message from Ludovick, asking Lerothodi to supply arms to the Griquas who were unarmed”, and that “Ludovick Kok, Sam Marais and Stoffel Bezuidenhout … all seemed to join in to have a fight”.180

Supported by Lepula,181 Le Fleur claimed, however, that he himself was at that stage averse to the use of force and that he encouraged the colonial government to settle land claims. Again supported by Lepula he also suggested that the “feeling of Native chiefs” was “very strong” against him for hesitating to take active measures against the colonial government. Projecting himself as a moderating force, Le Fleur claimed that “[a]lthough, from time to time, Natives and Griquas proposed and threatened to murder farmers, I always endeavoured to bring these people on the right path” and that if it was not for him, war would have broken out in January 1897.182

Stoffel Bezuidenhout claimed, however, that before his arrest in February 1897, Le Fleur informed him that he gave the Griqua Committee his “own private opinion” whilst “[t]hey were talking about the disturbance

178 Kokstad Advertiser, 26 March 1897, p. 3.
179 “During Sir Gordon Sprigg’s visit, on the 27th of November, I think, I received instructions from the [Griqua] committee, at a meeting held that evening to interview all the chiefs who came to town. … I interviewed the Chiefs – namely, Pata, Singapansi, Tshanibezwe, and others, including the son of Manguzela, and also the chiefiness, Nombonga. There were several other head-men, including Makoba, Mahambahlala, Macale, as well as the chiefs, Umhlhangaso and Zona. Matters at this stage amongst the Native tribes, so far as I was personally aware, were very critical. Members of the committee, such as Louw Pretorius, had also interviewed Mbona in Natal, and said to me that he was certain of the support of the people there in a fight. The Hlangweni and Baca on the other side of the border in Natal were worked up to the same pitch by Pata and Singapansi. It was decided at a meeting to get the rights by force, as Umhlhangazo said there that he, together with all the headmen of Kokstad district, were told by Mr. Stanford, the Chief Magistrate, that if the Griquas wanted any rights they would have to fight for them. The committee had also instructed Ludovick Kok and myself to proceed to Matatiele to see if the Natives there would join. A public meeting was held. After this meeting a private meeting took place. With the exception of George Moshe, who was represented by his chief councillor and his secretary – Sibi, being ill, was represented by his eldest son – all urged fighting as being the only method possible. During that time Ludovick Kok, as chairman had constant communication with the Basuto Chiefs. He was also instructed by the committee to go down to Pondoland – during 1895. I again, on December 7th, 1896, urged upon the Government the settlement of these claims. I was in Matatiele just after the visit of Sir Gordon Sprigg. The feeling of the Native Chiefs and Basuto Chiefs was very strong against me for hesitating to take active measures, as that disturbance about the border had taken place. The same feeling prevailed in the Mount Frere district, and in the Umzimkulu district – the feeling about the border fence was very strong against the Government”. Statement by AAS le Fleur during preliminary examination in his 1898 sedition case, Kokstad Advertiser, 4 March 1898, p. 4.
180 Kokstad Advertiser, 4 March 1898, p. 4.
181 Supplement to the Kokstad Advertiser, 25 February 1898, p. 6.
182 Kokstad Advertiser, 11 March 1898, p. 5.
at the time, and the rights of the Griquas”, thus suggesting a closing off of options preceding the shift to the use of force:

Le Fleur … said to me “I gave them my private opinion which was that Government will not give the Griquas their rights, and they will have to fight for them.”

What is suggested from Le Fleur’s own statements about the situation late in 1896, and by his unambiguous involvement in seditious activities late in 1897, is that the relation between contrary tendencies in him, that is, the tendencies towards constitutionality and rebellion, had been altered, even though he might still have been averse to the use of force prior to November 1897. Any aversion to the use of force by members of the Griqua Committee would unlikely have been unambiguous. The shift to the use of force was necessarily preceded by the conviction that others means were not effective.

Although the disinclination of the colonial government to meet Griqua land claims contributed significantly to the shift in the strategies of Le Fleur and the Griqua Committee, Le Fleur’s self-projection as heir of Adam Kok III would also have contributed to the shift in his strategies. Given that there were, by his own admission, “various claimants to the chieftainship of East Griqualand” like “Ludovick Kok … Gert Kok (Rex), … Mrs. Sophia … [and] Cornelius George de Bruin”, Le Fleur would have had to demonstrate that he was worthy to be a heir of Adam Kok, and that he stood out among all the aspirant heirs. The circumstances in which Le Fleur had to prove himself were extremely difficult. It appears that Le Fleur’s influence might have been threatened somewhat given the fact that the Griqua claims that he championed were not adequately met by the government, especially in light of money that people paid for the land claims campaign. Land rights were a critical concern activating an idealized past associated with Adam Kok III’s reign. That idealized past could not be restored or approximated through constitutional channels. Force was an alternative. Given the Griqua’s relative numerical weakness, cooperation with Bantu-speakers became especially important in the attempt to change the status quo. Cooperation was facilitated by joint subordination.

Although there were common factors that generated discontent amongst both Griqua and Bantu-speaking Africans, some factors affected specific segments more acutely. There were also, in addition to social constrains, environmental crises that contributed to a climate of rebelliousness amongst the underclasses during the late 1890s. Rumours of sedition abounded for much of this period.

Need for access to land was a potential binding factor amongst the underclasses. Griqua and Bantu-speakers both felt the limited access to land acutely. Pressure for access to land was growing, especially amongst Bantu-speakers in Umzimkulu where there was a large Bantu-speaking population. Land restoration was, however, an especially sensitive issue for the Griqua who had lost extensive land in the region to Whites and in Philippolis before their trek.

Bantu-speakers were special targets of growing restrictions aimed at bolstering White domination. Many Bantu-speakers were opposed to the fencing of farming land by Whites, undertaken particularly in areas

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183 Kokstad Advertiser, 25 February 1898, p. 3.
184 Kokstad Advertiser, 4 March 1898, p. 4.
185 CMK 5/16 [Stanford, Kokstad, to Under Secretary for Native Affairs, 1 October 1896], p. 301. Le Fleur indicated in March 1898 that after his acquittal in October 1897: “I found everything, my whole business, was wrecked, hundreds of pounds had been spent in the defence of the case; hundreds of pounds had been misappropriated, belonging to other people, everybody was demanding their money from me”. Kokstad Advertiser, 11 March 1898, p. 5.
where Bantu-speakers were concentrated in large numbers. For example, more land was fenced in Umzimkulu than in Mount Currie where there were actually more farms. Umzimkulu, on the other hand, had more locations of Bantu-speakers than Mount Currie. Much of the Bantu-speaking population of Umzimkulu lived on communal land that was interspersed with private farms belonging mostly to Whites.\footnote{Beinart: “Anatomy of a rural scare”, pp. 47, 53-4.} Fencing limited access to grazing land across boundaries that were formerly fluid. Forest regulations were introduced which also limited access to forests. Discontent was also generated through laws being carried out more strictly, and powers of chiefs being taken away.\footnote{Kokstad Advertiser, 12 March 1897, p. 3.} The government also increased the general discontent through measures against scab. Dipping solutions sometimes killed sheep in the early years of dipping. To compound matters, crops were partially destroyed by locusts and drought. Many amongst the underclasses consequently experienced shortage of food in 1896. The prices for grain were also highly inflated in 1896. Crops, however, looked promising for 1897.\footnote{Kokstad Advertiser, 12 March 1897, p. 3; Beinart: “Anatomy of a rural scare”, p. 55.}

In this climate of general discontent amongst Griqua and the Bantu-speakers, Le Fleur came to be regarded by many as the person who would initiate action against the colonial government and bring about the restoration of lost land. Diverse rumours were spread, for example, that messengers went around calling people in the name of Le Fleur; that the country had been given to the Griqua by the British Queen but that the White colonists were obstructing them; that farms purchased by Whites from the Griqua were to be restored to Griqua, and it seems particularly among Bantu-speakers, that Le Fleur was claiming the whole country; that he would lead a rebellion against the colonial government, get back Adam Kok’s country, and re-establish Kok’s government.\footnote{Kokstad Advertiser, 12 March 1897, p. 3; 19 March 1897, p. 3; CMK 5/20, p. 14.} Whilst sections of the underclasses hoped that Le Fleur would initiate a new order, the loyalty of others leaned towards the colonial government, as Donald Strachan suggested:

Son was against father and brother against brother. By taking sides, one said he belonged to Government and the other said he belonged to Le Fleur because he paid tribute to him. Others again would taunt those on the Government side by saying “We belong to Le Fleur, who is going to get the whole country back, and we will occupy the positions of those who are loyal to Government.”\footnote{Kokstad Advertiser, 12 March 1897, p. 3. See also Kokstad Advertiser, 19 March 1897, p. 3.}

Calls by the Griqua Committee for “dis-annexation”; Le Fleur’s positioning as the heir of Adam Kok; his conviction about the validity of Griqua land claims; his threats to take legal action against Whites who acquired land improperly, and his increasingly combative expressions, encouraged the perception that a new order, initiated by him, would be established, if necessary though the use of force. His messages on behalf of the Griqua Committee were, apparently, received and relayed in terms of the hopes, expectations and concerns and fears of people. It appears that many put their hope on Le Fleur as the person who would get land for them; that many actually hoped that he would get back the “country”, and that some wanted him to lead a rebellion against the colonial government, and that these hopes influenced much the relay of information from Le Fleur.

‘Scare’ of January 1897

Although colonial officials heard of rumours that were afloat about the restoration of Griqua land and received reports of turmoil especially in regard to Bantu-speakers prior to the visit of Sprigg in November 1896,\footnote{See e.g. Kokstad Advertiser, 12 March 1897, p. 3.} rumours about the restoration of Adam Kok’s land by Le Fleur and war against Whites abounded particularly in the aftermath of Sprigg’s visit to Kokstad. Much of the rumours were connected with the envisaged meeting of 25 January 1897.\footnote{Kokstad Advertiser, 12 March 1897, p. 3. On 17 and 18 January most White farmers in Umzimkulu, and some in Mount Currie and Matatiele, took their families and some of their stock into Natal, with some
leaving their property behind in the charge of their ‘Native’ servants, and returning to join patrols.\textsuperscript{194} 
\textit{Laagers} were also set up a few days before the 25\textsuperscript{th} to protect Whites and their property.\textsuperscript{195} White fears of an attack were strengthened when they heard of groups of ‘Natives’, notably Ntlangwinis in Umzimkulu, walking with assegais from around 20 January. Some of the Whites received information from their servants.\textsuperscript{196} White preparations for an attack in turn reinforced perceptions of an immanent violent confrontation.\textsuperscript{197}

Patrols by the East Griqualand Mounted Rifles, comprising mainly White farmers, served to restore order. 100 Sothos, 40 Whites and 17 Griqua were apparently at the disposal of the government for the upkeep of order.\textsuperscript{198} Pata, chief of the Ntlangwini, handed himself over to the Chief Magistrate, having feared that he would be apprehended.\textsuperscript{199} An inquiry into “the disturbance in Umzimkulu” held on 25 January 1897, found that Le Fleur was the main culprit behind the rebelliousness of January 1897:

\begin{quote}
The cause of the disturbance is that a widespread belief ... throughout the Baca and Hlangweni tribes, consequent on the intrigues of one Andrew le Fleur, that the whole of the country formerly occupied by the Griquas under Adam Kok was about to be restored to the Griquas who would take measures to overcome the opposition of the Chief Magistrate of the Territory as representing the Colonial Government and that after expulsion of the Cape Government the old Griqua Government would be re-established with desired relaxation in respect of the Hut Tax and use of the Forests.\textsuperscript{200}
\end{quote}

Pata was given a fine of 25 cattle. His first councillor, Mcholo, was dismissed from his headmanship.\textsuperscript{201} Whites, whose animosity against Le Fleur appears to have been very high,\textsuperscript{202} demanded that he be punished. Le Fleur attempted, however, to counter accusations against him in the \textit{Kokstad Advertiser}, depicting Whites as “alarmist” who responded to rumours without first verifying them. He affirmed that all was “simply and purely a constitutional act” on his part and warned Whites not to

\begin{quote}
follow men who follow up Kaffir gossip. You did not follow that warning [before] and consequently you have all experienced what I said was correct, and have put yourself in this state of fright. Let this be a warning not to work yourselves up into such an excited state without having truth to back you up.\textsuperscript{203}
\end{quote}

Le Fleur’s attempts to trivialise the rumours about an attack on Whites and his declaration of the constitutionality of his actions could not allay the suspicion that he was behind the turmoil of January, and might even have further infuriated Whites. He was arrested on 29 January 1897\textsuperscript{204} for conspiring to attempt a rebellion.\textsuperscript{205} Writing in the twentieth century, Le Fleur claimed that his imprisonment was the result of a contrivance to silence his agitations for Griqua land claims. The Sprigg Government actively worked “up an uproar so as to enable them to accuse me and so remove me”.\textsuperscript{206}

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\textsuperscript{194} CMK 5/20, see e.g. pp. 4-10; Beinart: “Anatomy of a rural scare”, pp. 60-1.
\textsuperscript{195} CMK 1/153, Papers received regarding disturbance in Umzimkulu, 1897 January; \textit{Kokstad Advertiser}, 29 January 1897, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{196} See CMK 5/20, pp. 4-10
\textsuperscript{197} CMK 5/20, p. 34.
\textsuperscript{198} \textit{Kokstad Advertiser}, 29 January 1897, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{199} CMK 5/20, p. 33.
\textsuperscript{200} CMK 5/20, p. 34.
\textsuperscript{201} CMK 5/20, p. 33.
\textsuperscript{202} See e.g. \textit{Kokstad Advertiser}, 4 March 1898, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{203} \textit{Kokstad Advertiser}, 29 January 1897, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{204} \textit{Kokstad Advertiser}, 18 February 1898, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{205} \textit{Kokstad Advertiser}, 17 December 1897, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{206} LC, File 9, Draft cuts & biography sub-file, AAS le Fleur: “What I omitted”.
\end{flushright}
A preliminary examination was undertaken in March in Kokstad under Resident Magistrate Cumming during which Le Fleur and his associates in the Griqua Committee, Adam PD Smith, Ludovick Kok and Louw Pretorius maintained that he and the Griqua Committee worked in a constitutional manner. Le Fleur’s associates in the Committee also attempted to underplay the possibilities of joint action with Bantu-speakers. Smith explained that the Committee wanted ‘Natives’ to be present at their meetings merely because it was the Griqua custom during Adam Kok’s time to invite them to their meetings. Smith and Pretorius also stated that the Griqua Committee wanted the land occupied by ‘Native’ chiefs, that is, the locations of George Moshoeshoe, Makoba, Umzongwana and Pata, to be given to them by the colonial government.

Le Fleur was kept in jail until October 1897 when his trial was begun before Circuit Court in Umtata. A number of Griqua attended the trial. It appears that the chief magistrate attempted to undermine the credibility of Le Fleur’s leadership by discrediting his identity as a Griqua. He suggested that Le Fleur was an interloper in the Griqua community, and in so doing, deeply disturbed Le Fleur who regarded himself as a Griqua, especially in light of the fact that his father was a Griqua burgher at Philippolis in the 1850s, as Le Fleur indicated in 1898:

> When I was at Umtata the Chief Magistrate, to the damage of myself, said “Le Fleur is not a Griqua.” Upon what evidence did the Chief Magistrate say that? That is a point which will weight greatly in the mind of the Government – that I’m simply a free-booter interfering in these people’s affairs. I would point out that my father was a burgher of Adam Kok.

The evidence brought against Le Fleur was not sufficient to secure conviction. He was consequently acquitted the same month that his trial started. Le Fleur claimed later during the December 1897 rebellion case that he was informed by Jacob Vangra after his acquittal in October 1897 that some Bantu-speaking chiefs and headmen had wished to make arrangements to free him from gaol in Kokstad.

**Edge of rebellion**

Much of Le Fleur’s activities in the months following his release were suggested in accounts in court during the December 1897 rebellion case, even though the accounts were often contradictory. Much of the revelations were made by associates of Le Fleur in the aborted December 1897 rebellion who became witnesses for the Crown. Although some of the accounts were calculated to deflect responsibility from witnesses who made them, they do suggest that members of the Griqua Committee did seek support from Bantu-speakers in the event of war and that they thus contributed to a combatative mood amongst the underclasses. The accounts also suggest that the Griqua Committee, to some extent, drew Le Fleur into a warpath. It also appears that Le Fleur had developed a stature that might encourage defiance amongst members of the Griqua Committee. The effect of Le Fleur’s stature was suggested by the apparent increase of war-talk after his release in October 1897. The accounts also suggest that a number of Bantu-speakers also prompted the Griqua to engage in war and that their expressions of support strengthened the resolve of

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207 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 26 March 1897, p. 3.
208 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 29 October 1897, p. 3; 17 December 1897, p. 3.
209 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 18 February 1898, p. 3.
210 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 6 May 1898, p. 3.
211 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 29 October 1897, p. 3; 17 December 1897, p. 3.
212 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 4 March 1898, p. 5.
213 E.g. Stoffel Bezuidenhout (*Kokstad Advertiser*, 11 February 1898), Lepula “a Basuto” (*Supplement Kokstad Advertiser*, 25 February 1898, p. 6), Piet Steenkamp, Lucas van der Westhuizen and Jacob Vangra (*Kokstad Advertiser*, 4 March 1898, pp. 4, 7). In contrast to evidence given e.g. by Stoffel Bezuidenhout, Lepula’s evidence was very sympathetic to Le Fleur, supporting his [Le Fleur’s] attempt to deflect much of the responsibility for the aborted rebellion away from him.
214 See e.g. *Kokstad Advertiser*, 11 March 1898, p. 5.
some Griqua to use force. Thus, individuals influenced each other’s proclivities for defiance and violence against the colonial order. It appears that whilst plotting occurred against the colonial order, that there were at the same time machinations and manipulation, both within the Griqua Committee and among rebellious sections of the underclasses in general, driven, to an extent, by a measure of suspicion, fear and cowardice – which might have co-existed in a fluctuating relation with boldness and trust.

Stoffel Bezuidenhout testified as a witness for the Crown on 11 February 1898 that on returning home after his release in October 1897, Le Fleur was accompanied by some of his associates who were to stand with him on trial for sedition in 1898, that is, Stoffel Bezuidenhout himself, Gert Karse, Jacobs Abraham, Willem Bezuidenhout, Jacobs Oliver, Isaack Holby, and Fortuin Kok. Adam Smith, Louw Pretorius, Abraham Le Fleur, Ludovick Kok, Gert Kok, as well as Willem David, Lepula, Willem de Vries and two other persons with the surnames of Oliver, also accompanied Le Fleur on his return to East Griqualand from Umtata but were not to stand trial for sedition in 1898.

Andrew le Fleur, Abraham le Fleur, Adam Smith, Louw Pretorius, Ludovick Kok and Stoffel Bezuidenhout met at Plessis’ house in Mount Frere and discussed future action. Plessis asked how matters stood given that Andrew le Fleur was released. Louw Pretorius indicated through metaphorical language that war was to be carried out:

Louw Pretorius … [gave] an illustration about trees planted – that when you plant trees, you always transplant them and get small trees from them. He also gave an illustration of a pumpkin pip, which, after it began to grow threw out its branches. Plessis said, “Yes; if you say that, I can understand it.” I understood from the illustrations that war was to be then carried on. Andrew Le Fleur said, “This is a big case and it rest upon me.” He continued to say that the land had been restored to us, but the authorities would not give it up.

Stoffel Bezuidenhout also claimed that after the party departed from Plessis’ house, they were met by two of Chief Pata’s messengers and slept at a kraal that evening. Andrew le Fleur took the messengers one side and spoke to them. Le Fleur then told Bezuidenhout that the two men came to ask him what was to be done now that he was out of prison. “Le Fleur said that he had given [them] an answer – to tell Pata that he must begin at once – the war”. Bezuidenhout also suggested that Le Fleur played a leading role in plotting that was undertaken in November 1897 with Bantu-speaking leaders. On being later cross-questioned in court by Le Fleur, he acknowledged that the Griqua urged him (Le Fleur) to make war after the secretary of Native Affairs stated that there was no chance of the Griqua getting land back, and again after his release in October 1897. Bezuidenhout also acknowledged that Le Fleur was then averse to war.215

Le Fleur corroborated (in March 1898) Stoffel Bezuidenhout’s account of Louw Pretorius’ illustration but also attempted to implicate other members of the Griqua Committee in his attempt to underplay his leadership role. He also tried to impress that he did not incite Griqua and Bantu-speakers into war as they were already prepared for war whilst he was in confinement. According to Le Fleur, Ludovick Kok also mentioned after the illustration that “[n]ow that Le Fleur is free it is certain we are going to have our liberty”. Le Fleur then

made a joke and said “Adam Smith has the flags ready.” Smith said, “Now it is time to press for these rights” and he said he had been looking and counting how many Natives there were to make up a large and huge army. I again remarked that they were shoving a heavy weight on my shoulders.

Louw Pretorius supposedly told Le Fleur after his release in Umtata that “[t]he Natives have already decided to have a fight”, but that the Griqua asked them to wait until Le Fleur’s release. After Le Fleur told him that he had decided to leave fighting behind, he replied that Le Fleur could not decline as he was under

215 Kokstad Advertiser, 18 February 1898, p. 3.
agreement with them and “paid for the work”. Pretorius also supposedly said that “it was the general feeling of the Natives in Umtata and the Griquas that if … [Le Fleur] had been convicted they would have fought”.

After leaving Umtata Le Fleur and his associates also met a man from Singapansi (a Bantu-speaking leader based at Umzimkulu) with a “greeting” saying:

> We have got you free to-day; since you were away from us the white people have killed our cattle, and we will have it out with them now. My reply was, “I am hardly out of gaol yet, and I cannot give you a reply, and I don’t know the situation.”

Whilst Le Fleur, Adam Smith and Louw Pretorius were in a hut at “Meeba” a Native woman came and said, “Oh, Adam Kok’s people, our cattle are dead – when will you drive the white people out of the country?” Pretorius said to me “You see what I told you?” Adam Smith said “It can’t be helped; it will have to be done now.”

Suggesting how momentary the bravery of Griqua Committee members like Adam Smith could be, Le Fleur stated that he was informed by a “Native from Umzimkulu”, whilst still on journey from Umtata, that Donald Strachan had engaged seventy men at Umzimkulu, as they were in great dread of me should I come to Umzimkulu, and the Government was now preparing for war. Adam Smith seemed to take fright at this, and rode away as hard as he possibly could to Kokstad.

Supported by Lepula, Le Fleur claimed that he got messages from leaders like Pata, Rolobile, Mncisane, Lerothodi, Umhlhlangaso, Selinyane and Sicgau that they were ready to join in a war against the colonial government. Le Fleur also claimed that Umhlhlangaso and Sicgau inquired early in November 1897 whether the Griqua would join in a general war, to which members of the Griqua Committee responded positively. Louw Pretorius subsequently pressed Le Fleur “for three days to take part with him again”. Though the transition might have been earlier, by the end of November 1897 Le Fleur had resolved to recover Griqua land through the use of force.

**Personal crisis**

Whilst there were general socio-economic and environmental conditions that predisposed sections of the underclasses to be defiant, Le Fleur himself was subjected to personal circumstances that pre-disposed him to rebellion. Disappointment with the government’s response to Griqua land claims predisposed many Griqua, including Le Fleur, to violent action against the government and White colonists. Le Fleur found himself in very difficult circumstances after his acquittal that further inclined him to violent action. Even though calculated, Le Fleur’s own explanation whilst on trial in 1898 probably captured his situation after his release fairly well:

> [After my acquittal] I found everything, my whole business, was wrecked, hundreds of pounds had been spent in the defence of the case; hundreds of pounds had been misappropriated, belonging to other people, every body was demanding their money from me; the Superintendent of Native Affairs was telling me it was best to clear out of the country; the European public generally were against me, the Press was thankful I had been nine months in gaol; the C.M.R. Camp was getting fuller of men every day; everywhere I looked I

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216 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 11 March 1898, p. 5.
217 *Supplement to Kokstad Advertiser*, 25 February 1898, p. 6.
218 That is, Ludovic Kok, Louw Pretorius, Nicholas van der Westhuizen, Nicholas Prinsloo, Philander Gouws and Adam Smith responded affirmatively. *Kokstad Advertiser*, 4 March 1898, p. 5.
219 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 18 February 1898, p. 3.
looked against a detective – I could not leave the country, having no money; round about was an ocean of troubles, Natives and Griquas urging for war; and the only thing that could have saved me was if I had committed suicide.  

Broader socio-economic and environmental crises fed into Le Fleur’s personal crises, propelling him to rebellion. Socio-economic conditions during the late 1890s contributed much to the widespread negative feeling towards Whites and a belief amongst sections of the underclasses that it was only through war that their circumstances could be improved. The general mood was also affected by the spread of the rinderpest in East Griqualand in 1897 and the government’s subsequent attempts to inoculate cattle against the disease. Many cattle died from rinderpest and many Bantu-speakers thought that Whites brought the disease to deprive them of their cattle. The government was also blamed for cattle deaths.

Thus, Bantu-speakers and Griqua, including members of the Griqua Committee, were varyingly predisposed to a joint rebellion through the socio-economic conditions of the late 1890s. Although the weight of colonial subordination compounded by environmental crises would have induced cooperation between Griqua and Bantu-speakers, suspicion persisted. Some Griqua feared being betrayed or left in the lurch by Bantu-speakers, as happened to Adam ‘Muis’ Kok and Smith Pommer during the rebellion of 1878.

Despite the often contradictory information that emerged during the December 1897 rebellion case, it does appear that at least some members of the Griqua Committee favoured war against the colonial government, that Le Fleur did become involved in seditious talks with Bantu-speaking chiefs and headmen, and that Le Fleur conveniently attempted to underplay his leadership role under examination in 1898.

**Plotting**

After his acquittal in October 1897 Le Fleur and members of the Griqua Committee established rapport with a number of Bantu-speaking chiefs and headmen (e.g. Sotho, Ntlangwini, Hlubi, Mpondo) in November and assessed the level of support for a joint attack on the colonial government. A number of chiefs and headmen expressed willingness to fight. Much of the plotting by the adherents of Le Fleur took place at the Driekop farm in Mount Currie district – where a number of Griqua and Bantu-speakers stayed as tenants. Messengers were sent out to Bantu-speaking chiefs and headmen from the farm. Messengers were also received at the farm from Bantu-speaking chiefs and headmen. Le Fleur also personally visited a number of chiefs and headmen.

Some of those involved in the plotting were suspicious about the intention of some leaders. Lepula, a Sotho follower of Le Fleur, for example, appears to have been suspicious about Umhlangaso who supposedly urged Le Fleur to start the war. Lepula claimed that he met Umhlangaso in November 1897 and told him ‘that Le Fleur said he had ... agreed to his request to war; [and] also that Le Fleur said, “You are the leading man” (the fore ox)’. Umhlangaso told Lepula to ‘return to Le Fleur and to ask him to begin the war’. Umhlangaso also (supposedly) said that the war would give him an opportunity to go to the

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222 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 4 March 1898, p. 7.
223 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 18 February 1898; 25 February 1898.
224 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 18 February 1898; 25 February 1898; 1 April 1898, p. 3. Driekop was owned by Bezuidenhout Griqua.
226 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 18 February 1898, p. 3; 25 February 1898, p. 3.
government as a purported government ally to ask for guns that would be used against the government in the event of war.

I replied on my own responsibility that Umhlangaso was leading Le Fleur into a trap – that he was humbugging and wanted Le Fleur to be killed – that he would be one of the first to turn round and assist in killing Le Fleur. Umhlangaso said he only wished to obtain guns and ammunition to assist Le Fleur – that he would not turn against him.

Le Fleur subsequently reprimanded Lepula for the way he spoke to Umhlangaso. Umhlangaso, whose “grievance was that his chieftainship [in Pondoland] was taken away from him”, admitted in March 1898 that he wanted to use Le Fleur to get Sicgau, his rival from Pondoland, in trouble. Despite Umhlangaso’s testimony of his intentions with Le Fleur, he does appear to have actually favoured war against the colonial government in a very ambivalent manner. He appears to have contemplated a number of possible actions in light of the widespread hostilities against Whites and to have been inclined or resolved to act depending on the development of events.

Le Fleur’s circumstances appear to have inclined him to take seriously expressions of support for war by leaders like Umhlangaso, despite moments of possible doubt. Le Fleur and his compatriots proceeded to make arrangements for an attack on Kokstad. Commandos were supposed to meet on Sunday 28 November 1897 on Mount Currie from where an attack was to be launched. Griqua people in town were to wait until the commandos arrived and were then to direct them to where they were to get guns. Whites who gave themselves up were to be taken as prisoners and those who resisted were to be shot. Things did, however, not unfold as planned. On the morning of the 27th Le Fleur’s party went to Mount Currie and waited for the others until evening. There was much disappointment when the promised commandos did not turn up. Lepula then apparently reminded Le Fleur about his misgivings about people like Umhlangaso:

> About midday I spoke. I said to Le Fleur, “You reprimanded me for speaking to Umhlangaso in the manner I did in Kokstad, but you see now that they are all deceiving you. See now the position you have put us in. There is only a handful of us. The very same people you relied upon to assist us will assist the Government in killing us. … Le Fleur kept quite for a little time, and then said he could see that what I said was true.”

Le Fleur himself claimed that he then “suggested to the men [that] we should … abandon the whole thing – the fighting, or taking part with other people … [but] Stoffel Bezuidenhout pressed that we should fight.”

At some stage Le Fleur wrote a letter (puzzlingly dated 29 November 1897) addressed to Governor Alfred Milner, explaining why “the undersigned … and the Griqua and Natives … have decided to take up arms against the Government of the colony of the Cape of Good Hope”. The letter was left under a stone near a road some time after being written and was apparently brought to the notice of Chief Constable Jos.

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227 *Supplement to the Kokstad Advertiser*, 25 February 1898, p. 6.
229 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 1 April 1898, p. 3. Umhlangaso provided shelter to three of Le Fleur’s messengers after the onset of the aborted December 1897 rebellion sparked by the attack of Kyd on the 8th. Although he informed the resident magistrate of Kokstad that Le Fleur had passed his place after the attack on Kyd he did not inform the resident magistrate that he gave Le Fleur a gun nor about the three messengers. Although Umhlangaso was aware of a planned attack on Kokstad on 28 November 1897, he did not inform the colonial authorities, but instead merely took his brother’s son (on the 25th or 26th) from the Kokstad house of M Le Roux (an attorney) where he was employed. It seems, however, that he explained to Le Roux that the reason he came to fetch his brother’s son was because of the anticipated attack on Kokstad, but the information did not reach the colonial authorities. *Ibid.*
230 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 18 March 1898, p. 3.
231 *Supplement to the Kokstad Advertiser*, 25 February 1898, p. 6.
232 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 11 March 1898, p. 5.
Dremmer by Rudolph van Wyk, an adherent of Le Fleur captured after a skirmish on 8 December 1897 that initiated the aborted rebellion. The letter cited suffering “carried for 50 years, with consent and knowledge of Her Majesty’s Government” and the wrongs done in the Free State and East Griqualand. The letter also had a religious quality that would characterize Le Fleur’s twentieth century activities:

[W]e now fail to see any other course [T]o appeal to your Excellency now is useless for we have received no redress; and now only lean on God to help us against the wrong and murders committed and also those now in contemplation, to be committed. Our Hope … [is in] our God, he helps the right against the wrong, and God protects the weak against the strong, praise to His Holy name. We enter now to die, but leave our blood on the hands of Government and on those who has continually consented to have such innocent blood shed, we die for right. God will ask and does ask our blood from the hands of Her Majesty Government …. To lay down our lives we say there is but one [who] helps and that is our God and Maker, and he can and will help us though heaven and earth pass away, his promises cannot fail, for God’s strength is made perfect in weakness. We know the might of Great Britain, and that is just why the government shed our blood and wrongs us whenever it pleases Her and we know we are weak, but God is Mighty and cannot grow weak but remains gracious God forever. [T]he killing of our stock is said by some in authority to weaken us. [W]e say God is righteousness, though we are weak. [M]ay our God protect us against Government is our prayer. … Our Saviour has set us an example in the Garden secretly and on the cross on high, to teach his brethren and[ ] to suffer and to die, and as we mean to, in every way follow His example, God Grant us his Grace under the shadow of his almighty wings.

Le Fleur, who appears to have had some misgivings about a joint war against the colonial government after the expected commandos failed to arrive on Mount Currie on 28 November 1897, might have been induced by his circumstances to discard or suppress his misgivings, and might thus have been experiencing fluctuating relations in himself between trust and mistrust in regard to broad trans-ethnic alliances. For example, Lucas van der Westhuizen claimed in February 1898, that Le Fleur “told us [on Friday 3 December 1898] that the Government had given the country back, but that the officials here objected, and they would have to take it by blood”. Van der Westhuizen then (supposedly) asked Le Fleur how they could take the country back without guns. Le Fleur replied that “all the Kaffir chiefs were with us. I said to him “Do you know the Kaffirs and what they did to Adam Muis and Smith Pommer”? Le Fleur said: “You know nothing; the Kaffirs have lost all their cattle, and they will never take the Government side again – the white people have killed their cattle.”

**Attack on John Kyd**

Le Fleur and his associates continued their plotting at Driekop after 28 November. The activities taking place on the farm activated the suspicion of Bantu-speaking employees of two adjacent White farmers, that is, John Kyd and another with the surname of Richardson. Although meetings occurring at the farm were reported to these farmers, they did not initially take the reports seriously. However, on Wednesday 8 December 1897 Nyamazana, a Zulu employee of Richardson, reported suspicious activities by armed men at Bezuidenhout’s farm to White men at Dold’s (Umzimhlanga store) store in Kokstad (about eighteen miles from Richardson’s farm).

On the same day (Wednesday 8 December 1897), Le Fleur also received a message from Piet Steenkamp, a Griqua who was also at Dold’s store, who heard from another employee of Richardson named Jacob, that Nyamazana had reported the activities at Driekop to Whites and that Kyd had requested some Cape

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233 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 25 February 1898, p. 3.
234 National Archives, Pretoria, NTS 7599, 4/328, Part 1, AAS le Fleur, Mount Currie, to Sir Alfred Milner, Governor, Cape Town, 29 November 1897; Letter also reproduced in *Kokstad Advertiser*, 25 February 1898, p. 3.
235 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 4 March 1898, p. 7.
236 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 10 December 1897, 18 February 1898, p. 3.
Mounted Rifles from the magistrate and that they would surround the party at Driekop during the evening and attack them in morning.\footnote{Evidence of Piet Steenkamp \textit{(Kokstad Advertiser, 4 March 1898, p. 7)} and Le Fleur, \textit{Supplement to Kokstad Advertiser, 11 March 1898, p. 5}}

Le Fleur claimed to have then informed his men that “there were two roads – to scatter at once or to arrest Mr Kyd, and [to have asked them] which course they proposed taking. All [then] agreed that we should arrest Mr. Kyd”.\footnote{Kokstad Advertiser, 11 March 1898, p. 5.} According to Stoffel Bezuidenhout “[f]our Kaffirs suggested that Le Fleur should attack Mr. Kyd at once. The attack on Mr. Kyd was then decided upon by Le Fleur” who “sent out two parties… [on Wednesday evening and] said they must arrest Kyd, tie him up as a prisoner, and take his guns. Some of the Natives asked Le Fleur what they were to do if Kyd resisted, and he said they must use their own discretion”. One party, led by Rudolph van Wyk, consisted of seventeen men, and the other, led by Jacobus Bezuidenhout, of fifteen.\footnote{Beinart: “Anatomy of a rural scare”, p. 68.}

Around 20h30 Kyd (according to his own account), was disturbed by a noise outside his house, and on opening his door, heard Johannes Bezuidenhout claiming to have a letter. On advancing to take the letter Bezuidenhout stepped back and three or four men rushed at Kyd and a struggle ensued. Kyd was stabbed three times with an assegai on the right side, including his shoulder, and received a blow on the head with a \textit{knobkerrie}. One of Kyd’s two (White) visitors fired a shot as he was struck on the head. “There was a Native outside shouting “Bulala! Bulala!”” (i.e. kill! kill!), thus arousing, according to Kyd, his “boys in the kitchen”. One of Kyd’s “boys” fired shots at his attackers who then fled. Around six shots were altogether fired.\footnote{Statement of Lepula. \textit{Supplement to Kokstad Advertiser, 25 Feb 1898, p. 6.}} Ngovolo who joined Le Fleur “because his chief [Pata] was too dilatory in arming, and [as] his heart was sore”,\footnote{Kokstad Advertiser, 18 February 1898, p. 2; 25 February 1898, pp. 3, 6.\footnote{Kokstad Advertiser, 18 February 1898, p. 3; 25 February 1898, p. 3; 4 March 1898, pp. 4, 7.\footnote{Kokstad Advertiser, 17 December 1897, p. 3.}\footnote{Kokstad Advertiser, 25 February 1898, p. 3; 4 March 1898, p. 7.}} was consequently wounded in his legs.\footnote{Kokstad Advertiser, 4 March 1898, p. 7.}

On hearing the shots, Le Fleur ordered the men at Driekop to saddle up. Those at Driekop met the two parties that returned from Kyd’s farm and were informed about what happened. Le Fleur suggested that they should go to Umhlangaso’s place, also in the Mount Currie district. Le Fleur met Umhlangaso on 9 December and informed him that he had started the war. Le Fleur also sent out messengers to other Bantu-speaking chiefs and headmen inviting them to join in the war that they had wanted, for example, Singapansi (from Umzimkulu), Pata (from Umzimkulu), Sicgau (from Pondoland) and Rolobile (from Matatiele).\footnote{Kokstad Advertiser, 18 February 1898, p. 3; 25 February 1898, p. 3; 4 March 1898, pp. 4, 7.} Patrols of Cape Mounted Rifles were sent out from Kokstad to pursue the “rebels”.\footnote{Kokstad Advertiser, 17 December 1897, p. 3.} Le Fleur also visited some leaders like Mahlungulu and received a few visits by leaders like Madonela. The support that Le Fleur and his party hoped for was not forthcoming. However, minor leaders like Madonela and Mahlungulu provided a few men for the “war”.\footnote{Kokstad Advertiser, 4 March 1898, p. 7.} Despite their discontent with the colonial government, major chiefs were disinclined to risk their already weakened positions within the colonial order by challenging the colonial order openly.\footnote{Beinart: “Anatomy of a rural scare”, p. 68.}

A warrant of arrest, reflecting the potential disjuncture between self-identity and official classification, was issued on 11 December for the arrest of Le Fleur for committing crimes contravening “The Native Territories Penal Code” (Act 24), of 1886 by, a) “[a]ttempting to wage war against the Queen”; b) conspiring against the government; c) collecting men with the intent of waging war, and d) “[a]ttempting to
commit murder”. Le Fleur was described in the warrant of arrest as a 6 feet “Cape Native”, with grey eyes, a straight nose, woolly hair, and a yellow complexion, who spoke English well and could read and write. 247

White farmers in the vicinity of the attempted rebellion were alarmed and went to Kokstad to obtain ammunition. Some also brought their families to Kokstad for refuge. *Laagers* were set up at some farms. Some White farmers who were dissatisfied with the ability of the authorities to capture Le Fleur even formed a band of about sixty to seventy armed men that set out after Le Fleur and his associates. 248 Farmers in Umzimkulu also offered a reward of £100 for the capture of Le Fleur. 249

With the support Le Fleur hoped for not forthcoming, the anticipated war against the colonists did consequently not materialize. With the possibilities of the war against the colonial order having dissipated it became especially expedient for some Griqua and Bantu-speakers to affirm their loyalty to the government and to express their disapproval of the actions of Le Fleur and his followers as a counter-measure to a White backlash. The aborted rebellion also moved White farmers to push for stronger control measures to keep Bantu-speakers and Griqua in check. At a “large and influential meeting” held by White farmers on Saturday 8 January 1898 “to consider the present lawless and unsafe state of the country, and to try to devise measures for remedying it”, there was unanimous agreement that “it [should] be made illegal for any Kaffir, Griqua, or coloured person to carry firearms, assegais, knobkerries, or any arms without a permit”. The farmers wanted Le Fleur to be outlawed, that severe sentences be given to guilty headmen, and that rebellious locations be broken up. The farmers believed that stern measures were necessary to restore order and to secure White prosperity:

> Everybody who came here admitted that as regards climate and soil this was the best part of South Africa, and if it were not for the Native Question and the want of laws properly enforced there would be no better country in the world than this. 250

Some of Le Fleur’s associates in the Griqua Committee judiciously attempted to distance themselves from the rebels. In a letter to Assistant Chief Magistrate WG Cumming that was also published in the *Kokstad Advertiser*, APD Smith and Louw Pretorius (now chairman of the Griqua Committee) affirmed their loyalty to the government and declared the opposition of the Griqua Committee to the actions of the rebels and even volunteered to be send out to help capture Le Fleur. Echoing White sentiments, they stated that “prompt and severe proceedings should be taken against A. Le Fleur and his followers”. They also indicated that “A. Le Fleur when caught, and after trial by law, … [should] be banished from East Griqualand for ever”. 251

Alarmed with the wish of White farmers that it should become illegal for Griqua to carry arms (without a permit), a Griqua indicated “that those rebels now in gaol must be punished with the utmost severity of the law if found guilty, and [that] their guns [should] be taken from them”. The individual asked “why … the loyal Griquas [should] suffer for what the disloyal did, and why … Griquas quite as loyal as Europeans [should] be forbidden to carry arms?”. 252

The actions of Le Fleur and his associates tended to reinforce White suspicion about the Griqua. After-event expressions Griqua of loyalty were thus quickly dismissed, as suggested in the response to the letter from the Griqua Committee:

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248 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 17 December 1897, p. 3.
249 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 24 December 1897.
250 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 14 January 1898.
251 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 21 January 1898.
252 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 28 January 1898, p. 3.
The loyalty of the Griquas is too frivolous to bear much weight with any sensible community. … Where were these loyal hearts at the time of Le Fleur’s secret meetings?\textsuperscript{253}

Although there was general discontent amongst chiefs and headmen with the colonial government, there was also distrust and suspicion among them and conflict between some that undermined unity and joint action. Some feared the consequences of their involvement in war against the colonial government. Some feared that their opponents would disclose their seditious activities to colonial authorities. As indicated before, Umhlangaso acknowledged later that he wanted his rival Sigcau to become involved in the plot against the government so that he could get him in trouble. After Le Fleur visited Umhlangaso after the attack on Kyd, requesting support for war, Umhlangaso told him that he had no men. Fearing that he would be charged if he did not report Le Fleur’s visit to the colonial authorities, Umhlangaso reported Le Fleur’s visit to the Kokstad magistrate the same day that Le Fleur arrived at his place.\textsuperscript{254}

Some of the rebels were captured a short while after the attack on Kyd. Some gave themselves up. Some were harboured in homesteads of Bantu-speakers, apparently with the knowledge of some headman or chiefs. Umhlangaso harboured three messengers of Le Fleur.\textsuperscript{255} Ngovolo was apparently harboured by Umhlangaso and Sigcau’s Mpondo people. Le Fleur appears to have been harboured by Pata’s people for some time during December and then by the people of Sigcau and Umhlangaso on the Ingeli Mountains.\textsuperscript{256}

It appears that throughout the period of the (attempted) insurgency, Le Fleur believed that war was in line with God’s will and that he inspired his adherents by invoking God. For example, Le Fleur, with an assegai pointed to the sky, told a constable sent by the chief magistrate to urge him to put down arms and to go to Kokstad after the attack on Kyd that

\textit{[t]his assegai has been given to me by God, and I am going to carry out the work deputed to me by God.}\textsuperscript{257}

Le Fleur, who allowed his beard to grow whilst in hiding, was one of the last rebels to be delivered to colonial authorities. Early in February 1898 Le Fleur undertook a visit to Sigcau in Pondoland on the latter’s invitation.\textsuperscript{258} However, a detective pursuing Le Fleur got information that he was on his way to Pondoland with 11 of his followers.\textsuperscript{259} On Saturday 5 February R Stanford, assistant chief magistrate of Pondoland, was informed that Le Fleur was on his way to Sigcau’s “Great Palace”. He subsequently called for Sigcau and warned him when they met on Tuesday 8 February not to shelter Le Fleur. Stanford pointed out to Sigcau “how very wrongly he had behaved, by denying that he had met … three messengers sent to him by Le Fleur a short time ago, and told him, what had taken place at that meeting”. The information that Stanford disclosed was too much for Sigcau’s comfort. Stanford also told him that he got information that Le Fleur and a few of his followers were on their way to Pondoland and that it was his duty as a government subsidized chief to assist law officials, to apprehend Le Fleur, and to hand him over to the colonial authorities.\textsuperscript{260} Sigcau complied with the wishes of Stanford. After Le Fleur arrived at his “Great Palace” on Friday 11 February Sigcau instructed some of his men to take Le Fleur to the colonial authorities.\textsuperscript{261}

\textsuperscript{253} \textit{Kokstad Advertiser}, 28 January 1898, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{254} \textit{Kokstad Advertiser}, 25 March 1898, 1 April 1898, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{255} \textit{Kokstad Advertiser}, 1 April 1898, p. 3; 4 March 1898.
\textsuperscript{256} \textit{Kokstad Advertiser}, 11 March 1898, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{257} \textit{Supplement to Kokstad Advertiser}, 25 February 1898, p. 6; \textit{Kokstad Advertiser}, 4 March 1898, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{258} \textit{Kokstad Advertiser}, 11 March 1898, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{259} \textit{Kokstad Advertiser}, 18 February 1898, p. 2
\textsuperscript{261} \textit{Kokstad Advertiser}, 18 February 1898, p. 2
Although Le Fleur claimed that he went to Chief Sigcau to hand himself over to the colonial authorities, and that he supposedly “knew” when he went on a visit to Sigcau that “it was trickery, but ... thought we should all come together in the end”, it is likely that Le Fleur merely suspected that there might be trickery but nevertheless hoped that Sigcau would provide himself, Ngovolo and another follower with shelter. Sigcau instead steered Le Fleur and his two followers under escort to the colonial authorities at Lusikisiki from where the prisoners were sent to Kokstad under a Cape Mounted Rifles escort.

**Trial**

On 31 January “fifty Griquas and Natives” suspected to have been involved in the attempted rebellion appeared in court before the acting resident magistrate of Kokstad, A Rein, to undergo a preliminary examination. The rebel suspects were finally indicted on 27 April on four counts: a) for waging war, attempting to wage war, and abetting the waging of war, b) conspiring to wage war, c) collecting men and arms for the purpose of waging war, and d) for concealing the design to wage war. More than half of those indicted pleaded guilty, including Le Fleur. Of the 63 accused 56 were convicted on 29 April 1898 in the Circuit Court before Justice Jones. Le Fleur attempted to impress the court at the conclusion of the trial that he did not play as prominent a role as was alleged and that the role he did play was much influenced by his circumstances and prompting by Griqua and Bantu-speaking leaders. He insisted:

> I am not the leader. Practically speaking all the people – the Griqua people – have their Chairman and Committee. We all took part in the present disturbance. It would be hard for me to be placed personally in the dock as a leader while actually I did not constitute a leader... [The] ... pressure from those people outside and about me, forced me into that position.

Convinced that Le Fleur played a key role in the aborted rebellion, Justice Jones told him that he certainly took a leading part in the rebellion and were practically in command of the expedition .... Whether the rebellion was continued with the advice of others I know not, but certainly it was under your guidance. It was a foolish rebellion. ... [Y]ou allowed yourself to be persuaded, and you had a great deal to do in persuading others, in taking part in what I may term a mad rebellion. A number of men went out on the veld with a few assegais, a few quince sticks, some peach sticks and expected that they were going to carry on war against the Government, which can command hundreds of thousands in the field. A more ridiculous thing I don’t think I have ever heard of.... You were the ringleader. The sentence of the court must deter any one in the future from taking up the position you now occupy.

Le Fleur was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment with hard labour. The sentences of the others varied from 3 to 6 years with hard labour. The convicted rebels were escorted for imprisonment at the Breakwater prison in Cape Town on 6 May 1898.

Confidence in support for an uprising contributed much to the course of action that Le Fleur pursued in East Griqualand late in 1897. Failure to receiving the expected support significantly influenced his future empowerment strategies. He mentioned in February 1898 during the sedition case that

> [m]y greatest regret is that I ever mixed myself up with men who could not be trusted by any man, and it should ever remain a regret to me. ... Circumstances did not justify my taking arms against the Government, but I thank God it has terminated.

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262 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 11 March 1898, p. 6.
263 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 18 February 1898, p. 2.
264 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 4 February 1898, p.3.
265 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 29 April 1898, p. 3; 6 May 1898, p. 3.
266 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 6 May 1898, p. 3.
267 *Supplement to Kokstad Advertiser*, 11 March 1898, p. 6.
Le Fleur’s attitude to the aborted rebellion might have varied, especially over time. Though he refrained from unconstitutional behaviour after 1898 he affirmed in 1926: ‘I shall always be proud to have revolted against the set of officials in East Griqualand’.\textsuperscript{268}

**Aftermath of rebellion**

The imprisonment of Le Fleur and his associates brought some security to Whites in East Griqualand.\textsuperscript{269} Whites, as well as some Griqua, expressed much satisfaction with the imprisonment of Le Fleur and his associates.\textsuperscript{270} After the aborted rebellion officials became even less inclined to take Griqua land claims seriously. Griqua were expected “to behave themselves and live in a quiet, orderly manner, and [to] endeavour to regain the confidence of the Government which they had lost”.\textsuperscript{271}

The failure of the rebellion also had implications for intra-Griqua politics. Griqua leaders with stronger pro-government leanings now assumed prominent roles in Griqua politics. At a meeting held on 4 July 1898 attended by about 150 Griqua, approval was expressed to a proposal initially made by Donald Strachan that the government be requested to appoint a Griqua headman. A few of the Griqua present, including Adam Smith, opposed such an appointment. Cornelius de Bruin was chosen to be the Griqua headman. The government sanctioned De Bruin’s selection on 3 August 1898 after the chief magistrate had recommended that he be officially appointed as a government salaried headman of Mount Currie.\textsuperscript{272}

It seems that the rebellion and the collapse of the Griqua Committee’s land restitution campaign ruptured the relations within the Griqua Committee. Some of Andrew le Fleur’s old associates remained active in Griqua politics. Some of them were inclined to expediently turn against him and his father, given the marginalization of those associated with him by the government and by De Bruin and his associates. Abraham le Fleur was a special target as a relative of Andrew le Fleur and also as someone seen by some “as an outsider” and interloper in Griqua affairs.

LJ Kok, one of Andrew le Fleur’s associates in the Griqua Committee, objected late in 1898 through the *Kokstad Advertiser* to Abraham le Fleur being “allowed to interfere with any matters concerning the Griqua public”. He expressed hope that the Government would “put a stop” to his activities “as we got quite enough of the Le Fleurs”. Kok reasoned that the Le Fleurs were now redundant since the government had appointed a headman to represent the grievances of the Griqua.\textsuperscript{273}

Someone who claimed to be a “thoroughbred Griqua” indicated in the *Kokstad Advertiser* that the Griqua “all suffer [today] through the agitation of the incomers”. The person also indicated that the government-sanctioned headman was appointed at the “request and wish of the majority of the Griquas” and was an appropriate representative, “being a Griqua himself, [and] a man that has the Griqua grievances at heart, and a man who still agrees with the authorities”.\textsuperscript{274}

The aborted rebellion also had an impact on the way the Griqua dealt with their land claims. They complied – in the months following the conviction of the rebels – with the advice of the superintendent of Native

\begin{footnotes}
\item[268] *Griqua and Coloured People’s Opinion*, 13 August 1926.
\item[269] *Kokstad Advertiser*, 24 June 1898.
\item[270] *Kokstad Advertiser*, 20 May 1898.
\item[271] *Kokstad Advertiser*, 2 September 1898.
\item[272] NTS 79, 1/15, CMK, Kokstad, to Superintendent, Native Affairs, Cape Town, 19 July 1898; Superintendent, Native Affairs to Prime Minister, 28 July 1899; Acting Secretary, Native Affairs, Cape Town, to Headman CG de Bruin, Kokstad, 3 May 1904. CMT 3/874/644, CG de Bruin to WP Leary, Resident Magistrate, Kokstad, 28 January 1911.
\item[273] *Kokstad Advertiser*, 2 December 1898.
\item[274] *Kokstad Advertiser*, 9 December 1898.
\end{footnotes}
Affairs in 1898 to remain quiet and not to speak about their land claims.\textsuperscript{275} When Griqua representatives made claims they were relatively modest.\textsuperscript{276} During the visit of the colonial premier to East Griqualand in March 1899, De Bruin and H Bezuidenhout indicated to him that most Griqua were now prepared to accept the recommendation of the chief magistrate that the Griqua be given allotments (of four morgen) in the place of farms. The meeting with the premier also revealed the reconfigured Griqua political landscape. Abraham le Fleur was not allowed to address the premier. Stanford indicated that Ludovick Kok should also not have addressed the premier as he was closely associated with Andrew le Fleur. Stanford, on the other hand, affirmed the loyalty of De Bruin and his privilege to address the premier.

The premier’s visit also revealed the positioning of the Griqua on the colonial identity and cultural spectrum. Fears of being treated as ‘Natives’, increased by a proposed Native Location Act, were expressed to the premier. Griqua were once again moved to emphasize their closeness to Whites in order to prevent being classified as ‘Native’ in terms of the proposed Act. W Bezuidenhout reasoned that the Griqua regarded classification with the ‘Natives’ as “class discrimination”. He also asserted that “[t]hey wished to advance with civilization, and … to have privileges somewhat similar to those of Europeans”.\textsuperscript{277}

During Le Fleur’s absence from East Griqualand, Adam Smith kept Griqua agitation alive in a more critical manner.\textsuperscript{278} Smith formed an organization called “the Society” that apparently comprised Griqua and Bantu-speakers sympathetic to Le Fleur. De Bruin and his supporters opposed Smith and his Society. De Bruin even asked the government to put an end to Smith’s Society.\textsuperscript{279}

**Summation**

This chapter has shown that by the 1890s in East Griqualand ‘Griqua’ and ‘Coloured’ categories were (already) distinguished or disassociated from ‘Native’ and ‘Black’ categories even though some people perceived as ‘Native’ (notably Tlhaping and Rolong) were Griqua burghers under Adam Kok III’s rule; that ‘Native’ was associated with ‘Black’, and that ‘Coloured’ subsumed ‘Griqua’. The period between 1894 and 1898 was also a key one in Griqua land claims history (drawing on an idealized past valorising independence and land ownership in past Griqua polities), that would significantly influence the behaviour of Le Fleur and his 20\textsuperscript{th} century adherents. Le Fleur’s actions between 1894 and 1898 manifested (a shift through) alternative courses – for the attainment of Griqua land claims – within a spectrum of possibilities. The courses pursued were very much influenced by economic circumstances and social relations (between subordinated and dominant groups and within subordinated groups) that both enabled and disabled rebellion. The land claims campaign predicated on Griqua identity and ideals necessarily reinforced Griqua identity, having been accompanied by differentiation between the Griqua and other social categories perceived to inhibit the realization of Griqua land claims, for example, Whites and Bantu-speakers – perceived to be illegitimately occupying Griqua land. However, dissatisfaction with the response of the colonial government to Griqua land claims, also allowed for the development of trans-ethnic cooperation and for the cultivation of an alternative social vision in which Griqua and Bantu-speakers were land owners in a shared liberated space, culminating in a rebellion drawing on shared resentment against the colonial order, but disabled through deceit; thus foreclosing, for Le Fleur, future trans-ethnic alliances and conventional protest politics.

\textsuperscript{275} *Kokstad Advertiser*, 31 March 1899.

\textsuperscript{276} *Kokstad Advertiser*, 2 September 1898.

\textsuperscript{277} *Kokstad Advertiser*, 31 March 1899.

\textsuperscript{278} CMT 3/874/644, Magistrate, Kokstad, to CMT, Umtata, 28 January 1911.

\textsuperscript{279} CMT 3/874/644, CG de Bruin to Resident Magistrate, Kokstad, 28 January 1911; Magistrate, Kokstad, to CMT, 28 January 1911.
Chapter 4: Quest for an ethnic identity (1898-1921)

The previous chapter showed how Andrew Abraham Stockenström le Fleur I came to identify with Griqua aspirations through the influence of his father and his residence in East Griqualand. Le Fleur assumed a Coloured and Griqua identity and became an influential Griqua leader in the region from 1894. This chapter and the subsequent one shows how Le Fleur, who attempted for much of his life in the twentieth century to turn Coloureds into Griqua, had to grapple with contending discourses and negotiate between identity categories that could be deployed in his upliftment endeavours, particularly during the first two decades of the twentieth century. Le Fleur’s identity articulations were, to an extent, influenced by his locational shifts between Griqua and Coloured environments. His socio-political orientation in the twentieth century was much influenced by a series of events that unfolded when he was still in East Griqualand, and after his release from Breakwater prison in 1903; that is, the abortive 1897 East Griqualand rebellion (in which Le Fleur was, to a large extent, drawn in through promises of support by Bantu-speaking chiefs that never materialized, thus inclining him to break with conventional protest politics, and trans-ethnic alliances); his residence in the vicinity of Cape Town in a predominantly (non-Griqua) Coloured environment; moves towards the formation of the Union of South Africa, and his return to a Griqua environment in 1916. Le Fleur’s residence in Cape Town deepened his association with, and appropriation of a Coloured identity. His reconnection with Griqua in East Griqualand in 1916 and the subsequent Griqua trek of 1917 to the Touws River vicinity, contributed much to his attempt to turn Coloureds into Griqua. Le Fleur’s identity options reflected his own personal transformation. His thinking, pronouncements and activities also reflected the impact of contending (establishment and anti-establishment) discourses as well as his own capacity to varyingly distance himself from operative discourses. Though he valued and appropriated much from the ensemble of colonial culture and discourse, he developed during his residence in Cape Town representations affirming the capacity of Coloureds to live independently from White tutorship and leadership that drew on prior Griqua ideals of independence.

F6053: Le Fleur at Breakwater prison, 1898-1903

Le Fleur and his fellow convicts of the December 1897 East Griqualand rebellion were sent to Breakwater prison to serve their sentences. Most of the convicted rebels were given prison numbers between F6050 and F6090, with Le Fleur himself being numbered F6053. During their stay at Breakwater between 1898 and 1903 the convicted rebels were subject to a classificatory regime that differed much from the one espoused by Griqua and also applied by many Bantu-speakers in East Griqualand. The classificatory regime would also differ much from the one Le Fleur would promote after his release. Whether of Griqua or Bantu-speaking origin, Le Fleur and his adherents were placed in the “Hottentot”, “Kafir” and “Native” categories. Although Griqua could be identified as Griqua, and rebels of Sotho-speaking origin as “Basuto”, Griqua and Bantu-speakers were together also slotted in the categories of “Kafir” and “Native”. Reference to the 1897 rebellion as a Griqua rebellion and to the convicts as Griqua convicts and the attendant inclusion of Bantu-speaking African participants in the Griqua category was also encouraged by

1 Cape Town Archives, Breakwater Prison (PBW) 158, F6001-F8000, 1898-1906.
2 The classification applied at Breakwater by Superintendent Foster and his associates would also, in some respects, confound twentieth century sensibilities. For example, in 1901 in PBW 60 (Letters Despatched, 1901 June – 1904 March), William Willemse was categorized as “Kafir” (p. 66), James Arthur Cupido as “European” (p. 71), Johan Els as “European” (p. 74), Jacobus Jagers as “Hottentot” (p. 91), Martinius September as “Kafir” (94), Joseph Grootboom Vusani as “Kafir” (p. 98), Baboo Cassim as “Hottentot” (p. 111), Cedras Treurnict as “Bastard” (p. 113), Qubeni as “Fingo” (p. 116), George […] Nelson as “Malay” (p. 146), and Mahomet Salie as “Malay” (p. 199).
3 PBW 60, p. 404 (21.7.1902).
4 PBW 59, Letters dispatched, 1898 June – 1901 May, p. 473 (17 August 1899); p. 692 (23 May 1900); p. 837 (19 October 1900); PBW 60, pp. 61 (20 August 1901); pp. 243-5 (16 January 1902).
5 PBW 60, p. 63 (20 August 1901).
6 PBW 59, p. 598 (13 February 1900).
7 PBW 60, p. 63 (20 August 1901).
the numerical preponderance of Griqua amongst the rebels. Broad differential distinctions were also made by Breakwater Superintendent P Foster and his associates between “Natives” and “Europeans” in reference to the prison population in general in a manner that subsumed categories applied to people who were not European in the “Native”8 category, with “Native” thus including, for example, “Bastard”, “Basuto”, “Fingo”, “Griqua”, “Hottentot”, “Kafr” and “Malay”.9 The classificatory scheme applied by prison officials does not appear to have had much of an impact on Le Fleur, given his identity politics after his release. Le Fleur’s behaviour at Breakwater and the relation that he developed with the superintendent was, however, fairly consistent with his behaviour after his release and his attempts at developing cordial relations with government officials.

Whilst at Breakwater Le Fleur received a number of visitors who would serve to keep him in tune with developments outside. He was, for example, visited by W Nicker from Hanover Street in Cape Town on 2 September 1900, and received regular visits from L Metcalf and W Metcalf from Newlands, Cape Town, in 1902. Le Fleur and a few of his associates were even visited by a Griqua contingent that included his old foes of the Griqua Political Association on 11 August 1901, that is, C de Bruin, H Bezuidenhout, T Kok and W Van Rooyen. Le Fleur also received a visit from his father on 1 March 190310 before his departure for England where he apparently laid the subject of Griqua land rights before Joseph Chamberlain, the colonial secretary, and requested a commission of inquiry to examine the violation of Griqua rights in the Philippolis polity.11 A visit by Francis ZS Peregrino, the publisher and editor of the South African Spectator on 28 November 190212 in particular might have contributed to Le Fleur’s reception of current discourses on Coloured upliftment, self-reliance and ‘racial’ pride that he adapted and applied in his own ethno-racialized self-upliftment schemes after his release. Peregrino, a British educated Ghanaian, developed a special interest in Le Fleur’s story and Le Fleur would, after his release also manifest a concern for Coloured upliftment manifested by Peregrino, particularly through his newspaper. Le Fleur’s application of the Coloured category was, however, more narrow than Peregrino’s usage of the category tended to be.13

From the year of his arrival at Breakwater Le Fleur petitioned the authorities for his release14 and also encouraged his associates15 to petition for their release. The behaviour of Le Fleur and his associates and the relation that he developed with Superintendent Foster encouraged the latter to be supportive of Griqua petitions for an early release. The superintendent valued Le Fleur especially for his “knowledge of most of the native dialects”, that made him useful as an interpreter.16 Thus, in light of a petition by Le Fleur and 20 of his associates, Foster appealed to the colonial secretary in August 1901 “for special consideration of these men’s cases in view of their very excellent behaviour while serving their terms of imprisonment, and also [in view of] the fact that the rank and file here now completed more than half of the term of imprisonment imposed upon them”. Foster also indicated that “Le Fleur ha[d] been a much useful man on the station, being employed in the bootmakers shop and also as Interpreter” in his “Court” as well as in the

8 PBW 59, pp. 729, 742 (1900); PBW 60, p. 434 (18 August 1902).  
9 See above references (f.n. 3-8) for specific instances in the usage of group categories.  
10 PBW 188 and 189 (Visitors books).  
11 Kokstad Advertiser, 10 April 1903.  
12 PBW 7, FZS Peregrino [to Breakwater Convict Station], 28 November 1902; PBW 189.  
13 Peregrino preferred to use the Coloured category to include all the people who were not European/White. However, he at times also used the category in the restricted sense to exclude Bantu-speakers, reflecting thus the impact of the localized usage of the term. Vivian Bickford-Smith: Ethnic pride and racial prejudice in Victorian Cape Town (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1995), pp. 203-4; Gavin Lewis: Between the wire and the wall (Cape Town: David Philip, 1987), pp. 16-19, 125.  
14 PBW 59, p. 160 (1898); PBW 59, p. 473 (1899); PBW 60, p. 61 (1901).  
15 PBW 59, pp. 598, 692-3, 694 (1900); PBW 60, pp. 243-5 (1902).  
16 PBW 70, [Foster to AB Shaw, Colonial Office, 7 March 1902], pp. 801-2.
one of the “Visiting Magistrate”. The 1901 petition of Le Fleur and his associates was, however, deferred by the relevant government officials due to the war between “Boers” and the British.

In January 1902 Le Fleur and his associates again petitioned for the remission of their sentences. Referring to “Boers” from the “Anglo Boer War” the petitioners argued that they should be treated with leniency since others who were guilty of treason were treated leniently. Foster again suggested that “some special mitigation” be granted in view of the “very excellent conduct” of the men “during their incarceration”. On considering the petition some government officials feared that once released, Le Fleur and his associates could again cause trouble. In the words of WG Cumming, assistant secretary of Native Affairs:

To release [Le Fleur] and to allow him to go back to East Griqualand would be an act of clemency of which I fear we would have cause to repent in the future. Le Fleur poses as a man who has been brought to see the error of his ways but I am persuaded that so soon as he regained his liberty he would try to pick up the threads of his former intrigues. … As regards Le Fleur’s Griqua followers I see no reason why they should be liberated before the expiration of their sentences. We have no guarantee that they would not sow the seeds of mischief amongst their people so soon as a favourable opportunity present itself. And what time would be more opportune than the present for such a purpose? At this very moment the inhabitants of East Griqualand are guarding their border against an expected invasion and it would add to their burdens to let loose amongst them a number of men who not so long ago were plotting to destroy them.

However, the attorney general recommended in January (1902) that Le Fleur should serve only ten years of his sentence and that he should be made to understand that a further reduction of his sentence would depend to a large extent on his future conduct. The attorney general also recommended that that the sentences of some of Le Fleur’s fellow petitioners be reduced provided that their behaviour was good.

The undertaking of the government to remit the sentences of numerous imprisoned rebels from across South Africa generated expectancy that Le Fleur and other rebels from East Griqualand would also be released. The Cape Times, for example, indicated on 25 March 1903 that Le Fleur and his associates would soon be released. Le Fleur was finally released from Breakwater prison on 3 April 1903, together with a fellow East Griqualand rebel, Ncapayi, alias Moses Stoffels, after the colonial secretary instructed Superintendent Foster verbally earlier in the day to release them. Foster recommended that Le Fleur be granted a “gratuity at the rate of 3d for each working day, between 1st October 1901” and 3 April 1903, “both days inclusive”, for the “skilled work” he performed “whilst a Convict in the Shoemaker Shop” at Breakwater. Thus, Le Fleur who was sentenced to 14 years hard labour, might only have done hard labour at Breakwater until September 1901, and served only four years and eleven months of his fourteen-year sentence.

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17 PBW 60, [Foster to Colonial Secretary, 20 August 1901], pp. 62-3.
18 PBW 7, Under Colonial Secretary, Cape Town, to Superintendent, Breakwater, 19 March 1902.
19 National Archives, Pretoria, Secretary of Native Affairs (NTS) 7599, 4/328, Part 1, Memorandum on “Petition of Le Fleur and four others” by WG Cumming, Assistant Secretary, Native Affairs Department, Cape Town, 21 August 1902.
20 NTS 7599, 4/328, Memorandum on “Petition of Le Fleur and others”, WG Cumming, 25 January 1902.
21 PBW 31, Foster to Colonial Under Secretary, 20 March 1902, p. 451.
22 NTS 7599, 4/328, Memorandum on “Petition of Le Fleur and others”, WG Cumming, 25 January 1902.
23 NTS 7599, 4/328, Memorandum on “Petition of Le Fleur and four others”, WG Cumming, 21 August 1902.
24 Cape Times, 25 March 1903.
25 PBW 32, Foster to Under Colonial Secretary, 4 April 1903, p. 413. For further references to Ncapayi whose prison number was F6078, see PBW 7, Under Colonial Secretary, Cape Town, to Superintendent, Breakwater Convict Station, 19 March 1902.
26 PBW 32, Foster to Under Colonial Secretary, 4 April 1903, p. 414.
On the occasion of his release Le Fleur was “interviewed” by Under Colonial Secretary Sir Pieter Faure. Le Fleur “promised to report himself” at the office of the Cape Town resident magistrate “on, or about, the first of each month”. Le Fleur also appears to have made a “solemn assurance” to the government that he would abstain from political agitation and that he would not encourage unrest amongst the ‘Natives’. Le Fleur also accepted official advice not to return to East Griqualand.

A number of government officials would later come under the impression that Le Fleur’s release was conditional on him not returning to East Griqualand without permission from the government, and that he was liable to be re-imprisoned for the remainder of the sentence that he did not serve if he broke the conditions of his release. However, when Le Fleur returned to East Griqualand in 1916 government officials were not able to invoke purported restrictions imposed on him on his release. They therefore accepted that his release was unconditional.

Le Fleur’s return to East Griqualand was clearly a concern to government officials who feared that he might incite marginalized communities to rebellion. There was also an expectation amongst a number of Griqua and Bantu-speakers in East Griqualand that Le Fleur would return soon after his release and play an important role in regional politics. Some thought that Le Fleur would return to East Griqualand to act as a chief or king. Le Fleur himself claimed (later in the century) that in 1904 the “Chieftainship of Paramount Adam Kok” was conferred to him “in terms of a crown decision”.

Whilst Le Fleur’s ideal to be a Griqua chief that was first cultivated in East Griqualand might have been varyingly sustained, his location amongst Coloureds in Cape Town inclined him to deploy identity categories transcending Griquaness, deepening his somewhat ambivalent association with the Coloured category. Le Fleur’s location amongst Coloureds in a non-Griqua environment inclined him to organize Coloureds and to develop a broader geographic or national focus. Socio-political developments in the early 1900s also impacted much on Le Fleur’s thinking and organizational activities.

Racism, segregation and ethno-nationalism

On his release from Breakwater Le Fleur found himself in a Cape environment marked by rapid urbanization and renewed ethno-’racial’ prejudice drawing much on biological racism. Informal ethno-’racial’ discrimination by Whites encouraged ethno-’racial’ organization amongst ethno-’racial’ underclasses aimed at impeding discrimination. Growing ethno-’racial’ organization, particularly around a

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27 PBW 50, Superintendent P Foster to Resident Magistrate, Cape Town, 3 April 1903, p. 473.
28 NTS 7599, 4/328, E Barret, Acting Under Secretary, Native Affairs, to Commissioner, Cape Mounted Police, Cape Town, 11 March 1911.
29 See e.g. NTS 7599, 4/328, (undated) “memorandum” on “Andrew AS le Fleur” – between correspondence of 1912; National Archives, Pretoria, NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 2, Director of Prisons [Pretoria], to Secretary, Native Affairs, Pretoria, 7 September 1921.
30 Cape Town Archives, Chief Magistrate, Transkei (CMT) 3/874/644, 3/874, 644, (Telegram) Pretoria [Native Affairs] to Tembu [Umtata], 27 November 1916; JB Moffat, CMT, Umtata, to Deputy Commissioner, SAP, Umtata, 9 January 1917. See also correspondence of 1916-17 in NTS 7599, 4/328.
31 CMT 3/874/644, Statement of Samuel Vakalisa made sometime before 25 January1917; Resident Magistrate, Matatiele, to CMT, Umtata, 24 January 1917. NTS 7599, 4/328, Commissioner, Urban Police district, Cape Town, to Acting Under Secretary for Native Affairs, Cape Town 21 April 1911.
32 The GNC constitution as amended on 20 April 1959 stated: “In 1904 het die Hoofskap, van Opperhoof Adam-Kok in gevolge ’n kroonbeslissing [sic] na Opper-hoof A.A.S. Le Fleur gekom”. The “kroonbeslissing” might have been a decision taken at some meeting organized by Le Fleur and his followers. University of South Africa library (archival division), Pretoria, Le Fleur Collection (LC), Item 4.1, Constitution of the Griqua National Conference of South Africa.
33 See chapter 6 in regard to Le Fleur’s ambivalence with the Coloured category.
Coloured category, was exemplified in 1902 by the establishment of the Coloured based APO\textsuperscript{34} (African Political Organization, renamed African Peoples’ Organization in 1920\textsuperscript{35}). The formation of the Union of South Africa on 31 May 1910, facilitated by the defeat of Afrikaner (or Boer) republics in the South African War of 1899-1902, also provided an impetus to political organization within marginalized communities across South Africa. Many feared that the explicitly ‘racially’ discriminatory practices of the Afrikaner republics could be extended to the Cape with the formation of a Union of South Africa and that they could be deprived of the rights they were accorded in the Cape,\textsuperscript{36} notably a qualified franchise.

Le Fleur also found himself in an environment with various and often contending discourses. Already imbued with Griqua ideals for land ownership and independence, Le Fleur was drawn to, and varyingly appropriated and adapted in terms of his own prior ideals, ideas stressing self-reliance, self-control, ‘racial’ unity, progression through education and religious separatism – reinforced particularly through the African Methodist Episcopal Church (AME).\textsuperscript{37} His thinking reflected operative nationalist, ‘racial’ and segregationist discourses.

Le Fleur’s release from Breakwater and his subsequent self-improvement and organizational activities occurred during a period in which the ideology of segregation – drawing on eugenics and social Darwinism – was being systematized and implemented (in the context of industrialization, increasing urbanization and the planning, formation and consolidation of the South Africa Union), the first clear expression of segregationist discourse having been made by the South African Native Affairs Commission between 1903 and 1905, with many of its recommendations being put into practice in subsequent decades. With English speaking liberals having been at the forefront of the systematization of segregation discourse presented as a middle-ground or compromise between ‘assimilation’ (associated with the displaced classical or mid-Victorian liberalism), and ‘repression’ (associated with the policies of Boer republics), other social categories, notably Afrikaner nationalists, also came to deploy segregationist themes, highlighting the dangers of ‘miscegenation’ in advocating their socio-political ideals.\textsuperscript{38} Le Fleur’s thinking also manifested how he appropriated and wrestled with concerns of ‘swamping’ by Bantu-speaking Africans and the ‘racial’ and social decadence that was supposed to attend ‘racial’ mixing. That is, Le Fleur’s thinking manifested how he appropriated and wrestled with ideas that were deployed in the articulation and implementation of the ideology of ‘racial’ separation and White supremacy. Le Fleur’s avoidance of equal rights politics and disavowal of economic and political integration, suggesting to many Whites the breaking down of social

\textsuperscript{34} Ian Goldin: \textit{Making race: The politics and economics of Coloured identity in South Africa} (Cape Town: Maskew Miller Longman, 1987), pp. 12-27; Lewis: \textit{Between the wire and the wall}, p. 63.


\textsuperscript{36} Goldin: \textit{Making race}, p. 20. The Union constitution provided that the former Afrikaner republics (Orange Free State and Transvaal), and the Natal and Cape colonies each retain their franchise laws. The Cape colony provided for ‘non-racial’ but sexist franchise to men provided they were literate and met a property or income standard. In Natal legislation excluded all women from the franchise. In the Afrikaner republics only White men had the franchise. Explicitly ‘racially’ discriminatory and segregationist legislation safeguarding and enhancing White power and privilege was passed by successive Union governments. Leonard Thompson: \textit{A history of South Africa} (New Haven and London: Yale University Press: 2001), pp. 150-186.

\textsuperscript{37} On the influence of AME in Cape Town, see James Campbell: \textit{Songs of Zion: The African Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States and South Africa} (New York, Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 103-212.

barriers and thus of their ‘racial’ and cultural integrity,\(^{39}\) in part reflected his identification with segregation as well as his attempt to win favour of government officials.\(^{40}\)

Segregation ultimately served to secure White socio-political, economic, cultural and psychological domination. Segregation discourse, however, found resonance within a broad range of social categories, including people who were not White. It benefited White farmers seeking more controls over their African tenants and labourers. It also benefited White workers seeking protection from cheaper labour availed especially by Africans. It provided a solution to White elites concerned with: rapid urbanization of poor Whites and Africans; potential competition and conflict between Whites and Africans, as well as miscegenation and a unified class struggle. Segregation was also appealing to Africans concerned with the restoration of traditional authorities.\(^{41}\) It appealed to Le Fleur and other Griqua who wished to protect themselves from being reduced to the status of ‘Natives’.

Le Fleur’s views reflect how ideas developed locally and internationally could be adapted for specific objectives in particular situations of colonial domination. The appropriation, adaptation and development of views drawing on international discourses and ideologies in South Africa was conditioned by the specific nature of racial discourse, segregation and ethno-racialized hierarchization in the country. Le Fleur’s thinking had some affinity with aspects of the nationalisms that were cultivated internationally by Africans which emphasized the abolition of all forms of ‘racial’ discrimination, equal rights for Africans, self-determination, the raising of African consciousness, the cultivation of cultural pride and unity.\(^{42}\) Le Fleur’s nationalism also diverged from these nationalisms, notably in his eschewal of equal rights politics and in his narrow Coloured and Griqua focus. Ideas were also developed in South Africa during the early 1900s with an affinity to the nationalist ideas of Marcus Garvey, emphasizing Black pride. Le Fleur’s ideas showed some affinity to those of Garvey, but there were also significant differences between them. The important similarity was their emphasis on ‘race’ consciousness, pride and self-reliance. Le Fleur’s nationalism was, however, not based on ‘Blackness’ but focused on Griqua and Coloureds whom he regarded as a ‘mixed-race’. Garvey, on the other hand, showed antipathy towards ‘mixed-race’ Americans. Both Garvey\(^{43}\) and Le Fleur were not opposed to capitalism but opposed communism. In promoting Griqua-Coloured consciousness, pride and self-reliance, Le Fleur also distanced himself from organizations that were variably influenced by Garveyism,\(^{44}\) like the Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union of South Africa, the African National Congress, and the Wellington movement.\(^{45}\)

Segregation and the ethno-racialized social hierarchy conditioned significantly the local permutations of international discourses and encouraged ethno-racialized nationalisms that sustained each other. Whilst nationalisms that emerged amongst the underclasses drew variably on international nationalists currents, local Bantu-speaking, Griqua and Coloured ethno-racialized permutations — that fed into each other — can been seen as, having been, to some extent, reactions to broad White (Afrikaner and British) ‘racial’ domination, and to a more narrow Afrikaner nationalism and a British ‘race patriotism’. British economic

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\(^{39}\) Dubow: “Race, civilization and culture”, pp. 76-7.

\(^{40}\) Griqua and Coloured People’s Opinion (GCPO), 12 November 1926.


\(^{43}\) Young: *Postcolonialism*, p. 220.

\(^{44}\) As shown in chapter 6.

domination significantly shaped Afrikaner nationalism, which in turn fed into the nationalisms of ethno-‘racial’ underclasses.46

Religion and socio-economic development amongst Coloureds, 1903-1915

Le Fleur’s location and movement within Coloured communities influenced the social location he posited for Griqua and Coloureds and the parameters of his ethno-‘racial’ self-improvement schemes. After his release from prison Le Fleur resided in the vicinity of Cape Town, first in Goodwood and later in the Wynberg district.47 Discouraged from going to, or residing in East Griqualand after his release, Le Fleur found himself in a Coloured environment that inclined him to become involved in Coloured religious and socio-economic activities. Le Fleur held meetings with a strong religious tone across Cape Town in places like Parow, Retreat and District Six.48 He apparently initiated a (Coloured) “Mission” at Retreat in the same year of his release. It appears that from 1904 Le Fleur also became involved in undertakings to acquire land for the building of homes for Coloureds in places like Eureka, Welcome Estate, Norwood Estate, Heathfield, Retreat, Strandfontein and Grassy Park, for which support was unsuccessfully requested from the government and even from the Duke of West Minister.49

Le Fleur’s activities in East Griqualand, particularly his involvement in the aborted 1897 rebellion, induced a wide range of people, especially government officials, to suspect that he was once again involved in seditious activities. On receiving reports about Le Fleur’s suspicious activities, the attorney general instructed that detectives should monitor him. Le Fleur’s meetings were consequently closely monitored through the use of Coloured detectives. Aware that police were monitoring him and that he was suspected of organizing sedition, Le Fleur was especially inclined to steer away from politically provocative pronouncements and activities. A police investigation concluded in 1905 that his activities were not seditious; that he was merely attempting to organize an “independent coloured congregation” on the principles of the American Methodist Episcopal Church, and that he advocated temperance.50 Police and government officials nevertheless maintained an interest in Le Fleur’s activities.

Le Fleur also undertook more private business initiatives on which he spent much of his time in the first decade after his release. However, the business ideas that he applied in his private affairs, were also manifested in his socio-economic upliftment ventures and would be especially manifested through his farming resettlement schemes. Thus, in addition to being a “lay preacher”, Le Fleur became involved in blacksmithing, wagon-making, carpentry and agriculture. During the later part of the first decade, whilst still residing in Wynberg, Le Fleur obtained a Labour Runners Licence that enabled him to recruit labour on behalf of licensed labour agents (e.g. Alport and Langerman Labour Agents, from Salt River near Cape Town). He subsequently procured labourers from Cape Town for the mines in the Transvaal (e.g. Nourse Mines Limited and the Newcastle Group of Mines). Although Le Fleur also attempted to obtain a Labour Agent’s Licence51 he ceased from acting as labour procurer for Johannesburg mines around 1910.

48 Cape Town Archives, Attorney General (AG) 1635, 7542/05, see especially CID report on Le Fleur by Inspector Easton, 8 September 1905.
49 LC, Miscellaneous file, “Open letter, Eureka Estate” by AAS le Fleur, Cape Town, 1 April 1938; LC, Item 9.2, “The late Griqua leader”; Griqua manuscript (Writer, title and date of writing not known), p. 19; GCPO, 29 November 1924.
50 AG 1635, 7542/05, See especially CID report on Le Fleur by Inspector Easton, 8 September 1905.
Union
The formation of Union increased Le Fleur’s concern with the social position and prospects of Griqua and Coloureds in a ‘racially’ discriminatory South Africa. Le Fleur feared that the position of people who were not White would be severely curtailed under a White Union regime. Imbued with ethno-‘racial’ values and identifying with segregation, Le Fleur was inclined to advocate separatism from Whites, as well as from Bantu-speakers, and, for a while advocated the establishment of a colony for Coloureds.

In articulating his ideals in public Le Fleur conveyed his views in a manner that did not appear to be at variance with establishment ideologies. He manifested multi-discursive shaping and shifting, and a wrestling of racist and anti-racist discourses. Le Fleur advocated economic self-reliance and the spiritual, moral and national reformation of Coloureds. He expressed concern about the social and moral effects of ‘racial’ mixing and about Coloureds in Bantu-speaking areas being reduced to a backward way of life. The ethno-‘racial’ dimension of Le Fleur’s thinking, together with White fears of political cooperation between Coloureds and Bantu-speakers and the constant suspicion and rumours that he was inciting rebelliousness against Whites and the government, inclined him to make public expressions that were in line with the ideology of the dominant classes. In articulating himself in a manner that fell in line with pro-establishment ideologies, Le Fleur also sought to win the favour of the dominant classes, even though his schemes were ultimately driven by his desire to cultivate Coloured self-reliance and to establish geographic spaces providing a measure of independence for Coloureds; that is, even though his schemes challenged in subtle ways the racism that shaped the socio-economic and political order even as they appropriated and deployed the racialism. Le Fleur thus appropriated and varying-ly internalised ideas in pro-establishment discourses but at the same time also challenged aspects of these discourses. His perspective thus varying-ly combined establishment and anti-establishment elements.

Coloured colony
At a public meeting held at the Good Shepherd Church in Pretoria roundabout the formation of the Union of South in 1910, Le Fleur advanced a “the solution to the coloured question in South Africa”, that is, “the formation of a South African National Coloured Union with a view of acquiring a colony for themselves as a people and one race”. Le Fleur had in mind the “coloured mix races … in the Union” or “the Cape coloured” whom he “propose[d] to name Eur-Africans”. Though Le Fleur does not appear to have appealed to a Khoekhoe heritage at the meeting, he considered those he sought to represent as “offspring of the Hottentot race”. Le Fleur’s proposition that Coloureds be called “Eur-African” reflected his search for an appropriate category that he could deploy for his ethno-national goals. He did not subsequently use the term much. Given segregation and racism in South Africa, Le Fleur found it especially necessary to emphasize that the people that he represented were ‘racially mixed’ and Coloured, despite the limitation of the Coloured category for his ethno-national goals. Le Fleur’s expressions at that meeting, attended by over 300 people, revealed his segregationist affected ethno-‘racial’ thinking at the time of the formation of Union as well as his socio-economic goals that strongly suggested the influence and reworking of the ideal of land ownership and independence – an ideal valorising Griqua landownership and independence in past Griqua polities.

Le Fleur’s expressions at the meeting were calculated to appeal to Coloureds and Whites whose support he desired. He appealed at the meeting to White pretensions of their nobility and attempted to use their

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Cape Town to Acting Under Secretary, Native Affairs, Cape Town, 21 April 1911; Barret, Department of Native Affairs, Pretoria, to Minister, Native Affairs, 4 September 1912.
52 NA 347, 3630/1911/F1164, Undated clipping from unnamed newspaper, titled “Big native meeting in Pretoria”.
53 Documents in file are from pre-1912 period.
54 See chapter 6 on limitation of Coloured category for Le Fleur.
prejudices and fears to generate support for his idea of a colony for Coloureds. He attributed the unjust treatment of Coloureds not to the “greater minded Europeans” but to the “Labour Party and illiterate European section”. He maintained that unless “a scheme of absolute separate occupation of territory” was established there would be “nothing to avert one of the biggest coloured and European collisions and bloodshed in South Africa in the very near future”. He appealed “to every right thinking white mother and father, politicians and non-politicians of the white section in the Union of South Africa, as well as to those of my coloured brethren, to assit in forming or making this scheme of separate occupation in a colony to my people a success”. Le Fleur was well aware that his proposal for separation would resonate well with many Whites. He also felt that many Coloureds would support his view:

We are on the eve of a general election, and it has been the great cry of the majority of the white people in the Union to make the Union a white man’s country. I feel sure that the Eur-Africans in South Africa would be too willing and too pleased to stand aside and leave the Union for the whites as a white man’s country. The coloured people in turn would seek the support and assistance of Great Britain to allot to us a colony portion of her possessions in Africa which would be inhabitable for a civilised race, there to migrate as an asset and united people under the British Flag.

Le Fleur censured at the meeting sexual relations between White men and “aboriginal native[s]” and suggested strict measures by the government to prevent it.

Here I would suggest to any Union Government that in the future they pass a law making it a criminal offence for any such intercourse, yes, the highest possible offence, even so far as the death penalty. Why should we, a Christian and respectable community, be saddled with the vices of the white and black races in Africa.

Le Fleur was especially concerned that mixing between “white and black races” resulted in children lacking moral controls and “national instinct”, thus compounding the social and moral problems that he identified amongst Coloureds. His promotion of Coloured self-reliance and economic independence suggests that he did not buy much into biological racism, or aspects of it. It was especially in his deployment of Christianity that Le Fleur affirmed the ‘racial equality’ of Coloureds, as indicated later in a 1925 issue of his Griqua and Coloured People’s Opinion:

The sad state [Coloureds] … are in is the direct cause of using or misusing Christianity in a race, misguiding our children and causing their downfall by not teaching them what they are created for, only what they should be after death and eternal [life?] hereafter [W]e have been created just as fully as any other races, with all the faculties in life …

Le Fleur was well applauded after his presentation at the Good Shepherd Church. Aware that his ideal of a Coloured colony would be difficult to actualize, Le Fleur instead embarked on more modest farming resettlement schemes where Coloureds would be able to eke out a self-reliant existence and develop economically, spiritually and morally as a people.

**Touws River settlement, 1910**

It appears that towards 1910 Le Fleur had already become involved in plans for the acquisition of farms in Touws River for the purpose of establishing a farming settlement on which a “township” would be

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55 NA 347, 3630/1911/F1164, “Big native meeting in Pretoria”.
56 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 7 December 1917.
57 *GCPO*, 3 March 1925.
58 NA 347, 3630/1911/F1164, “Big native meeting in Pretoria”.
59 That Le Fleur had a township in mind was also suggested in 1915 after Le Fleur encountered payment difficulties with farms acquired in 1910. On looking for alternative land, Le Fleur told Piet Burger that he wanted to purchase his farm in order to lay out a “township”. *Cape Times*, 10 December 1920.
developed. Although Le Fleur might have initiated farming schemes in the area, his activity in the area might also have been at the invitation of Coloureds there who were impressed with his self-help schemes in the vicinity of Cape Town. From 1 February 1910 Le Fleur and a number of people settled on the farms Wolvekloof and a portion of De Draai in Touws River belonging to James Douglas Logan, even though Le Fleur and his associates signed a contract for the purchase of these farms only on 3 March 1910. Le Fleur and his associates undertook to form a company named the Touws River Land Settlement Company Limited that was supposed to raise money for the purchase of the farms. They acquired some livestock such as horses, cattle, and goats and planted a variety of crops. Le Fleur himself engaged extensively in agriculture, apparently sowing a huge amount wheat, sweet potatoes, onions, cabbage, as well as a variety of other seeds in 1913.

At least one person involved in the Touws River scheme was with Le Fleur at Breakwater prison, that is, Moses Stoffels, alias Ncapayi. Stoffels was apparently of Xhosa origin. His continuous association with Le Fleur would thus have undercut Le Fleur’s ethno-racialism and suggested Le Fleur’s ethno-racial ambivalence. It suggested that despite Le Fleur’s repeated pronouncements against ethno-racial mixing, and his expressions of an apparent Griqua-Coloured exclusiveness, he could nevertheless encourage certain individuals of Bantu-speaking origin to participate in his land schemes who could thus assume the identity associated with others in those schemes. Le Fleur was, however, far less accommodative of broad ethno-racial alliances between Griqua/Coloureds and Bantu-speakers after 1897.

The settlement initiative at Touws River was the beginning of a series of similar schemes in the Cape. After beginning the scheme at Touws River early in 1910, Le Fleur promoted his land acquisition ideals widely, as reflected at the meeting in the Good Shepherd Church in Pretoria where Le Fleur proposed the acquisition of a colony for Coloureds. It would only be after Le Fleur located himself once again in a Griqua environment in 1916 that the Griqua category would feature prominently in his ethno-racial farming resettlement schemes.

Although much in a Coloured environment after his release, Le Fleur was also in touch with some Griqua in Cape Town. Thus, whilst his residence and activities in the Cape Town area would have inclined him to strengthen his association with a Coloured identity, the links that he kept with the Griqua would also have sustained his association with a Griqua identity. His association with Coloureds and Griqua would have reinforced his identification of Griqua with Coloureds, and encouraged the inclusion of both Griqua and (other) Coloureds in his ethno-racial upliftment schemes.

East Griqualand: 1910 visit
Apart from contact with Griqua whilst in Cape Town, Le Fleur also rekindled his relations with Griqua in East Griqualand through a personal visit to the region, possibly his second after his release from Breakwater prison. Le Fleur might already have visited to East Griqualand shortly after his release to bring his wife and son to Cape Town where he was based for much of the first decade of the century. Whilst in Johannesburg

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60 Griqua manuscript , p. 20.
61 Including “Annex Pienaars Kloof” and “Annex Kruispad”. Cape Town Archives, Cape Supreme Court (CSC) 2/1/1/744, 231, Illiquid case, James Douglas Logan versus Andrew Abraham Stockenstrom le Fleur and others, 1914, Annexure A.
62 CSC 2/1/1/744, 231, Annexure B. On possessions of Le Fleur and his associates at the Touws River farms see also GG 1544, 50/492, A le Fleur, De Draai to Buxton, Governor General, Pretoria, 28 January 1915.
63 Others involved in the scheme included Jan Alsoner, Jacob Harmse, Jan Wangenstrom, August Srenberg, H Beukes and D Okhuis CSC 2/1/1/744, 231, Annexure A & B.
64 GCPO, 7 August 1925.
65 CMT 3/7874/644, Commissioner, Urban Police district, Cape Town, to Acting Under Secretary for Native Affairs, Cape Town 21 April 1911.
66 Griqua manuscript, p. 17.
with his family in 1910, Le Fleur undertook to visit his mother-in-law in East Griqualand who was apparently very ill. He notified the Native Affairs secretary about his intention and was allowed by the government to visit East Griqualand. Le Fleur left Johannesburg shortly before Christmas with his wife for East Griqualand. Le Fleur was acutely aware that the authorities were concerned about his visit to East Griqualand, fearing that he might again stir up the ‘Natives’. He was thus inclined to repeatedly emphasize his noble objectives, to renounce politics, and to stress his distrust of ‘Natives’. Before his departure he stressed in a letter to the secretary of Native Affairs that he did not have any subversive motives:

[A]s far as the Griqualand Question is concerned I have given it up 13 years ago and have never taken part nor do I even intend taking part in it. What is the use of flogging a dead horse. … Again about the Natives … let me ask does any man think after the deception practiced by the Kaffirs on us we will even be disposed to trust or even work together with them no matter what Question. I say no not me. I have done with Politics and trust entirely to see us justly treated.

Le Fleur’s assertions about his renunciation of politics and his distrust of ‘Natives’ were, however, not merely calculated to ease government officials, but reflected a socio-political orientation manifested in his upliftment projects.

Whilst in East Griqualand Le Fleur held a few meetings. Two cattle were apparently slaughtered at a feast organized by his “admirers” at Ensikeni where he stayed for a few days. In Kokstad Le Fleur was “entertained” by his old associate Adam Smith who welcomed him together other people. A “beast” was also slaughtered for the occasion.

Le Fleur’s visit had a big influence amongst the underclasses, especially amongst Bantu-speakers, and in particular those in Umzimkulu who were already much discontented due to east-coast fever restrictions and preventative measures. Like in the late 1890s, rumours that the country would be “handed back” to Le Fleur were again afloat, particularly amongst Bantu-speakers, thus reinforcing the suspicion amongst government officials that he had seditious intentions. White farmers, government officials as well as some Griqua and Bantu-speakers, monitored Le Fleur closely during his visit. Le Fleur left the region early in January 1911.

The rumours attending Le Fleur’s visit to East Griqualand thwarted his attempts to project himself positively to the government. His attempt to project himself as a law-abiding citizen together with the suspicion and rumours of seditious activities, suggested to government officials that he was cunning and deceptive. E Barret from the Department of Native Affairs indicated in 1912 that Le Fleur was crafty, cunning and false, incorrigibly mischievous, but never formidable, le Fleur presents a character without, so far as is officially known, a single redeeming quality. … [N]o good can reasonably be expected to result from encouragement of any section of the coloured population to regard this man as their leader.

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67 CMT 3/874/644, (Telegram) Kokstad Magistrate to Umtata, 2 January 1911; CID report of AE Ling, 14 March 1911; NA 347, 3630/1911/F1164, Le Fleur, to Secretary, Native Affairs, 11 December 1910. NTS 7599, 4/328, Commissioner, Urban Police, Cape Town, to Acting Under Secretary, Native Affairs, Cape Town, 21 April 1911; Barret, to Minister, Native Affairs, 4 September 1912.

68 NA 347, 3630/1911/F1164, AAS le Fleur, Denver, Johannesburg Burton, Secretary, Native Affairs, Cape Town, 11 December 1910.

69 CMT 3/874/644, Resident Magistrate, Kokstad to CMT, Umtata, 28 January 1911.

70 CMT 3/874/644, Magistrate, Umzimkulu to Stanford, 11 January 1911; Resident Magistrate, Kokstad, to CMT, 28 January 1911. NA 347, 3630/1911/F1164, Stanford, CMT, to Under Secretary, Native Affairs, Cape Town, 7 February 1911.

71 CMT 3/874/644, (Telegram), Magistrate, Kokstad, to Umtata, 2 January 1911.

72 NTS 7599, 4/328, Barret, Department of Native Affairs, Pretoria, to Minister of Native Affairs, 4 September 1912.
Although Le Fleur steered away from East Griqualand, there was a persisting expectation amongst some of the underclasses in the region that he would return to play an important role as a Griqua leader. Samuel Vakalisa, “one of the Administrative Police in Matatiele”, claimed (in 1917) that by the end of 1912 he attended a meeting at Adam Smith’s house where the restoration of land and the return of Le Fleur was discussed:

There were many natives and Griquas present. Natives came from Umzimkulu, Mt. Ayliff, Mt. Frere and [other] Districts . . . Adam Smith addressed [the people] from a wagon. He said Andrew Le Fleur would come soon and that this land . . . would be given back to Griquas and would be put under the Chieftainship of Le Fleur . . . Smith said all who voted for A. Le Fleur [to be chief over East Griqualand] must sign the list and pay 2/- so that when Le Fleur came he (Smith) could show him the list. Smith said the Government gave East Griqualand to the Griquas. . . . He said all the . . . Headmen who did not follow his (Smith’s) advice would be discharged by Andrew Le Fleur when came, and all the people who did not follow his advice would be chased away from East Griqualand by Andrew Le Fleur. He said the white people would go away from East Griqualand as soon as Le Fleur came. The people were very much pleased and they signed the list and each paid the required 2/-.73

Le Fleur’s visit to East Griqualand, and the high regard that many amongst the underclasses had of him, might have strengthened his chiefly aspirations, and, given his location amongst Coloureds in Cape Town, induced him to attempt to promote his chiefly aspirations amongst Coloureds and in so doing he would have reactivated an identification with a Khoekhoe heritage within Coloured communities.

**Leadership positioning**

After his (December 1910 – January 1911) visit to East Griqualand Le Fleur returned to Cape Town where he resided for a while on his farm at Diep River in the Wynberg district. About six Griqua worked for Le Fleur on the farm (in 1911), two of whom resided on it. Le Fleur obtained a portion of his income from cutting wood on the farm that he sold in the Wynberg district.74 Much of Le Fleur’s time between 1910 and 1915 appears, however, to have been spent on the farming schemes in Touws River. Whilst attempting to develop a farming settlement in Touws River between 1910 and 1915 Le Fleur also attempted to generate government respect for chieftainship amongst Coloureds. He also projected himself to the government as a responsible Coloured leader who would instil order amongst his followers. Communicating to the Governor General Lord Gladstone early in 1914 Le Fleur reasoned that the

[The missionary belief that] removing [the] . . . Chief amongst the Coloured people will be for their good and that Christian influence was enough . . . was the most foolish thing ever thought of. . . . [L]ook at the result generally speaking the people are further back than when they look[ed] up to their chief who demanded and compel respect for them [sic].75

In projecting himself as a creditable Coloured leader, Le Fleur had to deal with rival leaders and organizations like the APO. He indicated to Prime Minister General Louis Botha in 1914 that it was “the greatest mistake possible” for the “European public to take all the A.P.O. expresses as coming from the Coloured people” as it expressed only the view of a few. He also expressed his opposition to the “labour

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74 NA 347, 3630/1911/F1164, Commissioner, Urban Police District, Cape Town, to Acting Secretary, Native Affairs, Pretoria, 1 September 1911.
75 GG 955, 19/196, AAS le Fleur, Cape Town, to Lord Gladstone, Governor General, Cape Town, 1 April 1914.
Le Fleur sought official support for his attempts to ‘restore’ Coloured national life and hoped that the government would support his farming schemes.

De Draai & Wolvekloof settlement difficulties

Developments at the farms in Touws River did not go in line with the plans of Le Fleur and his associates. Their undertaking to form a company for the purchase of De Draai and Wolvekloof did not materialize. The occupiers of the farms were also unable to pay the instalment agreed on in 1910. In 1913 the occupants entered a new agreement undertaking to pay rent “for the use and occupation of the land” at a rate of “fifty pounds sterling per month, reckoned from the 1st February, 1910 up to the end of June, 1913”. Thus, instead of being potential owners Le Fleur and his associates agreed to be merely “monthly tenants”.

The occupiers pledged their “crops, livestock and general property” to James Logan for outstanding as well as for future rent. They also undertook not to remove any crops, livestock or other property belonging to them until all the rent due to Logan was paid. As soon as their crops were harvested, they were to be delivered to any agent appointed by Logan. The proceeds of their sale were to be used for the reduction of their debts to him.

The tenants’ financial difficulties continued, prefiguring future farming schemes of Le Fleur. Le Fleur applied unsuccessfully for financial assistance from the Agricultural Bank of South Africa in Pretoria in July 1913. He also appealed unsuccessfully for aid from the minister of finance. The tenants’ relationship with Logan deteriorated. They “failed and refused” to pay rent, notwithstanding Logan’s demand for rental payment. The circumstances of Logan, whose medical advisors “ordered” him to go to Europe, might have induced him to put pressure on the tenants to comply with their agreement.

In November 1913 Logan was granted an interdict by the Cape Town Supreme Court preventing the tenants from removing their property and produce. Although set aside by the same court in February 1914, the interdict appears to have impeded the sale of the tenants’ produce, thus disinclining or disabling them further from paying rent. Failure to pay rent further induced Logan to initiate legal proceedings in February 1914. He demanded outstanding rent for the use and occupation of his farms from November 1911 until 1914, in terms of the agreement of 1913. Logan also sought an order requiring the occupiers to deliver all their crops and stock on his farms and that he acquire the proceeds of their sale. He also issued them a notice requiring them to vacate his farms. The tenants refused, however, to vacate his farms.

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76 NTS 7599, 4/328, AAS le Fleur, Cape Town, to General Louis Botha, 6 April 1914.
77 GG 955, 19/196.
78 GCP0, 29 May 1925 (copy in Cape Town Archives Magistrate/Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Sterkspruit (2/SPT) 16 N1/9/2).
79 CSC 2/1/1/744, 231, Annexure A.
80 CSC 2/1/1/744, 231, Annexure B.
81 LC, Correspondence file, E Viljoen, Private Secretary, Minister of Justice and Native Affairs, Pretoria, to AAS le Fleur, De Draai, Touws River, 21 July 1913.
82 GCP0, 29 May 1925.
83 CSC 2/1/1/744, 231, Plaintiff’s [D Logan] Declaration, Supreme Court, Cape of Good Hope, 6 April 1914; CSC 2/1/1/744, 231, Defendants’ Plea. [Stamped] 14 August 1914.
85 CSC 2/1/1/744, 231, Statement of Harry Hands, 8 May 1914.
86 CSC 2/1/1/744, 231, Defendants’ Plea. [Stamped] 14 August 1914.
87 CSC 2/1/1/744, 231, Plaintiff’s [D Logan] Declaration, Supreme Court, Cape of Good Hope, 6 April 1914; CSC 2/1/1/744, 231, Summons of Deputy Sheriff, Worcester, 9 February 1914.
88 CSC 2/1/1/744, 231, Plaintiff’s [D Logan] Declaration, Supreme Court, 6 April 1914.
Represented by (Cape Town based) Messrs Van der Byl and De Villiers in the Cape Town Supreme Court in August 1914, Le Fleur and his associates denied the validity of the ‘agreement’ (or arrangement) of 1913 on the grounds that Logan “never agreed with them”. They made a counter claim of £2000 for damages caused by the plaintiff to their character, reputation, business and legal expenses, including damages that resulted from the interdict granted in favour of Logan and then later revoked — that prevented them from removing their property, thus resulting in the delay of the sale of their produce. Despite their attempts to extend their stay on the farms of Logan, Le Fleur and his associates were compelled to leave. Communicating to the governor general in May 1915 Le Fleur cited, however, earlier prospects of an attack by Afrikaners rebels as the reason why he decided to move from De Draai.

A number of “coloured people”, presumably Le Fleur’s associates from Logan’s farms, moved to the farm Breuwelsfontein in Ceres a few months after Le Fleur purchased it on lease from Peter Christian Burger for £4000 – with the intention to establish a “township”. In 1916, after about three months at the farm, Le Fleur and his associates were again forced to leave after Burger asked them to do so when he realized that Le Fleur was not in a position to pay for the farm. Le Fleur decided to “return home to Kokstad” to try to make a living from farming. On his return to East Griqualand, Le Fleur based himself at the Driekop farm in Mount Currie, the same farm on which he and his adherents plotted rebellion against the colonial government in 1897.

**East Griqualand, 1916**

The move to East Griqualand was, according to AAS le Fleur’s grandchild, Eric le Fleur, in response to a calling from Adam Kok:

> In die jaar 1916 terwyl Opperhoof le Fleur saam met Koos Olivier in die veld was gaan staan Opperhoof doodstil en Koos Olivier hoor net hoe Opperhoof sê “Goed Kaptein.” Hierna vertel die Profeet vir Olivier dat dit Kaptein Kok was, wat met hom gespreek het en vra wanneer gaan Opperhoof sy mense haal in Griekwaland Oos. Gevolglik vertek Opperhoof le Fleur na Kokstad om die trek gaan opvorm aldaar.

Attempting to deflect responsibility (whilst on trial for fraud in 1921) for the loss sustained through the 1917 trek from East Griqualand – reminiscent of 1898 when he was on trial for sedition – Le Fleur suggested on 27 September 1921, that he did not go to Touws River in 1916 for the purpose of initiating a migration from East Griqualand to Touws River, but that such a migration was initiated by “some of the leading Griqua who were unable to make their holdings pay”. On supposedly being approached by the leading Griqua Le Fleur consented to go to Touws River with a Griqua party to inspect certain land which he knew was for sale and suitable for settlement. They brought back a good report and “all agreed to trek”. Le Fleur insisted that he did not personally urge the Griqua to trek but that they went out on their own free will, and that Jacobus (or Koos) Olivier, who persuaded the Griqua to embark on a trek, had greater influence than himself. He insisted that he was merely the Griqua’s agent in the trek.

Jacobus Olivier, a close associate of Le Fleur (called by Le Fleur as a witness in the 1921 fraud case), provided an account that was much in line with that of Le Fleur. He admitted on 22 September 1921 that he

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89 CSC 2/1/7/44, 231, Defendants’ Plea. [Stamped] 14 August 1914.
90 GCPO, 29 May 1925.
91 GG 1544, 50/492, A le Fleur, De Draai, to Viscount Buxton, Governor General, Pretoria, 28 January 1915.
92 Cape Times, 10 December 1920; 21& 28 September 1921.
93 National Archives, Pretoria, Prime Minister (PM) 1/1/296, PM150/34/1916, AAS le Fleur, Breuwelsfontein, to General Louis Botha, Prime Minister, Pretoria [1916].
94 Cape Times, 28 September 1921.
96 When on trial for fraud inconsequent of the failed 1917 Griqua resettlement scheme in the vicinity of Touws River.
97 Cape Times, 28 September 1921.
was part of a deputation that went to Le Fleur at Kokstad to ask him what they were to do for a living since they could not plough as the government had taken away their land and as the forest where they used to cut wood had been closed to them. The idea was then formed to trek somewhere else. A meeting was held and it was agreed that they should throw all their belongings into a common pool for the trek.\textsuperscript{98}

The social and economic activities that Le Fleur engaged in after he arrived in East Griqualand do suggest that he might have relegated the idea of self-reliant resettlement schemes, at least outside East Griqualand, when he moved to the region in 1916. After his arrival in the region Le Fleur opened a blacksmith and wagon-making business on the Driekop farm. He also engaged in farming and planted a huge amount of cabbage, with a number of Griqua being in his employ. He apparently started a school and taught a number of Griqua children agriculture and wagon-making.\textsuperscript{99} The plight of Griqua in East Griqualand may, however, have made the idea of a resettlement scheme outside East Griqualand urgent.

Unlike in 1921, Le Fleur was less inclined to attempt to deflect responsibility for the trek in 1917, that is, before the failure of the scheme. When government officials found out about the envisaged trek a short while before it took place, Le Fleur stressed to the resident magistrate of Kokstad in October 1917 the moral and economic factors that inspired the trek. He also deployed the racial segregation discourse that would be appealing to many government officials, and suggested his leading role in organizing the trek:

> On my arrival here [East Griqualand] I found the Griqua and coloured people so low in industrial life moral life Christian life that I felt my duty as a Christian to make some endeavour to pull them up. Many having sunk lower than the raw native and so we had decided to make a move out of the native environment to the more settled district where there our people live under Europeans and has gone forward. I feel without a change the future of these people is dark in deed and that is why we hope that when removed from here they would become industrious and better people. I know it is a great very great responsibility to take [sic] – but we cannot … shirk our human duty to our fellow-men.\textsuperscript{100}

It does appear that some Griqua were also inclined to opt to move to the Western Cape due to their liability to be treated as ‘Aboriginal Natives’ in East Griqualand. There was a perception that there was greater equality in the Western Cape.\textsuperscript{101} Living in close proximity with Bantu-speakers could reinforce their classification as ‘Native’. Le Fleur would, through his stay in Cape Town, have developed a sharpened awareness about geographic variations in the interpretation and application of the law, particularly in regard to Coloureds, Griqua and ‘Natives’.

Thus, after his arrival in East Griqualand, Le Fleur became involved in meetings about a migration to Touws River. Le Fleur communicated at the same time to government officials that the meetings he attended were only religious and that he would not attend any meetings of a political nature. He also indicated that he intended to live quietly on the Driekop farm where he would grow vegetables for the Johannesburg market.\textsuperscript{102} Griqua supporting a migration were encouraged to sell their land and other possessions in East Griqualand to raise money for farming land that Le Fleur would buy for them.\textsuperscript{103} Le

\textsuperscript{98} Cape Times, 23 September 1921.


\textsuperscript{100} CMT 3/874/644, AAS le Fleur, Kokstad, to Resident Magistrate, Kokstad, 2 October 1917.

\textsuperscript{101} See testimony of Frederick Samuel Berning a Kokstad based attorney, during 1920-21 fraud case against Le Fleur. Cape Times, 23 November 1920.

\textsuperscript{102} CMT 3/874/644, Resident Magistrate, Kokstad, to CMT, 24 November 1916; Resident Magistrate, Kokstad, to Moffat, 29 December 1916.

\textsuperscript{103} Cape Times, 28 & 29 September 1921.
Fleur’s brother, Thomas, suggested in 1920 that Le Fleur’s objective from the onset was to “found a settlement and amalgamate the Griqua and the coloured people into one.”

Le Fleur and his associates did not make the idea of a trek known to the authorities during the early stage of the scheme. The excitement generated by Le Fleur’s return and the meetings held amongst Griqua and Bantu-speakers consequently reinforced the suspicion of government officials and White farmers that Le Fleur had seditious objectives. Government officials therefore sought grounds to arrest him or to have him removed from East Griqualand.

As during his visit between late 1910 and early 1911, Le Fleur’s presence in East Griqualand between 1916 and 1917 made Whites, who felt that the Griqua and ‘Natives’ were becoming more assertive and insubordinate, paranoid. In the words of SC Manning, a White person who stayed in Mount Currie in 1916:

I am living alongside Maraiskop [in Mount Currie] which seems to be a sort of centre for Le Fleur. ... I reported to the Police that there has been a big meeting about a month ago. Yesterday there was still a larger meeting and Griquas from all parts turned up. There must have been between 80 and 100 Griquas. Le Fleur came in a wagon packed with men. I passed him this morning in the direction of Bultfontein [another Griqua farm] and another wagon with him also full of Griquas all strangers to these parts. They stared at me in a most insolent manner making remarks to one another. I don’t think any one could call me an alarmist, but I feel absolutely convinced that these men are hatching mischief. The natives are talking about it freely and wondering why the Government don’t arrest them.

Dexter, a White storekeeper from “Ilangweni Location”, mentioned sometime before 12 February 1917 that the ‘Natives’ have been particularly “independent and impudent” for some weeks. The coincidence of Le Fleur’s visit with the ‘First World War’, also led to speculations that he might join disaffected ‘Boers’ sympathetic to Germans in an attack on the Union government. It was rumoured that Le Fleur wanted the Griqua and ‘Natives’ to join the ‘Boers’ so that they could regain their independence. The rumours could have fed on a perception among sections of the underclasses that the war situation was opportune for revolt, as well as on fears amongst Whites, especially Anglo-Saxons, that the underclasses might exploit the war situation to launch an attack, especially in the light of Le Fleur’s visit to the region.

The climate of suspicion inclined longstanding pro-government Griqua leaders to reaffirm their loyalty to the government. Addressing Governor General Lord Buxton on his visit to East Griqualand in July 1917 on behalf of Griqua people, Cornelius de Bruin, the government sanctioned Griqua headman, pledged Griqua loyalty to the Union government and the British empire.

[We feel pleased to take part in the struggle of the Great War in Europe, as loyal subjects of the Empire, trusting that in future, we will reap the fruits of loyalty under our Government, for the services we have done as subjects of the British Empire.]

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104 Cape Times, 10 December 1920.
105 CMT 3/874/644, See correspondence between 1916-17, especially Resident Magistrate, Kokstad, to CMT, 24 November 1916; Resident Magistrate, Kokstad, to Moffat, 29 December 1916.
106 CMT 3/874/644, CS Manning, Franklin, to Scott, 26 December 1916.
107 CMT 3/874/644, Deputy Commissioner, SAP, Transkeian Division, to CMT, 12 February 1917.
109 Kokstad Advertiser, 27 July 1917. The Griqua committee on whose behalf De Bruin addressed the governor general included, inter alia, APD Smith, GP Bezuidenhout and JG Werner, the Secretary. Adam Smith’s association with De Bruin appears anomalous.
De Bruin also undertook not to present Griqua grievances to the government during the war.\(^\text{110}\) In his communication with government officials, Le Fleur also emphasized his loyalty to the government as well as the good relations between himself and Whites. Because of suspicion that attended him, Le Fleur repeatedly communicated his commitment to peace and order to government officials. He indicated to the resident magistrate of Kokstad in April that

\begin{quote}
I have on my part endeavoured to do all I can to let us live in peace and goodwill and have found that feeling of kindliness is apparent and open, especially the European people. I have had the opportunity here to point out to all natives who have come to greet me that there is no matter of dispute between myself and the Europeans and that they must do their duty to the authority.\(^\text{111}\)
\end{quote}

In October Le Fleur again attempted to reassure the resident magistrate of his commitment to peace:

\begin{quote}
[A]s far as it was possible we have preached to the natives to live in peace and good will toward the Europeans as it was protection to themselves to have the Europeans amongst them. And as long as I and my people live whom I live with [sic] we will ever preach reconciliation come what may to the contrary.\(^\text{112}\)
\end{quote}

Rumours of plotting against the White regime contributed to the high level of interest that government officers maintained in Le Fleur’s activities. A close watch was kept on him through police agents.\(^\text{113}\) Seeking legal measures to curb his activities, government officials attempted to have Le Fleur arrested in terms of the conditions of his release in 1903 but had to accept that his release was unconditional.\(^\text{114}\) Postmasters in the Transkeian Territories (of which East Griqualand was part) were instructed in January 1917 to hand to the resident magistrates in the territory any correspondence addressed to Andrew le Fleur. His correspondence was to be opened by steam and any suspicious matter was to be reported by telegraph to the chief magistrate of the Transkeian Territories and retained.\(^\text{115}\) Head police suspected that ‘Native’ police at Kokstad warned Le Fleur that the authorities were monitoring his activities.\(^\text{116}\) The information that Le Fleur might have thus received would have made him more guarded in his actions.\(^\text{117}\) Although police and magistrates heard much rumours about Le Fleur’s seditious meetings and his hostility and bitterness against the government, they could not find anything substantial warranting his arrest.\(^\text{118}\)

Le Fleur probably realized that the secrecy of the planning of the envisaged Griqua migration contributed much to suspicion that a revolt was being plotted. He claimed that the proposed migration was kept secret because he and his associates wanted to purchase land in the vicinity of Touws River for as small an amount as possible, reasoning that the owners would immediately put up the prize if they new about the envisaged migration.\(^\text{119}\) East Griqualand authorities found out about Le Fleur’s settlement plans in the Touws River

\(^{110}\) \textit{Kokstad Advertiser}, 27 July 1917.

\(^{111}\) CMT 3/874/644, A le Fleur, Driekop, to Welsh, Kokstad, 14 April 1917.

\(^{112}\) CMT 3/874/644, AAS le Fleur, Kokstad, to Resident Magistrate, Kokstad, 2 October 1917.

\(^{113}\) CMT 3/874/644, Resident Magistrate, Kokstad, to CMT, 24 November 1916, Deputy Commissioner, SAP to CMT, 2 January 1917.

\(^{114}\) CMT 3/874/644, (Telegram) Pretoria [Native Affairs] to Tembu [Umtata], 27 November 1916; Chief JB Moffat, Magistrate Umtata, to Deputy Commissioner, SAP, Umtata, 9 January 1917. See also correspondence of 1916-17 in NTS 7599, 4/328.

\(^{115}\) CMT 3/874/644 (Telegram), Magistrate, Matatiele, to Umtata, 15 January 1917; CMT Circular to “all Resident Magistrates in the Transkeian Territories”, 16 January 1917.

\(^{116}\) CMT 3/874/644, Deputy Commissioner, SAP, Transkeian Division, to CMT, 12 February 1917.


\(^{118}\) CMT 3/874/644, Resident Magistrate, Kokstad, to CMT, 24 November 1916; CS Manning, Franklin to Scott, 26 December 1916; Deputy Commissioner, Transkeian Division, SAP, to CMT, 8 January 1917 and 12 February 1917; Resident Magistrate, Matatiele, to CMT, Umtata, 5 February 1917; Chief Native Commissioner, Natal, to CMT, 20 June 1917.

\(^{119}\) CMT 3/874/644, CMT to Magistrate, Kokstad, 12 November 1917.
region only a short period prior to the Griqua trek. By then Le Fleur had purchased (in his own name) the farms Smousbosch in Worcester and Driekoppen in Lainsburg. Smousbosch was purchased for £2,500 on a bond of £1,500. Driekoppen was purchased for £1,800 on a bond of £1,200. Le Fleur intended to sub-divide the farms amongst the Griqua when the full purchase prize was eventually paid. He depicted the farms very positively before the migration. Le Fleur emphasized that there was an abundant supply of water and that the ground was good for agriculture.

Le Fleur’s expression of the nobility of his motives in regard to the settlement scheme was put to in doubt by divergent accounts of his aims. There were rumours that a trek would be followed by a revolt by the Griqua or by a joint revolt with Bantu-speakers. As between 1896 and 1897, Le Fleur’s ideas between 1916 and 1917 were received and relayed in terms of the expectations, hopes, concerns and fears of different people. Continuing resentment against Whites generated hope or fear that Le Fleur would attempt to forcibly repossess land from Whites. Le Fleur would thus again have been exposed to forces from various quarters prompting him in various directions. His past experience was, however, decisive in the direction that he opted for and in the ideals that he pursued.

Adam Albert of Cedarville in Matatiele supposedly visited Le Fleur at his home on Driekop on 7 September 1917. He made a sworn statement affirming the supposed seditious intentions of Le Fleur:

Alfred [sic] le Fleur … told me that he had bought land in the colony and he desired that all the women and children of the Griqua families should be sent to this land, … he also said they should sell their cattle but retain their horses because he wants all the men to come back here to take their land with blood.

Zwartboy Mfundisi from Cedarville also claimed that Le Fleur had seditious intentions. According to Mfundisi Le Fleur was present at a service in the Griqua Church in Cedarville on Sunday 21 October 1917. Le Fleur requested that all the women should leave the building. A meeting was then held between the men. Le Fleur mentioned at that meeting that

the country belongs to the Griquas and Natives and to-day it is occupied by the White Men, but he … has purchased land in the Cape Province and desires that all Natives and Griquas should take their families to that [land]. … [T]he men [were then] to return here and take their land with their Blood. He further stated that they must not fear because he … has all the plans (indaba) of all the Native Chiefs about here in his hands [sic].

The sworn statement of Jeremiah Duzingwa, “a Hlubi and a teacher at the Griqua School [at] Cedarville”, was more in line with the writing that Le Fleur bequeathed. He claimed that after a service in the Griqua church on a Sunday evening in October, Le Fleur “spoke … to the people in something of these terms”:

I am like Moses, I know you people are poor and in trouble. I now want to take you to a land where you will be in liberty, and where you can make progress, I have bought you land in the Western Province where you can live free, there is no money in this country. I have come to take you away.

Although Duzingwa’s affidavit was more in line with Le Fleur’s conduct, those who had a prior image of Le Fleur as troublemaker were inclined to find his account incredible. A police detective indicated that he was

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120 CMT 3/874/644, Magistrate, Kokstad, to CMT, 1 November 1917; Guthrie to Secretary, Native Affairs, 16 July 1920.
121 Kokstad Advertiser, 7 December 1917.
122 Affidavits of Zwartboy Mfundisi and Adam Albertus, dated October 1917 in SAP 34, Conf 6/496/17.
123 NTS 7599, 4/328, Affidavit of Jeremiah Duzingwa, 7 December 1917.
not satisfied with the account given by this man Jeremiah, he appears to me to be a drunken reprobate with a fair show of crafty intelligence and I am inclined to think that he is concealing something that may to some extent support the statement of Zwartbooi.\textsuperscript{124}

The ideas people had of Le Fleur were also much relayed, recycled and reworked in terms of concerns generated by prevailing political, socio-economic, and environmental conditions, as exemplified by the claims of Samuel Vakalisa. Vakalisa claimed in November 1917 that Adam Smith was recruiting “natives” for “Paramount Griqua Chief” Le Fleur. Le Fleur’s agents informed “natives” that the “Europeans of East Griqualand were to go out of this country and that they were to leave behind all their live stock and cattle, sheep and horses … for the benefit of this Paramountchief le Floure” [sic]. East Griqualand would be given back to the Griqua. Le Fleur would then “restore every native’s cattle that died of the E.C.F. [east coast fever]”. If the Europeans did not go out of the country then there would be war against them. A number of “natives” joined Le Fleur and paid one shilling to get their names written on papers, indicating the number of cattle that they lost due to the ‘east coast fever’. Those “natives” who did not have these papers would be driven out of the country after all the Europeans have left.\textsuperscript{125}

Rumours about Le Fleur’s intentions drew partly on Le Fleur’s own ideals about Griqua independence or self-reliance and resettlement. His own ideas were, however, liable to be augmented, embellished and radically transformed to diverge from his ethno-‘racial’ self-reliant resettlement schemes.

Township ideal

Although Le Fleur’s ultimate ideal appears to have been the creation of a ‘Coloured colony’ in which Coloureds could be formed into a nation, he decided, however, to embark on a more modest but unsuccessful farming resettlement and ‘township’ scheme in Touws River in 1910, perhaps as an interim measure. After returning to East Griqualand in 1916 Le Fleur was again driven to attempt to set up a township in the Touws River region. Le Fleur envisaged the establishment of a Griqua township on the settlement projected as having huge productive potential. The trekkers were to be allocated plots after their arrival at the settlement. He envisaged that houses would be built on a co-operative principle, with the trekkers contributing a weekly payment towards the buildings. The Griqua themselves, among whom there were sawyers, blacksmiths and wagon-makers, were to do much of the construction.\textsuperscript{126}

Le Fleur also envisaged the erection of a large school where “Christian and national ideals” would be inculcated in children. A general tax on the holders of property would be raised to provide for the erection of the school. Le Fleur and his associates agreed to leave the “church question” in abeyance “to avoid strife among us”. Le Fleur reasoned that “[r]eligion in South Africa is very much akin to liquor in always creating divisions, whereas it ought to work for unity and concord”. A church plot would be set aside and held until we have an understanding as to what form of religion will suit us, and contribute to that unity which is strength. As we stand now we are divided into fifty sects, and if we start putting up a church before we got away from the environment of sect jealousies, we would land our people back into the ditch of discord and strife, on the very ground where they ought to be united to combat the evils of drink and immorality.

It was decided that liquor would not be sold in the township. Those who wanted to drink could obtain liquor outside the envisaged township. It seems that the nearest place where liquor could be obtained was at a hotel 20 miles from the envisaged township. The township would be managed by a village management board in the beginning and later by a municipality “which will enable us to compel all erf holders to build

\textsuperscript{124} NTS 7599, 4/328, SJ Carter, Detective Head Constable, Kokstad, to District Commandant, Kokstad, 13 December 1917.
\textsuperscript{125} NTS 7599, 4/328, Samuel Vakalisa, Mount Ayliff, to Resident Magistrate, 20 November 1917.
\textsuperscript{126} Le Fleur also thought that if lucerne was planted, one acre would yield an income of £60 per annum and an agricultural holding an income of at least £200 to its owner per year. \textit{Kokstad Advertiser}, 7 December 1917.
their habitation in a proper way”. Le Fleur apparently expected or hoped that Coloureds from the Western Cape would join the Griqua in the resettlement scheme in the vicinity of Touwsriver.

**Departure to Touwsriver**

In preparation for the trek Griqua participants, many of whom were from Umzimkulu and Mount Currie, sold much of their property to raise funds for the resettlement scheme, with farm-owners selling their farms and livestock. Much of the sale proceeds were put into a common fund controlled by Le Fleur. Le Fleur acquired the services of Gilbert Dold, a Kokstad based attorney, to carry through land transactions. The bulk of the migrants went by train from Maclear station in mid-October 1917 with the first instalment of migrants, comprising thirteen families, arriving in Touws River on 19 October 1917. Attempts were subsequently made by government officials to prevent other Griqua from travelling to Touws River. The station master at Maclear, A Larkin, was instructed not to issue tickets to Griqua unless they had health permits. Around 700 people eventually migrated to Touws River.

An early group trekkers arriving at Touws River were met by Reverend JW van Stavel of Worcester, apparently on invitation and with his expenses paid for. A service was held involving short prayers, scripture readings and the singing of Dutch hymns. Elaborating on the religiosity of the arrival, the *Worcester Standard* mentioned that “The Chief and his followers were invited to consider well their undertaking at such a remote spot; and then the blessing of heaven was invoked ... as they inspanned - themselves and their few animals”. From 1917 Le Fleur was represented very much in the press as a Griqua chief and his followers as Griqua. The representation of his 1917 adherents in Touws River as Griqua contributed to new followers in subsequent schemes also being referred to as Griqua, by the press, government officials, as well as members of the public, even though many of them did not have prior Griqua associations, thus aiding Le Fleur’s attempt to turn Coloureds into Griqua.

Rumours continued back in East Griqualand that the trek would be followed by a revolt by Griqua and Bantu-speakers. It was rumoured that Le Fleur would explain the plan of attack on his return and that he would supply the insurgents with weapons and lead the attack. It was also rumoured that the “Dutch” (i.e. Afrikaners) with whose assistance they would get back the country speedily would join the insurgents. Adam Smith, with a long history of political agitation for the Griqua, was also suspected to be involved in the supposed plotting against the government.

In light of continuing rumours about the motives behind the migration, and in light of Le Fleur’s aim of drawing more Griqua from East Griqualand into his settlement schemes, he reaffirmed social and moral concerns behind the migration and his desire to restore the Griqua national spirit. In attempting to ease White concerns Le Fleur once again deployed a discourse that appealed to the ‘racial’ and cultural sensibilities and prejudices of many Whites. In his communication to the *Kokstad Advertiser* shortly after the trek, Le Fleur reiterated that they did not go to Touws River for political purposes and reaffirmed the ethno-national and moral motives behind the trek:

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127 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 7 December 1917.
130 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 7 December 1917.
133 SAP 34, Conf 6/496/17. See correspondence of late 1917 and early 1918.
134 As suggested in chapter 3.
135 NTS 7599, 4/328, Resident Magistrate, Matatiele, to CMT, 29 November 1917.
We have come with the object of removing our girls and boys from the environment of other nationalities, who are only working for their downfall. We most strongly object to intermarriages with other races, which in the first place brings discord between us and other nationalities, and make the offspring of these marriages outcasts among those nationalities in whom their parents married. It also builds up a race of criminals, and men and women brought up without control, without God, without self-respect, without hope, without love for nationality, and leaves our future generation to face a most cruel problem. Our daughters are the flower of our race, our virgin pride, and we in moving have decided that steps must be taken, no matter what it costs, to safeguard their future. Our boys need our control and to be taught the honour of their own nationality, the respect of their women and mothers. This cannot be done by mixing with other races, and until we teach them national instinct, national honour, they will never be able to fill their proper place in South Africa. This is the whole mystery of the trek.

The sentiments expressed by Le Fleur were in circulation among Griqua in both in East Griqualand and in Griqualand West and would thus be well received by many Griqua. In 1913 Petrus Pienaar from Griqualand West expressed similar sentiments before the Natives Land Commission in appealing for Griqua farms:

[...]iving in towns, the intermixture of different races does not tend to raise our morals, we are getting demoralised, our children cannot be educated properly, and their characters cannot be formed properly because of this intermixture. And therefore we have looked about where it would be well to have ground for the Griquas [...].

Whilst Whites and government officials in East Griqualand suspected Le Fleur’s motives, White farmers in Touws Rivier and surrounds were delighted with the arrival of the Griqua as they arrived during the season when wheat had to be reaped and when labour thus was required. Griqua labour was also in demand during the fruit season. Agents for municipal and divisional councils in surrounding areas were sent to “negotiate with Chief Le Fleur” for labourers. Griqua girls were taken into the service of Whites in the vicinity of Touws River. While younger men were reaping on White farms, older men prepared the homesteads. Thus, as it was with Le Fleur for some time prior to 1911, he once again operated as a labour provider.

Caring for the flock
To the extent that Le Fleur aspired to have self-reliant farming settlements, he would have disseminated Griqua to Whites as labourers only as a temporary measure until his scheme worked according to plan. In advancing his plan Le Fleur decided that the Driekoppen farm should be used for the establishment of a township. Agricultural plots were allocated at Smousbosch. Le Fleur and his wife appear to have assumed a wide range of social roles and responsibilities at the settlements. According to Le Fleur, they helped with “first-aid and sickness” and “in seeing to the spiritual” and “bodily needs” of the people. They also taught the Griqua “how to use economically their small resources of income”. Le Fleur found it necessary “in instances” that “stern measures ... be taken with the young men to teach them discipline and obedience, which measures had a most marvellous effect on the young people ... and has proved that they can act as an honourable people if only led right”. Le Fleur claimed later (in 1921 whilst on trial for fraud) that the Griqua came to look to him for everything.

136 Kokstad Advertiser, 7 December 1917.
137 NTS 2945, 40/305, Part 1, Natives Land Commission, 3 December 1913.
138 Kokstad Advertiser, 7 December 1917.
139 Kokstad Advertiser, 12 July 1918.
140 Kokstad Advertiser, 5 September 1919.
141 Kokstad Advertiser, 7 December 1917.
142 Cape Times, 26 November 1920.
143 Kokstad Advertiser, 7 December 1917.
I was not only their slave but their doctor, veterinary surgeon, cashier, and all sorts of things. In fact they worried me from morning till night.  

**Mining**

Manifesting an inclination to embellish reality in ways that served to sustain and expand his flock despite difficulty, Le Fleur claimed that Smousbosch contained enough minerals to make the Griqua wealthy. Communicating with Gilbert Dold after the trek, he indicated that “that they had discovered gold in payable quantity, cola in abundance, tin ore of the richest quality, mercury, etc., and that the rocks were loaded with diamonds, petroleum oil and also petrol of the highest grade”. Le Fleur suggested that another Transvaal “has been discovered by us. It seems to us almost like a dream, and you can imagine with what joy we behold the prospect before us”.  

According to his brother Thomas, Le Fleur attempted to raise funds in Cape Town for the mining of minerals that were supposed to be on Smousbosch. A meeting attended mainly by Coloureds and a few Whites was held in Claremont, Cape Town, in 1918 in regard to the creation of a company to mine the minerals – after Le Fleur and an associate had brought samples of what they claimed was gypsum, coal and other valuable minerals from the farms. A delegation subsequently investigated the farms. It was apparently confirmed that there were minerals on the farms. It was proposed at another meeting in Claremont that a company with a capital of £10,000 with shares for £1 be floated. 650 shares were applied for at the meeting. Le Fleur was, however, not in favour of the proposition, fearing that the Griqua could lose their property if the syndicate became insolvent. He did not attend subsequent meetings and the plan to set up a mining company could thus not be carried through.

**Settlement difficulties**

Agricultural production on the farms did not accord with the vision Le Fleur painted to his followers before the trek. Both Driekoppen and Smousbosch proved too dry for the settlement of a large number of people. The trekkers apparently went to Driekoppen with around 100 horses but lost most or all of them. Some Griqua obtained work in Lainsburg. Others went to look for work in places like Ceres and Calvinia. Le Fleur sent a number of Griqua to Cape Town in 1918 and apparently told them that it was not safe for them to stay in Touws River without explaining why it was unsafe to remain. A few of the Griqua that Le Fleur sent to Cape Town returned to East Griqualand.

At the same time as Le Fleur attempted to develop the resettlement scheme in the vicinity of Touws River, he also attempted to purchase land on the Cape Flats. In June 1918 Le Fleur purchased a piece of land in Welcome Estate near Cape Town for £4,500 on bond, apparently to provide refuge for the Griqua that he sent to Cape Town from Touws River. Le Fleur could, however, not pay the monthly instalments on the farm and the sale was eventually cancelled.  

Le Fleur also encountered serious financial problems in regard to Smousbosch and Driekoppen. Corresponding with Gilbert Dold in March 1919, Le Fleur mentioned that he had not then started with the settlement as he intended because of the danger posed by the “Boer nationalist”, who might force the Griqua to join them when they attacked the government. He claimed that that was the “sole reason for why” he “moved the majority of the Griquas to Cape Town”. In the midst of the crisis that the Griqua

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144 Cape Times, 28 September 1921.
145 Kokstad Advertiser, 5 September 1919.
146 Le Fleur’s communication to Dold is cited Cape Times, 20 November 1920.
148 CMT 3/874/644, Secretary, Native Affairs, to CMT, 24 December 1919.
150 Cape Times, 22 September 1921.
151 Letter to Gilbert Dold written on 19 March 1919 reproduced in parts in Cape Times, 23 November 1920.
encountered, Le Fleur found their victory over liquor and the growth of self-esteem as causes for some satisfaction. He informed Dold that

the Griquas are a people who if away from the dark life of East Griqualand, are most worthy of respect, and I can assure you they have proved, amidst the many trials and temptations, first they can bear a trial without a murmur, and they can fight against the drink evil [sic] better than any European people, and I feel proud to say they have come through the first trial and temptation triumphant, and up to now no Griqua has been convicted for drunkenness. They have set an example to the farmer by refusing to be served with drink ... . [T]heir migration ... has made them a people from the very lowest degradation as these fellows are to-day in East Griqualand, to the best respected coloured people at the Cape, and every European feels that when speaking to a Griqua he is speaking to a man.  

Le Fleur could not maintain the mortgage payments for Smousbosch and Driekoppen. The remaining Griqua were compelled to leave the farms after the Supreme Court issued a sequestration order on Le Fleur’s estate in 1919. Driekoppen was seized by the high-sheriff and resold to a White farmer for an amount much below the original prize. Smousbosch was retaken by the original owner.  

As most of those who migrated to Touws River in 1917 were poor, with only a few having been fairly well off in East Griqualand, the Griqua would not only have been left stranded after the collapse of the resettlement scheme but be even further impoverished. Many of those who were among the last to leave moved to the Cape peninsula to places like Plumstead, Wynberg, Eureka and Kensington. Le Fleur himself went to Wynberg.  

**Commission of inquiry into migration**  
The failure of the resettlement venture in the vicinity of Touws River provided an opportunity for government officials to act against Le Fleur and to curb his activities. After the collapse of the venture Walter Stanford from the Native Affairs Department suggested that an enquiry be held into Le Fleur’s activities to ascertain whether there was sufficient evidence for charges of fraud and embezzlement against him. F Guthrie, the resident magistrate of Kokstad, was subsequently appointed by the minister of Native Affairs to conduct an inquiry at Kokstad. In line with Stanford’s wishes, the enquiry would look specifically at, a) the nature of the promises made by Le Fleur to the Griqua when they were induced by him to sell their property in East Griqualand and to migrate to Touws River; b) the sum of the money obtained from them by Le Fleur; c) whether the sums or any portion of them have since been recovered by the Griqua concerned; and d) whether the circumstances justified the institution of criminal proceedings against Le Fleur on charges of fraud and embezzlement.  

Guthrie started his investigation in East Griqualand in 1919. Having conducted his investigation in East Griqualand, Guthrie felt that he had obtained evidence locally that supported the suspicion that Le Fleur obtained and retained fraudulently money from certain Griqua. Guthrie was permitted to proceed with his investigation in the Western Cape where he questioned Griqua in places like Worcester, Wynberg and Cape

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152 Cape Times, 23 November 1920.
154 Cape Times, 23 November 1920, 17 September 1921.
155 Cape Times 25 November 1920.
156 CMT 3/874/644, Secretary, Native Affairs, Pretoria, to CMT, 24 December 1919; A Celliers, CID, Cape Town, to Inspector, CID, Cape Town, 27 September 1920; Kokstad Advertiser, 5 September 1919.
158 CMT 3/874/644, Secretary, Native Affairs, E Barret, to F Guthrie, Resident Magistrate, Kokstad, 12 February 1920.
159 CMT 3/874/644, Resident Magistrate, Kokstad, to CMT, 14 April 1920.
Town. According to Guthrie a “number [of Griqua] were unable or unwilling to furnish information that would have assisted the inquiry” because of the influence that Le Fleur wielded.

Le Fleur is a man with a considerable amount of ability and exercises a great deal of influence over the Griquas, and some of those who had suffered through him gave the information obtained in a very unwilling manner.  

With assistance from magistrates and police from Wynberg and Worcester, Guthrie managed to examine twenty-seven Griqua from whom he took statements. Some of the sworn statements implicated Le Fleur in fraud. Griqua interviewed generally maintained that Le Fleur told them that he obtained land in Touws River for the Griqua. Most alleged that he said that he would give them land if they gave him money, which they should raise by selling their property in East Griqualand. A few alleged that Le Fleur said that he would merely give them land if they accompanied him to Touws River. Many alleged that they handed over or authorized the handing over of the money obtained from the sale of their land to Le Fleur on condition that he used some of it to purchase land at Touws River, and that he placed the balance in their credit in the Standard Bank at Worcester.

Some witnesses alleged that their farms were sold without their knowledge or consent. Some who could not read or write alleged that they signed documents that were Powers of Attorney authorizing the sale of their land without realizing it. A few apparently thought their land in East Griqualand would be leased and not sold and that Le Fleur would get the rent and hand it over to them. Witnesses generally claimed that they never received any of the money for the purchased land. A number said that they repeatedly asked Le Fleur for their money but he repeatedly replied that the money had not yet arrived.

Whilst the commission of inquiry into the 1917 migration was still at work Le Fleur continued in his organizational work, founding a newspaper called the Griqua and Coloured People’s Opinion early in 1920, the Griqua Independent Church of South Africa and what became known as the Griqua National Conference in April 1920. Le Fleur’s movement was, however, curbed for a short while in consequence of the findings of the inquiry into the Touws River migration. Government officials felt that there was ground for a case of fraud against him. The extent of fraud was estimated to be around £3000. Le Fleur was arrested in October 1920 in Cape Town. On his arrest a large amount of documents related to the trek were taken from his office. He was charged with fraud on 9 October and remanded without bail.

Le Fleur’s lengthy fraud case at the First Criminal Court at Caledon Square in Cape Town had the potential to damage his reputation amongst the underclasses, especially if found guilty. The case also had the potential to enhance his image as a pre-eminent Griqua leader, despite his attempt to conveniently underplay his leading role in the 1917 trek – in order to deflect responsibility from himself. Le Fleur was depicted as Griqua leader and as the leading figure behind the trek. Depictions during the case were relayed and spread through the press. Representations of Le Fleur as a Griqua leader or chief and his followers of 1917 as part of a “Griqua tribe”, during and after his fraud case, further predisposed the categorization of those who participated in his later schemes as Griqua.

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160 CMT 3/874/644, F Guthrie to Secretary, Native Affairs, 16 July 1920.
161 For Griqua affidavits, see attachments to CMT 3/874/644, Guthrie to Secretary, Native Affairs, 16 July 1920. For allegations made during Le Fleur fraud case in court see e.g. Cape Times, 25, 26 November 1920; 20, 22 & 23 September 1921.
162 See chapter 6 in regard to Le Fleur’s periodical, church and the Griqua National Conference.
163 Cape Times, 11 October 1920.
164 Fairly detailed accounts of the proceedings of Le Fleur’s case are given in the Kokstad Advertiser and Cape Times (October 1920-January 1921, July 1921-October 1921). Accounts in the Kokstad Advertiser are mainly reproductions from the Cape Times. Extracts of the case from the Cape Times are found in NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 2.
Over sixty witnesses, including a few Whites, Griqua witnesses and Le Fleur’s elder brother Thomas, appeared during the preparatory examination. Le Fleur was eventually granted bail of £500 on 28 January 1921. The preliminary examination was concluded on 2 August 1921. Le Fleur was then committed (arraigned) on 66 counts of theft, forgery and “uttering.” His indictment was reduced to 52 counts when his trial commenced on 16 September 1921. Not having a legal defence, Le Fleur conducted his own defence and cross-examined witnesses. Witnesses brought forward by Le Fleur, who included his close associate Jacobus Olivier, his brother Thomas, and his son Abraham, generally provided support for the view that the arrangement in the 1917 trek scheme was that all involved were to throw their assets into a common pool for the benefit of everyone. Le Fleur even claimed that his Griqua accusers actually owed him money. 

The conclusion of the trial between 26 and 29 September brought forward issues around the honesty, sanity and rationality of Le Fleur that would concern government officials much in light of Le Fleur’s subsequent resettlement schemes. E Douglas, the attorney general, indicated to the jury on 26 September that the main point for them to decide was whether this trek of 1917 was honestly intended for the benefit of the Griquas or whether it was an ingenious scheme on the part of the accused to relieve them of their money under the pretence of being their friend. They had to consider from what they had seen and heard whether accused was really a man whose only object was to do good to his tribe, and in so doing got himself into a muddle from which he could not extricate himself, or whether he, knowing their simple nature, had used his influence with them to enable him to defraud them of their money and belongings.

The attorney general argued, however, that it was evident from the statements of the “the three old Marais” who accused Le Fleur, that they understood that their properties were to be let and not sold as Le Fleur tried to prove, and that the jury should, if they found that the accused had no right to sell the Marais’ farms, find him guilty of theft of the money accruing to them.

The attorney general also asked the jury to decide whether the accused played so much on the feelings of the trekkers – using his undoubted influence among them – as to get them in an excitable state, and by such means induced them to agree to projects and to sign documents which they now repudiated.

Le Fleur, on his turn, also attempted (on the same day) to impress upon the jury that he was not the main figure behind the trek to the Touws River region and that the Griqua who accused him of fraud were well aware of the nature of the trek when they embarked on it. Although he acknowledged that he had a degree of authority amongst the Griqua, Le Fleur maintained that the leadership was not of his own seeking but was thrust upon him. Apparently having particularly those Griqua in mind who turned against him, Le Fleur

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166 *Kokstad Advertiser*, 26 November 1920, 17 December 1920; 29 July 1921, 23 September 1921.
167 *Cape Times*, 29 January 1921.
168 *Cape Times*, 3 August 1921.
169 *Cape Times*, 17 September 1921.
170 *Cape Times*, 17 & 20 September 1921.
171 *Cape Times*, 23 September 1921.
172 *Cape Times*, 24 September 1921.
173 *Cape Times*, 27 September 1921.
174 *Cape Times*, 24 September 1921.
175 *Kostad Advertiser*, 17 & 23 September 1921.
also drew on Griqua stereotypes of laziness in his attempt to deflect blame for the failed resettlement venture, portraying himself as a victim of unreasonable Griqua expectations, as reported in the Cape Times:

Imbued with a desire to help his people, with whom he admitted he had some authority, he did his best under the most difficult conditions. Instead of helping him, they hampered him. They deserted him at Touws River, but took care to leave their dependents on his hands to care for. And now, disappointed with their expectations of wealth, which possible consummation was frustrated by their own lethargy and incorrigible laziness, they wanted to repudiate their word and make a scapegoat of him. As far as he was concerned he had gained nothing except obloquy and sorrow from his disinterested efforts to help these ingratiates. His dealing with them had been open and above board, and he had not benefited to the extent of a penny, in fact, was a very heavy loser over the affair.176

On 29 September the judge informed the jury that the delay by Le Fleur’s Griqua accusers in bringing their cases forward, only taking action after Guthrie’s inquiry, “lent some colour to accused’s contention that they agreed to the sale of their farms”.177 He further indicated to the jury that

[the] question to be decided was … whether the accused swindled the Marais and Pienaars. Did he deceive these people. He undoubtedly, on their own admission, spent some of the money which, he said, belonged to the trek, on them. He did not put the money in his own pocket. But they had to decide whether he was a muddler or a blunderer who had too much on his shoulders through having a swollen head. Accused had shown himself to be an ambitious man. He said he was a patriot, but the question was: Was he a limelight type of patriot who worked only for his own aggrandisement?

The jury found Le Fleur not guilty on all charges against him by a majority of seven to two. The judge cautioned Le Fleur not to undertake such a venture again:

I should only like to say before formally discharging you that you have to some extent brought these difficulties on yourself. I say this because I am satisfied after hearing the evidence in this long trial that although … you had no criminal intention in the matter, you acted in a manner in which you should not have acted. When you took a large thing like this on your shoulders – which must have involved you and other Griquas in thousands of pounds – you should have been more careful how you dealt with those funds, in the manner in which documents were signed, and estates administered. It is true that you did not personally make money out of this. You were a poor man when the trek started. You are a poor man to-day. But let me warn you that you must be more careful in the manner with which you deal with persons who have great confidence in you. Let all this suffering and worry be a lesson to you for the rest of you life.178

The Griqua who participated in the trek maintained keen interest in Le Fleur’s case.179 There was applause from the “crowded gallery of Griquas and Natives” after the judge concluded his remarks that was quickly suppressed by court officials.180

A number of Griqua who participated in the 1917 trek attempted to return to East Griqualand and sought government assistance. They felt that they would be in a better position in Kokstad where they had their friends. The secretary of Native Affairs, E Barret, was sympathetic to their plight181 but the resident magistrate of Kokstad thought that it would not be good for them to be returned to East Griqualand. He reasoned that it was unlikely that they would find work and felt that they would be a burden on already impoverished Griqua in East Griqualand. The Griqua in East Griqualand, the mayor of Kokstad and

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176 Cape Times, 29 September 1921.
177 Kokstad Advertiser, 7 October 1921.
178 Cape Times, 30 September 1921.
179 Cape Times, 6 January 1921.
180 Kokstad Advertiser, 7 October 1921.
181 CMT 3/874/644, E Barret, Secretary, Native Affairs, to CMT, 24 December 1921.
Reverend Archibald who was in charge of the Griqua Church, were, according to the Kokstad resident magistrate, all averse to the trekkers’ return.\footnote{CMT 3/874/644, Resident Magistrate, Kokstad, to CMT, 7 January 1922.} The chief magistrate of the Transkeian Territories, WT Welsh, shared Guthrie’s sentiments:

> While one is disposed to feel considerable pity for these people, it must not be overlooked that they left their homes with their eyes open and against the clearly expressed advice of many well wishers. They have only themselves to blame for the position in which they now find themselves. I entirely agree with Guthrie’s views that it would be unwise for the Government to repatriate them en masse. ... I cannot recommend the extension of aid as to do so would not be in their interest nor in that of the Griquas who remained at home.\footnote{CMT 3/874/644, WT Welsh to E Barret, Secretary, Native Affairs, Pretoria, 11 January 1922.}

Despite the failure of the 1917 resettlement venture, Le Fleur continued to be perceived by many rural Coloureds as someone who could contribute to the improvement of their social and economic conditions. Whilst the commission of inquiry into the Touws River trek was at work in 1919 Le Fleur continued to propagate his ideals through his agents and to extend his influence, especially in rural areas, notably amongst people in the Namaqualand reserves.\footnote{CMT 3/874/644, WT Welsh to E Barret, Secretary, Native Affairs, Pretoria, 11 January 1922.} Whilst Le Fleur’s fraud case was going on in 1921, his agents continued to propagate his religious and resettlement ideas, as shown in the next chapter. Le Fleur was not only able to inspire people to participate in his ambitious ventures but was apparently also much inspired by his own magnificent visions.

**Summation**

The chapter showed that Le Fleur negotiated between different identity categories that he could use in the promotion of his ethno-national socio-economic upliftment ventures. His upliftment ventures amongst Coloureds manifested the articulation of Griqua ideals of independence and landownership with nationalist, self-reliance and segregationists discourses of the early twentieth century. Le Fleur’s identity options were influenced by his locational shifts between Griqua and Coloured environments. His activities amongst Coloureds in Cape Town after his release from Breakwater prison in 1903 provided impetus to his deployment of a category that transcended Griiquaness. His return to East Griqualand in 1916 and the subsequent 1917 trek to the Touws River region allowed him to put greater emphasis on the Griqua category in his organizational work. His deployment of a Griqua category had much to do with the fact that those who went with him to the Touws River region in 1917 were Griqua. The Khoekhoe associations of the Griqua category, however, also made it useful for his attempt to promote Khoekhoe derived chiefly leadership amongst Coloureds – with himself as a pre-eminent chief within a Coloured (or Griqua-Coloured) “colony”, or within more modest farming resettlement schemes. Government officials and the press also referred to Le Fleur’s adherents as Griqua and to himself as a Griqua leader, thus reinforcing the association of Le Fleur’s adherents with the Griqua category. The chapter also showed that although Le Fleur broke decisively with conventional protest politics and trans-ethnic alliances after 1897, his past reputation and ongoing rumours of his seditious activities undermined his attempt to project himself as a law-abiding leader. Despite his repeated pronouncements against ethno-‘racial’ mixing, and his expressions of Griqua-Coloured exclusiveness, he could nevertheless encourage certain individuals of Bantu-speaking origin to participate in his land schemes who could thus assume the identity associated with others in those schemes.

\footnote{LC, Item 9.4, EMS Le Fleur: “Griekwa Volksgeskiedenis”; NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 2, A Carinus, Superintendent of the Leliefontein and Komaggas Reserves, to Magistrate, Springbok, 14 April 1919. LC, Correspondence file, AAS le Fleur to JC Merriman, 11 November 1919.}
Chapter 5: Griqua-Coloured resettlement (1920-1941)

This chapter shows the significance of Andrew Abraham Stockenström le Fleur’s resettlement schemes in his attempt between 1920 and 1941 to unify and reform Coloureds as Griqua into ordered, law abiding, self-reliant ethno-national Christian subjects. His resettlement schemes manifested the reworking of the Griqua ideal of independence and landownership in the context of White domination and segregation and demonstrated the practical dimension of Le Fleur’s ethno-national Christianity. The promotion of his resettlement schemes also activated ideas of landownership and independence before dispossession by Whites which in turn opened Coloured segments, especially amongst the rural labouring class, to socio-economic alternatives to the prevailing order. Striving to promote ordered and loyal Griqua subjects, Le Fleur attempted to channel the aspirations of his adherents along constitutional lines, thus suppressing rebelliousness that readily emerged amongst ethno-‘racial’ underclasses during the 1920s. Some of Le Fleur’s adherents were, however, fairly open to the use of unconstitutional means, thus replicating at a collective level the pre-1898 ambivalence of Le Fleur between constitutional and unconstitutional means. Le Fleur’s vision and messages were refracted through the aspirations and concerns of different people, thus generating divergent accounts of his activities and ongoing rumours of his seditious intentions. Attempting to re-channel resentment against White oppression into his self-reliant and resettlement schemes, Le Fleur managed, in the main, to keep his adherents within the limits of constitutionality. His attempt to build a reputation of his Griqua adherents as law abiding, self-disciplined and hardworking Christians consequently gained a measure of success, thus contributing significantly to Griqua compliance under successive governments.

In 1920 Andrew le Fleur started a newspaper, the Griqua and Coloured People’s Opinion (GCPO). He also established the Griqua Independent Church of South Africa (GIC) in 1920 at a national conference that was institutionalized as the Griqua National Conference (GNC). He used the GCPO, GIC and GNC to promote a practically orientated Griqua-Coloured ethno-national Christianity. His ethno-national Christianity encouraged self-control, self-belief, self-confidence, self-reliance and self-upliftment.

GIC ministers played an impotant role in the promotion of Le Fleur’s schemes. GIC ministers travelled throughout the country, holding meetings where religious services were combined with the promotion of Le Fleur’s resettlement schemes. The religious dimension of the meetings held by GIC ministers facilitated their activities. GIC ministers found it relatively easier to travel than ordinary Griqua people and were thus useful for the propagation of Le Fleur’s resettlements schemes. Shares for the resettlement schemes were collected at meetings and members procured for the GIC and GNC. GIC and GNC branches were also formed throughout the country. However, despite their best intentions, the suspicion on Le Fleur stemming from his involvement in the aborted December 1897 rebellion in East Griqualand was also extended to his agents.

Le Fleur’s resettlement schemes manifested the combination of religious and secular goals. They were ment to contribute to Griqua-Coloured spiritual, moral, national and economic restoration. The settlements were thus key terrains in which Le Fleur attempted the realization of his ideal of Coloured people being transformed into a proud and self-reliant and united Christian Griqua nation. Le Fleur envisioned Griqua settlements characterized by order and an absence of evils in society. There would, in his view, be no drunkenness on the settlements. There would also be an absence of “pride and difference in opinion” that Le Fleur considered to be “the weakest points in our [Coloured] Race”. On them a “Griqua spirit” would be cultivated that would counter threatening social forces:

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1 Chapter 6 provides more detail on the GCPO, GIC, and Le Fleur’s ethno-national Christianity.
2 GCPO, 27 August 1926.
Agents, many of whom were GIC ministers, were sent out to encourage Coloureds to join the Griqua and to contribute to funds for the purchase of resettlement land. The acquired land would be divided in plots. A number of Coloureds handed over money to Le Fleur’s agents. Le Fleur’s agents were much active in the southern and north-western regions of the Cape in 1921, organizing meetings where Le Fleur’s ideas were promoted. The effects of the meetings were generally the same. Le Fleur’s message was refracted through the hopes, concerns or fears of different people. Though Le Fleur sought to keep the conduct of his adherents within constitutional parameters, his reputation as a rebel leader made his pronouncements against dependence on Whites liable to be interpreted as a call for revolt against White oppression. His promotion of Griqua-Coloured resettlement schemes did not only reactivate memories of land possession before White dispossession but was also liable to be interpreted as a call for the removal of Whites from South Africa. Some people decided to participate in his land schemes whilst others declined. Many people suspected that Le Fleur’s schemes were fraudulent. Coloureds who joined Le Fleur’s GIC and resettlement schemes assumed a Griqua identity. Those involved in resettlement schemes were often referred to as Griqua by government officials, the press as well as members of the public, thus encouraging and reinforcing their self-identification as Griqua. Participants in Le Fleur’s resettlement schemes were also often referred to as Coloureds by government official and Whites and at times also as ‘Hottentots’, reflecting thus the association of the Griqua, ‘Hottentot’, and Coloured categories.

Rural poverty
Those who proved most receptive to Le Fleur’s ideas were from the rural areas of the Cape characterized by a primarily agricultural based economy. Given that it was especially in rural areas where Coloureds with a Khoe-San heritage were located, Le Fleur would thus have rekindled identification and pride in their ancestral heritage. Prior awareness of a Khoekhoe heritage also sensitized some people to Le Fleur’s ethno-national upliftment ventures. Receptivity to Le Fleur’s ideas promising an alternative self-reliant livelihood on agricultural settlement schemes was also promoted by ‘racial’ discrimination, exploitation and poverty during the 1920s and 1930s, exacerbated by the 1929-1933 depression. Although the growth of agricultural production in the 1920s generated a demand for labour, wages were relatively low, exploitation severe, thus contributing to the huge rural success of the Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union during the 1920s. The 1929–1933 depression led to falling agricultural prices; falling agricultural prices contributed to large scale seasonal unemployment which further increased prior conditions of poverty. Falling agricultural prices also led to the intensification of labour exploitation (to offset falling prices), leading to dissatisfaction and disillusionment with White farmers. The social and economic condition of rural underclasses opened many to ideas promising an alternative order. Le Fleur himself had to compete with rival leaders and organizations with different ideologies and strategies.

Although Le Fleur had resolved to pursue his goals in a constitutional manner, some of his adherents were more open to the use of unconstitutional means, thus replicating at a collective level the pre-1898 ambivalence, or shift of Le Fleur between constitutional and unconstitutional means. It appears that the articulations of Le Fleur’s agents were influenced by the people whom they wanted to mobilize, and that in

3 GCPO, 18 June 1926. Le Fleur elaborated his vision of a settlement near Cookhouse (in the vicinity of Bedford and Somerset East) in this GCPO issue.
4 See e.g. Cape Town Archives, Chief Commissioner, Eastern Cape (CCK) 12, 15/15.
5 On conditions of the underclasses in the context of the agricultural based rural Cape economy during the 1920s and 1930s, see e.g. Willie Hofmeyer: “Agricultural crisis and rural organization in the Cape: 1929-1933” (MA, Economic History, University of Cape Town, 1985), esp. chapters 2, 3, 6.
the process of conveying their Le Fleur-mediated aspirations of Griqua-Coloured self-reliance and unity, they might varyingly have exploited or played on resentment against Whites that could engender further hostility. Le Fleur managed, however, to keep his adherents within the limits of constitutionality, baring a few exceptions.

**Marthinus Phillip Hannie – Great Brak River, 1921**

Meetings organized by Le Fleur’s agents were held in the southern Cape at places like Groot Brak Rivier near Mossel Bay and in Oudtshoorn in 1921, generating much interest amongst the labouring classes. Rumours of sedition that tended to attend Le Fleur again re-emerged. It was rumoured that Griqua leaders made anti-White pronouncements, asserting that dispossessed land would be restored by force and that Coloured exploitation would be ended.

Broader political developments amongst Coloureds impacted on the reception of Le Fleur’s messages, engendering at times confusion of organizations and ideals. For example, at some meetings organized by Le Fleur’s agents, distinction between the ‘Griqua movement’ and the Coloured based African People’s Organization (APO) was often blurred. The blurring of the distinction between the ‘Griqua movement’ and the APO at times also ironically revealed disillusionment with the APO, especially amongst more radically inclined Coloureds.

Some of the relayed messages were consistent with Le Fleur’s ideals. Some were, however, mixed with ideas that were inconsistent with Le Fleur’s written ideas. Abraham Erasmus, a storeman at Great Brak River, attended a meeting of Marthinus Phillip Hannie, a GIC minister, in Great Brak Rivier in May 1921 at which Hannie spoke of various matters affecting Coloureds. According to Erasmus, Hannie said that he came to unite the Coloured people and to assist Dr Abduraman, the leader of the African Peoples Organization. He then explained the difference between the different Coloured races and how they originated and said that the Coloured people in the Colony are not a Nation but that the Griquas are and that he is trying to get all the Coloured people to become one nation namely ‘The Griquas’, and that when all the Coloured people in this Country are one Nation they should all belong to one Church, namely the Griqua Independent Church and pointed out to us that the Coloured people belonged to too many different Churches.  

In line with Le Fleur’s strategy, Hannie also supposedly stated that money should be raised to buy Crown land and other land available for farming purposes, and that schools and churches would be erected. Abraham Erasmus and his son, Johannes, a bootmaker at Great Brak River, were at first in favour of the ‘Griqua movement’ but became disillusioned as they suspected that it was involved in fraud. Johannes felt that it was “being run on a loose footing, [with] money being collected amongst the Coloured people … not [being] accounted for”. It appeared to him that Hannie was “pocketing the money”.

George Koert, a factory foreman at Great Brak River, claimed to have attended a meeting of Hannie at Voorbrug near Great Brak River in July: Hannie stated there that Coloured people should not have a “white man” as a church minister as they only poisoned the minds of Coloured people and that the few Coloured teachers and ministers were looked upon by Griqua as dogs, as White people only used them to make money for them. Hannie read several letters from colonial and imperial dignitaries, for example, the governor-general and the king and the queen of England, thanking the Griqua for what they have done during the ‘First World War’. He stated that the English king ignored Coloured people and only considered the Griqua.

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6 National Archives, Pretoria, Secretary of Justice (JUS) 528, 6515/29, Statement by Abraham Erasmus, Great Brak River, 28 September 1921.
7 JUS 528, 6515/29, Statement by Johannes Erasmus, Great Brak River, 26 September 1921.
8 JUS 528, 6515/29, Statement by George Koert, Great Brak River, 23 September 1921.
Hannie was able to win many supporters at Great Brak River, especially among the Coloured labouring class, including a number with rebellious inclinations. A police sergeant “found that the majority of Coloured people there especially the better class are against Hannie”. Many who belonged to the Dutch Reformed Church strongly resented the loss of church membership that was caused at Great Brak River in consequence of work by the adherents of the ‘Griqua movement’, as Abraham Erasmus indicated:

[A]bout one half of the Coloured people here are followers of Hannie, the other half is deadly against him on account of him trying to break up their Churches by asking the members to leave their respective churches. Only the lower class of Coloured people at Great Brak River and Voorbrug are followers of Hannie.

Hannie appears to have communicated Le Fleur’s ideal of Griqua-Coloured national unity and self-reliance much in line with Le Fleur’s written ideas. He also preached against the use of violence. A number of the new adherents of the ‘Griqua movement’ at Great Brak River supported the ideal of economic self-reliance but also thought that achieving economic self-reliance and the restoration of dispossessed land required the use of force.

**Jakobus Frans and Kieviet Seconds**

Jakobus ‘Koos’ Frans and Kieviet Seconds imbued the ‘Griqua Movement’ at Great Brak River with radicalism that Le Fleur attempted to curb amongst his adherents. Their own augmented ideas about Le Fleur were probably further augmented through relays that ultimately reached colonial officials. A police lieutenant from Mossel Bay feared that the “temperament and excitability of the coloured races as may naturally be exhibited in the speeches of” Jakobus Frans, “the recognized leader” of the ‘Griqua Movement’ at Great Brak River “may cause unrest”. Frans was educated but his compatriot, Seconds, had “little education” and was, according the aforementioned lieutenant, “absolutely irresponsible”, reflecting thus some inclination by government officials to regard those with views deviating radically from pro-establishment thinking as mentally suspect.

Frans and Seconds organized many meetings in the region after the visit of Hannie. Frans and Seconds appear to have had rebellious inclinations that induced them to misconceive or reformulate Le Fleur’s ideas mediated through Hannie. For example, Kieviet Seconds is reported (by Izak Fortuin) to have stated at a meeting at Voorbrug around August 1921 that they were going to get all Coloured people together and make a Griqua nation of them; that Coloured people should all come to their meetings and pay six pence, as they required the money to fight the “white people” as they were going to clear them out of the country. Seconds supposedly stated that that they had a large amount of ammunition and rifles in Cape Town and that he just had to request his connections in Cape Town and the weapons would be forwarded to him. “He told us that we are working for the white people as slaves and we remain poor and they get rich and this is going to be stopped and we must take our country from them”. Fortuin reported the meeting to his White master, thus serving to fuel White concerns about the ‘Griqua movement’.

Suggesting how easy it was to become ‘Griqua’, and some willingness to draw individuals of Bantu-speaking origin into the ‘Griqua movement’, Dirk August, a labourer at Great Brak River, claimed that Kieviet Seconds asked him in August 1921 to what nation he belonged. After August told him he was a “Basuto”, Seconds told him to call himself a Griqua and to join them. Seconds and two of his associates, Koos Frans and Verwag Wesso, supposedly further said that

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9 JUS 528, 6515/29, Report of Sergeant GD Griessell on “Native Unrest Great Brak River” to District Commandant, SAP, Oudtshoorn, n.d.

10 JUS 528, 6515/29, Statement by Abraham Erasmus, Great Brak River, 28 September 1921.

11 See JUS 528, 6515/29, SAP, Mossel Bay, to District Commandant, SAP, Oudtshoorn, 30 September 1921.

12 JUS 528, 6515/29, SAP, Mossel Bay, to SAP, District Commandant, SAP, Oudtshoorn, 5 October, 1921.

13 JUS 528, 6515/29, Statement by Izak Fortuin, 23 September 1921.
they are forming a new nation called the Griqua Nation, and that as soon as they get all the Coloured people
together they are going to kill all the white people and take the country from them, as it belongs to the Coloured
people. They then told me that they have been working to get the country back for some years and that we
Coloured people would have had the country already, if it was not that Abdurahman, as he is Malay [sic], and
they have made a mistake by appointing him Chairman of the movement, but they are sure to succeed now.
Seconds explained to me that they are just waiting until Hannie has travelled through the country to get the
Coloured people together, then they are going to kill all the white people. I then told Seconds that I am satisfied
with my master and the white people and that I am not going to join his movement. He then told me that they
are going to kill all the Coloured people who do not join them. I went home and reported the matter to my
master. Since Hannie and Seconds are holding meetings I hear the Coloured people talking daily about killing
the white people and taking the country.¹⁴

From the account of Dirk August it does appear that it was relatively easy to become Griqua. Those from
among the underclasses who identified with the ‘Griqua movement’ could become Griqua, especially if they
were Coloured but with some space also being made for Bantu-speakers, at least at Great Brak River. Self-
identification might vacillate; it could be temporary. Le Fleur sought to draw supporters into structures
sustaining their identity as Griqua. His Griqua resettlement schemes, GIC and GNC served that purpose.

The idea of restoration of land, even if through force, and the ending of subordination or even the reversal of
master-servant relations, appealed to a number of poor people. The promotion of the Griqua category and
resettlement schemes also appears to have rekindled association amongst Coloureds with the early indigenous
people of the country (i.e. the Khoi-San), reinforcing the idea that the country was originally theirs. Klaas
April, a servant, who was supposedly “of weak intellect” claimed that another employee, Adam Meyer,
mentioned that the “white people” would run (i.e. when a Griqua revolt took place) and those who did not join
the “movement” would also run; and that he (Meyer) would subsequently become master of the farm where
they worked. He would stay in the house and the “Missus” would be his servant. There was now, in the words
of a police lieutenant, “some talk amongst the inferior type of coloured people that this Country did belong to
them once and was taken away by the White people and that they intend taking it back some day”.¹⁵

The meetings of the ‘Griqua movement’ generated much rumour of sedition being fostered. In June 1921 a
rumour went about that on the 25th of that month “Coloured people” would attack Whites.¹⁶ Whites were
greatly alarmed by meetings that were held and rumours of Coloureds rising and killing them. “The majority
of them heard nothing themselves at these meetings or from individual members of the Griqua movement”. Some
of them were informed by Coloured children and others by their Coloured servants.¹⁷

On the evening of the 25th several White families in the vicinity of Great Brak River got together at different
places and kept watch until the early hours of the morning. The anticipated attack did not take place.
However, rumours of subversive meetings continued.¹⁸ On 27 August 1921 Whites resolved at a meeting in
Voorbrug to request the magistrate of George that the authorities take active measures and that an inquiry be
undertaken into claims of Coloured unrest. They also resolved that the government be requested to provide
them with arms. Rumours of an attack on Whites appear, however, to have begun to die away in August.¹⁹
The activities of the ‘Griqua movement’ subsided in the region of Great Brak River by October 1921.²⁰

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¹⁴ JUS 528, 6515/29, Statement by Dirk August, 23 September, 1921.
¹⁵ JUS 528, 6515/29, Report of Sergeant Detective GD Griessel, to District Commandant, SAP, Oudtshoorn, n.d.
¹⁶ JUS 528, 6515/29, Statement by Phillip Albertus Pio, Voorbrug, 25 September 1921.
¹⁷ JUS 528, 6515/29, Detective GD Griessel, to District Commandant, SAP, Oudtshoorn, n.d.
¹⁸ JUS 528, 6515/29, Statement by Phillip Albertus Pio, Voorbrug, 25 September 1921.
¹⁹ Short report on meeting attached to JUS 528, 6515/29, District Commandant, SAP, Oudtshoorn, to Deputy
Commissioner, SAP, Cape Town, 15 September 1921.
²⁰ JUS 528, 6515/29, SAP, Mossel Bay, to District Commandant, SAP, Oudtshoorn, 5 October 1921.
**HJ Fredericks – Outdshoorn**

Another of the rebelliously inclined adherents of the ‘Griqua movement’ was HJ Fredericks, a minister in Le Fleur’s Griqua Independent Church21 who was also active in the southern Cape in 1921 in the vicinity of Outdshoorn. Fredericks accompanied MP Hannie on a number of occasions. Fredericks claimed to have been the secretary of the “Griqua Independent Church Conference” and to be a presiding elder in the Church.22 A police official opined that Fredericks had “a jumbled idea of Politics and Religion, and [that] his views on either … [were] both misleading and dangerous”.23 Fredericks was reported to have called for the restoration of dispossessed land and for the departure of Whites. He also supposedly promised the establishment of shops financed and managed by Coloureds, and urged Coloureds to: boycott White stores; refuse to reside in places set aside for them; not to work during the hours their White masters expected them to; he also encouraged domestic servants not to sleep on their masters’ premises.

Fredericks held meetings in the vicinity of Outdshoorn at places like De Rust, Dysseldorp and Willowmore and obtained support mainly amongst poor labour-class Coloureds.24 Michael Ackerman, a “Plain Clothes Constable at Outdshoorn”, claimed to have attended a meeting of Fredericks on 23 August 1921: Fredericks addressed the audience with a Bible in his hand. He (supposedly) said that he possessed authority from the Administrator to organize the “coloured race” and “to unite them into a big nation (called the Griqua Independent Nation) who in future will be the only recognised Nation in South Africa”), and that he was “a Moses” who would “lead them through the Dead Sea and have their persecutors (vervolgers) drowned as Moses had Faro [sic] drowned in the Dead Sea”. It was, in Ackerman’s view, “only the criminal section of the Coloured community … who supported him”.25

Like Le Fleur, Fredericks invoked religion to inspire support for his ideas and attempt at bringing about socio-economic change. Fredericks was, however, more willing to challenge the prevailing social order through radical means. Hermanus Julies claimed to have attended a meeting in Dysseldorp on 11 September 1921 held by Fredericks that “was supposed to be religious”:

> He preached from the book “Daniel” a certain verse he quoted and explained to us that this was a promise made by God – that after a thousand years the world will change. This period of 1,000 years as he explained expired on Saturday last. In his sermon he said “Zeg julie vir al die Joode en andere wit mense hulle moet terug gaan naar hulle land – dit is ons land hier die, zeg vir hulle ik Fredericks zeg zoo.” Then he said “Koop julle hout en water?” Answered “No” Nauw maar op Outdshoorn koop julle hout en water – Answer “Yes” – Nauw maar waarom zo. God het mos vir julie die hout en water gegee, hoekom koop julle dan julle eigen goed.” He further said “Als julie met een vraag haaver gestuur word en julle kom [...] nacht terug, rust julie morgen, nee, maar morgen moet julie weer waterlui.” Further he said “Als julie my weer hier wil hebben, laat my net weet dan kan julie ook al die wit mense uitnoodig na die vergadering en ik sal dan hulle ook die waarheid vertel. Als een van julie in die moeilikheid is, laat my ook net weet.” Many other things were said but I cannot remember. After this sermon he said we will all pray. Women started praying and crying. I got frightened as I have never seen such a movement before. Many other coloured men left before the close of the meeting.26

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21 JUS 528, 6515/29, District Commandant, SAP, Oudtshoorn, to Deputy Commissioner, SAP Cape Town, 23 September 1921 (also in NTS, 7600 4/328, Part 2).
22 JUS 528, 6515/29, WJ Adkins, SAP, Mossel Bay, to District Commandant, SAP, Oudtshoorn, 30 July 1921.
23 JUS 528, 6515/29, District Commandant, SAP, Oudtshoorn, to Deputy Commissioner, Cape Town, 15 September 1921.
24 JUS 528, 6515/29, Statement by Hermanus Julies, n.d.; SAP, Oudtshoorn, to Deputy Commissioner, SAP, Cape Town, 23 August 1921; District Commander, SAP, Oudtshoorn, to Deputy Commissioner, SAP, Cape Town, 15 September 1921.
25 JUS 528, 6515/29, Statement by MC Ackerman, Oudtshoorn, 26 August 1921.
26 JUS 528, 6515/29, Statement by Hermanus Julies, n.d.
Fredericks is reported to have caused “great unrest amongst the lower and poorer class Coloureds” and to “have [had] a following of some 400 of this class” in Oudtshoorn.

Several very intelligent Coloured men … stated that Fredericks is thoroughly believed and has great influence amongst the class he is working amongst. He is consequently a grave source of danger and a Religious Maniac. He is … out for trouble and his followers will do anything he suggests to them. It is purely amongst the ignorant lower class that he exercises his influence.

It appears that Fredericks decided to embark on decisive action on the evening of 22 September 1921. He is reported to have “collected a crowd of his followers” in Oudtshoorn and to have “incited them to accompany him to Schoemanshoek twelve miles from Oudtshoorn”, allegedly “with the intention … to kill” a White farmer that they supposedly had a grudge against. A police patrol of four men was also dispatched to Schoemashoek. Three miles out of Oudtshoorn the patrol met a person named Du Plessis who was driving hurriedly, having earlier encountered Fredericks and his party. Du Plessis indicated that he was on his way to Oudtshoorn with two wagons. A “coloured mob … stopped him” and “practically” took “possession of his wagons, looting a parcel” of food belonging to his drivers. “On remonstrating … Fredericks told him to shut up or they would finish them. The mob then proceeded towards Schoemanshoek and en route augmented their numbers by calling others to join them”. The police patrol managed to catch up with Fredericks and his party of about 20 men and youth “of the Criminal coloured Class”. Fredericks told the sergeant in charge of the patrol that he was going to hold a service at Schoemanshoek. The police patrol proceeded to Schoemanshoek to the White farmer who was supposedly under threat “to warn him of the approaching mob”. They managed to arrive at his house before Fredericks and his party. On Fredericks being asked what the purpose was of his party’s visit after their arrival at the farmer’s house, “Fredericks said that they wanted a J.P. as he was there to free his people from slavery”. After a short discussion the police arrested Fredericks and 11 of his “ principals”. They appeared in the Oudtshoorn Magistrate Court on the 23 September on a charge of public violence and were remanded without bail. “Fredericks appeared in Court with a bible in his hand and assumed an insolent and martyredised attitude”. Frederick’s conduct in 1921 was reminiscent of Le Fleur’s conduct in 1897 that culminated in an aborted rebellion in East Griqualand. The failure of the rebellion made Le Fleur much more guarded in the way he attempted to improve the socio-economic conditions of his adherents.

At the same time as Fredericks was encouraging militancy, MP Hannie was discouraging it, even as he advocated self-reliance and socio-economic independence from Whites. On 26 September 1921 Hannie held a meeting in a house at Tarka Location, Mossel Bay. According to a police officer who heard part of Hannie’s speech, Hannie “advised his followers to stand firm as a race”. He also advised that “those Griquas (meaning thereby the whole coloured race) who are not faithful to their movement should be cast aside by the true Griquas”. He stated that “those who … keep on hanging on the whiteman, are counted by the Griquas as dogs tied with a chain round their necks”. He, however, “warned his followers not to use any threats or violence in any way”.

As at Great Brak River, the presence of Griqua agents in Mossel Bay caused concern amongst adherents of other churches that they were being deprived of their members. Reverend Jones from the All Saints Gospel Mission at Mossel Bay complained to the police that the ‘Griqua Movement’ was the cause of a number of coloured children not attending his Mission School, and that he was surprised to find that approximately fifty per cent attending were children of adherents of the movement. He estimated that half the inhabitants of Tarka location were influenced by the ‘Griqua movement’. He also “stated that the movement was causing friction amongst the coloured population, and that the leaders were preaching “Anti-European” “Anti-White

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27 JUS 528, 6515/29, SAP, Oudtshoorn, to Deputy Commissioner, SAP, Cape Town, 23 September 1921.
28 See chapter 3.
29 JUS 528, 6515/29, SAP, Mossel Bay, to District Commandant, SAP, Oudtshoorn, 28 September 1921.
Clergymen and “Anti-Government”’. He found that his congregation was “diminishing seriously … and felt that coloured people were looking on him with contempt”.  

Despite Hannie’s moderation, his message of self-reliance could be construed as a call for action against White oppressors. Le Fleur attempted to counter the misapprehension about the ‘Griqua movement’. He was among the many people, comprising both Coloureds and Whites, who attended the preparatory court examination of Fredericks and his compatriots concluded in October 1921. The conclusion of Le Fleur’s fraud trial (in relation to the 1917 Griqua trek to the vicinity of Touws River) and his acquittal on 29 September 1921, allowed him to visit the southern Cape and to correct the misapprehension of his ideas. Le Fleur communicated to police officials that Fredericks had “departed from legitimate” work and was a source of danger. He resolved to dismiss Fredericks from the “Griqua Church and movement”. He also cautioned Hannie about his future conduct. Le Fleur held meetings in the Oudtshoorn region, attempting to undo the work of Fredericks. 

**Griqua Land Bank, Factories and Township Limited**

Le Fleur’s grand visions of Griqua-Coloured self-reliance were very inspiring for the downtrodden yearning for an alternative order. Le Fleur’s ideals also readily drew on memories or imaginings of past independence, prosperity and self-sufficiency that inspired some people to support endeavours to create an alternative order. Le Fleur viewed farming settlements as a link to Khoekhoe traditional pastoral practice. His *Griqua and Coloured People’s Opinion* lamented that “Coloured farmer[s] in Bushmanland, Namaqualand, Hantam and Midlands who “used to be trek farmers” rearing “enough sheep and goats to pay their way” were now “crushed” and “not in a position to ever rise again, unless aided”. Le Fleur hoped to be able to “keep these people on the land”.

To promote Griqua and Coloured social and economic upliftment Le Fleur proposed the creation of a Griqua Land Bank, Factories and Township Limited at a conference of the Griqua Independent Church at Maitland in April 1922. In promoting the idea of a Griqua bank the *GCPO* lamented that Coloured people invested their money inadequately and therefore remained poor and dependent on Whites who prospered through the clever use of money. It also lamented that the wealth of Coloureds enriched Whites through their investments in White owned banks:

> [T]here are many well-to-do coloured people and let us ask the question what they do with their wealth, who do they enrich, who has all the benefit of their money which they place for safety in the Commercial Banks of South Africa, where does this money go to, does it come to them? certainly not. … [W]e never think we must use our money to build up our country, no, we must be fed by the Europeans, they must find work for us, and they must think for us … .

The object of the Griqua Land Bank, Factories and Township Limited was “to acquire suitable land to lay out a township”. *Erven* (plots) would be offered “to our people” which would “carry with them a Bank Share in the Griqua National Bank of South Africa”. Such shares would only be “held by men of our own race”. Le Fleur hoped that the township would spawn a brick-making factory and other industries. The envisaged

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30 JUS 528, 6515/29, SAP, Mossel Bay, to District Commandant, SAP, Oudtshoorn, 15 October 1921.
31 JUS 528, 6515/29, District Commandant, SAP, Oudtshoorn, to Deputy Commissioner, SAP, Cape Western Division, 8 October 1921.
32 JUS 528, 6515/29, Commissioner of Police, Pretoria, to Secretary, Justice, Pretoria, 5 November 1921.
33 *Cape Times*, 30 September 1921.
34 JUS 528, 6515/29, District Commandant, SAP, Oudtshoorn, to Deputy Commissioner, SAP, Cape Western Division, 8 October 1921.
35 *Griqua and Coloured Peoples Opinion*, 12 December 1924.
36 *Cape Times*, 24 April 1922.
37 *GCPO*, 13 March 1925.
township was promoted as a means of providing employment, and of getting people out of slums and providing ‘decent’ housing for shack dwellers, and thus as a means for creating ‘respectable’ living.\footnote{GCPO, 12 December 1924.}

In promoting the idea of a Griqua Bank and Factories and Township company, the GCPO also attacked Le Fleur’s rivals. Coloured leaders and organizations like the APO were criticized for neglecting self-reliance and settlement schemes and for allegedly concerning themselves merely with the church, temperance, burial societies and with “preaching politics”:

\begin{quote}
[H]ad they gone in for Banking and learnt the power of money, these Brewery places would have to-day been smaller, and there would have been a body of Industry which would have been, financially in the very front rank by now … .
\end{quote}

Promoting material as well as after world ‘salvation’, the GCPO also criticized church ministers who encouraged their congregations to focus on the after-world but neglected their economic upliftment, supposedly leading their congregations towards drunkenness and gambling:

\begin{quote}
[B]anking their earnings, should have been preached into our people, and industries wherein they had interest, should have been their watchword, instead of preaching only eternity, then gambling, drinking and other evils … . [L]et us study banking, preach it into the ears of everyone, just as eager as ministers preaching the Gospel, preach banking into our race, and they will be saved, let your preaching on Sunday be eternity, and on Monday Banking, Banking and again Banking so that on Friday your preaching may be practiced, and a sober people will be the outcome and your reward.\footnote{GCPO, 20 March 1925.}
\end{quote}

Even though Le Fleur explored the creation of housing schemes and factories in the vicinity of Cape Town, his primary goal appears to have been to draw people into rural farming settlements. Le Fleur was also concerned that inland Coloured poverty would push people into the towns and cities, swell the labour pool there, increase the levels of unemployment and lower Coloured wages,\footnote{GCPO, 20 March 1925.} thus making “the unbearable position of the Coloured people [there] still more unbearable”.\footnote{GCPO, 12 December 1924.} “[D]isaster will come because we will have to move out of the towns and cities as we would not be able to find employment”.\footnote{GCPO, 20 March 1925.} Le Fleur’s future perspective thus inclined him to focus much of his attention on the establishment of rural farming settlements providing self-reliant existence for Griqua-Coloureds. His visions proved especially inspiring to Khoekhoe descendants in Namaqualand where he was able to gain a significant following.

**Namaqualand – 1922**

The activities of Le Fleur and his agents in the north-western parts of the Cape had similar effects to those in the southern Cape. Some of Le Fleur’s agents, particularly Dirk Sehas, promoted the GIC and Le Fleur’s resettlement schemes in the vicinity of Namaqualand in 1921.\footnote{National Archives, Pretoria, Secretary of Native Affairs (NTS) 7600, 4/328, Part 2, Commissioner, SAP, Pretoria to Secretary, Native Affairs, Pretoria, 1 June 1922; Commissioner of Police, Pretoria, to Secretaries of Justice, Defence and Native Affairs, Pretoria, 6 June 1922.} Le Fleur and one of his sons also held meetings during the first half of 1922 in Namaqualand in the vicinity of the Richtersveld, Leliefontein, Okiep, Steinkopf and Pella.\footnote{National Archives, Pretoria, South African Police (SAP) 34, Conf6/496/17, Deputy Commissioner, SAP, Cape Town, to Deputy Commissioner, Pretoria, [stamped] 18 July 1922.}
The activities of Le Fleur and his agents once again generated divergent rumours, with Le Fleur’s vision and messages again being refracted through the aspirations and concerns of different people. Dirk Sehas held a meeting near Martin Island in November 1921. In answering a question put to him as to what Le Fleur was going to do if the “white man” resented (or opposed) ground being taken from him, he supposedly replied that “[t]he day will have arrived when we are out for trouble and then we will take what we want”.\(^{45}\) It was rumoured that the “Government wanted the Namaqualand Reserve land which had only been lend to coloured people and for this reason the people must trek”; that “Le Fleur’s object was to make this a coloured man’s country, where only coloured Magistrates, Missionaries and officials would be allowed to deal with the affairs of the coloured people”, and that “Le Fleur would restore to the coloured people all the land which they had lost in Namaqualand”.\(^{46}\) John Damara is reported to have told people in 1921 that Le Fleur was uniting the “coloured and mixed races”; that he was a powerful leader who was versed in the art of warfare, and that he would make war on Whites if it was necessary to attain his ends.

White farmers in the region dreaded the influence of Le Fleur. They feared hostile acts and perceived a “mood ... among the natives that boded no good. They [the “natives”] were defiant and truculent and were aggressive towards their employers”. The visit of Dirk Sehas to the farm of Man Rossouw in Hardeveld does appear to have made at least one of his workers more assertive and defiant. Rossouw, a White farmer, claimed that Sehas passed his farm around the beginning of May or the end of April 1922 and slept in one of his servants huts one night. A few days later Rossouw scolded one of his shepherds. The “old Hottentot” answered him as follows:

Julli wit mense dink julli kan doen wat julli wil, Ons dag kom aan. Ons het nou die man wat ons gaan vooruit lei, en julli heart kom om onder die voeten getrap te word, jy het nie lang om te wacht om dit te zien.

Le Fleur and his associates received opposition from local government officials and reserve management boards. The Steinkopf Reserve Board prohibited Le Fleur from holding a meeting on the reserve in May 1922.\(^{47}\) Le Fleur nevertheless succeeded to obtain a huge following in Namaqualand, particularly in Leliefontein. He attempted around this period to purchase three farms in the vicinity of Van Rhynsdorp.\(^{48}\)

**Le Fleur and the Bondelswartz revolt**

Opposition by government officials to Le Fleur’s activities in Namaqualand grew, particularly in light of the May-June 1922 revolt of the Bondelswartz Khoekhoe in the southern part the South-West Africa (SWA) Protectorate. As elsewhere where Le Fleur promoted his schemes, local government officials suspected that he had subversive motives, making the people of the reserves insubordinate. They felt that “the natives were discontented through the teachings of Le Fleur” and that matters would probably become worse if the rebels from SWA crossed the Gariep River and got amongst the people in Namaqualand. The senior superintendent of reserves at Okiep suggested to the Okiep magistrate that measures be taken to keep the people pacified and to prevent the growing influence of Le Fleur.

Le Fleur should be watched and, if possible prevented from returning to Namaqualand. It is possible that Le Fleur may be organizing a revolt on the Leliefontein Reserve and a force of twenty five men at Garies would probably have a good effect.\(^{49}\)

\(^{45}\) SAP 34, Conf 6/496/17, Deputy Commissioner, SAP, Cape Town, to Deputy Commissioner, Pretoria, [stamped] 18 July 1922.

\(^{46}\) NTS 7600, 4/328 Part 2 Senior Superintendent of Reserves, Okiep, to Magistrate, Okiep, 6 June 1922.

\(^{47}\) SAP 34, Conf6/496/17, Deputy Commissioner, SAP, Cape Town, to Deputy Commissioner, Pretoria, [stamped] 18 July 1922.

\(^{48}\) NTS 7600, 4/238 Part 2, Commissioner, SAP, Pretoria, to Secretary, Native Affairs, Pretoria, 1 June 1922; Commissioner of Police, Pretoria, to Secretaries of Justice, Defence and Native Affairs, Pretoria, 6 June 1922; (Telegram), Magistrate, Springbok, to (Secretary) Native Affairs, Pretoria, 1 August 1922.

\(^{49}\) NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 2, Senior Superintendent of Reserves, Okiep, to Magistrate, Okiep, 6 June 1922.
Police suspected that “[a]lthough le Fleur invariably cloaks his activities under his functions as Head of the Griqua Church, his real gospel is that the coloured people should throw off the yoke of the white man, and set up institutions, laws etc. of their own”. Given the reputation of Le Fleur and the activities of his agents in Namaqualand, government officials linked him to the Bondelswartz revolt – which started late in May, ending early in June with the surrender of the rebels. Police received reports of statements supposedly made by Le Fleur’s adherents expressing support for the Bondelswartz and urging unity amongst the underclasses, thus inclining them to suspect that Le Fleur provided some encouragement to the Bondelswartz rebellion. Zwart Jasper Cloete, allegedly one of Le Fleur’s agents, supposedly “openly urged [or told] a certain native employed by one Piet Coetzee of Sterkfontein that it was the duty of everyone of them to go into Rebellion and help the Bondelzwarts against the white man”.

Police were aware that Le Fleur never went to the Bondelswartz in SWA before the revolt broke out but suspected that he was in communication with them through correspondence and through his agents. For example, it was reported that a messenger named Hendrick Smit of Kariep had brought a letter from Le Fleur to Jacobus Christian, chief of the Bondelswartz. The “Hottentot Council” supposedly discussed the letter. The community of Bondelzwarts were told by their leader that Le Fleur was coming from across the River to put right everything that was wrong in the law of the land, and was going to have restored to them their country as it had been before the war”. Jacob Balli, a son-in law of Abraham Morris, supposedly stated: “Le Fleur will unite us”, “He is a big Chief in Namaqualand among the people”, “He is going to put everything right as it was before”. Le Fleur was supposedly expected in Christian’s camp but “the revolt came first and he failed to put in an appearance”.

Police had difficulty finding concrete evidence for Le Fleur’s involvement in the Bondelswartz uprising. Reluctance by Le Fleur’s adherents to talk to government officials about his activities reinforced the officials’ suspicion of him. In the words of the deputy commissioner of the SAP in Cape Town:

It was found impossible to get any followers of Le Fleur to discuss any matter with my Intelligence officer … and some of the Steinkopf Mission men reported as being Le Fleur men when questioned to avoid discussion, denied being followers of Le Fleur. This raises a suspicion that if Le Fleur’s Mission was purely religious why did his adherents rather than say so deny all connection with him or his teaching and thus avoided cross examination.

A commission of inquiry into the Bondelswartz rebellion reflected and reinforced official mistrust in Le Fleur. The commission found that any “sinister influences in Namaqualand, on political matters, centre[d] round the name of le Fleur”, and that “Le Fleur’s influence and reputation with the leaders of the Bondelzwarts and the people of the Richtersveld was great”. The commissioners claimed that at least two letters to an agent of Le Fleur from Jacobus Christian were found enumerating the grievances of the Bondelswartz and appealing for assistance. “According to the evidence of certain witnesses, Abraham Morris [the leader of the revolt who was exiled in South Africa from around 1906 until his return to SWA in April 1922] became an adherent to le Fleur’s party”. The commissioners opined that Jacobus Christian was “under the influence of le Fleur”.

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50 SAP 34, Conf6/496/17, Deputy Commissioner, CID, Pretoria, to Deputy Commissioner, SAP, Umtata, 29 July, 1922.
51 UG, 16-23, pp. 23-4.
52 SAP 34, Conf6/496/17, Deputy Commissioner, SAP, Cape Town, to Deputy Commissioner, Pretoria, [stamped] 18 July 1922.
55 UG 16-23, p. 13.
The commissioners did not think that the Bondelswartz rebellion was influenced “by movements on the Union side of the Orange River”. They were, however, certain that there was a growing spirit of unrest among the Hottentots in the Union and that this unrest is associated with the name of le Fleur. The Bondelzwarts knew of this unrest and undoubtedly expected assistance from the Union. This assistance, however, was not given except in the case of a few individuals who acted on their own initiative and responsibility.

The commissioners opined that Le Fleur was a “very disturbing and even disrupting force, and that it would be in the interests of the country if his activities could be stopped or curtailed”. Although Le Fleur had refrained from unconstitutional behaviour, his reputation as a rebel in East Griqualand in 1897, and the belief that he was a “new Moses who … [was] going to give his people a new land and a new form of Government”, most probably had some influence on the defiance and rebelliousness immediately north and south of the Gariep amongst Khoekhoe descendants.

Le Fleur’s resettlement schemes, and his promotion of Coloured self-reliance, ignited memories of past independence amongst rural Coloureds of Khoe-San descent, which in turn generated support for his schemes and ideas as well as defiance that was at odds with the image of the Griqua as lawful subjects that he promoted. The activities of Le Fleur’s agents also appear to have contributed to the separation of the Richtersveld people into those of the “Old Law Party” which included adherents of Le Fleur, and the “New Law Party”. There was “constant reference to the old law and the new law”, and “talk about getting away from the present law and reverting to the old law”, with Le Fleur himself, as indicated before, being seen as a “new Moses who … [was] going to give his people a new land and a new form of Government; Le Fleur would thus, by implication, restore the old order marked by land ownership and independence.” Le Fleur’s vision of a bank and factories owned by Griqua, and of Griqua-Coloured nationhood forged and sustained through a Griqua church on self-reliant farming settlements, was apparently reworked and radicalized by some individuals who desired an alternative order. Reserve corporals claimed that the men who became adherents of Le Fleur always spoke about a new regime that was to come, where the Hottentots, Bastards and Coloured men having thrown off the yoke of Government by the white man, was going to have his laws, Magistrates, Churches, Factories, etc.

The accusations against Le Fleur severely undermined the image that he projected to the government and caused him great concern. Le Fleur attempted to counter the accusations of the commission of inquiry into the Bondelswartz revolt after their report was released in 1923. He also took issue with the administrator of SWA. Le Fleur suggested that the report of the inquiry into the Bondelswartz revolt led to him and his associates being “held under the supervision of the whole criminal investigation department” and that it led to the spread of “extraordinary falsehood[s]” which were even “preached from pulpits”. Le Fleur attempted to have the administrator of SWA removed from his office for the allegations he made against him. He appealed to the government and Lord Buxton “without redress”. He then appealed to Prince Arthur of Connaught who succeeded Buxton as the governor general the Union of South Africa in 1920. He maintained that “such an officer who deliberately reports a falsehood to our Parliament, to our Government, to our King and the League of Nations”, should not “be left in his office”. He felt that an “example should be made to stop other officers from following up such dishonourable tactics”. Le Fleur also attempted to make representations to

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56 UG 16-23, p. 27.
59 SAP 34, Conf 6/496/17, Deputy Commissioner, SAP, Cape Town, to Deputy Commissioner, Pretoria, [stamped] 18 July 1922.
60 NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 2, AAS Le Fleur, Woodstock, to Prince Arthur of Connaught, Governor General, Union of South Africa, 1 May 1923.
the League of Nations criticizing the SWA administrator and challenging the findings of the commission of inquiry into the Bondelswartz revolt.\textsuperscript{61}

Despite opposition, Le Fleur succeeded in gaining many supporters in the Namaqualand reserves who were drawn to his settlement schemes. Attempts by officials to curb Le Fleur’s influence and to thwart his schemes were made ineffective through the worsening social and economic conditions in the reserves that sensitized the inhabitants to his ideas. The copper mines in Namaqualand had closed down and work was not readily available. Locusts destroyed crops in 1921. Food had become scarce and many people were starving. Dissatisfaction was also expressed with the management of the reserves. Reserve taxes were raised to an unbearable level, with the property of those who refused to pay tax being seized and sold. Cognizant of the effects of the socio-economic conditions in the reserves the superintendent of reserves suggested that wheat seed be given free of charge and that rations be more freely issued to destitute persons. He reasoned in June 1922 that if his suggestions were adopted the people might take less interest in troubles in the SWA and also pay less attention to Le Fleur and his proposed resettlement trek.\textsuperscript{62}

**Stylhoogte**

Working jointly with a number of residents from Van Rhynsdorp who formed the Stylhoogte Committee,\textsuperscript{63} Le Fleur managed in July 1922 to reach an agreement with Isaack Frank for the purchase of Stylhoogte near Van Rhynsdorp on behalf of the Griqua Independent Church and the Griqua Land Bank, Factories and Township Limited for £2500 that would be paid in instalments.\textsuperscript{64} Although the settlement at Stylhoogte may have been initially targeted for people of Van Rhynsdorp, it was soon flooded by people from Namaqualand. By August 1922 a number of Leliefontein residents had embarked on a trek to Stylhoogte, despite all efforts by government officials to dissuade reserve inhabitants. Imbued with Le Fleur’s ideals, the trekkers from Namaqualand intended to form a community attached to the Griqua church. The men also hoped that they would find employment on the Olifants River Irrigation Works.\textsuperscript{65} Less then “200 families” (or people) supposedly agreed to join the trek but that number was greatly exceeded.\textsuperscript{66} There were around 600 hundred people at Stylhoogte early in September 1922.\textsuperscript{67}

Those who moved to Stylhoogte developed a Griqua identity. They were also referred to as Griqua by government officials and members of the public, reflecting thus the transformation of Nama into Griqua, at least those migrants who were (originally) Nama. The success or failure of Le Fleur’s resettlement schemes influenced the participants’ association with him and with a Griqua identity. Settlement difficulties inclined a number of the participants to depart and consequently to distance themselves from a Griqua identity. However, Le Fleur’s ethno-religious views, his church, his reputed prophetic abilities, and his projection as a Moses called by God to deliver his volk,\textsuperscript{68} inclined many participants to stick to him and to retain a Griqua identity despite settlement difficulties or failures.

\textsuperscript{61} LC, Item 9.6, Letter to Commission of the League of Nations (n.d.).
\textsuperscript{62} NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 2, Senior Superintendent of Reserves, Okiep, to Magistrate, Okiep, 6 June 1922.
\textsuperscript{63} NTS 7600, 4/238 Part 2, SAP, Calvinia, to Deputy Commissioner, Cape Town, 21 August 1922.
\textsuperscript{64} NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 2, “Deed of sale and hire agreement” between AAS le Fleur and Isaack Frank, Cape Town, July 1922.
\textsuperscript{65} NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 2, Magistrate, Van Rhynsdorp, to Secretary, Native Affairs, Pretoria, 21 August 1922.
\textsuperscript{66} NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 2, W Freestone, Inspector of Labour, Cape Town, to Acting Under Secretary, Mines and Industries, Labour Division, 11 October 1922.
According to Le Fleur 680 people trekked to Stylhoogte.\(^{69}\) Around 500 of the trekkers were from the Leliefontein mission reserve.\(^{70}\) The conditions at the settlement were not as the trekkers hoped they would be. They were very disappointed to find that work was not as readily available as they had hoped. There was no longer a demand for work at the Olifants River Irrigation Works. Soon after arriving at Stylhoogte, Johannes Witbooi, one of the leaders of the Namaqualand trekkers, sent messages to Namaqualand warning that there were too many people at Stylhoogte and that no more should go.\(^{71}\) A number of the migrants returned to Namaqualand.\(^{72}\) Some moved away to more distant places. A number of those who remained did, however, find employment among White farmers in the region who were especially appreciative of the availability of labour during the harvest period.\(^{73}\)

As the settlement at Stylhoogte was inadequate to carry the amount of people that trekked there Le Fleur attempted to move some of them to other settlements. He attempted unsuccessfully to purchase the Dreyersvlei farm in Wellington. Late in 1922 Le Fleur sent 38 people from Stylhoogte with 321 donkeys and 41 cattle to the farm without having raised the amount for the first instalment of the purchase price. The farmer supposedly earlier declined Le Fleur’s proposition that he take the cattle of the people who were coming until the first instalment was raised. The migrants were very disappointed when they arrived at the farm to be informed that Le Fleur had not purchased the farm. They apparently felt that Le Fleur had misled them. Le Fleur subsequently recalled the trekkers to Stylhoogte.\(^{74}\)

Le Fleur also managed to purchase on mortgage the farm De Put, located at Gifberg about 22 miles from Van Rhynsdorp where a few families were settled from late 1922. By January 1923 there were about “ten families” at De Put and about 300 sheep. There were by then between 340 and 380 people at Stylhoogte with 115 huts. The settlers at both Stylhoogte and De Put were very impoverished, with a number of them apparently in a worse state than they were in Namaqualand.\(^{75}\) Le Fleur also negotiated with the George Forest Timber Company Limited for the purchase of a farm in George between 1922 and 1923, with the company putting a price of £23,000 for a piece of land called Barbiers Kraal that it purchased for £8000 in 1916.\(^{76}\)

**Griqua as good subjects**

Like elsewhere where Le Fleur and his agents were active, the settlement at Stylhoogte led to rumours of an attack being planned on Whites. Rumours about an attack by the underclasses around Christmas were also current in Van Rhynsdorp in 1920 before the ‘Griqua’ came over to Stylhoogte, but nothing transpired then.\(^{77}\) From October 1922 there was talk amongst Whites in Van Rhynsdorp that the people at the Stylhoogte

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\(^{69}\) NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 3, AAS le Fleur, Griqua Independent Church “Kerk Konferensie Verslag” (Deel Twee), 18 April 1927.


\(^{71}\) NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 2, Magistrate, Van Rhynsdorp, to Secretary, Native Affairs, Pretoria 21 August 1922; SAP, Calvinia, to Deputy Commissioner, Cape Town, 21 August 1922.

\(^{72}\) NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 2, JF Herbst, Native Affairs, Pretoria, to Prime Minister, Pretoria, 22 September 1924.

\(^{73}\) NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 2, SAP, Van Rhynsdorp, to District Commandant, Calvinia, 19 October 1922; W Freestone, Inspector of Labour, Cape Town, to Acting Under Secretary, Mines and Industries, Labour Division, 11 October 1922. Much of their livestock was sold in order to purchase food. Around 100 sheep and goats and 175 donkeys were supposedly dispatched to Cape Town for sale. W Freestone to Acting Under Secretary, Mines and Industries, Labour Division, 11 October 1922.

\(^{74}\) NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 2, HF Trew, Deputy Commissioner, SAP, Cape Town, to Divisional CID Officer, Cape Town, 31 October, 1922; Affidavit of Johannes le Roux van Niekerk, Wellington, 7 November 1922; Statement of JP Ungerer, n.d.

\(^{75}\) NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 2, SAP, Van Rhynsdorp to District Commandant, SAP, Calvinia, 25 January 1923; Magistrate, Van Rhynsdorp, to Secretary Native Affairs, Pretoria, 25 January 1923.

\(^{76}\) NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 2, Raubenheimer, George to General Smuts, Cape Town, 20 February 1923.

\(^{77}\) NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 2, Office of NCO, SAP, Van Rhynsdorp, to District Commandant, SAP, Calvinia 4 December 1922.
settlement were scheming to attack them. Some discerned an attitude of insubordination or impertinence. It was rumoured that the ‘Griqua’ would attack Whites between 16 December and Christmas. Some Whites connected the supposed insubordination and impertinence of the ‘Griqua’ with the rebelliousness of the Khoekhoe in SWA. The rumours were apparently caused by the fact the ‘Griqua’ intended sending out parties of men and women to sing hymns at farms around Christmas time, “apparently with the idea of beating up converts”.

Le Fleur’s attempt to build a reputation of his ‘Griqua’ adherents as law abiding, self-disciplined and hardworking subjects gained a measure of success, thus countering rumours that they were scheming to attack Whites. Many Whites were not alarmed by the settlement at Stylhoogte and did not take the rumours seriously. Many felt that the ‘Griqua’ were civil and respectful and did not have problems with their ‘Griqua’ workers. The police were also satisfied with the conduct of the ‘Griqua’ because since their arrival at Stylhoogte criminal charges were rarely if ever laid against them. Success in countering rumours about the seditious activities of Le Fleur and his adherents varied from place to place. Le Fleur had little success in countering rumours of his seditious and fraudulent activities in East Griqualand.

East Griqualand visit – 1923
In March 1923 Le Fleur visited East Griqualand, arriving in Kokstad with a few of his agents on 17th day of the month. Le Fleur appears to have held a low profile meeting in Kokstad. Headman Madonela from Matatiele, an associate of Le Fleur in the aborted 1897 East Griqualand rebellion, was informed that one of his sub-headmen and a number of his followers “went secretly at night … to Kokstad … to meet Andrew Le Fleur”. Le Fleur’s agents were active in the region both during his visit and after his departure, promoting his resettlement schemes, as well as his leadership. The conduct of these agents of Le Fleur suggested to some that they looked to him “as their Prophet, Priest and King and [as being] greater than what Moses was for the Jews”.

Whilst in Kokstad Le Fleur stayed with Petrus Makabuwa, a minister in his church, until he departed to Umzimkulu on 22 March on horseback “accompanied by a Griqua ... and three natives”. Le Fleur held a meeting at Clydesdale in Umzimkulu on 24 March. Ngcaza Nduku, “a Native Constable … stationed at Umzimkulu” claimed that he “heard Henry le Fleur [sic]” address people who were gathered at Clydesdale on 24 March telling them that those who wanted “to live with him should follow him to his country. He also

78 NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 2, Statement of Van Zijl, Van Rhynsdorp, 30 November 1922; SAP, Van Rhynsdorp, to NOC, SAP, Van Rhynsdorp, 2 December 1922.
79 NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 2, Office of NCO, SAP, Van Rhynsdorp, to District Commandant, SAP, Calvinia, 4 December 1922.
80 NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 2, Statement of Van Zijl, Van Rhynsdorp, 30 November 1922; Report of Constable CJ Human, Van Rhynsdorp on “Rumours concerning Griquas at Stylhoogte”, 2 December 1922.
81 NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 2, Office of NCO, SAP, Van Rhynsdorp, to District Commandant, SAP, Calvinia, 4 December 1922.
82 Cape Town Archives, Chief Magistrate, Transkei (CMT) 3/951, 2/51, Detective FC Jones, CID, Kokstad, to District Commandant, South African Police, Kokstad, 23 March 1923.
83 CMT 3/951, 2/51, Resident Magistrate, Matatiele, to CMT, Umtata, 5 June 1923.
87 CMT 3/951, 2/51, Detective FC Jones, CID, Kokstad, to District Commandant, South African Police, Kokstad, 23 March 1923.
stated that people … [were] illtreated by Europeans … and treated as Negroes. He asked people there to go along with him to Canaan where he has got his own ground”.  

Information from Le Fleur and his agents was again embellished as it was relayed. For example, Mcketwa Mtu Mtu, “a Sub-Headman at Ludi’s Location, Matatiele District”, was “told by other natives, and particularly a native named “Ndotja” … [who attended] one of these private meetings” called by the Griqua, that “the Griquas were telling them that”

[all the Europeans would have to shift out of Griqualand as le Fleur was going to be Chief and that they were waiting for Le Fleur to come back and that they were collecting money to get Le Fleur back. When this money is collected a big feast it to take place and it would be decided that all the natives who sided with Europeans would also have to leave with them ….”  

The Criminal Investigation Department monitored the activities of Le Fleur closely during his visit. Le Fleur departed from East Griqualand on 27 March and proceeded to Pretoria.  

**Settlement difficulties**

Whilst Le Fleur was achieving some success on the religious and moral planes, his resettlement schemes did not meet their desired economic goals. Problems encountered at Le Fleur’s resettlement schemes had the potential to erode his credibility as well as the credibility of the Griqua Independent Church, the Griqua National Conference, and support for other resettlement schemes. Blame for settlement failures could, however, be shifted and located outside of the GIC and GNC. Le Fleur and his associates tried to attribute the failures of the Stylhoogte settlement to the Namaqualanders. They stressed in their communication with government officials that the Namaqualanders went on their own initiative contrary to what they planned with the settlement. They argued that their aim was to acquire land in districts where destitution amongst Coloureds was evident for the purpose of assisting them to become self-supportive. However, in regard to the Namaqualanders, it was decided to find a place in the Western Province to which they could be brought and settled. The Namaqualanders were advised to seek work in the Western Province. Only people of the districts where land was acquired were to be eligible for settlement purposes. Stylhoogte in Klaver was intended for the inhabitants of Klaver. Around “50 families” along the Olifants River decided to buy Stylhoogte. People from Namaqualand, however, began to trek to Stylhoogte in great numbers. The arrival of too many people upset initial plans and other arrangements had to be subsequently made. 

**Government aid**

Desperate to maintain Stylhoogte, Le Fleur applied to General Hertzog, the prime minister and minister of Native Affairs for a loan on behalf of the people at Stylhoogte in July 1924. Le Fleur also requested the government in 1924 to take over the farm under a bond. In requesting assistance Le Fleur also insisted that the Namaqualanders went to Stylhoogte contrary to his advice that they should seek employment in the Western Province. Le Fleur apparently “also sough a personal interview with Hertzog”. There was, however, already a strong belief among government officials that Le Fleur was the principal person behind the trek of the Namaqualanders. JF Herbst from the Department of Native Affairs communicated to Hertzog that Le Fleur’s

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88 CMT 3/951, 2/51, Statement of Ngcaza Nduku [1923].
90 CMT 3/951, 2/51, Deputy Commissioner, SAP, Transkei Division, to CMT, 27 March 1923.
91 CMT 3/951, 2/51, E Mulle[?], Umtata, to Secretary for Native Affairs, Pretoria, 6 April 1923.
92 NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 2, W Freestone, Inspector of Labour, Cape Town, to Secretary, Mines and Industries, Labour Division, 12 October 1922; W Freestone, Inspector of Labour, Cape Town, to Acting Under Secretary, Mines and Industries, Labour Division, 11 October 1922; A le Fleur, Woodstock, to General Hertzog, Prime Minister and Minister of Native Affairs, Pretoria, 14 July 1924.
93 NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 2, A le Fleur, Woodstock, to General Hertzog, (the) Prime Minister and Minister of Native Affairs, Pretoria, 14 July 1924.
claim that the people from Namaqualand trekked to Stylhoogte contrary to his advice was wholly incorrect. It appeared to Herbst that history was repeating itself at Stylhoogte and that the scheme had failed. Thus, “[u]nder these circumstances it is felt that no good purpose would be served by according the applicant a personal interview, and that his request for financial assistance from the Government should be refused”. Herbst felt that the failure of previous ventures should have convinced Le Fleur of the impossibility of carrying the present scheme to a successful end and that there was no good reason for the government to rescue him “from the consequence of his folly”. Hertzog accepted the advice of Herbst and declined Le Fleur’s request for assistance.\footnote{NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 2, JF Herbst, Native Affairs, Pretoria, to Prime Minister, Pretoria, 22 September 1924.}

Though the government was not inclined to provide material assistance to Le Fleur for his schemes, he continued to appeal for government assistance. Le Fleur also encouraged his adherents across the Union to petition for land concessions.\footnote{LC, Correspondence file, Secretary for Native Affairs, Pretoria, to AAS le Fleur, Woodstock, 14 October 1924.} Using a common draft document, “Griekwa Burgers” from places like Riversdale, Oudtshoorn, De Aar, Caledon, Graaff-Reinet and Genendal sent petitions to Hertzog in 1925 appealing for farming and lamenting the socio-economic situation of Coloured people.\footnote{National Archives, Pretoria, Department of Lands (LDE) 4257, 12449, Petitions, Griqua Burgers residing at Touws River, Riversdale and Oudtshoorn for Griqua land. Magistrate, De Aar to Private Secretary, Minister of Lands, Cape Town, 24 April 1925.} Le Fleur himself unsuccessfuely appealed to the Department of Lands in 1925 that vacant crown land and farms in Touws River, Prince Albert, Barkley West and Elseberg be availed to Coloureds.\footnote{See correspondence of 20 September 1924-16 July 1925 in LDE 4257, 12449.}

To thwart his schemes, government officials not only opposed the financial assistance that he requested but also attempted to warn Le Fleur’s prospective adherents that his schemes were doomed, as JF Herbst indicated:

I fear … that we can do very little officially to put a stop to his operations as he is cute enough to keep within the bounds of the law. The only way to circumvent him is for the officials to keep in the closest touch with the people and bring a moral influence to bear against Le Fleur.\footnote{NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 2, JF Herbst, Cape Town, to J Verschuur, Magistrate, Springbok, 22 February 1924.}

Many Coloureds did come to believe that Le Fleur’s schemes were doomed. Many became hostile to him, believing that he was a fraudster. On 19 October 1923 Le Fleur organized a meeting in Calvinia. No one apparently attended the meeting. Another one was arranged for the following day attended by 60 people to whom Le Fleur explained his resettlement schemes. He apparently wanted a collection for a resettlement scheme but was shouted down and told to leave Calvinia or else the (Coloured) people there would throw him out. The meeting is said to have lasted only half an hour, with Le Fleur eventually walking away. Le Fleur reportedly had, by late 1923, decreasing success in influencing people in Namaqualand.\footnote{NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 2, JF Herbst, Cape Town, to AAS le Fleur, Cape Town, to Deputy Commissioner, SAP, Cape Town, 23, October 1923.}

Experiencing difficulty in turning purchased land into envisioned productive self-supporting settlements, and unable to get assistance from the government, Le Fleur was once again forced to act as a labour distributor, in an attempt to provide an income to his destitute adherents and other impoverished rural Coloureds. In April 1925 Le Fleur queried the administrator of the Orange Free State on behalf of the GNC about the possibility of impoverished people from Van Rhynsdorp, Calvinia and other districts being employed by Whites in the Free State. Le Fleur reasoned that such a move would allow young girls and boys to learn to work and to be
useful and that it would keep the children and their parents out of the “Kaffir environment”. Le Fleur at the same time also encouraged some of his impoverished adherents in Van Rhynsdorp to seek work in the Western Province. Government officials were, however, disturbed by the prospect of impoverished Coloureds moving from Van Rhynsdorp southward to Cape Town. An attempt was made to induce those who left for Cape Town to return to Van Rhynsdorp.

Le Fleur’s magnificent visions and the poverty and unemployment amongst rural Coloureds encouraged him and his associates to continue in their empowerment schemes. The appeal by impoverished Coloureds and Whites of Van Rhynsdorp to the government for aid in 1925 – many of whom were previously employed on government “relief works” and subsequently left destitute by the closure of those “relief works” – provided some justification for Le Fleur and his associates to continue to promote their resettlement schemes and their message of self-reliance. The GCPO indicated the year before that government relief works like the building of railway lines, “irrigation landworks” and dams were only a temporary measure of help and that when they were ended the people working on them would be in a worse state than before. It was reasoned that due to government welfare “Coloured people will be lost to the spirit of self help”.

Le Fleur and his associates generated enough interest and support to encourage them to persist in their resettlement schemes. Those who were most open to the resettlement schemes were from communities that had the least involvement with prior unsuccessful resettlement schemes. Opposition to Le Fleur and his associates tended to be the least in communities in which they did not operate before.

**Summation**

Thus, Le Fleur’s leadership role was, to an extent, shaped in a dialectical relation with his adherents and their aspirations. Le Fleur shaped his followers but was also influenced by them. However, unlike the 1890s, the parameters in which Le Fleur could be influenced in the 20th century were strictly confined to what was constitutional. Le Fleur did what he did because he found support for his schemes that were devised to meet the problems that Coloureds faced, particularly impoverished rural Coloureds. Le Fleur also attempted to channel the aspirations of his Griqua, Coloured and Nama adherents along constitutional lines in his attempt to create an ordered, respectable Griqua Christian community, thus suppressing rebelliousness that readily emerged amongst the underclasses during the 1920s. Le Fleur’s activities in Coloured communities variably located in relation to Khoekhoe, Bantu-speaking African and European cultures influenced the configuration of cultural elements of his Griqua adherents. Le Fleur brought those who were variably Westernized and who identified themselves as Coloured, into the Griqua fold, allowing them to identify with or to acknowledge a Khoekhoe heritage, even those who were not necessarily of Khoe-San descent. Those from Namaqualand, where elements of Khoekhoe culture would have been the strongest, would have reintroduced elements of traditional Khoekhoe culture into the Griqua fold.

101 LDE 4257, 12449, Le Fleur, Cape Town, to Administrator of OFS, 25 April 1925.
102 GCPO, 22 May 1925; LDE 4257, 12449, AAS le Fleur to Administrator, Sir Fredrick De Waal, Cape Town, n.d).
103 NTS, 7600 4/328, Part 2, Secretary for Labour to Secretary for Native Affairs, 6 June 1925.
104 GCPO, 22 May 1925; NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 2, Secretary for Labour to Secretary for Native Affairs, 6 June 1925.
105 GCPO, 22 May 1925.
106 GCPO, 12 December 1924.
107 In July 1925 Le Fleur explored farms in Barkley West that were suitable for a farming settlement. He held meetings in the district and encouraged people to subscribe to a fund for the purchase of land (LDE 4275, 12449, TM Cartz to Secretary, Lands, Pretoria, 18 July 1925; Magistrate, Barkly West to Secretary, Lands, Pretoria, 28 August 1925). Later in 1925 Le Fleur and some of his agents travelled throughout the Orange Free State to promoting their settlement schemes. They “confine[d] their efforts to the coloured and native sections of the population”. LDE 4257, 12449, SAP, Bloemfontein, to Secretary, Lands, Pretoria, 11 November 1925.
East Griqualand visit – 1926

Whilst Le Fleur contributed to the expansion of the Griqua population by turning those who were not Griqua into Griqua, his support within the longstanding Griqua community of East Griqualand ironically declined, especially in light of the failure of his resettlement scheme in the vicinity of Touws River stemming from the 1917 trek from East Griqualand. It appears that despite the problems he encountered with the 1917 settlement venture and subsequent schemes, that there were still some people in East Griqualand who thought that Le Fleur could improve their situation. Some Griqua apparently invited him to East Griqualand. Le Fleur visited the region in March 1926, arriving in Kokstad on the 19th day. Le Fleur and some of his Church ministers from East Griqualand and elsewhere held meetings in East Griqualand (e.g. at New Amalifi, Rietvlei and Kokstad) attended by Griqua and Bantu-speakers. They promoted resettlement schemes and also attempted to raise funds.

In contrast to Le Fleur’s 1923 visit to the region, his visit in 1926 was a more open affair. On 22 March Le Fleur called a meeting at the Griqua School in Kokstad attended by “about 70 Griquas and 50 natives (from all over the border)”. However, in consequence of a discussion between Le Fleur and Reverend Archibald of the Kokstad Griqua church, it was decided to hold the meeting later. It was also arranged that Le Fleur and his associates meet with Archibald on the 26th at his house.

The agreed meeting was duly held on 26 March at Archibald’s house in Kokstad. The government sanctioned headman of the Griqua of Mount Currie, Johannes Bezuidenhout, and 6 elders of the Griqua church were also present. Le Fleur arrived at the meeting by himself. Archibald and others at the meeting requested Le Fleur to outline his “policy, workings and intentions”. According to Detective R Broekman, Le Fleur stated at the meeting that his “scheme” was “well in hand” in the Cape colony to purchase land “for coloured people” where they would be “segregated” so as not to “encroach on European or native lands”. Le Fleur also appealed that the split that had developed in the Kokstad Griqua church be repaired and offered to use his influence to promote unity in the congregation. He also “repudiated any allegations that he was disloyal” or had “at any time … preached or talked sedition”. He stated that he was “not responsible for the rumour that he [was] preaching that the white men would be driven into the sea”, and that the land would be “returned to natives, Griqua’s and Coloureds”. It was decided at the conclusion of the meeting that a public meeting be called at the Kokstad market square on 29 March to allow Le Fleur to express his views and to answer questions. Le Fleur did call a meeting in Kokstad on 29 March. The meeting “consisted mostly of Natives”. Contrary to the expectations that some had of him, Le Fleur discouraged disobedience to the government at the meeting.

Le Fleur’s 1926 visit to East Griqualand suggested a variance between some of his pronouncements and his doings – further suggesting his influence by – or his shift between – differing discourses. Apparently inconsistent with his Griqua-Coloured ethno-‘racial’ nationalism, Le Fleur “requested Native Chiefs” to attend one of his meetings, with his other meetings also being attended by ‘Natives’ as well as Griqua. Although Le Fleur expressed approval of segregation he acknowledged to the acting magistrate of Kokstad during his 1926 visit to the region that he had ‘Native’ adherents in his church and that he was not willing to

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108 Star, 27 March 1926.
109 NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 3, R Broekman Detective, Sergeant, CID, Kokstad, to District Commandant, SAP, Kokstad, 23 March 1926; HJ Bryant, District Commandant, SAP, Kokstad, to Deputy Commissioner, SAP, Umtata, 24 March 1926.
110 NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 3, Detective, R Broekman, CID, Kokstad, to District Commandant, SAP, Kokstad, 23 March 1926.
111 CMT 3/951, 2/51, Detective, R Broekman, CID, Kokstad, to District Commandant, SAP, 29 March 1926.
112 NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 3, Statement of Moyo Lingani, Bees Valley, 3 April 1926.
113 NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 3, Detective R Broekman, CID, Kokstad, to District Commandant, SAP, Kokstad, 23 March 1926.
exclude them as that would, in his view, be contrary to the teaching of the Gospel to do so.\textsuperscript{114} ‘Natives’ who joined Le Fleur’s church could also assume positions of authority, especially if they had historical associations with the Griqua. Le Fleur had already appointed Petrus Makabuwa, “born a Bahlapeng” in Kokstad (his parents having gone to East Griqualand with Adam Kok III) as a minister in his Griqua church in 1921.\textsuperscript{115}

Le Fleur’s following and his association with people like Makabuwa complicated the identity location of his adherents. The Griquanness of Le Fleur and his agents was contested by some government officials as well as the likes of Cornelius de Bruin, a government sanctioned headman for the Mount Currie Griqua from 1898 until 1925. De Bruin informed Detective Broekman who was monitoring Le Fleur and his agents, that Le Fleur’s party did not comprise Griqua people. Most of those who followed Le Fleur were, in the view of Broekman “not Griquas but Coloureds, Barolongs, Batlapengs etc.”. He conceded, however, that for him the “Griqua is such an indefinite breed that it is hard to prove what they are”.\textsuperscript{116}

Some people in East Griqualand regarded Rolong and Tlhaping as ‘Natives’ and excluded them from Griquanness. Some Griqua, however, regarded and treated them as Griqua,\textsuperscript{117} especially those whose ancestors had burgher status under Adam Kok III’s rule. Giving evidence in a 1926 court case of John Mentor, a “native male labourer” descendant from Griqua burghers, charged with contravening a curfew law applicable to “Natives”, Cornelius de Bruin claimed that the Rolong and Tlhaping descended from (Rolong and Tlhaping) Griqua burghers were regarded and treated as Griqua. De Bruin testified that he knew the Mentors and that they came with Adam Kok to East Griqualand in 1862-3, and that they were his burghers and subjects. “The Baralongs and Batlapins looked to him as their headman”. They “were christened and married in the Griqua Church and as such regarded as Griquas. They were looked on as Griquas because they had all the privileges of Griquas. The late Cape Government looked on them as Griquas because they were allowed to join the Coloured Corps and one Mentor was a sergeant … . The accused was acquitted”\textsuperscript{118}

Thus, whilst De Bruin might have regarded Bantu-speakers descended from (Griqua) burghers as Griqua, he was apparently disinclined to regard Le Fleur’s adherents who were not descended from burghers, as Griqua. Although De Bruin emphasized that Rolong and Tlhaping were treated as Griqua, the perception that they went to East Griqualand as servants of the Griqua inclined some Griqua to regard them as second class Griqua. The perception that Griqua were of ‘Hottentot’ and European descent\textsuperscript{119} would also encourage a differential slotting of Rolong and Tlhaping within the Griqua category.

Le Fleur’s visit to East Griqualand manifested his desire for Griqua-Coloured upliftment as well as his attempt to project himself and his adherents as lawful subjects. He also hoped to establish a settlement venture in East Griqualand on which he could promote his Griqua-Coloured ethno-national ideals. Le Fleur also advised on land allocation and settlement in East Griqualand, much in line with segregation discourse. He told the magistrate of Kokstad, W Wright, that he aimed to buy 600-1000 morgen of land between Vogel Vlei and Franklin and that he wanted to take all Griqua out of ‘Native’ locations.\textsuperscript{120} He indicated in a circular letter to

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{114} NTS 7600, 4/328 Part 3, W Wright, Magistrate, Kokstad, to Acting CMT, 19 May 1926.
\textsuperscript{115} NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 3, Affidavit of Petrus Makabuwa, 6 April 1927.
\textsuperscript{116} NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 3, R Broekman Detective, Sergeant, CID, Kokstad, to District Commandant, SAP, Kokstad, 23 March 1926.
\textsuperscript{117} NTS 79, 1/5, Kokstad, Proceedings of the Court of the Magistrate of Mount Currie in case of Trustees of Griqua church properties vs George Abrahams and others, 1914.
\textsuperscript{118} GCPO, 27 March 1926.
\textsuperscript{119} NTS 79, 1/5, Proceedings of the Court of the Magistrate of Mount Currie in case of Trustees of Griqua church properties vs George Abrahams and others, 1914.
\textsuperscript{120} GCPO, 27 March 1926.
\end{footnotesize}
“Headman, Leaders and Burgers and friends”, that it was not proper “to settle the Griquas at Rietvlei it being right in the native area”. He pointed out that it was against the “interests and good bringing up of both races to live” there together. He “maintained that the Griquas and Europeans should not be allowed to live in the large centres where the natives are living but [must] be segregated in the Mount Currie District and a portion of Matatiele District”. Le Fleur emphasized that “each section” should be “in its own area”. In that way their children could be saved “from future trouble”. There was “no other hope for our country”.121

Le Fleur’s message was once again relayed and refracted through the perspectives, hopes and fears of different people, generating different accounts about Le Fleur. Some accounts reflected ongoing resentment to White domination. Although Le Fleur appears to have promoted peaceful dealings with the government, his visit to East Griqualand again generated suspicion that he and his associates were inciting Griqua and Bantu-speakers to attack Whites. Skova Mngeni, a Hlubi from Kaka’s location in Matatiele, was apparently informed by Elijah Maqashalale, supposed to be an agent of Le Fleur, “the Chief of the Griquas” that

Le Fleur … [said] that the whole of South Africa belonged to him and said now that he had arrived, all the Europeans and also the natives that do not unite with the Griquas had to leave South Africa for England. He said I must inform you the people that you are going to live happy now as there are no more taxes to be paid, you will live where you like, there will be no passes and permits for removal of stock, it’s going to be the same as in the olden days, all the offices will belong to Le Fleur, there will be no attorneys, Police or detectives. He said Le Fleur said that the ground had been handed back to him by King George and now the Europeans refused to leave South Africa. The American Troops are coming over and take South Africa by force [sic], and the Europeans will leave in blood. … He said all the natives must unite with the Griquas … . All churches has to be done away with and only to have the Griqua Independent Church.122

Referring to Le Fleur’s meeting in Kokstad on 29 March 1926, Moyo Lingani “a Basuto male” from Kaka’s location in Matatiele also indicated that Le Fleur stated that the “ground in Africa had been handed back to him by King George and General Hertzog” and that “all the coloured and natives should unite in Africa”. Claiming to have directly heard Le Fleur addressing the meeting, Lingani did, however, not impute the militancy to Le Fleur that Mngeni did. According to Lingani, the “meeting consisted mostly of natives”. Le Fleur was apparently disappointed that only one headman was at the meeting, as he had hoped to see more:

Chief le Fleur … said I am here to inform you that the ground in Africa has been handed back to me by King George and General Hertzog, and further stated that all the coloured and natives should unite in Africa. He did not say for what purpose. … Le Fleur … said [to headman] Makwawini, I have heard your grievances, in regard to dipping of cattle, those natives that had hundred head of cattle has not that number any more. They are becoming poor and the children are starving from want of milk, because the dip has burnt the cows’ udders, and the cattle are also dying from the dip. Headman Makwawini then replied and said to Le Fleur, the Government has increased the Hut taxes, the first taxes were hard to pay, but what about the new taxes. Le Fleur then said I have heard this, I will forward your grievances to the Government, but you must pay taxes, as I am also paying same [sic].123

The religious activities of Le Fleur’s GIC ministers and their attempts at drawing members into their church were also imputed with seditious intentions. Interviewed by Sergeant WO Mackesy, Reverend Asboe of the Moravian mission at Mvenyane complained that Griqua residents were continually having secret meetings in the evening near the mission church (presumably organized by Le Fleur’s GIC ministers); that they were doing their utmost to depreciate the prestige of Whites, and that they had left the mission church and taken their children away from the school since the arrival of “two strange Griquas”, that is, Allen Corner and Mike Johnson. The two started a new Griqua church with their chief Le Fleur as president. Asboe was

121 NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 3, Undated “Circular Letter” by AAS le Fleur to “Headman, Leaders and Burgers and friends”.
122 NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 3, Statement of Skova Mngene, 4 April 1926.
123 NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 3, Statement of Moyo Lingani, Bees Valley, 3 April 1926.
convinced that the “new Church movement” was “entirely political and under cloak of religion” and that Le Fleur’s adherents “were making use of every available means to persuade the natives to join them”. Asboe did not, however, foresee immediate danger but thought that “if the Griqua succeed[ed] in procuring support from the natives the position would become more serious than it is at present and was bound to end in bloodshed”. Asboe therefore saw a need for Le Fleur’s “movement” to be “checked”.

Frank Meyer, a “loyal Griqua” who resided in Mvenyane near the Moravian mission church informed Sergeant Mackesy that Allen Corner, a minister in Le Fleur’s GIC who arrived in East Griqualand in January, tried to persuade him to leave the mission church. When he refused Corner told him that it would be too late to change his mind when Le Fleur came to Mvenyane with his followers, and that Le Fleur would take his farm from him and drive the Whites out of Africa.

A storeowner at Bees Valley by the name of Dovey informed Sergeant Mackesy that “three strange Griquas”, Allen Corner, Mike Johnson and Petrus Makabuwa, called at his store with a choir of small girls and boys. The choir supposedly sang “in Dutch and Kaffir” that “[t]he day for the coloured and black has come, the country will run with blood, we Christians fear nothing”. Dovey claimed to have received information that the choir had sung the same song at some farm-houses. He felt that the attitude of the ‘Natives’ towards him was not as friendly as it was prior to the arrival of the three strange Griqua.

Convinced Le Fleur and his associates were seditious, government officials once again attempted to curb their activities. Law officials undertook to arrest Le Fleur and his associates if they did not have passes to enter the Transkeian Territories. Allan Corner and Mike Johnson were eventually arrested for entering the Transkeian Territories without passes.  

Le Fleur did not remain for long in East Griqualand. He proceeded to other regions, promoting his resettlement schemes. GIC ministers were sent to different places for promotional purposes. Although Le Fleur aspired for a central geographic area on which his ethno-nation-building could be undertaken, the difficulty of actualizing his goal inclined him to promote micro agricultural settlements across South Africa. By 1926 Le Fleur had apparently purchased (presumably on mortgage) three farms in Victoria West district (in the extent of 14 000 morgen). He negotiated with a Mr Kempen for the farms Drupfontein and Klerkskraal in the region, and collected funds that were apparently deposited in trust for the Griqua in a local bank. Negotiations were apparently also undertaken for farms in Molteno, Beaufort West and near the junction of the Gariep and Vaal Rivers that were to be owned communally by Griqua. Petrus Makabuwa, who believed that the Bible said that “the tribes must all be together”, promoted resettlement schemes in the vicinity of Herschel in May 1926. At the same time Reverend John F Jeftha promoted the Victoria West schemes in Molteno. Le Fleur’s eldest son, Abraham J le Fleur, the “Young Chief”, canvassed supporters to the Griqua cause in places like Kingwilliam’s Town. Le Fleur also sought to acquire farms from Lax Brothers in the vicinity of Bedford and Somerset East. The promotion of resettlement schemes continued to

124 NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 3, WO Mackesy, Sergeant, SAP, Mobile Squadron, Umtata, to District Commandant, SAP, Umtata, 7 April 1926.
125 See chapter 4 on Le Fleur’s idea of a Coloured colony.
126 CCK 12, 15/1/5, Magistrate, Herschel to Chief Native Commissioner, King-William’s Town, 8 May 1926.
127 CCK 12, 15/1/5, Magistrate, Victoria West, to Magistrate, Molteno, 14 June 1926.
128 GCPO, 10 September 1926.
129 CCK 12, 15/1/5, Chief Native Commissioner to Secretary, Native Affairs, 1 June 1926.
130 CCK 12, 15/1/5, Magistrate, Herschel, to Chief Native Commissioner, King William’s Town, 8 May 1926; Chief Native Commissioner, Kingwilliam’s Town, to Secretary, Native Affairs, Pretoria, 1 June 1926.
131 GCPO, 26 November 1926.
132 CCK 12, 15/1/5, Chief Native Commissioner to Secretary, Native Affairs, 14 June 1926.
be blended with church services, Coloureds being encouraged to form part of the restoration of the Griqua nation. Jeftha proposed in Molteno in 1926 that Coloureds should all join the Griqua with the objective of rebuilding the Griqua nation. Each male was encouraged to contribute 2/6d to the fund for the acquisition of land in Victoria West.\(^{134}\)

Government officials continued to attempt to curb the activities of Le Fleur and his agents. In 1926 the chief Native commissioner at King William’s Town sent a circular to magistrates requesting them to “do all in their power to discourage participation [in Le Fleur’s land schemes] and [to] warn Griquas and nati...".\(^{135}\) Le Fleur and his agents continued, however, to generate interest and support amongst rural Coloureds for their resettlement schemes, drawing a large amount of people to settlement schemes in the south-eastern parts of the Western Cape, notably at Elandsdrift and Fontein’s Hoek near Cookhouse located midway between Bedford and Somerset East.

**Elandsdrift and Fontein’s Hoek**

Le Fleur managed in 1926 to negotiate with Lax Brothers for the purchase of the farms Elandsdrift and Fontein’s Hoek in the Golden Valley near Cookhouse located between Bedford and Somerset East. The price that Le Fleur agreed to pay, that is, £83 000 according to the *GCPO*,\(^ {136}\) was apparently more than double the value of the property. In terms of the agreement Le Fleur would pay £20 000 before the transfer was passed.\(^ {137}\) The Griqua Land Settlement Limited was created in 1926 to raise funds by offering shares for the purchase of Elandsdrift, Fontein’s Hoek and other properties.

The broad objectives set out for the Griqua Land Settlement Limited reflected the long held but unrealized ideals of Le Fleur. The company was intended to generally engage in the acquisition of land. It was also intended to become involved in farming, manufacturing, mining, trades, education, sport and recreation. Purchased farms were to be divided into allotments allocated to shareholders.\(^ {138}\) Le Fleur envisaged that thousands of people would be settled on their farming settlements near Cookhouse.\(^ {139}\)

In promoting the Cookhouse land schemes, Le Fleur and his agents appealed to Coloured ethno-‘racial’ and nationalist sensibilities and emphasized the material benefits that would follow from participation in the agricultural settlements, again combining their promotional work with religious services. Le Fleur himself promoted settlement schemes in glowing terms in Grahamstown in June and July 1926, as indicated in a pamphlet that he issued:

> [W]e want our people plainly and simply, to improve their present condition. We are going to remove you and your children into the Fruit Industry. There will be a settlement of over 40000 in three years at the Fruit Industry in Golden Valley at Cookhouse. We will therefore have to remove the Coloured People out of the Locations and get them in to settle and work up their properties or acre lots. Well, you have no time to loose ... here your opportunity has come. Move onto it at once, there is no time to spare, here is the future of yourself and children, you can procure the land from us, we have bought it and you come and hear our terms of

\(^ {134} \) *GCPO*, 26 November 1926.
\(^ {135} \) CCK 12, 15/1/5, Chief Native Commissioner, King William’s Town, to Secretary, Native Affairs, Pretoria, 15 June 1926.
\(^ {136} \) *GCPO*, 31 December 1926.
\(^ {137} \) CCK 12, 15/1/5, WH Innes, Divisional CI Office, Grahamstown, to Deputy Commissioner, SAP, Grahamstown, 11 October, 1926.
\(^ {138} \) CCK 12, 15/1/5, WH Innes, Divisional CI Office, Grahamstown, to Deputy Commissioner, SAP, Grahamstown, 11 October, 1926; LC 415, 2913, Griqua Land Settlement Limited, “Memorandum of Association”, 16 July 1926.
\(^ {139} \) *GCPO*, 18 June 1926.
occupation with the price of each lot. You will your self have to plant over 150000, which will yield £150 000, in five years time.140

Although Le Fleur was generally averse to rights politics, to promote his resettlement schemes the GCPO even emphasized the political benefits that would accrue from participation in his schemes and from ownership of land, given that the franchise was conditional on property ownership. The GCPO urged people to

get in to the Griqua Land Settlement … there is but one door open – settle on land, become property owners and as the Franchise will be raised to a very high point to become a voter do get your own property …. At East London you will be regarded as native pure and simple because only a few of you own houses …. 141

Le Fleur and his agents also invoked the support of important British imperial and colonial figures to lend credibility to the resettlement schemes, for example, the king of England, the prince of Wales, Prime Minister General Smuts, Colonel Creswell and John Merriman.142 Government officials were disturbed when Le Fleur and his associates succeeded to induce a number of Coloureds in Grahamstown to sell their property and to purchase shares in the settlement schemes at Cookhouse. Government officials again attempted to prevent Le Fleur from persisting with his schemes. Police investigated whether he could be prosecuted for obtaining or attempting to obtain money by means of false pretences.143 There was, however, not much that government officials could do to within the confines of the law to curb the activities of Le Fleur and his associates.

Accompanied by John Jephta, Le Fleur continued his organizational and promotional work amongst Coloureds in East London. They again combined religious services with the promotion of their settlement schemes. A choir of about twelve girls and boys aged between 15 and 19 accompanied them. The choir apparently arrived on foot from Grahamstown around July and held concerts in the Coloured location, taking collections from the public. Jeftha ordained one man who was previously a dean in the Presbyterian church. He also gave sacraments and baptized a number of children. A number of people sold their properties in order to purchase shares in Le Fleur’s land schemes. Others were hostile to Le Fleur. Those who felt Le Fleur was bringing division to their community wanted him to be kept out of their area.144

Many farmers in Bedford and the adjacent Somerset East district were disturbed by the possibility of a settlement of numerous “Hottentots or Griqua families” on Elandsdrift and Fontein’s Hoek. They reasoned that such a settlement was a danger to them and liable to seriously damage the value of all properties and irrigation schemes. They also wanted the government to intervene and to prevent the transfer of farms to the Griqua.145 The Lax Brothers, on the other hand, were not much concerned about the inflow of Griqua or their failure to pay the requisite amount for the farms. They saw an inflow of Griqua as beneficial for their labour demands. A police inspector reasoned that that there was “work for several hundred permanent unskilled labourers, and for quite a number of skilled labourers such as bricklayers, carpenters and painters” on the properties of Lax Brothers so that even if the sale did not go through the Griqua could be absorbed into the

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140 CCK 12, 15/1/5, Pamphlet of (8/6/26) cited in J Carruthers, SAP, Grahamstown, to Magistrate, Grahamstown, 2 July 1926.
141 GCPO, 12 November 1926.
142 See translation of extract from GCPO of 16 July 1926 in CCK 12, 15/1/5, Blazeyi, Minister, Union Congregation, King William’s Town, to Chief Native Commissioner, King-Williams’ s Town, 11 August 1926.
143 CCK 12, 15/1/5, J Carruthers, SAP, Grahamstown, to Magistrate, Grahamstown, 28 June 1926; FH Kunhard, Dist Commandant, SAP Cradock, to Magistrate, Cradock, 21 July 1926; Acting Magistrate, East London, to Chief Native Commissioner, King William’s Town, 18 October 1926.
144 CCK 12, 15/1/5, Statements of William Stafford (August 1926), Robert Meine (August 1926), Henry Martin (19 August 1926), Frank Prince (19 August 1926).
145 CCK 12, 15/1/5, Secretary, Native Affairs, Pretoria, to Chief Native Commissioner, King-William’s Town, 14 July 1926.
Golden Valley Estates as labourers. W Lax was supposedly advised by the manager of their packaging plant that at least 500 people were needed for picking, drying and packing and that the requisite number would more than double yearly. A Griqua settlement would thus be a very useful labour reservoir for Lax Brothers. In the words of the aforementioned police inspector:

A reserve such as the one they have in view means that they will have the same body of people each year, and there will be no necessity to spend two or three valuable days training raw Natives into the work with the risk (especially at picking time) of substantial loss.  

Whilst it was not intended that the participants in the resettlement scheme at Elandsdrift would move on to the property until £20 000 was paid and the transfer passed, a number of families comprising about 300 people had moved on the property by October 1926 before the transfer was passed. They lived in two large sheds and a number of huts. As with previous land settlement schemes, Le Fleur and his associates had difficulty maintaining the Cookhouse schemes. They could not pay the first instalment for Elandsdrift. The sale agreement was consequently revoked. Difficulty in paying the first instalment may have been compounded by the owners of Elandsdrift apparently preventing people who trekked there from working the land and thus raising some funds, as occupation was made conditional on the payment of the first instalment. The trekkers on Elandsdrift did not move immediately after the agreement was revoked. One of the Lax brothers even asked for police assistance in removing the ‘Griqua’ from their property.

Payment problems were also encountered with Fontein’s Hoek and the sale of that farm also fell through. About “nineteen families” apparently moved from Elandsdrift to Knysna; “five families” to Klipfontein in Somerset East and about “ten families” to Thorngrove, also in Somerset East. It appears that there were still about “nineteen families” left at Elandsdrift in January 1927. Those who moved to Somerset East found employment in the region. Those who remained on Elandsdrift were employed temporarily. After the failure of the Elandsdrift and Fontein’s Hoek schemes, the Knysna-Plettenberg Bay region became a significant area for Le Fleur’s land schemes.

Knysna
The Griqua Land Settlement Limited undertook to obtain a number of farms in the Knysna-Plettenberg Bay region in 1926 and 1927, for example, Dubbelberg, priced at £6000, Woodlands also priced at £6000, Jackalskraal prized at £3000, Loredo, Redford, Buffels River, and a portion of Kranshoek. Some adherents of the GNC also settled on property acquired at The Crags. From late 1926 a number of treks were undertaken from various places to land schemes in Knysna. Most of the trekkers were from Graaff-Reinet. Others came from places like Mosselbay, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and Genadendal. Groups of ‘Griqua’ trekked to Knysna from as far as Petrusberg and Philippolis in the Orange Free State.

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146 CCK 12, 15/1/5, WH Innes, Senior Inspector, CI Officer, E. Cape D, Grahamstown to Deputy Commissioner, SAP, Grahamstown, 11 October 1926.
147 CCK 12, 15/1/5, Acting Magistrate, East London, to Chief Native Commissioner, King William’s Town, 18 October 1926.
148 CCK 12, 15/1/5, FE Kunhardt, Inspector, Cradock, to Deputy Commissioner, Grahamstown, 13 December 1926.
149 GCPO, 28 January 1927.
150 CCK 12, 15/1/5, FE Kunhardt, Inspector, Cradock, to Deputy Commissioner, Grahamstown, 13 December 1926.
151 CCK 12, 15/1/5, PE Hole to District Commandant, Cradock, 12 December 1926.
152 CCK 12, 15/1/5, PE Hale, Divisional Inspector, SAP, Grahamstown, to Chief Native Commissioner, King William’s Town, 25 January 1927.
153 GCPO, 31 December 1926.
154 Cape Times, 24 January 1927.
156 The Crags is referred to in the GCPO as the Cracks, GCPO, 18 February 1927.
157 NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 3, Magistrate, Knysna, to Secretary, Native Affairs, Pretoria, 24 February 1932.
The trekkers encountered various problems on their way to the settlement schemes. A Group of trekkers, comprising about “sixty families”, encamped on the farm of GH Schreve at Moorlands in 1927. Schreve apparently gave the ‘Griqua’, who were 7 months on his farm, permission to camp on his property for a few weeks whilst they were trekking through. He subsequently had difficulty getting them off his ground. Hope of a better future generated by Le Fleur sustained many of the trekkers on their way to his land schemes. Le Fleur supposed that there was “an abundance of work” work for “men, women and children” in the vicinity of Knysna. He reasoned that the trekkers would not “in any way … squat on the properties bought by our Company” and that they would be all “immediately put to work to provide for themselves with local farmers”.

Sanity in question
Le Fleur’s persistence with unsuccessful settlements schemes suggested to many government officials and some White farmers that he was insane or a deceiver and his followers deluded. The chief Native commissioner at King William’s Town, wanted “Law Advisers” to suggest some means of preventing Le Fleur from continuing from point to point as he has done for years. His promises have never matured and there is no doubt these people are becoming pauperised by contributing money to grandiose schemes which invariably fail. Could his mental state not be enquired into?

The Cape Town deputy commissioner of the South African Police was one of those who thought that Le Fleur was a deceiver and his followers deluded:

I cannot imagine how the promoters of the Griqua Movement can possibly hope to establish their followers on farms in the Knysna area and with any idea of their becoming agriculturalists, or of ultimately becoming farmers; these seen by me are a poverty stricken crowd of all mixed nationalities. A form of religious mania appears to be instilled into them by Le Fleur, who to my mind is an arch scoundrel and who, together with a few Europeans, are exploiting these people. The whole movement has a wonderful appeal to the Coloured population who blindly contribute towards the general fund, and whose hopes are centred in the promises of Le Fleur, which can never materialize.

White farmers in Knysna appear to have been generally opposed to the inflow of ‘Griqua’ into the region. As was the case in the Bedford–Somerset East region, White farmers in Knysna were concerned that a Griqua settlement would lead to a depreciation of the value of adjacent farms and deter the purchase of farms. Whites wanted the prime minister to introduce legislation to stop the ‘Griqua’ migration into that region. Government officials managed to achieve some success in their attempt to discourage trekkers to Le Fleur’s schemes in the vicinity of Knysna. A group of trekkers from Philippolis turned back at Cradock. It was, however, difficult for government officials to dissuade many of Le Fleur’s adherents from participating in his schemes. Government officials also struggled to get information about Le Fleur from his adherents that they might use in their attempt to curb his activities. Many of those who had already embarked on treks had high

158 GCPO, 28 January 1927.
159 NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 3, MM Jackson, Inspector, SAP, Oudtshoorn, to Deputy Commissioner, SAP, Cape Town, 27 January 1927.
160 CCK 12, 15/1/5, Sergeant GJ Strydom, SAP, Karreddow, to SAP, Humansdorp, 17 September 1927.
162 NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 3, Chief Native Commissioner, King William’s Town, to Secretary, Native Affairs, Pretoria, 4 February 1927.
163 NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 3, Deputy Commissioner, SAP, Cape Town to Commissioner, SAP, Pretoria, 4 February 1927.
164 CCK 12, 15/1/5, Secretary, Native Affairs, Pretoria, to Chief Native Commissioner, King William’s Town, 18 February 1927; NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 3, “Minutes of special emergency meeting held at Knysna on 22. 1. 27”.
165 GCPO, 28 January 1927; Cape Times, 24 January 1927.
hopes and confidence in Le Fleur and were suspicious of government officials, as exemplified by the “obstinate” group of trekkers that Sergeant GJ Strydom, from Karreddouw, encountered on the farm of GH Schreve at Moorlands in 1927.

The trekkers who were encamped on the farm of Shreve comprised “Hottentots and cross-bred Hottentot-Kaffirs” who “call[ed] themselves Griquas”. They declined to speak to Strydom individually but were willing as a group to answer questions of their general organization, but not on Le Fleur:

As a body they will answer questions, re general organization, but when it comes to what they call their Chief: le Fleur, they will not answer any questions: they simply decline to give any statement as to what they did or are contributing to le Fleur, or what benefits they are to receive, and on this point take up a rather hostile attitude, and I have to leave the camp just as wise as I went there. … Le Fleur has been trying to buy land in the Knysna District for the last twelve months, but up to date failed to settle any of these people, who are left stranded in the road, having already lost most of their belongings and practically all draught animals. These people have all faith in their scheme and are very hot-headed, and will not listen to my argument.

The unwillingness or inability of Le Fleur’s adherents to give the kind of information about him that officials like Strydom desired, that is, information that was in line with their suspicion, could further reinforce the lingering suspicion that his activities were seditious and that his followers were very much under his spell. Strydom was of the opinion that there is some underhand work by le Fleur, and furthermore I am of the opinion that something should be done. To me it will appear a second Bull-Hoek affair. The general attitude of these people in the camp are very much the same as the start of the Bullhoek affair when over 160 people of a religious sect led by Enoch Mgijima were killed by government forces in 1921 when they refused to leave Bulhoek near Queenstown when order to do so.

Through his organizational activities, Le Fleur’s support spread across the country. A number of Coloureds were turned into Griqua through joining the GIC and GNC and through their participation in his land settlement schemes. Le Fleur, however, also generated suspicion amongst Coloureds of being a fraudster and troublemaker. His reputation was also undermined through the failure of his schemes. It was particularly in East Griqualand where Le Fleur started his public life that he was highly suspected and opposed. Le Fleur, however, still had some support among the ethno-‘racial’ underclasses in East Griqualand. The failure of the 1917 resettlement scheme in the vicinity of Touws River and subsequent ones, allowed government officials to be more effective in their attempts to erode his support in East Griqualand and to dissuade Griqua from participating in his schemes.

**East Griqualand - 1927**

Whilst still in the early phase of the resettlement schemes in the vicinity of Knysna, Le Fleur once again visited East Griqualand in March 1927, promoting his land schemes, after having visited the region a year before. He was again kept under close police observation. According to the Kokstad Mayor Samuel Halford:

Le Fleur painted a glowing picture of fertile lands laid out into plots, where produce could be grown in plenty, while markets were near by. His speech was listened to in stolid silence, no questions were asked … .

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166 CCK 12, 15/1/5, Secretary, Native Affairs, Pretoria, to Chief Native Commissioner, King William’s Town, 12 February 1927.
167 CCK 12, 15/1/5, Sergeant GJ Strydom, SAP, Karredow, to NCO, SAP, Humansdorp, 17 September 1927.
168 On the Bulhoek massacre, see Robert Edgar: Because they chose the plan of God (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1988).
Called by Reverend G Archibalds, the Griqua church minister, to address the crowd, Halford “reminded them of how, a few years earlier, Le Fleur had enticed away a number of their nation with glowing accounts of the land prepared and waiting for them, where prosperity was assured”, and “how those poor people had been deluded”. The support that Le Fleur hoped for was consequently not forthcoming.\footnote{Samuel L Halford: \textit{The Griquas of Griqualand: A historical narrative of the Griqua people, their rise, progress, and decline} (Cape Town and Johannesburg, Juta, n.d.), p. 188.}

Le Fleur’s Kokstad meetings were, to his disappointment, not well attended by Griqua or Coloureds.\footnote{NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 3, Statement by Solomon Nono, Kokstad, 29 March 1927; Detective R Broekeman, CID, Kokstad, to District Commandant, SAP, Kokstad, 4 April 1927.} His meeting in Kokstad on 26 March 1927 was, according to Solomon Nono, attended by “Hlangwinis, Xesibe’s, Barolongs, or Bahlapeng’s … [but] no Griquas at all with the exception of … [Le Fleur’s] attendants from Cape Town District. There was not a big attendance of people at this meeting, and at the conclusion, Le Fleur told the meeting that on Monday the 28th March 1927 he will again hold a big meeting at the same house … and then he will expect good attendance”. At the subsequent meeting at Reverend Makabuwa’s house, Le Fleur preached to a “small number of natives”. At the close of the meeting Le Fleur thanked all the natives that attended the service, and also told them that he was disappointed at not seeing a single Griqua at his service”. A further meeting had a “very small attendance” of “mostly local Bahlapeng’s”. A Tlhaping choir sang at the meeting but no speech was delivered. On departing from the meeting Le Fleur and three of his men went into a nearby house but they were not well received. A number of men threw stones at them. The Griqua were “all up against Le Fleur” and did not want him there. Some of the Bantu-speakers were consequently uneasy to attend Le Fleur’s meetings. Nono claimed that at one meeting a “Native” expressed concern to Le Fleur about the absence of Griqua at his meetings:

> All we native people are wondering why your meetings are attended only by us natives, and this will cause us to be afraid of attending them, as we don’t know the reason.\footnote{NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 3, Statement by Solomon Nono, Kokstad, 29 March 1927.}

The activities of Le Fleur in East Griqualand were curbed through his arrest. With Griqua being defined as “aboriginal Natives” in Proclamation 109 of 1894 (as amended by Proclamation 92 of 1903) Le Fleur was charged before the assistant magistrate of Mount Currie for contravening Proclamation 109 of 1894 by being in Kokstad between 26 ad 29 March, having entered the Transkeian Territories without a pass (that ‘Natives’ were require to obtain before entering the Territories). Le Fleur pleaded not guilty but was convicted on 31 March 1927 and sentenced to pay a fine of £1 or else to undergo a month’s imprisonment with hard labour. Le Fleur appealed unsuccessfully against his conviction.\footnote{NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 3, W Wright, Magistrate, Kokstad, to Chief Magistrate, Umtata, 11 May 1927. Halford: \textit{Griquas of Griqualand}, p. 188; Rex v Le Fleur, 1927, EDL [South African Law Reports, Eastern Districts Local Division], p. 341.}

With Le Fleur having thus been located legally as a Griqua and a ‘Native’ he would have to possess a pass signed by a resident magistrate or other authorized official before entering the Transkeian Territories of which East Griqualand was part. His ability to move in the Transkeian Territories would thus have been much determined by the wishes of officials authorized to issue and sign passes. The obstruction of Le Fleur’s movement in the Transkeian Territories further undermined his influence in East Griqualand, already eroded though his failed faming resettlement schemes. Although Le Fleur lost much support in East Griqualand, there was still a predisposition amongst sections of the underclasses, especially amongst Bantu-speakers, to support a figure with the stature of Le Fleur who might mobilize support for a revolt against White domination.

\textbf{Singelwa}

Despite his ethno-‘racial’ pronouncements, Le Fleur continued to be regarded as a significant leader by some people in the Bantu-speaking communities of East Griqualand. A ‘Native’ named Singelwa apparently
claimed to be a “chief Induna” for Le Fleur in Pata’s location where he (Singelwa) had much influence. A
detective was informed that Singelwa claimed that the country was going to be taken over by Le Fleur, and
that after Le Fleur had chased all the Whites out of the country, all people who were in possession of ‘passes’
would be given farms. Many ‘Natives’ were said to have already received passes that they paid for. Singelwa
told people to get rid of their pigs as he was going to drive all the Whites away from Umzimkulu through
mixing certain herbs, and that the mixture would not work if there were pigs in his area. Singelwa would be
chief after White people were driven out and Le Fleur would be the paramount chief. Many ‘Natives’ in the
area were said to be eagerly awaiting the fulfilment of Singelwa’s claims.

The Natives in this vicinity are very excited and agitated and pay money and kill pigs as instructed by Singelwa.
They are not going to fight or resort to violence yet, but are firm in the belief that on a certain day this
“Singelwa” will work his charms and magic to his aid and then all the Europeans, together with the Natives who
have not joined up and bought receipts, will either be burned or driven out of the land.  

A few months after Le Fleur’s March 1927 conviction, Singelwa was charged with fraud, together with GIC
Reverend George White. The relation between Le Fleur and Bantu-speakers remained ambivalent, with Le
Fleur making very racist and segregationist pronouncements even though some people of Bantu-speaking
origin became involved in his schemes. Whilst Le Fleur promoted segregation and affirmed the difference
of Griqua from ‘Natives’ and Bantu-speakers, people of Bantu-speaking origin were nevertheless
incorporated in Le Fleur’s organizational structures. Griqua separation from Bantu-speakers was further
complicated by the fact that there were already people of Bantu-speaking origin within the Griqua
communities, that is, before Le Fleur’s Griqua-Coloured nation-building campaign. By separating the Griqua
category from the ‘Native’ category, and by linking Griqua to Coloureds, those of Bantu-speaking origin in
Le Fleur’s GNC-GIC structures and land schemes were also liable to be turned into non-‘Natives’, Griqua and
Coloureds.

**Settlement failures**

Le Fleur could not realize his goal of establishing self-reliant farming communities. The resettlement
endeavours of Le Fleur and his associates during the 1930s suffered the same fate as previous endeavours.
They did not have sufficient capital to hold on to land that they purchased on credit. By 1929 the Griqua Land
Settlement Limited had purchased, presumably on mortgage, land in De Aar, including 550 **erven** in the area
of the Waterdale Village Management Board. The company undertook to start farming that “would help to
keep over a hundred families employed”. The company also undertook to open paint and lime factories.
Two of Le Fleur’s agents, Johannes Jacobs and Sam Janse, apparently did promotional work in the Free State
in 1932, facing much government opposition when they attempted to enter Thaba Nchu.

The Griqua Land Settlement Limited could not raise money to pay instalments on the purchase price of the
farms in Knysna and elsewhere, resulting in the cancellation of sale agreements. Some ‘Griqua’ obtained

### Sources

175 NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 3, HE Grant, Magistrate, Umzimkulu, to Chief Magistrate, Transkeian Territories, Umtata, 26
March 1928.
176 See chapter 5 in regard to involvement of some people of Bantu-speaking origin in Le Fleur’s schemes.
177 JUS 528, 6515/29, Magistrate, De Aar to Secretary for Justice, Pretoria, 23 October 1929.
178 JUS 528, 6515/29, AAS le Fleur, Chairman, Griqua Land Settlement Ltd., to Resident Magistrate, De Aar, 21
October 1929.
179 JUS 528, 6515/29, Magistrate, De Aar to Secretary for Justice, Pretoria, 23 October 1929.
180 NTS 7600. 4/328, Part 3, Native Commissioner, Department of Native Affairs, Thaba Nchu, to Secretary, Native
Affairs, Pretoria, 22 July 1932; John S Allison, Secretary, Native Affairs to Native Commissioner, Thaba Nchu,
temporary or fixed employment on White owned farms.\textsuperscript{181} A number became tenants on the land of a Mr Victor, a White person, in Plettenberg Bay.\textsuperscript{182} Despite the lingering suspicion about Le Fleur’s activities, the reputation was taking hold officially that the Griqua were respectable law-abiding subjects. In 1932 the magistrate of Knysna described the Griqua in the region as “undoubtedly law abiding, well behaved, and well controlled. No theft or crime is reported”.\textsuperscript{183}

Though Le Fleur had little success with his land schemes, not being able to raise money for the outright purchase of any farm, the Kranshoek farm, rented by Griqua from different White owners from the late 1920s, was exceptional, being occupied by the adherents of Le Fleur on a continuous basis and, growing after Le Fleur’s death, into the principal settlement and organizational basis of Griqua under the GNC.\textsuperscript{184} After Le Fleur’s death in 1941 his son Thomas negotiated with Johannes van Rooyen for the lease of Kranshoek at £60 a year. The farm was, however, purchased by another White person, a Mr Maloney, with whom the Griqua entered another lease agreement. The farm was finally purchased by the government for the benefit of the Griqua in 1957 for R8 678,\textsuperscript{185} in gratitude for the loyalty displayed by the Le Fleur Griqua, especially through their participation in the 1952 Van Riebeeck Festival.\textsuperscript{186}

**Conclusion**

This chapter showed that Le Fleur was strongly driven by his ideal and vision of Griqua-Coloured nationhood being cultivated in farming resettlement schemes, an ideal and vision that propelled him despite persistent setbacks. His success in drawing support for his schemes, despite past failures, reflected his capacity to inspire people with his splendid visions of an alternative existence. Poverty and socio-economic marginalization and a yearning for an alternative order or existence amongst sections of the ethno-‘racial’ underclasses encouraged Le Fleur to pursue his ideals; poverty and socio-economic marginalization and a yearning for an alternative order amongst sections of the underclasses also sensitized many to Le Fleur’s ideas and schemes. Drawing on past Griqua independence and landownership, Le Fleur’s resettlement schemes also readily reactivated identification with a Khoekhoe past, especially amongst Khoe-San descendants in rural areas, prompting sections of the underclasses to participate in his land schemes. Whilst Le Fleur’s reputation as a rebel leader made his pronouncements against dependence on Whites liable to be interpreted as a call for revolt against White oppression, his ethno-religious schemes inculcated behaviour that was constitutional. Through the promotion of a Griqua category amongst Coloureds, Le Fleur reconnected Coloureds of Khoekhoe descent with their Griqua-mediated Khoekhoe past. By promoting a Griqua identity amongst Coloureds, Le Fleur and his associates also cultivated identification with a Khoekhoe heritage amongst Coloureds who might not necessarily have been of Khoekhoe descent. Through the inclusion of some people of Bantu-speaking origin in his organizational structures and resettlement schemes, Le Fleur also made it possible for them to be classified as Griqua and Coloured. Through his organizational work amongst people who were not traditionally Griqua, Le Fleur contributed to the broadening of the Griqua population.


\textsuperscript{182} NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 3, GF Strydom, Knysna, to AG de Smidt, Knysna, 17 December 1931.

\textsuperscript{183} NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 3, Magistrate, Knysna, to Secretary, Native Affairs, Pretoria, 24 February 1932.


\textsuperscript{186} Chapter 7 deals with Griqua participation in the Van Riebeeck Festival.
Chapter 6: Griqua-Coloured ethno-nationalism (1920-1970s)

This chapter explores Le Fleur’s peculiar Griqua-Coloured ethno-nationalism and the significance of the Griqua and Coloured People’s Opinion (GCPO), Griqua National Conference (GNC), and the Griqua Independent Church (GIC) in his attempt between 1920 and 1941 to unify and reform Coloureds as Griqua into ordered law abiding, self-reliant and proud ethno-national Christian subjects. The chapter also explores Le Fleur’s ambivalent association of the Griqua and Coloured categories in his ethno-national project. Building on the previous one, this chapter shows that it was especially through the belief that Le Fleur had supernatural abilities and that he was called by God to ‘deliver’ his people, that he was able to impress people with his visions of an alternative existence and to retain his followers, despite setbacks. The divine intent that Le Fleur imputed on his Griqua-Coloured ethno-building project made his followers believe that their own participation was special and part of a divine plan. Whilst Le Fleur resolved to turn Coloureds into Griqua, he also reinforced the association of the Coloured and Griqua categories, thus contributing to the distancing of Griquaness from ‘Nativity’ during a period when Griqua were liable to be categorized as ‘Native’, and to be subjected to attendant restrictions. Reflecting the colonial juncture in which Griqua and Coloureds were constituted – a juncture characterized by the erosion of Khoi-San cultures, and the appropriation and ascendance of colonial culture and values amongst colonized sections – Le Fleur cultivated a Griqua identity that appealed much to Christian and European cultural values at the same time as he promoted the affirmation of Khoekhoe identities.

Griqua and Coloured People’s Opinion

By 1920 Le Fleur had embarked on an earnest project to organize Coloureds and to unite them under a Griqua category. In attempting to turn Coloureds into Griqua and to turn the latter into respectable self-disciplined and law abiding subjects, Le Fleur had to contend with alternative self-representations and socio-political agendas. He also had to contend with depreciating representations of Griqua, Coloureds and Bantu-speaking African communities which stemmed from operative racial discourses. As was the case with those who promoted alternative oppositional representations, Le Fleur utilized some of the technologies of representation used in the promotion of dominant discourses, establishing his own newspaper. He also distributed a huge amount of documents within the organizational structures that he created that promoted his ideas as well as his leadership as a Griqua paramount chief.

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1 See e.g. University of South Africa Library (archival division), Pretoria, Le Fleur Collection (LC).
Established early in 1920\(^2\) by Le Fleur, the *Griqua & Coloured Peoples Opinion* (GCPO) was originally meant to be a weekly “coloured paper”\(^3\) promoting the advancement and “unity of our [Coloured] races”. Projected as non-political, the newspaper articulated opposition to the labour movement, socialism and Coloured political leaders from its inception. Whilst the GCPO lamented from its inception the poverty and the lack of institutions owned by Coloureds, it advocated the need to advance social justice through constitutional means.\(^4\) The GCPO was also utilized to promote Le Fleur’s leadership aspirations, projecting him as a creditable leader of Griqua and Coloured people who was called by God to restore them into nationhood.\(^5\)

The name of the newspaper reflected Le Fleur’s attempt at forging unity between Griqua and Coloureds. It also reflected Le Fleur’s attempt to turn Coloureds into Griqua in a manner that reinforced the association of Griqua with the Coloured category. The GCPO manifested well at its inception Le Fleur’s ethno-’racial’ and socio-political positioning:

> We have decided to start a weekly paper of our races entirely a coloured paper with the only aim to see our people’s advancement. We are not prepared to allow our paper to be used as a medium for party Politics or for creating disunion with other races or to [stir?] up strife about past matters. Our aim will be to bring about unity amongst what is commonly known to be coloured people for social moral and material advancement in every form and therefore we are starting our paper without outside aid or funds [O]ur principle will be not to attack other races and so raise hostile feeling, but to seek the friendly co-operation of all races, as we feel sure. We who live in South Africa need unity not strife and bitterness which will only end in destruction of our whole country and race. … Our aims will be to warn our people against Bolshevist or what is termed socialism. Because it is a deceiving spirit and an evil which need checking in the bud out of our people as it is sure to create a spirit of hatred and murder in the end. …Coloured people who are not so fully aware of this evil, will be led to join this Bolshevist movement who comes under the guise of higher wages, better homes and other things less work, and so on. … All people in the district will be led to believe a war on Capitalist, will remove our sorrow and better our condition. This is entirely false, it will do nothing of the kind [I]t will be just the reverse and bring about less work, more starvation and lead to our children walking naked and ourselves in our graves or in other words, Hell let loose and the devil triumphant. One will want more than the other, and murder and plunder will be the order of the day.

In promoting Coloured unity through the GCPO Le Fleur appealed to a common descent that he associated with a past unity, thus suggesting an aspiration for the restoration or recreation of a purported lost unity:

> Our aim is to bring this unity about [W]e propose first that we come to recognise our race, we all spring from one stock. [W]e must come and see that we are a people [and] learn to acknowledge that our common interest is one you see.\(^6\)

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\(^2\) Early copies of the GCPO are difficult to come by. One early copy, Vol. I, No 12, Friday 9 April 1920, can be found at National Archives, Pretoria, Secretary of Native Affairs (NTS) 7600, 4/328, Part 2. Given that the GCPO first appeared as a weekly paper, the first issue (Vol. 1, No 1) must thus have been dated Friday 23 January 1920. A substantial but incomplete set of GCPO issues can be found in the Le Fleur Collection at Unisa. Reproductions of the Unisa set are available at the Cape Town National Library.

\(^3\) LC, *Griqua and Coloured Peoples Opinion* and Editorials file, undated editorial document for “Griqua and Coloured Opinion” titled “Interdictionary leaders of the Griquas and Coloured Opinion” [sic]. The content of the document shows that it was written at the inception of the GCPO. The GCPO was printed by Cape Times Printers. Griqua manuscript (writer and date not known), p. 25.


\(^5\) See e.g. GCPO, 10 December 1926; 28 January 1927; 17 September 1928; 2 December 1933.


As suggested in the *GCPO*, Le Fleur did not only project a common indigenous lineage on Coloureds and Griqua but imputed this lineage with ‘race’ mixing that preceded White settlement in South Africa. Reflecting the appropriation of colonial historiography in the projection of a shared indigenous ancestry of Griqua and Coloureds, the *GCPO* indicated that:

In 1624 our forefathers lived in South Africa as heathens under their chiefs. They migrated from North Africa, and came along downwards to the South. Our race was a mixed one, and it had its own language and in every mode of thinking and acting a similarity with the Jews. Our forefathers mixed with the Bantu and Bushmen and thus we developed to what we were before the European came here. Then came the time, in 1652, when the Europeans, who for many years had done trading by ships with our people, settled here and with them the intermixture continued; we then became an even more mixed race and lived amongst the Europeans. Slowly we developed to form a distinct race with a chief. The chief tribes that lived on the West Coast were called Namaquas, and those on the Eastern shore, near Mossel Bay, were called Outeniquas. In what is now Paarl lived the Korannas and in Saldanha Bay Namaquas. These lived in clans and at Mamre the mixed race got the name of Griquas and are greatly mixed with the Europeans. … Many of … [the slaves] got mixed up through Inter-marriage with Griquas, and also formed an important link in the Coloured Race, which intermixture is still going on to-day.\(^7\)

Although Griqua were inclined to acknowledge having Khoekhoe, European and slave ancestry, thus suppressing a Bantu-speaking and San heritage, Le Fleur appropriated historiography that induced him to accept that “Our forefathers mixed with the Bantu and Bushmen”. Le Fleur could thus affirm that the Griqua had Bantu-speaking African, North African, Khoekhoe (or ‘Hottentot’), San (or ‘Bushman’), European and slave ancestry, and that they were a ‘mixed race’ and Coloured.

Although he affirmed that the Griqua were Coloured, Le Fleur regarded the Coloured category as limiting for his nation-building project amongst Coloureds. Whilst the association of the Coloured category with partial European ancestry made it a privileged category relative to the ‘Native’ category, it also had negative associations undermining attempts at forging Coloured pride and ethno-national integrity. Located midway between Whites and Bantu-speaking Africans in the colonial ethno-‘racial’ hierarchy, Coloureds tended to be identified negatively as those people who were neither White nor ‘Native’/‘Bantu’/African/Black who lacked distinctive cultural features that might be imputed on other social groups.\(^8\) Given White denouncements of ‘racial mixing’, Colouredness became associated with “immorality, sexual promiscuity, illegitimacy, impurity, and untrustworthiness”. The definition of Coloured identity “in terms of ‘lack or taint, or in terms of a ‘remainder’ or excess’” which did “not fit a classificatory scheme”,\(^9\) “reinforced ideas that Coloured people were not of the same standing as other groups” and “that their claims to autonomous group status – usually articulated in terms of the word ‘nation’, ‘people’ or ‘race’ – were deficient or lacked a degree of authenticity”.\(^10\)

The association of Griqua with ‘racial mixing’ and Colouredness made the category liable to draw the negative connotations of the Coloured category. The Griqua category, however, easily generated ethno-national specificity that could draw on past Griqua polities.\(^11\) The category was also associated with leadership by captains or chiefs that Le Fleur sought to promote amongst Coloureds, with himself as a pre-eminent chief. Le Fleur’s uneasiness with the Coloured category was strongly suggested in a 1925 newspaper

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\(^7\) “Short history”, GCPO, 3 September 1927. This *GCPO* article a slight alteration of s similarly titled article of in an issue of 23 January 1925


\(^10\) Adhikari: “Continuity and change in the expression of Coloured identity”, pp. 34-5.

\(^11\) LC, Item 9.2, “The late Griqua leader”. 

article in which he was reported to have objected to being “classed as a coloured man” and to have mentioned that “[t]he name coloured would always be regarded by him and his people as degrading, and [that] they would refuse to be called bastards for the sake of accepting equality with Europeans”. Le Fleur was also reported to have uncharacteristically stated that the Griqua “would prefer to remain in the native category”. Though uneasy with the Coloured category, Le Fleur was not generally inclined to express outright rejection of the category. Given the deficiency of the Coloured category for his ethno-national project, Le Fleur attempted to transform Coloureds into Griqua. Though Le Fleur achieved little success in his land schemes, the GCPO boasted about Griqua achievement in regard to government recognition:

Let us see what they have achieved since they began in 1917. They have got their National Status recognized in Law, their Church Conference by the King and the Governor-General, their National Conference, their Land Settlement by the Government, and see what the few who were not mislead from their Chief into foul slander, got as a reward – a Great Race is to-day recognized by our Greatest men of European Extraction.

The GCPO also specifically boasted about the special status of the Griqua as a ‘mixed-race’:

The mixed people who call themselves Griquas, have this in their favour [they have recognition as a nation] …. [B]y Act of Parliament they are recognised as a distinct nation. Again by judgement of Supreme Court the Griquas are pronounced a mixed race. …. Can the European cede more recognition than we have already on national grounds? … Our race has become one, under one leader and our position as the official body in our race is recognised by the King, Government of South Africa, and League of Nations.

Although Le Fleur regarded the Coloured category to be of limited value for the creation the nationhood he strived for, he had to use it in his attempt to turn Coloureds into Griqua. He also found it useful to apply to the Griqua in so far as it reinforced their association with ‘mixed racial’ descent and distinguished and separated them from ‘Natives’, thus making them less liable to be subjected to restrictions imposed upon ‘Natives’. By imputing the Griqua category with ‘racial mixture’ and Colouredness, Le Fleur could thus secure privileges that the Coloured category conferred and at the same time invoke the ethno-national qualities of the Griqua category which were lacking in the Coloured category. Given that many Coloureds were ashamed of their Khoe-San heritage, the association of the Griqua category with ‘Hottentots’ who were associated with primitivism and inferiority, would have made Le Fleur’s attempt at turning Coloureds into Griqua very challenging.

A wide variety of societal segments categorized as Coloured were targets of Le Fleur’s mobilization and thus, for him, potential Griqua, as Reverend John F Jeptha, from Le Fleur’s Griqua church indicated in 1924:

[O]ns wil hê alle kleurlinge moet hulle as onder die banier van die Griekwas beskou. Ons wil hulle laat voel dat ons een volk is, dan sal daar drie nasionaliteite in die land wees, n.l. Die Bantoe, Griekwa en die witman.

Even Cape Malays were for Le Fleur potential Griqua. It was reasoned in a 1925 GCPO issue that

[t]here are many people who argue we cannot class the Malays as Griquas; we ask, where can you draw the line? seeing that they are to-day so intermixed in us, how can they claim a different Asiatic Nationality? We cannot go by the Religion, that is another matter altogether from the National History.

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12 *Star*, 30 December 1925, p. 8.
13 GCPO, 15 May 1925.
14 GCPO, 23 January 1925, relevant article (titled “Short History”) reprinted in issue of 3 September 1927.
16 GCPO, 23 January 1925.
Le Fleur did not regard Cape Malays in the same way as he regarded the ‘Asiatics’ to whom he displayed an
aversion that had both an economic dimension and a cultural-religious one. Although he evinced hostility to
Islam (associated with Malays), the Cape Malays were for him a mixed group intertwined with Coloureds
whom he sough to mobilize. He regarded, on the other hand, the ‘Asiatic’ as a group posing an economic
threat to Coloured people. ‘Asiatics’ were for him also a religious and cultural group that posed a threat to
Christendom and ‘Western civilization’. Interpreting world events and conflicts much in terms of his
understanding of the Bible, notably Revelation, Le Fleur pitted Japan, India, Islam and Hinduism against
Christendom in a struggle for global domination. In terms of that scheme the accommodation of ‘Asiatics’ in
South Africa would be an invitation for ‘Asiatic’ domination on a local scale that would advance ‘Asiatic’
struggle for global domination. Le Fleur felt, as suggested in the *GCPO*, that ‘Asiatics’ should be kept out of
the country and that those who were in the country should be encouraged to go back to Asia:

> [I]t is their [Europeans’] duty towards the Country and themselves to keep out other Races, or do they possess
> the right to allow us to be swamped by Asia, and so to take the livelihood from the Coloured Race? Can the
> Asiatics claim to dispossess us from our very existence through economic pressure out of living in our country?
> Has not the government already allowed too much scope to this foreign invasion, whereby already to-day our
> children are ... in the hands of the Asiatic traders? ... The Europeans and ourselves have built up South Africa
to the high position it holds to-day and not the Asiatics from Asia, from whom we have received no
development, they have only made large profits out of the country and built themselves up with profit, which
comes from our hard earnings. The time has probably arrived for the Asiatics to leave our Country.  

As an ethno-national instrument, the *GCPO* promoted pride in being Griqua as well as Coloured. Given the
somatic variety amongst Coloureds and the liability of somatic distinctions to generate status differentiation
and to discourage a sense of peoplelessness, drawing on the Bible, the *GCPO* encouraged Coloureds to look
beyond somatic differences:

> Do let us discard the colour of our skin, which threw away the beautiful work in the past, it is only skin deep
> and get into the depth of our human life, and let us rather than wanting to be recognised by our skins, be
> recognised by our creation. Let us see what King David said in the 30th Psalm: “Oh God that has laid thine
> hand on me, for I am wonderfully and fearfully made, marvellous is the work of thine hands and that my soul
> knows full well.” Oh! This wonderful creation is despised by ourselves. Do let us understand that it is National
> Instinct in King David who made him acknowledge his creation.

**Griqua (National) Conference and the Griqua Independent Church of South Africa**

Le Fleur’s ideals were further cultivated and sustained amongst his followers through Griqua organizational
structures that he developed from 1920. Partly influenced by Le Fleur in their aspiration for Coloured unity
and an independent church for Griqua-Coloureds, Le Fleur’s adherents projected him as a person able to
advance Coloured unity and encouraged him to call a “Christian conference” for the advancement Coloured
interest and Coloured unity.  

Le Fleur subsequently organized a big conference in the Maitland Town Hall in Cape Town that eventually took place between Friday 2 April and Tuesday 6 April 1920. The conference took place during the Easter period which generated great symbolism for the event. Le Fleur at times, before, during and after the 1920 conference gave Khoekhoe content to the Colouredness and common descent of the people he sought to organize and for whom the 1920 and subsequent conferences were intended. Thus, in 1911 Le Fleur congratulated the English King George V and Queen Mary for their coronation on behalf of the “offspring of the Hottentot race”. In regard to the envisaged 1920 conference Le Fleur indicated that the “members of the Conference represent[ed] the Griquas, Namaquas Outeniquas and coloured people out of

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17 See *GCPO*, 8 January 1926.
18 *GCPO*, 26 June 1925.
19 LC, *GCPO* and Editorials file, incomplete document on, *inter alia*, the need for a conference.
20 *GCPO*, 9 April 1920.
21 GG 96 3/430, AAS le Fleur to Gladstone, Governor General, Pretoria [May 1911].
those races”. In referring to a 1922 Griqua conference he indicated that the “Assembly represent[ed] the following Tribes of our Race, what are commonly known as Griquas, Namaquas, Outeniquans and Hottentots and mixed Coloured people, which form the Griqua Tribe”. Le Fleur had a long-term social, economic, religious and ethno-national perspective in organizing the 1920 conference. For example, he undertook to propose at the conference that hostels, homes and hospitals be built across the country and that provision be made for coloured orphans. He also undertook to raise the problem of alcohol, education, trading and banking, socialism and the need for church unity.

A key concern of the conference would be unity, in line with Le Fleur’s earnest effort at forging Griqua-Coloured nationhood. He undertook to propose that a resolution be passed that unity ‘be our gospel in the future’. To foster unity Le Fleur also deemed it necessary to get rid of ‘the class pride out of the educated coloured people’ as they were ‘too proud to speak to the poorer people’. He deemed it necessary for the cultivation of unity that conferees were to recognize or cultivate a sense of a common descent and affirm that they were a ‘race’. A prepared address urged envisaged conferees to recognize each other as having sprung from one race. Let us learn to acknowledge our common interest is one, because we despise each other. We refuse to raise our fallen brothers. We leave them to white missionaries to preach to. Why? Because we refuse to accept national status. … I want to let us discuss freely this important point, viz: national status. We Griquas are recognized by law although being a mixed race. Wonderfully the wording of the act says the Griquas and the like and all the coloured people look just as we do. Now let us from to-day accept ourselves for ourselves and claim the rights belonging to ourselves of being a race created by God in all the glory that other races are created with. Let us establish a firm union in our own race.

Le Fleur undertook to lay a resolution before the conference that “a committee be appointed to deal with all urgent matters and to carry out the wishes of the Conference and do all things necessary for the uplifting of our race to the point of unity and harmony with other races”. Envisioning subsequent national gatherings, Le Fleur also intended to ask the conferees “to meet again in a Conference next year unless urgent matters would necessitate a special Conference, but to fix April as the time for an annual Conference”.

Conference symbolism

About 800 people attended the 1920 conference. The 1920 conference influenced very much the symbolism, themes and pattern of subsequent Griqua national conferences. The Easter period during which the conference was held was very symbolic. Easter was supposed to be a period commemorating the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ. Holding the conference during this period allowed for the association of the historical struggles and suffering of the Griqua and Coloureds with the suffering of Christ. Held during Easter the conference encouraged the association of the resurrection of Christ with the aspiration for a Christian-centred moral, social and economic restoration of Griqua and Coloureds as a nation.

The conference started on Good Friday (2 April) with a crucifixion service in the morning during which the significance of the crucifixion of Christ was explained. The service was held in the open air and attended by over three hundred people. Another service was held at 11 o’clock that was attended by about five hundred people. The crucifixion service was finalized in the evening. The day was brought to an end with special hymns sung by Griqua choirs. Choirs also sang on Saturday evening until the “resurrection service” was started at Le Fleur’s “residence” on Sunday morning where Le Fleur delivered an address on the resurrection.

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22 NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 2, AAS le Fleur, Kensington, Maitland, to Capt. Maryon Wilson, Cape Town 22 March 1920.
23 NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 2, AAS le Fleur to Prince Arthur of Connaught, Governor General, Cape Town, 15 April 1922
24 For prepared address by AAS le Fleur see NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 2, AAS le Fleur, Kensington, to G Hazlerigg, Secretary, Governor-General, 31 March 1920.
At 3.30 a.m. the choirs gathered up around our Chief’s residence and began the Easter joy of the Resurrection. … Here we asked God to endow us with a spirit to receive him in our hearts and lives, and we left after the sun rose, and felt we had received an answer to our prayers. The Chief … was truly in top form. His soul was beautifully illuminated with God’s spirit and that illumination lifted up our souls. It stirred our souls in God’s glory, which is the joy of all Christians’ lives, and thus opened the day for more blessings.25

Thus, whilst the religious ceremony was Christian, aspects similar to those associated with Khoekhoe religious traditions were also at work. The Saturday evening choir singing continuing until the Sunday morning “resurrection service” at Le Fleur’s “residence”, was reminiscent of pre-Christian Khoekhoe all night communal singing and the worshipping of Tsuni-/Goam in the bush at dawn.26 The main service, held at Maitland Town Hall was marked by characteristic ritual of the Le Fleur Griqua:

At 9.30 the choirs gathered at Maitland Town Hall, and on the arrival of our Chief, lined and sang the beautiful anthem “I shall see the king in His beauty.” When this was over, two choirs followed, singing, “Cry aloud and shout, for great is the Holy One of Israel.” Then the older men went into the rooms behind, where the Chief led with a most impressive prayer …

The morning service was quite full, with some people having had to stand. A service was also held for children in the afternoon attended by over two hundred children. A service was again held in the evening.

The 1920 conference was organized in two stages, the first being devoted to religious activities from Friday to Sunday. The more secular concerns were dealt with on Monday and Tuesday when serious deliberations were actually conducted. The atmosphere on the last days of the conference was, however, also a religious one, reflecting thus a Griqua universe in which the secular and spiritual could be intimately connected, and by extension, the religious (or ethno-religious) nature of the ethnic identity of the Le Fleur Griqua. The interconnection of the religious and secular also reflected the practical dimension of Le Fleur’s Christianity. Like it was on Sunday, the events of Monday were started with prayers at the residence of Le Fleur where a gathering was held early before daylight:

Armed with the spirit of God, we started our prayer to God to lead us aright in our work, as we felt we were going to deal with the future of our children and we needed God’s guidance in so grave a matter, and we needed light and patience. Unless God gave us that light our work would end in darkness.

The ritualism at Maitland Town Hall on Sunday was repeated on Monday:

We gathered at the Maitland Town Hall at 9.30, and at 10 a.m. the chief arrived. The two hundred choir girls and men waited lined up and ready. Over four hundred men lined the route to the hall, where the Committee leaders and old men were waiting at the entrance of the hall. The Chief was saluted by the Choir master, and the choirs sang “Teach me, O Lord, the way of Thy salvation.” After a review of the choirs, they sang “I shall see the King in His beauty.”

After singing, and a prayer by Le Fleur, the “opening ceremony address was read”, followed by addresses to the king of England and to Lord and Lady Buxton (in their absence), reflecting Le Fleur’s attempt at obtaining official support and respect for his ethno-building endeavours. As suggested before, during his address Le Fleur gave more precise Khoekhoe content to the heritage of the people to whom the conference was intended, suggesting an attempt at reviving or encouraging identification with a broad Khoekhoe ancestral heritage:

25 GCPO, 9 April 1920.
Fathers of the Griqua, Namaqua and Outeniqua Branches of our race, and all coloured people springing from those Branches: we are here to-day to gather for the first time under the shade of Table Mountain since our forefathers moved into the interior in the Sixteenth Century.

Le Fleur’s address was characteristically inspired by his Christian sensibilities. It also manifested the extent to which he internalized (some) colonial values, even as he challenged (some of) them in encouraging identification with a heritage devalued in colonial discourse. His address also suggested his attempt at allaying White concerns that he had seditious motives:

It was God’s will that we should become scattered, that the European people should be sent into our country, and that we should bow to their ruling. In many ways we believed our forefathers disliked the advent of the Europeans, and undoubtedly they suffered many wrongs, but they were heathens and knew not the Lord Jesus. Let us ask ourselves to-day, admitting the sufferings and wrongs: What were the blessing the Europeans brought? The wrongs which they and we suffered melt away like snow before the sun. What was that sun but the glorious gospel of Jesus Christ? They gave us this Gospel, entrusted to them by God, and they gave it us most fully; they hid nothing.  

The significance of singing, which served to keep Le Fleur’s followers together and to maintain their attachment to his teachings, was reflected at the conference. Choirs sang at the beginning and end of ceremonies as well as at intervals “rendering some beautiful music, which was most heartily appreciated by the audience”. Many of the hymns sung by Le Fleur’s choirs reflected the appropriation and redeployment English and Dutch hymns for Le Fleur’s Griqua-Coloured nation-building project. Many of the songs of the Griqua were composed by themselves and dealt specifically with their volk experiences and aspirations. Many of their hymns were also derived from Dutch and English hymnbooks, for example, the Evangelisch Gezangboek that was later rendered into Afrikaans (Evangelies Gesangboek) and The Bristol Chant, Anthem and Service Book, the Alexander Hymns no. 3 and the Congregational Anthems. The words of the Griqua National Conference anthem, “God ewig, groot en goed” was, with many other songs of the Griqua, also in the Evangelies Gesangboek. Le Fleur himself taught his adherents hymns out of Dutch Hymn books, including the popular “Juig Aarde”. The Christian songs generally sang by Griqua, were of various kinds, for example, revival, deliverance, offering, faith, thanks-giving and praise songs.

The conference was adjourned at 22h30 and reconvened on Tuesday. Key resolutions were taken on the final conference day. A twenty-four man council was selected “to assist the Chief in the work of our race”. The conference also decided to accept “the Griqua Church as our national Church, as constituted at Kokstad and Griquatown”. Although 1920 is often referred to as the year in which the Griqua Independent Church of South Africa (GIC) was established, the church was apparently already “established” in “Kensington by the members of the Griqua Church, since their arrival in Cape Town”. Thus, the 1920 Conference might have occasioned the reconstitution of the Griqua Church (modelled on the one at Kokstad) as an independent Griqua church under the leadership of Le Fleur. Le Fleur’s Griqua church was not formally linked to the church at Kokstad. His own Griqua Independent Church would thus in a sense have been established in 1920.

The identification of Griquanness with Colouredness was sharply manifested through a resolution that the government be requested to make provisions for a representative body, the Coloured National Council, through which Coloureds could deal with their affairs. It was envisaged that such a council would deal with
issues such as schooling, religion, housing, hospitals, Coloured settlement management boards, trade, assurance and banking.\textsuperscript{33}

The 1920 conference was followed by regular national gatherings. Their organizational structure was at first simply called the Griqua Conference. By 1925 the organizational structure was called the Griqua National Conference.\textsuperscript{34} The 1920 conference was a very important event for Le Fleur’s Griqua-Coloured ethno-nation building. Reflecting on the 1920 conference in 1938 Le Fleur declared that “we became a people at Maitland Town Hall on Easter 1920, and God became our God”.\textsuperscript{35} The establishment of GIC and GNC braches served to bind Le Fleur’s adherents.

The establishment of a GIC and GNC reflected Le Fleur’s attempt to achieve both socio-economic and spiritual upliftment of Griqua and Coloureds. These two structures were intimately connected. Membership of one of these structures led to an association with the other. GIC and GNC branches were established across South Africa. Where the GIC operated the GNC also automatically operated and where the GNC operated the GIC also operated. The GIC, as the church of the Le Fleur Griqua, was much more devoted to religious activities. The GNC, as the “national organization”\textsuperscript{36} of the Le Fleur Griqua, on the other hand, dealt much more with secular concerns. However, the GIC also dealt with secular concerns such as land settlements whilst the GNC was also imbued with religion. The GIC and GNC thus reflected the Le Fleur Griqua universe in which the secular and the spiritual were intertwined.

The establishment of Le Fleur’s GIC and the institutionalization of the 1920 conference (as the Griqua National Conference of South Africa), provided organizational structures through which his values, ideas and leadership were promoted and sustained. Le Fleur became president of the Griqua Independent Church of South Africa as well as the head of the Griqua (National) Conference.\textsuperscript{37} Manifesting a great love for choir singing, Le Fleur also became president of the Griqua Choirs Association with his second oldest son, Adam J le Fleur, as secretary. AAS le Fleur also used the title of paramount chief in his communications to the government by the mid-1920s.\textsuperscript{38} The paramount chief became constitutionally president of the GNC. The wife of the paramount chief became constitutionally president of the Women’s Society.\textsuperscript{39}

AAS le Fleur’s family members, children and trusted church ministers were made to play key leadership roles in GNC structures. His eldest son, Abraham Andrew, also referred to as the “young Chief”, was elected president of the Griqua church in 1926.\textsuperscript{40} Abraham’s brother Adam was president of the Griqua Young-Men’s Association with C Abrahams as secretary. Adam also became secretary of the GNC in 1928, in addition to being the secretary of the Griqua Choirs Association. Reverend John Jeptha also acted as secretary of the GNC and the GIC. He was also the GIC’s scribe. The chief’s wife, Rachel Susanna le Fleur, became president of the Griqua Women’s Society with his daughter Charlotte as vice president and D Grew as secretary. Annie le Fleur, another of the chief’s daughters, became president of the Griqua Girls Society with Johanna Cloete

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\textsuperscript{33} GCPO, 16 April 1920.
\textsuperscript{34} GCPO, 23 January 1925. This issue has a copy of a letter from the governor general’s secretary to the president and general secretary of the “Griqua Conference”, dated 14 June 1922. The letter responds to an address made to the British King at the “Griqua Conference” held in April 1922 at Maitland.
\textsuperscript{35} LC, Miscellaneous file, AAS le Fleur: “Conference call … 1939”, Ratelgat, 1 February 1939.
\textsuperscript{36} LC, Item 9.2. “The late Griqua leader” [1941].
\textsuperscript{37} GCPO, 23 January 1925.
\textsuperscript{38} GG 1567, 50/1314, Griqua National Conference, Wynberg, to Earl of Athlone and Princess Alice, Cape Town, 3 November 1926; GCPO, 21 May 1926.
\textsuperscript{39} See LC, Item 4.1, Constitution of the Griqua National Conference of South Africa, as amended in 1959.
\textsuperscript{40} GCPO, 8 January 1926.
as secretary. An expectation was thus cultivated amongst the adherents of AAS le Fleur that his relatives and descendants were to play leading roles in the GNC and GIC.

Le Fleur’s GIC provided opportunities for people to become church officials who would otherwise have difficulty playing leadership roles in churches established and led by Whites. The ability to do God’s work, that is, to transform demoralized and impoverished Coloureds into a disciplined, self-reliant and proud Christian Griqua, became an important criterion for official positions in the GIC, and not formal education. Ministers in the GIC were required to balance their spirituality in a practically orientated Christianity. Le Fleur censured ministers who became ‘too spiritual’ in their orientation. He wanted his ministers to be actively involved in the promotion of resettlement schemes.

Young Women’s & Young Men’s societies
The GNC attempted to ‘restore’ Griqua and Coloured national sensibility through its various sub-structures through which Le Fleur’s ideals and values were cultivated and sustained. Special structures were formed to deal with young people. The Young Women’s Society and the Young Men’s Society served as important mechanisms for the cultivation of Griqua cooperation and ethno-‘racial’ sensibility and unity.

The Young Women’s Society aimed “to bring about a social understanding amongst the coloured Girls to learn to recognise each other socially so as to receive each other, to have a common ground whereon to uphold each other, and to help and protect each other”. It was also meant to “aid the old and the sickly” and to help young girls to take “[their] proper place in our Race as the future mothers of it”. By getting women “working socially together in one Race” the Woman’s Society was to “help to consolidate our people into one whole.” It was reasoned in the GCPO that “once there exist a body of women who work nationally together with only one aim, that is the preservation of their race, then there is surely in the future coming out of the Coloured people, a race fully armed with the feeling of “united we stand, divided we fall”.

The Young Men’s Society was “formed with the object of getting the Young Coloured Burgers to work in co-operation and unison”.

This would be one of the Bodies which everyone in South Africa (irrespective of denomination) should join and help to make it a success, as this is the missing link in our Race. … [I]t will build up the feeling of brotherhood and break down the razor assaults which figure in our Courts daily; it will reduce the many murders which is the direct cause of loosing the spirit of brotherhood in our Race; it will build up the work of a race in common sympathy and regain the fullest respect from all Races in South Africa which we have lost through the conduct of our Young Men, which did not give us recognition as we had in the past.

Religion and ethno-national restoration
Once established, the GNC and the GIC were promoted much in the GCPO. Religion became a significant feature of the GCPO, in addition to the more secular resettlement schemes that were promoted in the

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41 GG 1567, 50/1314, Griqua National Conference, Wynberg to Earl of Athlone and Princess Alice, Cape Town, 3 November 1926. See also LC, Correspondence file; GCPO, 29 October 1926; Item 9.4, EMS le Fleur: “Griekwa volksgeskiedenis”, p. 3.
42 Burger, 11 December 1924, p. 8
43 GCPO, 11 December 1925.
44 See GCPO, 11 December 1925; 26 November 1926.
45 GCPO, 13 February 1925.
46 GCPO, 20 March 1925.
47 GCPO, 20 March 1925.
48 GCPO, 10 July 1925.
newspaper. Le Fleur, who edited the GCPO until his regular travelling across the country made it difficult for him to continue, had a decisive influence on the ideas promoted in the newspaper.

Reflecting Le Fleur’s thinking, the GCPO advanced the cultivation of a Griqua-Coloured national identity as a Biblical goal that should guide Griqua conduct. Each Griqua was encouraged to have

one supreme object in view – the building of my Race on earth, and [to] prepare it to take its place in the future hereafter, when the great call comes, and all people shall bring their honour into the Great eternal City.

Le Fleur associated many of the social problems that were identified in Coloured communities with their loss of a national spirit. He therefore reasoned that the cultivation of a national sensibility amongst Coloureds was necessary for their socio-economic upliftment. The GCPO indicated that “when people lose National instinct then they drift apart and become powerless to move as a clock without the spring and have lost … [purpose] and beauty of creation, because even cattle have retained the instinct of creation and feel proud to bellow and not neigh as a horse”.

Missionaries and mainline churches were liable to criticism by Le Fleur to the extent that they were perceived to be responsible for the erosion of the ‘national instinct’ of Coloureds. They were therefore also liable to be blamed for the social evils (associated with the loss of ‘national instinct’) that befell Griqua and Coloureds. Missionaries were also criticized for actively opposing attempts by Le Fleur and his associates to forge Griqua-Coloured national unity:

What causes so many assaults with razors and murder amongst the Coloured people, is the loss of National instinct, and National honour or respect for each other. You find Missionaries teaching this very spirit [of assault and murder], and also in the Missions of the various Denominations in the South-Western Districts, that this spirit is generally taught throughout [sic]. More especially in the Coloured Mission bodies and Churches. Their teaching is hate against Griquas when their (the abovementioned churches) people get drunk and start murdering each other, then they wonder what the cause is. Well it is for us to help our Young people out of this evil spirit they are being taught.

Missionaries and mission churches were also liable to be criticized by Le Fleur for focussing too much on after-world salvation, thereby neglecting the material needs of their congregations. Contrasting his religious approach to that of missionaries, Le Fleur promoted a practically orientated ethno-national Christianity affirming not only a belief in God but also promoting also self-control, self-belief, self-confidence, self-reliance and self-upliftment:

Faith in God is quite all right, but it is vitally necessary that we have faith in ourselves. We, as a people, have everything necessary to advance, but we lack one essential quality – Self Control. It is not the strongest who can

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49 See e.g. GCPO, 5 December 1924
50 GCPO, 5 February 1926.
51 GCPO, 26 June 1925.
52 GCPO, 13 August 1926.
53 GCPO, 4 September 1925, reproduced in issue of 13 August 1926.
54 GCPO, 27 August 1926 (Relevant article also in issue of 13 February 1925).
I do not believe that a miracle is going to happen, no matter the beautiful Churches [built by mission societies]. I believe our people will have to use their labour by unity and combination and getting settled on the Land. No, all the great preaching will never yield grain, but sowing will. Here we will have to get them one by one out of the day’s dream preached to them that God will help them without their own efforts. What I find is the idea of being only useful servants, preached for the last hundred years, has got such a grip on our people, that it is there where time will be lost, because the European Farmers are taking their own poor people, and quite right – they owe them first consideration. Meanwhile the condition of the Coloured Race is becoming worse every hour, and the saddest part is that their Missionaries, Leaders and Teachers are ignoring these plain and visible facts before their very eyes. Had they joined up and taken the leading part, their Congregations would to-day have had a bright future … . They only wanted to work out some heavenly scheme in mud walls and leave the creation command alone. Well, what was? “Go plough. Sow and work the earth, and I will bless you.” That was turned into “Oh build nice Church, and you will be blessed.”

A peculiar Griqua ethos developed among the Le Fleur Griqua as a result of the articulation of Biblical understandings with nationalist and ethno-‘racial’ discourses. Le Fleur imbued his followers with a Griqua inflected pre-millennialism. He believed that the second coming of Christ was imminent and consequently infused GNC meetings and GIC services with a measure of expectancy of the imminent fulfilment of New Testament prophecies. Like many Protestants Le Fleur believed that God acted through nations and other collectives and passed judgement on wayward communities. He believed that the world was evil and that the new millennial kingdom will be preceded by an impending battle of Armageddon and that all the warring parties and military infrastructures would be wiped out. Griqua choir girls would supposedly sing as the ‘harlot and beast’ of Revelation were punished. They would also supposedly have a role in the custodianship of the new kingdom. Thus, Griqua were moulded to interpret unfolding events and conflicts in the world in terms of the Bible’s book of Revelation. Prophecies from Revelations were seen as actualized in current world events. Griqua conduct was directed in line with the understanding of the broader Biblical scheme that gave divine significance to their lives and their involvement in Le Fleur’s ethno-building project.

GNC meetings and GIC services were at times characterized by Old Testament analogies with Israel drawn to guide Griqua behaviour and to legitimate Le Fleur’s leadership. The relation between God and Abraham was seen as a model for the relation between the Griqua and God. Griqua church ministers taught, for example, that the way Abraham was led by the Spirit of God was an example of how God wanted to lead nations. Griqua were encouraged to be led by the same Spirit of God. Griqua ministers taught that just as God called Abraham as a leader, someone must be periodically called to lead people into righteousness. Like Abraham, Le Fleur was projected as a Kneg and Prophet called to lead the Griqua nation. The errors of the Israelites were viewed as instructive for Griqua and Coloureds in their relation to God as well as to Chief Le Fleur:

55 GCPO, 30 July 1926.
56 GCPO, 5 June 1926.
58 See e.g. GPCO, 14 June 1929, 24 November 1934.
59 See LC, Miscellaneous files.
60 See e.g. GCPO, 8 January 1926.
61 See e.g. GCPO, 8 January 1926.
62 See e.g. GCPO, 27 August 1926; 17 September 1927; LC, Miscellaneous file, Letter to the “Gri[e]kwa volk”, by AAS le Fleur, Ratelgat, Vredendal, 17 November 1938.
Die kwade gees van minachting betoon aan die Hoof en leider [deur die Gekleurde geslacht], het hulle in die sloot gebreng zoals die Joode [vernietigd was omdat hulle Christus afgestaan het]. Die Gekleurde geslacht het diezelfde pad geneem en het ook in diezelfde grond geland.\(^{63}\)

Le Fleur himself cautioned that disobedience to him was at the same time disobedience to God (whose will he was supposedly fulfilling). He admonished any deviation from the path that he projected as Godly and lauded the results that were achieved through his adherents living in line with his prescripts.\(^{64}\)

During the 1930s Le Fleur moved between Griqua communities on settlement schemes located between Ratelgat,\(^{65}\) a semi-desert area (located around 20 km north of Vredendal), and Knysna and Plettenberg Bay in the southern Cape, consolidating his followers within GNC-GIC structures and his ethno-‘racial’ religious universe, encouraging them to keep in line with the path that God was held to have set for them. Whilst in the southern Cape Le Fleur often resided in his clay house on the farm Jackalskraal or in a small cottage on Robberg, Plettenberg Bay. His adherents believed that he went into periodic retreats for spiritual meditation in Ratelgat during the 1920s and 1930s. His adherents also believed that he made most of his purported prophesies at Ratelgat and Robberg.\(^{66}\) His purported prophetic qualities lent credibility to his projection as a leader called by God. Le Fleur’s stature as a Kneeg of God, and his reputed supernatural powers and prophetic ability served to bind his adherents within his religious infused universe. Katie Stoffel, an adherent of Le Fleur, reported his supernatural acts at Piesangrivier near Plettenberg Bay in 1940:

Saterdag was ons by Mnr Jaftha se huis en toe waai daar ‘n Storm Suide Wind en die Hoof sê aan die wind ‘Jy moet nie die Huis op my af waai nie, kom laat ek vir jou sing dan word jy vrede’ en die Hoof sing die Engelse versie wat so sê ‘Fierce raged the tempest of the Deep, watch did thine anxious servant keep, Save Lord, we perish was their cry, Oh save us in our agony; Thy word above the storm rose high, Peace be still, Thy wild winds ceased and the billows of the Sea, at thy will;’ op die plek was die wind still [sic]. Dit het nie 3 minute geneem nie.\(^{67}\)

Le Fleur imbued Ratelgat with special spiritual significance. He projected Ratelgat as a place where authority figures would come to request God to remove plagues and social ills. He projected himself as a maligned mediator of God whose honour would be affirmed when government and church authority figures come to Ratelgat to ask him to request God to bring to an end misery experienced through natural disasters in South Africa, notably drought and plagues:

Griqua Volk ... die baas en nooi sal ... kom om eer te doen aan God se kneeg ... . God Kneeg en Profeet woon op Ratelgat en na hom toe moet jy loop, dit help nie of Koning is of wat, maar hom toe moet jy loop, om deur hom Gods guns en genade die sware land laat sied is versag en lewe weer skenk. Nou om daar te kom moet die Governeur Generaal na Ratelgat toe kom en hier ... kuier staan plek vra en 14 dae om die Regering gelee om die vrede en die bepaalde dag wanneer God die Heere Almagtig om: No 1. Reen uit te Seen by terug te gee aan die land. No 2. Om die wind reg te draai, so laat die gewone grooi winde die gesaaite laat lewe en die storm winde laat sak. No 3. Die Aarde se are en vog gebied om deur en in die aarde lewe te gee, want die vog is uit, uit die aarde uit, en dit verwek die ernstige droogte en breek die grooi af en rooi die uit en hongersnood tree in, die vroe en ontjydige Ryp weg hou, laat die laat gesaaite nie daardeur verwoes word nie. No 4. Die motte wat so gevaarlyk wees in winter vrugde, die moet die Heere terug roep, die Sprinkane weg orde en sy goed weer aan Suid Afrika skenk en vrede aan ons land. No 5. So een ernstige saak staan voor die Regering, die kerke se

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\(^{63}\) Ordinary GIC services were often held in the open air as GIC branches lacked their own church buildings, with halls being usually hired for more important services like communion. *GCPD*, 13 August 1926.

\(^{64}\) See e.g. LC, Miscellaneous file, letter by AAS le Fleur, Ratelgat, Vredendal, 14 November 1938.

\(^{65}\) Le Fleur apparently leased the farm Ratelgat from a Mr Frank from Van Rhynsdoorp. Griqua manuscript, p. 43.


\(^{67}\) Item 9.5. “Rapport van die dienste wat gebeur het op Piesangs Rivier”, by Katie Stoffel, Piesangrivier, Plettenberg Baai, 12 Augustus 1940.
koppe moet ook kom, waar hulle Hoof-Bestuur is en same [...] sak voor die heer God Almagtig. Hier is ons met God te doen en nie met Jesus nie onse Heere, want die armoed klim in onse mense en als ons nie na werke toe loop sal die saak hulle nog lei.68

Poverty, urbanization and ethno-‘racial’ inflected Christianity
Le Fleur’s attempt at cultivating Griqua-Coloured nationhood and establishing rural agricultural settlement schemes, was much influenced by his concerns with the socio-economic and moral conditions of urban and rural Coloureds, notably poverty, crime and lack of ‘national spirit’. He hoped to draw Coloureds to rural agricultural settlement schemes, viewing, like many of his contemporaries, the city as the cauldron of evil. Some commonality developed between ‘race’-based churches, especially between Le Fleur’s Griqua church and the Afrikaner churches, in dealing with social and economic concerns generated by rapid urbanization which contributed to urban unemployment and poverty. Bantu-speaking Christians linked to ‘Zionist’ churches, for example, responded to urbanization by planting new churches in the cities, offering physical healing, a supportive community, and spiritual solace to newly urbanized Bantu-speaking Africans.69

Le Fleur’s Griqua-Coloured nationalism had a special affinity with the nationalism that was being cultivated by Afrikaner churches in the early 1900s but reflected a particular ethno-‘racial’ deployment of operative ideas. Afrikaner churches, particularly the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC), responded with practical steps to support and develop the Afrikaner community. They attempted to remedy Afrikaner poverty identified much with the city, British capitalism and the ‘Black peril’ (Swart gevaar). The city was seen as devaluing labour and creating a host of problems such as divorce, sexual immorality, crime, oppression and gambling. Reflecting much of the aims of Le Fleur for Griqua-Coloureds, a host of Afrikaner organizations were also formed in the early 1900s with the express aim of rehabilitating Afrikaners. Thus between 1915 and 1918 an Afrikaner press, an insurance company, and the Cooperative Winemakers Union were established in the Cape; at about the same time the Afrikaner Broederbond (a secretive organization) was founded in Johannesburg. New initiatives followed in the 1930s, among them, the establishment of Volkskas Bank and the convening of a Volkskongres on economic matters in 1939. Afrikaner Reformed churches, and the DRC in particular, also became involved in the creation of work colonies, the provision of boarding houses for the poor, and the establishment of hostels in town for rural school children. The DRC established industrial schools as well as a school for the deaf, blind and mute at Worcester in the Cape; it founded orphanages and homes for the aged as well as a few hospitals. Some para-church organizations were established, particularly from the 1930s onward, notably Christelike Maatskaaplike Rade which coordinated various social work activities. Various women’s organizations also came into being, for example, the Afrikaner Christelike Vroue Vereniging. Apart from practical steps to provide temporary relief to poor Afrikaners, Church-linked Afrikaner organizations also sought to cooperate with other structures to transform society.70

As with the GNC and the GIC amongst Griqua-Coloureds, the attempts of Afrikaner churches to improve the social conditions of poor Afrikaners were also at the same time attempts at cultivating ethno-‘racial’ nationalism. The common religious inspired or imbued ideas that were developed in the cultivation of Griqua-Coloured nationalism and Afrikaner nationalism, would later contribute to the Griqua’s support of aspects of apartheid and the Afrikaner’s relative openness to the Griqua under apartheid. Like GNC Griqua, Afrikaners were moulded to view nations not as human creations but as ordinations and institutions of God. No one was supposed to be able to come into full being outside the nation. Participation in the national calling meant fulfilling the plan of God. Service to the nation was thus service to God. This outlook generated opposition to

70 Johan Kinghorn: “Modernization and apartheid: The Afrikaner churches”, in Elphick and Davenport: Christianity in South Africa, pp. 139-140.
organizations and movements promoting individualism, like liberalism, or to organizations and movements that aimed to integrate all of humanity into one trans-ethnic entity, for example communism.\footnote{Kinghorn: “The Afrikaner churches”, pp. 141-3.}

**Leadership rivals**

Like many of his contemporaries and leadership rivals, notably those in the Coloured based African People’s Organization (APO), Le Fleur identified much with Western culture and promoted Western inspired practices amongst his adherents. However, unlike his rivals in the APO and many other Coloured elites, Le Fleur did not aspire for the integration of Griqua and Coloureds into White society.\footnote{On the (White) assimilation dynamic in Coloured identity, see e.g. Adhikari: “Expression of Coloured identity”; Gavin Lewis: *Between the wire and the wall* (Cape Town: David Phillip, 1987), p. 13.} Le Fleur wanted Griqua and Coloureds to emulate Whites economically and culturally without being assimilated into White society. Le Fleur instead strove for Griqua and Coloured nationhood within Griqua-Coloured ‘enclaves’. As in earlier phases of his life, in promoting his ideas, schemes and leadership in the 1920s and 1930s, Le Fleur also attempted to discredit alternative ideas, leadership and organizational rivals. Whilst promoting his land resettlement schemes in East Griqualand in March 1927, Le Fleur criticized leaders and organizations with alternative agendas. He took issue with Marcus Garvey inspired Wellington Buthelezi, a “native who stile[d] himself as an American” leading “natives” to believe that “black Americans would come out and destroy the Europeans, and free the people of South Africa”. Le Fleur informed Bantu-speakers that American “[had] no Government of their own”; were “all under Whitemen like we are in this Country”, and that they “own[ed] no Army, no warships, nor Aeroplanes”. Le Fleur also criticized the Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union (ICU) and political organizations such as the African National Congress and the APO.

Cautioning people about the ICU, Le Fleur pointed out that “£17, 000 ha[d] melted away, and cannot be accounted for”, and that “all the Eastern Provinces Natives have lost their money”. ICU incitements to strike would “lead our people to starvation”. The ICU “got our people in Cape Town and Paarl to strike, and in the end they had to starve”;

> if you follow the I.C.U. … you are working for starvation and death, and they will sympathise with you, but do nothing to get you out of the dark hole you will be in. Let this I.C.U. business alone. We never joined, because we saw this underhand work from the beginning. All your money gone, and not even one child has been made a doctor for the £17,000, only high class living and drinking was done. Leave these mad fools alone, they are only bringing heavy laws on our people, and creating evil, that is all, and unless you help to suppress this, you will have to destroy your own children in the end.

Le Fleur was very impressed with attempts by GIC Reverend Pertus Makabuwa to curtail the influence of the ICU:

> I cannot speak too highly of Makaboa’s firm stand he has made against this incitement of our people. He has truly saved our Country from sorrow. He held his foot down, and I say it must be our duty to help to suppress this foul work of the I.C.U. and congress as it can only lead to more Bull Hoeks.

Le Fleur also warned about White controlled unions. “These White unions use our own hands to cut our throats”. He maintained that the (African National) Congress

> are not any better [than the ICU] as they have collected over £15,000, running about making speeches, and these men live on the fat of the land, and create all the bad feeling they can with your money, and your poor old people are starving. They are Ministers, let them show us one home for Old and sickly and helpless? No, all your money is spent for the Franchise, which means only signing a cross in 5 years time, and then you have to wait 5 years before you select your enemies, the Labour Party. For this purpose the Congress have worked, and got nothing more. They never obtain anything, but make your lot harder by these mad and foolish works.
Le Fleur’s criticism of the APO was similar: “The A.P.O. has for twenty years done nothing but eat our people’s money. Over £60,000 has been wasted by that body, and no Hospital nor a plot of land. All your organized bodies are like that, even the “Nationale Verbond”.”

Legislation, discrimination and identity
Le Fleur’s attempt to promote his ideas in East Griqualand in 1927 were curbed through his arrest. With Griqua being defined as “aboriginal natives” in Proclamation 109 of 1894 (as amended by Proclamation 92 of 1903), Le Fleur was charged before the assistant magistrate of Mount Currie for being in Kokstad between 26 ad 29 March, having entered the Transkeian Territories without a pass ‘Natives’ were require to obtain before entering the Territories (in terms of Proclamation 109 of 1894). Le Fleur pleaded not guilty but was convicted on 31 March 1927 and sentenced to pay a fine of £1 or to undergo a month’s imprisonment with hard labour. Le Fleur’s case exemplified his need to link the Griqua and Coloured categories in his ethno-national project, despite his uneasiness with the Coloured category; it exemplified why he and other Griqua were inclined to emphasize that Griqua were a ‘mixed-race’ and Coloured.

Le Fleur appealed against his conviction, and in so doing reflected how the deployment of legislation could influence the articulation and (public) projections of Griqua and Coloured identities. Le Fleur’s appeal was considered at the Grahamstown Supreme Court on 27 June 1927. Represented by FG Reynolds, Le Fleur appealed against his conviction on the ground that he was a Coloured and not a Griqua and because Proclamation 109 of 1894 was repealed by section 28 of the Natives’ Urban Areas Act (No 21) of 1923. Section 28 repealed any law or regulation which made it compulsory for “coloured persons” to carry passes. It defined “coloured persons” as “any person of mixed European and native descent”. It defined a “native” as “[a]ny person who is a member of an aboriginal race or tribe of Africa”.

Operative criteria for Griquaness in East Griqualand were suggested by witnesses. These criteria influenced what Le Fleur said in order to prove that he was not a Griqua. Witnesses also suggested the difficulty of separating Griqua from Coloureds. A detective pointed out that Le Fleur mentioned in his affidavit of 28 March 1927 that he was a Griqua chief. The magistrate of Mount Currie said that in his administrative capacity he had always treated Le Fleur as a Coloured. Johannes Bezuidenhout, headman of the Griqua of Mount Currie, mentioned that he had always recognized Le Fleur as a Griqua and that the Griqua community also recognized him as such. A Griqua was according to him, “a follower of Adam Kok, who had been born of a Hottentot mother and a European father”. A Griqua constable related to Le Fleur’s wife mentioned that he could not be a chief unless he was a Griqua.

Le Fleur stated in his defence that he was not a Griqua, never having been under the jurisdiction of Adam Kok III or having received burgher rights from him, though he always championed the Griqua cause. He was their chief by virtue of his position as chief of the Griqua National Conference. Le Fleur admitted, however, that he wrote in one GCPO issue: “We as Griquas will refuse to be called bastards”. To consolidate his suggestion that he was a Coloured, but not a Griqua, Le Fleur asserted that both his parents were Coloured.

In giving judgement Justice Gane reflected broader considerations amongst government officials as well as amongst Griqua in regard to their identity location. Gane suggested that their composition warranted them being classed as Coloured:

73 NTS 7600, 4/328, Part 3, Detective R Broekman, CID, Kokstad, to District Commandant, SAP, Kokstad, 4 April 1927. Letter contains reproduction of “Chief’s report” from the GCPO.
Remembering two facts of which we cannot but have knowledge, namely (1) That the true Griquas are now very few in number, indeed almost non-existent, and that the so-called Griquas are an aggregation of persons of various shades of colour more or less remotely related to the original Griquas, and (2) That certain colonies of Griquas are now found within the Cape Province proper as well as in Griqualand East, it seems impossible to hold that the Griquas do not fall within the very broad definition of „coloured persons” framed in this [Natives’ Urban Areas] Act [21 of 1923].

Gane thought, however, that Proclamation 109 of 1894 was not repealed by Act 21 of 1923. He also thought that the Mount Currie magistrate was right in determining the racial class of the appellant on the evidence of habit and reputation. Le Fleur’s appeal was dismissed.75

Discrimination against those categorized as ‘Native’ and the association of the Griqua, ‘Hottentots’ and ‘Bushman’ with the ‘Aboriginal Native’ category inclined Le Fleur and his associates76 and many other Griqua to distance themselves from the ‘Native’ category;77 to emphasize having mixed ‘racial’ descent and being related culturally and biologically to Whites, thus locating the Griqua within a ‘Coloured’ category from which ‘Natives’ were excluded. Though Le Fleur invoked historical ‘Hottentot’ categories, he also invested ‘Hottentots’ with ‘racial mixture’, thus encouraging their exclusion from the ‘Aboriginal Native’ category and attendant restrictions. The liability of ‘Hottentots’ being included in the ‘Native’ category also inclined Griqua to disassociate themselves from a ‘Hottentot’ category, as exemplified by Cornelius de Bruin, headman of the Mount Currie Griqua between 1898 and 1925. Expressing concern about Griqua being subjected to curfew regulations De Bruin affirmed in the Kokstad Advertiser in 1920 that

[a] Griqua is a person descendant from white and coloured blood namely an Englishman, Frenchman, Dutchman, German, Scotsman, or an Irishman, etc, from coloured blood [sic], and a Griqua is not an aboriginal, like the Hottentot, Bushman, Koranna, Basuto, Fingo, Pondo or Zulu.78

The liability of being classed ‘Native’ inclined many Griqua in East Griqualand to affirm a Coloured identity. Many even opposed the appointment of Johannes Bezuidenhout79 as headman of the Mount Currie Griqua after the retirement of De Bruin. They reasoned that such a position lowered their status and rights relative to Coloureds and made them liable to classified as ‘Natives’.80 The East Griqualand Pioneers Council also opposed the position of a Griqua headman. Claiming to be a “body representative of the Coloured and Griqua People of Griqualand East” the Pioneers Council, like Le Fleur, also reinforced the association of the Griqua with the Coloured category. Resolutions were unanimously passed at the organization’s first conference on 16 December 1933 affirming that Griqua were Coloureds and appealing that they be exempted from restrictions imposed on ‘Aboriginal Natives’. The organization invoked past Griqua ‘civilizational’ achievements and deployed a definition of Griqua as “a mixed race of European descent” to show that it was not “compatible

75 Rex v Le Fleur, 1927, EDL, pp. 340-6, reproduced in Daily Dispatch (East London), 2 July 1927.
76 See e.g. LC, Correspondence file, AJ Le Fleur, General Secretary, Griqua Land Settlements Ltd., Cape Town to Secretary, Native Affairs, Cape Town, 4 June 1930.
77 E.g. LC, Correspondence file, C Abrahams, Secretary, Griqua and Coloured People’s Opinion, Cape Town to Minister of Native Affairs, General JB Hertzog, 21 January 1927.
78 Kokstad Advertiser, 24 December 1920, p. 6. See also Cape Town Archives, Chief Magistrate, Transkei (CMT) 3/809, 478/2, Bruin to JB Moffat, CMT, Umtata, 21 November 1916 & 21 December 1916, for similar definitions of De Bruin in his attempt to get “respectable” Griqua of “good character” exempted from liquor regulations restricting Griqua access to liquor.
79 Johannes Bezuidenhout was appointed as headman of the Griqua of Mount Currie after the retirement of Cornelius de Bruin in 1925 (NTS 79, 1/15, GA Godly, Secretary, Native Affairs, Pretoria, to CMT, 2 April 1925). He died on 30 March 1934. NTS 79, 1/15, JS Allison, Secretary, Native Affairs, to CMT, 27 April 1934.
80 NTS 79, 1/15, Petition of “Coloured Voters of Kokstad”, 8 February 1927; Department of Native Affairs, Pretoria, to Minister of Native Affairs, 1930 (precise date not indicated).
80 GCPO, 27 March 1926.
with justice that they should be herded with the hordes of aboriginals, who live under totally different conditions and with whom the Griquas have nothing in common. The organization also deployed a segregationist discourse. It lamented that “the Griquas and coloureds” were “scattered in almost all of the native locations” where they could “make no progress” and appealed to the government for the provision of land for Griqua and Coloureds so that they could move out of ‘Native’ locations. Griqua in Griqualand West were also inclined to locate themselves as Coloured in order to evade restrictions imposed on ‘Natives’.

Whilst discrimination against ‘Natives’ inclined Griqua to affirm a Coloured identity, other factors served to sustain Griqua identities, for example, pride in past Griqua achievements and the desire for access to land which encouraged the deployment of the Griqua category in appeals for land restitution. Griqua descendants were thus both inclined to affirm a Coloured identity to evade restrictions imposed on ‘Natives’ and to deploy a Griqua identity in attempts to access ancestral land.

Though Griqua were inclined to disassociate themselves from ‘Hottentot’ and ‘aboriginal Native’ categories due to their legal liabilities, some people deployed these categories self-referentially in cases where they yielded benefits, for example, to access land reserved for ‘Natives’. Some of the people who deployed these categories self-referentially were perceived by government officials as probably of mixed ‘Native’ and European origin. Some people assumed a ‘Native’ identity to access land restricted to ‘Natives’ and a Coloured identity to access privileges accorded to Coloureds.

**Summation**

Thus, in their interaction with government officials, Griqua played a role in the shaping and reshaping of the meanings of ‘Native’, ‘Aboriginal’ and Coloured in their attempt to give content to Griquaness and to position themselves socially, culturally and economically. Attempting to counter a perception with some currency in society and amongst government officials that Griqua were part of the ‘Aboriginal Native’ category that included Bantu-speaking communities, Le Fleur and other Griqua positioned Griqua as a non-Aboriginals and non-‘Natives’ within the relatively privileged Coloured category; they also reinforced the association of Griquaness and Colouredness with ‘racial mixing’. By investing the Griqua category with ‘racial mixture’ and Colouredness, Le Fleur could thus secure privileges for his Griqua adherents that the Coloured category conferred. Le Fleur could at the same time invoke the ethno-national qualities of the Griqua category which were lacking in the Coloured category in his attempt to forge Griqua-Coloured nationhood.

**Re-channelling resentment**

Le Fleur drew his adherents into an ethno-national cultural and religious system that cultivated respect for the church and authorities, discouraged violent confrontation, and promoted cooperation and consultation with the government. He refrained from unconstitutional conduct after his release from Breakwater prison in 1903, despite attempts by government and church officials to derail his projects, as he himself indicated in 1926:

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81 NTS 1772, 65/276, AS Ruiters, Secretary, East Griqualand Pioneers Council, to General Smuts, Minister of Justice, Cape Town, 17 January 1934.

Samuel Halford, the mayor of Kokstad in the 1920s (*Kokstad Advertiser*, 5 March 1920), claimed that “[a]fter the retirement of C. G. de Bruin as Headman [in 1925], the Griquas were left without any authorized representative. Then an association was formed, “The Pioneer Griqua Council”” (Halford: *Griquas of Griqualand*, p. 203). De Bruin was, however, replaced by Johannes Bezuidenhout in the same year of his retirement (see f.n. above).

82 NTS 2941, 34/305, Part 3, East Griqualand Pioneers Council, Matatiele, to Secretary for Native Affairs, 8 October 1938.

83 NTS 2945, 40/305, Part 1, see especially 1913 Griqua petition to parliament (for farms).

84 CMT 3/1450, 37/C, Part 1, CJ Warner, Resident Magistrate, Nqamakwe, to Secretary for Native Affairs Department, Cape Town, 7 June 1905.

I feel that after 42 years of toil, suffering and precaution, not by the drunkards, but by men of Authority, from whom I must and aught to get protection, run about in every direction to ruin, try an injure me and the Churches of Christ who ought to teach peace, good will and truth, practice every method of slander and evil, then they have through 2,000 Church Shares and a full Government [sic]. Yes to the very last ditch they fought. I wonder if honour will teach them a new road; of course, Honour, as far as I am concerned, is a matter of the past, but surely the Europeans of to-day must remember their position and try and heal this foul stop [sic] in their Churches and Government. Well we will triumph through it all. God has led us safely through the past and He is able to do the same to-day.

By affirming in 1926 that “I shall always be proud to have revolted against the set of officials in East Griqualand”, in light of impediments that he experienced, Le Fleur suggested that he did not refrain from rebellion after his release from Breakwater because of a principled aversion to violence but very much because of circumstances. He was convinced that any attempt at rebellion against White rule was bound to end in failure.

Le Fleur’s promotion of Griqua-Coloured self-reliance and his pronouncements against dependence on Whites indicated that he resented White domination, although he was cautious not to express his resentment openly. His resentment of White domination was channelled into his ethno-national project which aimed to create geographic spaces of independence in the form of rural farming settlements on which Griqua and Coloureds could be turned into a proud self-reliant Christian nation.

Death of Le Fleur
Le Fleur, or Die Kneg as he was called by his adherents, died on 11 June 1941 in his cottage at Robberg, Plettenberg Bay. His death came as a big shock to his followers. Because of the spiritual stature that he developed many of his followers did not initially believe that he had died. Some even believed that his body in his grave on Robberg did not decompose and that it remained warm. There was a perception after Le Fleur was declared dead that he would soon return to life. Some, however, believed that he had predicted his death and that he accordingly bid farewell to his family and acquaintances before his death. Ideas also developed that a spiritual force emanated from Le Fleur’s grave and that there was a spiritual connection between Robberg and Ratelgat in the Vredendal region.

Though Le Fleur had little success with his farming resettlement schemes, not being able to raise money for the outright purchase of any farm, the Kranshoek farm, rented by Griqua from different White owners from the late 1920s, was exceptional in Le Fleur’s resettlement schemes, being occupied by the adherents of Le Fleur on a continuous basis and growing after Le Fleur’s death into the principal settlement and organizational basis of Griqua under the GNC. Although the followers of Le Fleur did not embark on the grand schemes that he undertook, they continued to draw inspiration from him. Adherence to what was deemed the ideals and principles of Le Fleur, inclined the GNC Griqua to conduct themselves within constitutional parameters and to adhere to the authority of the government.

References:
86 GCPO, 13 August 1926.
87 GCPO, 13 March 1925.
89 Personal communication, Calvin Cornelius, Robberg, Plettenberg Bay, 13 October 2000.
90 Bredekamp: “The dead bones of Adam Kok”, p. 141.
91 Personal communication, Calvin Cornelius, Robberg, Plettenberg Bay, 13 October 2000.
Religiosity and order after Le Fleur, Die Kneg

Le Fleur mediated religiosity remained an important binding factor that also significantly influenced the conduct of the Le Fleur Griqua. Their way of life was based much on religion. Children were brought up in their religion from the start and taught to respect their church and authorities. This resulted in the GNC Griqua being disinclined to take part in civil disobedience.93

The identification of Griquanness with religiosity and respect for authorities and order, became very much internalized, as reflected in the GNC’s Volksbode of 1952.

Commemorations

At Le Fleur’s death in 1941 the Griqua National Conference/Griqua Independent Church had 43 branches and represented “over 10,000 active members”.95 The organizational structures that Le Fleur created and the Le Fleur mediated ideology that permeated and sustained them, ensured that his followers remained well organized and close to his ideals after his death. GNC leaders reinforced a historical understanding stressing that Le Fleur was called by God to restore the Griqua as a volk.96 Le Fleur’s own historical representations of his past, which were much shaped by his Griqua-Coloured nation-building aspirations, were relayed to successive GNC generations.97 Key GNC events centred on Le Fleur. Yearly conferences and commemorations sustained the veneration and posthumous influence of Le Fleur. Legitimate GNC leadership became connected with Le Fleur, with GNC leaders being inclined to sustain veneration of Le Fleur from whom they derived much of their legitimacy.

Die Kneg was succeeded by his eldest son Abraham,98 who assumed the position of Chief of the GNC and President of the Griqua Independent Church.99 With Kranshoek developing into a significant GNC centre, Abraham moved the headquarters of the GNC and GIC there from Cape Town in April 1948. Abraham le Fleur died in Knysna on 13 July 1951.100

In line with an instruction of Abraham, GNC Griqua from across the country gathered yearly at Die Kneg’s burial site on Robberg between 31 December and 1 January to reaffirm an oath of obedience to, and protection from God; to express their concerns and to give thanks to God for providing for their needs and for
protecting them over the past year. God was also called to protect Griqua during the forthcoming year. The annual gathering was given special significance by a promise supposed to have been made by Die Kneg that he would intercede for the Griqua volk when they gather together through their current chief:

So glo die Griekwa volk en by die geloof sal hulle sterwe want die Gods man se belofte was dat wanneer die volk so deur middel van hul Opperhoof bymekaar kom hy aan hulle anderkant by God hul smeke en swaarmoedigheid oordra.

After Abraham’s death, John Presence acted as regent until Abraham’s eldest son, named after his grandfather Andrew Abraham Stockenström, was elected as paramount chief of the GNC Griqua on 6 October 1952 at a conference in Elsiesrivier. AAS le Fleur II was finally sworn in as paramount chief at Kranshoek on Easter Sunday, 5 April 1953 by the GNC Executive Council. Before AAS le Fleur II was sworn in at a school in Kranshoek, a ceremony was held at the Robberg grave of Die Kneg where a choir formed a half-moon and delivered a song. Characteristic volk typifying and volk sustaining GNC ritual was continued after AAS le Fleur II was sworn in as paramount chief at Kranshoek, with the master of ceremony delivering a prayer and the Griqua national anthem, “God ewig groot en goed”, being sang. Reflecting the importance of loyalty to God, chief, volk and the government, the master of ceremonies indicated that the Griqua wanted to be led by a man who was responsible for the survival of their volk. “Wanneer hy … die verantwoordelikheid neem en ons is getrou en onderdanig, sal hy die volkie deur lei met vrede en liefde vir mekaar en respek vir ander geslagte en overhede”. Those at the ceremony undertook in turn to stand by the paramount chief. Two more hymns were then sung, that is, “To God is the glory” and “Praise the Lord”.

Expressing sentiments also articulated by Die Kneg, the master of ceremonies expressed the Griqua’s pride in their volk, and the necessity of abiding in God. Although the Griqua made strong appeals in the following decades for government recognition the master of ceremony could, like Die Kneg, boast that the Griqua had the privileged status of being recognized in legislation:

Ons voel trots om die Griekwavolk in Suid Afrika genoem te word – al volk wat erkenning by die Wet het. Ons voel groot dat ons ’n nasionale status het, waarmee ons erken word .... Ons glo dat elkeen moet smaak wat hy is, want wie kan sy skepping verander? As ons by die woord van God bly, kan Hy ons red uit alle omstandighede. Hoewel die toekoms donker is, bou ons op ’n Rots wat altyd staan.

Government officials were also invited to the ceremony, reflecting the GNC’s attempt at establishing cordial relations with the government. A representative of the Department of Native Affairs delivered a speech and read a letter from the department in connection with the purchase of the Kranshoek farm as a residential place for the Griqua. AAS le Fleur II headed the (Kranshoek based) GNC until his death in July 2004 and was succeeded by his son Allan, who was sworn in as paramount chief on 30 December 2004.

Reflecting the significance of the connection with the Kok name, the GNC leadership also found it important to commemorate Die Kneg’s wife, Rachel Susanna le Fleur, the Volksmoeder or Kroommoeder. Rachel was the daughter of Adam ‘Muis’ Kok, a descendant of Adam Kok I. Die Kneg’s marriage to Rachel in 1896

101 Volksbode, 14 January 1959 (private source); Carse: “Die Griekwas”, p. 2.6.
102 Volksbode, 14 January 1959.
103 Carse: “Griekwas”, p. 2.7; Burger (Byvoegsel), 13 April 1953, p. 28.
104 Burger (Byvoegsel), 13 April 1953, p. 28.
105 GCPO, 23 January 1925; 15 May 1925.
106 It is also asserted in the Volksbode of 10 August 1952 that “Die Griekwa Nasionale Konferensie van Suid Afrika, is die regerende Liggaam van die Gemengde Ras. Onder Gesag van Haar Majesteitse Regereing in Suid Afrika, geniet die Volk die volste vryheid van sy Nasielike status”.
107 Burger (Byvoegsel), 13 April 1953, p. 28.
108 Cape Argus, 31 December 2004, p. 5.
facilitated his positioning as the heir of Adam Kok III. 14 October was Mother’s Day, a GNC *volksdag* in honour of Rachel on her birthday. Homage was also paid to the successors of Die Kneg on *volks*-days dedicated to them. 10 March was dedicated Abraham le Fleur, on his birthday. 11 May was dedicated to Abraham’s successor, AAS le Fleur II, on his birthday. Key events were also commemorated. GNC Griqua held annual conferences on Easter Sundays in commemoration of the founding of the Griqua Independent Church.109

**Le Fleur schism**

Although Die Kneg’s ideas and organizational structures served to keep his adherents united, divergences ensued within the GNC leadership that culminated in the splitting of the GNC in two factions, each with its own Griqua Independent Church. A leadership struggle between Paramount Chief AAS le Fleur II and his bother Eric le Fleur, not only led to the splitting of the GNC, but also contributed to the reconfiguration of the broader Griqua political landscape.110

Initial tension between E le Fleur and AAS le Fleur II centred on the morality of the latter’s conduct. The GIC’s council (“Hoof Kerk Ring”), comprising church President E le Fleur, Vice President J Jansen and SA Saayman, expressed objections to the paramount chief in the late 1960s for having an extramarital relationship. The church leadership reasoned that the lifestyle of AAS le Fleur II damaged community life at Kranshoek, led to lawlessness and encouraged immorality.111 E le Fleur also felt that the paramount chief was not carrying out his obligations to the Griqua volk.

On 13 June 1967 AAS le Fleur II issued a declaration that he was compelled (“genoodsaak”) by the GNC Executive Council to nominate his younger brother E le Fleur as his only legal successor for an indefinite period; that he was fully convinced in his decision due to the knowledge, insight and competency of E le Fleur and his perseverance over the past ten years; that E le Fleur would represent him in all affairs and would immediately form his Executive Council because he (AAS le Fleur II) was held back from properly carrying out his obligations through household and personal matters, and that E le Fleur would permanently assume the paramountship in the event of AAS le Fleur II’s death, but that AAS le Fleur II would have the right to nominate someone else if E le Fleur died first.112

AAS le Fleur II’s declaration was not carried out and he continued in his position as paramount chief. Pressure for his resignation also persisted. AAS le Fleur II informed the GNC President’s Council (chaired by his uncle, Tom le Fleur), on 4 April 1969 of his intention to permanently relinquish his position as paramount chief. He also informed Griqua elders (“Vadersraad”) of his intention. He also undertook to depart from Kranshoek. He finally delivered his resignation on 7 of April 1969 in the Kranshoek Church Hall where a volk’s gathering was held. AAS le Fleur II was instead suspended from his paramountship for 12 months.113 E le Fleur was also suspended from his position as president of the GIC for twelve months.114 The issue between him and E le Fleur was supposed to be reassessed during the 12-month suspension period. AAS le Fleur II was admonished not to make himself guilty again of reprehensible conduct. He was cautioned not to be actively involved in politics. However, a number of the supporters of AAS le Fleur II who were displeased

110 See chapters 8-10.
111 LC, Item. 2.4, EMS le Fleur, Kranshoek, to Sekretaris van Kleurlingsake, Kaapstad, 10 Februarie 1969.
113 LC, Item 4.5, Griekwa Independente Kerk van Suid Afrika … Vyfstigste Jaarlikse Konferensie”, n.d.
114 LC, Item 4.5, Griekwa Nasionale Konferensie van SA, Plettenberg Bay 7 April 1969.
with his suspension subsequently undertook to replace the GNC’s President’s Council, marking thus the rupture of the GNC.

AAS le Fleur II’s conduct after his suspension was not pleasing to the GNC President’s Council. He became actively involved in politics in September 1969, notably during the Union Council for Coloured Affairs elections, supposedly in opposition to the constitution of the Griqua Independent Church that objected to the involvement of church ministers, headmen and officials of the church in politics. The position of paramount chief was subsequently declared vacant during a 1970 GNC-GIC conference. E Le Fleur was appointed as regent for 12 months during which the volk would decide which Le Fleur male offspring would fill the position of paramount chief. The new paramount chief was supposed to be inaugurated at the 1971 GNC-GIC conference.¹¹³

However, AAS le Fleur II’s supporters rallied around him and encouraged him to continue as their paramount chief. In 1976 AAS le Fleur II briefly explained developments as follows:

[N]ou kan ek die rede vestrek waarvoor die bedanking gekom het. Dit was omdat ek nie goed genoeg was vir die familie nie en dit was ‘n familiereëling. Dit was ‘n familietwis. Maar toe draai Griekwamense om, nadat ek afgetree het, en hulle sê hulle stel nie belang in familiebesluite nie: “Jy bly wat jy is”, en hulle bring my terug.¹¹⁶

The GNC thus split into two organizations using the same name, each with its own Griqua Independent Church. The GNC under E le Fleur moved its head office to The Crags. E le Fleur himself took up residence in Knysna. His GNC faction continued to encounter problems with AAS le Fleur II whom they regarded as an obstructive element at Kranshoek who caused difficulties to those who did not support him.¹¹⁷ AAS le Fleur II’s association with the Federal Coloured People’s Party increased tension between himself and his Uncle T le Fleur, leader of the Coloured People’s Republican Party, contributing to divisions within the Griqua community.¹¹⁸ Divisions were further reinforced when Eric le Fleur joined the Labour Party.

Conclusion
The Griqua and Coloured People’s Opinion, Griqua National Conference and the Griqua Independent Church of South Africa were important devices through which AAS le Fleur I’s values, ideas and leadership were promoted. The GNC and GIC were also important structures for binding and unifying Le Fleur’s adherents. The belief that Le Fleur had supernatural abilities and that he was called by God to rebuild the Griqua into a nation, were also important factors that allowed him to impress people, to keep his adherents, and to feature as a significant figure amongst GNC Griqua after his death. Le Fleur did not only expand the Griqua population but also created mechanisms for the maintenance of a Le Fleur-centred Griqua identity. Although he did not focus on the promotion of ‘indigenous’ or ‘traditional’ Khoekhoe culture, Le Fleur connected his adherents with a Griqua-mediated Khoekhoe past, even though he, and other Griqua sought prevent the Griqua being

¹¹³ LC, Item 4.5, Griekwa Independente Kerk van Suid Afrika … Vyfstigste Jaarlikse Konferensie” [1970].
¹¹⁷ LC, Item 4.3, Griekwa Nasionale Konferensie, Kranshoek, to Streekverteenwoordiger, Administrasie van Kleurlingsabnke, George, 7 Oktober 1970.
¹¹⁸ Griqua at Beeswater in the district of Vredendal became divided along support for the Federal Coloured People’s Party and the Coloured People’s Republican Party. T le Fleur apparently had a role in the departure of “sixty families” from Beeswater who were disillusioned with the leadership of AAS le Fleur II, to the vicinity of the Knysna region early in 1971. It seems that a severe drought in the vicinity of Vredendal was also a significant factor propelling the people away. T le Fleur and E le Fleur subsequently sought accommodation and employment at saw mills near Plettenberg Bay for the people. Most of the men eventually found employment on the Kurland Timber Estate. They were settled at The Crags about 20 kilometers east of Plettenberg Bay. CRC, Second Council, Third Session, 13-19 October 1976, Vol. 35, p. 1196; 20-27 October 1976, Vol. 36, pp. 1296-7. Storrar: Portrait of Plettenberg Bay, pp. 214-6.
located legally in an ‘Aboriginal Native’ category in which ‘Hottentots’ and Bantu-speakers were liable to be included. Le Fleur cultivated Griqua-Coloured self-reliance and unity; respect for God, the church and the government, and the eschewal of violent confrontation amongst his followers through the deployment of an ethno-national religious imbued discourse disseminated through the GCPO, GNC and GIC. GNC ethno-nationalism was further manifested and sustained through the development specific ethno-national symbols and volk festivals. Le Fleur’s success in cultivating a disciplined and law-abiding ethno-national Griqua Christian community contributed much to the socio-political orientation of the GNC Griqua after his death.
PART 2

GRIQUA DURING APARTHEID
Chapter 7: Loyal subjects (1948-1980s)

Whilst the previous chapters on Andrew Abraham Stockenström le Fleur I were very much an exploration of the dialectic between an individual and his socio-political and economic environment, this chapter and subsequent ones explore more generally the engagement of Griqua, especially their leaders, with their socio-political environment. However, given the organizational legacy of Le Fleur, these chapters also show his posthumous influence. The chapters on the Griqua under apartheid are also very much a study of conservatism among ethno-‘racial’ underclasses. This chapter shows how the years following 1948 were characterized by Griqua organizational acquiescence with the apartheid regime and its ideology, exemplified by Griqua participation in the 1952 Van Riebeeck Festival. Griqua leaders attempted throughout the apartheid period to project Griqua as loyal, law abiding citizens, hoping to win concessions from the government through operating within constitutional parameters. Griqua ethno-national aspirations, which dovetailed with, and were reinforced by apartheid; their demonstrated loyalty to the government, and their identification with aspects of apartheid, made the apartheid government sensitive to their identity concerns. Whilst the articulation of Griqua identities by Griqua leaders often fell in line with apartheid ideology, social relations between Griqua and those who were not Griqua (notably Bantu-speakers and Coloureds) and the permeability of Griqua boundaries could at the same time frustrate the application of the apartheid classification regime and ethno-‘racial’ separatism. Crossing historically the ‘Native’ and Coloured identity categories, Griquanness remained socially paradoxical. Some Griqua identity claimants were liable to be slotted into the ‘Native’ category and to be subjected to attendant discrimination. Though some Griqua identity claimants were liable to be classed as ‘Native’, the Griqua category became officially firmly located under the Coloured category during the apartheid period. This allowed Griqua nationalists to promote the separation of the Griqua category from the Coloured category without the same measure of concern of the pre-1950 period of being consequently located as ‘Natives’. Whilst some Griqua leaders located the Griqua within the Coloured category others became inclined to promote the Griqua as an ethno-‘racial’ group distinct from Coloureds, Bantu-speakers and Whites.

Apartheid positioning

After the Afrikaner based National Party (NP) won the 1948 general elections and proceeded to intensify segregation under the apartheid policy, Griqua leaders were compelled to reconcile themselves with the altered socio-political landscape and to attempt to use the means availed by the apartheid regime to promote their identity and socio-economic and political aspirations. Griqua ethno-national aspirations accorded to some extent with apartheid ethno-‘racial’ segmentation, thus inclining Griqua leaders to be partly receptive to apartheid. The identification of Griqua leaders with aspects of apartheid reinforced their accommodationist leanings towards the government. The Bantustan policy, which aimed at creating self-governing homelands for Bantu-speaking Africans to justify their lack of citizenship rights in South Africa, rekindled hope of a Griqua territory and inclined Griqua nationalist leaders to appeal for a Griqua homeland. Residential segregation inclined Griqua nationalists to appeal for own Griqua residential areas. The notion of parallel development, introduced by the NP government in formulating an alternative to homelands for Coloureds, was also deployed by Griqua nationalists. Despite the NP’s disapproval of a homeland for Coloureds, Griqua nationalists persisted in appealing for a Griqua homeland. By the 1960s key NP figures like Prime Minister HF Verwoerd reasoned that Coloureds should be offered the fullest opportunities for self-determination parallel to the White population within the confines of one territory without jeopardizing White power and privilege, with each group retaining its own character. An attempt was made to generate a semblance of self-determination through Coloured representative structures like the Union Council for Coloured Affairs (1959-1969) and the Coloured Persons’ Representative Council (1969-1980) which provided for the nomination of

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1 Department of Coloured Affairs: “Report of the interdepartmental committee of inquiry into the identity of the Griquas” (Mentz Report), 27 October 1980, par. 3.7.2 d; Annexure A; Rapport, 30 July 1978, p. 3.
Griqua representatives. The participation of Griqua leaders in these bodies reinforced their entanglement with official ideology.

**Van Riebeек Festival, 1952**

The organizational structures that Andrew Abraham Stockenström le Fleur I, or Die Kneg, bequeathed, allowed Griqua under the Griqua National Conference (GNC) to play a prominent role within the Griqua socio-political landscape. His ideological legacy influenced much the conduct and socio-political orientation of GNC Griqua. Prescriptions of obedience to authorities encouraged GNC Griqua to be acquiescent under the apartheid government. The GNC further sought to win the favour of the government by demonstrating the loyalty of the Griqua. Participation in government sanctioned festivals was a means of demonstrating Griqua loyalty. Participation in government sanctioned festivals also allowed for the affirmation of the presence or existence of the Griqua and for the projection of their ethnic aspirations. Indeed, the participation of GNC adherents in the 1952 Van Riebeек Festival, which celebrated the 300th anniversary of the landing of Jan Anthonisz Van Riebeек at the Cape of Good Hope and the onset of White settlement, demonstrated their loyalty, obedience and openness to the NP government and aspects of its ideology and policies, thus serving to endear the NP government to the GNC, which in turn encouraged continued Griqua loyalty.

The Van Riebeек Festival reflected the NP’s ethno-‘racial’ nationalist and separatist ideals. It celebrated the purported superiority of European culture, projecting Europeans as the catalyst of ‘civilizational’ progress and development and thus as natural leaders in South Africa. Van Riebeек was projected as the bearer of the “light of western civilization” to “Darkest Africa”. Conceived as integral to the construction of an ethno-‘racially’ segmented South Africa, the festival involved the staging of historical events that were deemed significant by White nationalists, with Van Riebeек featuring as the central icon.

Although primarily a festival for the celebration of White supremacy, people who were not White were also invited to participate. It was envisioned by organizers that they would depict their appreciation of being brought in the ambit of European ‘civilization’. A special day in the final week of the festival would be set aside for Coloured communities who were to organize their own program under the direction of the commissioner for Coloured Affairs, ID Du Plessis. The festivities of ‘Natives’ were to include a ‘Bantu village’ showing the transformation of ‘Native life’ from tribalism to modernity under the guidance of Whites. The pageants by people who were not White were essential for promoting the view that there were separate ethno-‘racial’ and cultural groups in South Africa with their own traditions and special needs warranting apartheid separatism. A hugely successful boycott was undertaken against the festival, organized in the main by the Non-European Unity Movement, despite attempts to lure people who were not White to watch or participate in separate ethno-‘racial’ events at the festival. Material incentives were at times offered by government officials in their attempt to lure participants from the Coloured community.

Months before the festival, GNC leaders urged Griqua to participate in the festival. Coloured organizations agitating nationwide against the festival also attempted to dissuade Griqua from participating. GNC leaders successfully encouraged a number of Griqua to participate. Only Griqua and a Malay group participated in the section of the festival meant for Coloureds. About 700 Griqua from across South Africa, many being from Beeswater (near Vredendal) and Kranshoek in (Plettenberg Bay), came together shortly before the festival at Klaasjagersberg near Simonstown, practicing for a week under the leadership of Tommy Carse from the Department of Coloured Affairs.

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3 *Cape Times*, 2 April 1952, p. 1, 3 April 1952, p. 11.
5 Witz: *Apartheid’s festival*, pp. 129-130.
6 Witz: *Apartheid’s festival*, p. 137.
7 Witz: *Apartheid's festival*, pp.144-179.
Taking place on 2 April, the Griqua pageant portrayed the Griqua as a distinct ethnic group aspiring for its own national identity; the growth of the Griqua volk under the leadership of the Kok family, and their migration across the country. A section of the pageant was also devoted to the role of AAS le Fleur I. A choir accompanying the pageant sang the Griqua national anthem “God Ewig Groot en Goed”. Demonstrating Griqua cultural specificity, Griqua women were dressed in hoop dresses and caps identified with those worn by their ancestors who trekked to Nomansland (East Griqualand). Choir-girls were clothed in white dresses. Griqua men were dressed in the green-grey uniform associated with past Griqua warriors and grey broad-rimmed hats. The Griqua marched into the pageant arena with their own red, white, blue and green striped national flag with the kanniedood (aloë) in the centre, forming a circle whilst singing.

At an historical enactment of the landing of Van Riebeeck at the Cape staged on Saturday 5 April the Griqua portrayed the Strandlopers (Goringhaicona) Khoekhoe approaching Van Riebeeck represented with his family and soldiers. Van Riebeeck made a speech proclaiming that he and his party did not come to make profit at the expense of the indigenous people but to bring order and the light of civilization. The Strandlopers expressed appreciation for the words of Van Riebeeck and for the gifts that they were given from the ‘civilized world’; they bowed before him and retreated with expressions of gratitude.

The GNC Griqua’s participation in the festival did not merely portray the Strandlopers’ supposed gratitude for White ‘civilization’ but also expressed their own gratitude to Whites despite a persisting Griqua perception of historical injustice caused by Whites, as indicated in the GNC’s Volksbode of 10 August 1952:

Onlangs, te Kaapstad op 2de April, het die Griekwa Volk hulle plig op Nasielike grond, getroulik nagekom, om hulle dankbaarheid aan die nageslag van Jan Van Riebeeck, te bring, wat die Westersebeskawing aan die Suidelike deel van Afrika gebring het, waarvan ons deelname is [sic]. Hoewel, as swerwelinge in ons geboorteland, met geen tuiste nie, en met gevoelte dat onreg aan ons geskied is, voel ons nie hopeloos verlore nie, want ons wag op die Almagtige se belofte.

The event was for many Griqua of great historical significance. The Van Riebeeck Festival was, according to Piet Botha, a Griqua teacher at Kranshoek, a turning point and rebirth for the Griqua heralding a new period:

Vir die Griekwas was die Van Riebeeckfees ‘n keerpunt en ‘n wedergeboorte. Verpreid en onbekend – wie het van ons geweet of aan ons gedink? Die Griekwas is huis-toe in die vaste geloof dat ‘n nuwe tydperk in die geskiedenis vir hulle aangebreek het; ‘n Griekwa-volk wat eerbied vir gesag en orde het – ‘n volk met tradisievastigheid wat staande gebly het omdat hy vashou aan die goddelikheid.

In line with the religiosity of GNC Griqua and the importance of religion in Griqua ethnicity, the event was also imbued with religiosity:

Dit was jammerlik laat ons nie bevooreg was [om] die toneel in sy volheid [te] kon voordra nie, omdat die tyd bepaald was, nogtans kon die Volk in sy herlewende vorm ‘n verskyning maak en daardeur God se Heilige Naam met lofsang, opdra, vir sy behoudenis en bestand, deur alle storne.

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10 Witz: Apartheid’s festival, p. 86.
11 Burger, 9 April 1952, pp. 2; Carse: “Griekwas”, p. 2.8.
13 Volksbode, 10 August 1952 (copy at the Le Fleur Collection (LC) at Unisa Library (archival division).
 Regarded as a major event, AAS le Fleur I was also supposed to have predicted the Van Riebeeck Festival. According to Piet Botha, AAS le Fleur I mentioned in 1927 that the volk would go to Van Riebeeck’s festival tomorrow and that a White man, who would be divinely inspired (“besiel”) to help and serve them, would lead them to the festival. According to the 1927 prophesy Griqua would also go to the government of the day – to whom they were urged to remain loyal – to ask for a piece of land. The Griqua apparently felt that Tommy Carse was this prophesized White man. On their departure from the festival, the Griqua expressed great appreciation, loyalty and goodwill towards Carse.14

The GNC reasoned that Griqua participation in the festival advanced their recognition as a nation15 and that they would be rewarded by the government for showing respect for authority and order.16 The participation of Griqua in a festival affirming White superiority was ironic, reinforcing White pretensions to superiority whilst also affirming the presence of the Griqua who acknowledged a Khoekhoe heritage via their Griqua identity category. Thus, the Van Riebeeck Festival represented an opportunity for Griqua to affirm their presence and pride as a distinct community with a Khoekhoe heritage despite the inferiorization of their Khoekhoe cultural heritage in White supremacy discourses driving the Van Riebeeck Festival and the GNC Griqua’s own affirmation of the superiority of European culture. Griqua participation sanctioned the ethno-national (or separatist) elements of the Van Riebeeck Festival. Their support of the ethno-national elements of the festival also reflected pre-apartheid Griqua ethno-nationalist tendencies and ideal for self-determination.

In participating in the Van Riebeeck Festival the Griqua demonstrated their loyalty and openness to the policies of the government, thus contributing to their reputation as model subjects. The commissioner for Coloured Affairs, Dr ID du Plessis, hoped that the participation of Griqua and Malays would send a message that there were different ethnic communities with different needs that could only be solved through collaboration.17 The participation of Griqua also touched Afrikaner observers who saw the Griqua as a reflection of their predecessors:

Wat hulle kleredrag betref sowel as hulle waardigheid, is hulle ’n getroue weergawe van ons eie voorgeslagte. Ook hulle sang tydens die optog, was so ernstig smekend, dat dit ’n mens onwillekeurig laat dink het aan die Psalms en Gesange wat die Voortrekkers in hulle tye van nood in hulle lagers laat weergalm het! Hierin word die siel en lewe van die hervormde Volk gesien.18

GNC participation in the Van Riebeeck Festival was rewarded later in the year when the minister of Interior Affairs, Dr E Dönges, approved in principle that Kranshoek be purchased for the Griqua from a private owner19 following a request by ID du Plessis. Du Plessis stressed the importance of such a gesture by the government in consequence of GNC participation in the Van Riebeeck Festival.20 Kranshoek was finally purchased by the government in 1957 and rented to the GNC for £100 (then around R200) per annum.21 It also became the main centre and headquarters of the GNC. In addition to the 1952 festival, GNC Griqua also

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15 Volksbode, 25 November 1952 (copy at LC).
17 Cape Times, 3 April 1952, p. 4.
18 Extract from Burger (Brandwag) of 16 May 1952, in the Volksbode of 10 August 1952.
19 National Archives, Pretoria, Sekretaris, Binnelandse Sake (BNS) 1/1/1, 4/7, CJ Nel, Sekretaris van Binnelandse Sake, to Kommissaris van Kleurlingsake, Kaapstad, 18 November 1952.
20 BNS 1/1/1, 4/7, Coloured Affairs, Krantzhoek, Knysna (Purchase of farm for Griquas), ID Du Plessis, Kommissaris van Kleurlingsake, Cape Town, to Sekretaris van Binnelandse Sake, Pretoria, 12 July 1952.
demonstrated their loyalty to the government through participating in the republic festivals of 1966 and 1971.\textsuperscript{22}

**Griqua Centenary Festival**

GNC involvement in the Van Riebeeck Festival provided some inspiration in the planning of the commemoration of the 1861-2 Griqua trek to East Griqualand. Tom le Fleur, son of AAS le Fleur I, and a member of the Union Council for Coloured Affairs (UCCA) of the 1960s, was appointed Organizing Secretary of the Central Festival Committee for the Western and Northern Cape for the planned celebration.\textsuperscript{23} T le Fleur indicated that the celebration would include a historical pageant similar to the one held during the Van Riebeeck Festival. It would also involve sports events and a music festival. The celebration would end with an interdenominational church service.\textsuperscript{24} Much like the Van Riebeeck Festival celebrated the purported superiority of European culture, the Griqua festival would celebrate Griqua contribution to the spread of “Western civilization”. In the words of CIR Fortuin, chairperson of the Central Festival Committee:\textsuperscript{25}

\begin{quote}
[T]he celebrations … are primarily intended to pay homage to the memory of Kaptein Adam Kok III … . The celebrations will commemorate the part played by the Griquas in opening up East Griqualand for Western civilization and its eventual occupation and development by the Whites. For this reason Griquas and Coloureds all over the Republic and certainly all the Whites of East Griqualand have been invited to participate.\textsuperscript{26}
\end{quote}

The influence of the Griqua-Coloured nationalism of AAS le Fleur I, and his promotion of Griqua-Coloured self-reliance was also suggested in T le Fleur’s vision of the festival. T Le Fleur indicated that the 1963 festival was conceived as a means for promoting Griqua and Coloured self-reliance. “The purpose of these celebrations was to show the world what the Griqua and Coloured people are capable of doing on their own”. T le Fleur also saw the festival as a means of fostering Griqua-Coloured unity:

\begin{quote}
[t]he celebrations will commemorate the arrival of the Griqua trek at the foot of Mount Currie in May, 1863. It will also be an opportunity for commemorating the forgotten Coloured heroes in South African history.\textsuperscript{27}
\end{quote}

Dis die enigste van sy Soort, hierdie Griekwa Eeufees, en dit is nie net ons Griekwas s’n nie. Dit behoort ook aan die Kleurling Gemeenskap want daarvoor het die Hervormer [i.e. AAS le Fleur I] ons gevorm om een nasie te wees.\textsuperscript{28}

Organizers hoped that the festival would be a momentous event lasting three days. Preparations were initially done with the expectation that more 10 000 people could attend the festival.\textsuperscript{29} The idea of a festival in commemoration of the trek of Griqua under Adam Kok III, appears to have been raised after AJ le Fleur (President of the Griqua Independent Church), Tom le Fleur, J Presence, M Presence and Reverend Winnaar, all from the GNC, visited Kokstad during the Easter period in 1959 where they also attended the annual conference of the Kokstad based Griqua National Independent Church.\textsuperscript{30} The preparation of the Griqua Centenary Festival provided an opportunity for the easing of the relations between the Le Fleur leadership and leaders of the Griqua of East Griqualand. Adam Kok III was for both groups a central figure who could function as a unifying symbol. Preparations for the festival were, however, paralysed by squabbling in the

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{22} Carse: “Die Griekwas”, p. 2.9.
\bibitem{23} *Burger*, 22 September 1962, p. 11.
\bibitem{24} *Cape Argus*, 25 October 1962, p. 4.
\bibitem{25} *Burger*, 22 September 1962, p. 11.
\bibitem{26} *Kokstad Advertiser*, 15 August 1963, p. 7.
\bibitem{27} *Cape Argus*, 25 October 1962, p. 4.
\bibitem{28} LC, File 4, T le Fleur: “Die Griekwa Eeufees”. Document may be part of the *Volksbode* of 22 October 1962. LC, Item 4.6.
\bibitem{29} *Kokstad Advertiser*, 14 February 1963, p. 1.
\bibitem{30} LC, File 4, T le Fleur: “Die Griekwa Eeufees”.
\end{thebibliography}
Central Festival Committee (especially between Tom le Fleur and the Kokstad based organizers) and through difficulties in obtaining the requisite funding.\(^{31}\) Trying to account for delays in the acquisition of anticipated financial support from the Department of Coloured Affairs, Fortuin complained in 1963 that “a handful of reactionary socalled [sic] Griqua leaders tried to wreak the celebrations because they did not play a leading part”.\(^{32}\) The Central Festival Committee was eventually dissolved on 16 June 1965, without the festival having been held. It was instead decided that the money that was raised for the festival be used for a Centenary Adam Kok Memorial Hall.\(^{33}\)

**Official classification and Griqua identities**

Cultural and ethno-‘racial’ hierarchization under White domination significantly influenced Griqua social, cultural, political and identity positioning. Griqua identities during apartheid and before, were shaped in socio-political contexts of domination that undermined identity and cultural ‘autonomy’\(^{34}\) and inclined Griqua to forge their identities and cultures in ways that were much influenced by pro-establishment discourses. Though much shaped by pro-establishment discourses, Griqua identities were also, to some extent, influenced by anti-establishment discourses.\(^{35}\)

Located firmly within the Coloured category during apartheid, Griqua identities would, together with Coloured identities, be shaped in relation to European/White, and ‘Native’/‘Bantu’/‘Black’ categories. Associated with a Coloured identity category, the Griqua would be located as lower than the Whites but as better than Bantu-speaking Africans.\(^{36}\) However, stigma against a ‘Hottentot’ and ‘Bushman’ heritage associated with primitivism and inferiority, conferred a lower social status to a Griqua identity,\(^{37}\) making the Griqua category somewhat intermediate between the Coloured and ‘Native’/‘Bantu’ categories. Some Coloureds thought that the Griqua, or at least certain Griqua segments, were closer to Bantu-speakers than to Coloureds.\(^{38}\) The liability of some Griqua to be classified as ‘Native’/‘Bantu’, inclined Griqua leaders to strongly disavow social proximity to Bantu-speakers. Though there was a stigma against the Griqua category, Griqua managed to derive pride from the heritage and the achievements of their predecessors in past semi-independent Griqua polities.\(^{39}\)

Despite the official association of the Griqua and the Coloured category during apartheid, lingering associations of the Griqua with ‘Aboriginal Natives’ and ‘Hottentots’, manifested in pre-apartheid legislation, inclined some officials to classify Griqua identity claimants as ‘Native’/‘Bantu’/‘Black’.\(^{40}\) From as early as

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\(^{31}\) Problems around the collection funds emerged between T le Fleur and the Kokstad based organizers. Whilst T Fleur was initially empowered to collect funds for the Griqua festival, a statement was issued by the Central Committee of the Griqua Centenary Festival late in 1962, signed by CIR Fortuin the chairperson, and RCH Werner the secretary, that all money collected for the festival be send to Kokstad; that no one must for now collect money for the festival. Central Committee claimed that they wanted to make sure that the money was used only for the festival. *Banner*, November 1962.


\(^{33}\) *Kokstad Advertiser*, 24 June 1965, p. 4.

\(^{34}\) I am drawing on Zimitri Erasmus’ contextualization of the development of coloured identities. Zimitri Erasmus: “Re-imagining coloured identities”, in Zimitri Erasmus (ed.): *Coloured by history, shaped by place: Perspectives on Coloured identities in the Cape* (Cape Town: Kwela Books, 2001), p. 22.

\(^{35}\) As shown especially in the next chapter.


\(^{38}\) National Archives, Pretoria, Departement van Beplanning (BEP) 350, G7/305/3, PS van Reynoers, to Sekretaris van Gemeenskapsbou, Kimberly (date not clear).


\(^{40}\) See e.g. Waldman: “The Griqua conundrum”, pp. 122-3.
1828, laws and regulations were passed referring to Griqua together with other Khoe-San (descendant) people as 'Aboriginal Natives'. Some laws explicitly referred to Griqua and Khoe-San in general (e.g. ‘Bushmen’, ‘Hottentots’, Korana and Namaqua) together with Bantu-speaking communities as ‘Aboriginal Natives’. Some laws might be read by government officials as implicitly including Khoe-San in the ‘Native’ category by defining ‘Natives’ as people who were “members of an aboriginal race or tribe of Africa”. Some laws that explicitly referred to ‘Bushmen’, ‘Hottentots’, Korana and Namaqua as ‘Aboriginal Natives’ did not explicitly refer to the Griqua. Some laws explicitly excluded “remnants of an [aboriginal] race or tribe of South Africa which has ceased to exist as a race or tribe” from the ‘Native’ category. Divergences in the deployment of population categories by government officials was very much suggested by the inconsistency between the meaning of categories in legislation, as well as divergences between census categories and categories in legislation.

Between the censuses of 1921 and 1970s, the categories of ‘Bantu’ and ‘Native’ were used to delimit each other (i.e. they were used as equivalents), reflecting the strong social and legal association of the ‘Bantu’ category with the ‘Native’ category. ‘Hottentots’ and ‘Bushmen’, on the other hand, were excluded from the ‘Native’ category and included together with Griqua in the restricted Coloured category in censuses between 1904 and 1946 – despite being included in some laws as ‘Aboriginal Natives’.

The census location of Khoe-San, with the exception of the Griqua, changed in 1951. Viewed as “aboriginal race[s]”, ‘Bushmen’, ‘Hottentots’, Korana and Namaqua, were classified as ‘Natives’ in the 1951 census, with the census being brought in line with the 1950 Population Registration Act (No 30). The Act did not explicitly refer to Khoekhoe and San (or ‘Hottentots’ and ‘Bushmen’) but defined a ‘Native’ as “a person who is in fact or is generally accepted as a member of any aboriginal race or tribe of Africa”. The exclusion of Griqua from the ‘Native’ category in the 1951 census reflected the strong association of Griqua with Coloureds. The Population Registration Act defined a “coloured person” as “a person who is not a white person or a native”.

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41 Ordinance 49, 1828 (Admission of Native Foreigners); Ordinance 2, 1837 (Prevention of Crimes); Act 24, 1857 (Preventing Colonial Fingoes … being mistaken for Kafirs); Act 44, 1908 (Establishment of Native Township); Act 1, 1916 (Native Definition Amendment Act); Act 32, 1909 (Private Locations Act).
42 E.g. Act 15, 1911 (Native Labour Regulation Act); Act 25, 1945 (Native Urban Areas Consolidation Act).
43 E.g. Act 8 1878 (Native Locations Amendment Act); Act 28, 1898 (Liquor Law Amendment Act); Act 30, 1899 (Native Locations Amendment Act); Act 40, 1902 (Native Reserve Locations Act).
44 Act 18, 1936 (Native Trust and Land); Act 12, 1936 (Representation of Natives).
Whilst ‘Bushmen’ and ‘Hottentots’ were to be classified as ‘Natives’ in censuses from 1951 onwards, the categories of ‘Bushman’ and ‘Hottentot’ became effaced in subsequent censuses, reflecting the treatment of Khoe-San descendants as either Coloureds or ‘Natives’. The effacement categories such as ‘Bushman’, ‘Hottentot’, and Korana in censuses also reflected the widely held perception amongst government officials that there were not many real or pure ‘Hottentots’ and ‘Bushmen’ left and that most who were included in the category of ‘Hottentot’ (including ‘Bushmen’) in censuses (e.g. 81, 598 in 1865 and 85, 892 in 1904) were ‘racially’ mixed.\(^{48}\) It was mentioned in the 1911 census report that “[t]he term “Hottentot” … [was] colloquially applied to many persons who, though their forebears in the distant past may have belonged to the Hottentot race, should strictly speaking be classed … as of the Mixed Race”\(^{48}\).

The terms ‘Native’ and ‘Aboriginal’ became very strongly associated with Bantu-speaking Africans, thus making those still considered to be ‘Hottentot’ and ‘Bushman’ liable to be classified as ‘Bantu’, particularly in cases where the term ‘Bantu’ was used instead of ‘Native’. From 1961 population censuses generally used the term ‘Bantu’ in the place of ‘Native’. ‘Bantus’ were defined in the 1961 census as persons “who in fact are, or who are generally accepted as members of any aboriginal race or tribe of Africa” referred to in “previous census reports … as ‘Native’”.\(^{49}\) A 1961 circular from the Department of Bantu Administration and Development indicated the liability of Khoe-San to be classified and treated as ‘Bantu’:

> Some district officers may encounter difficulty due to the fact that certain groups such as Nama – Korana and Bushmen may claim classification as Coloureds. It must be emphasised that although the abovementioned groups are lighter of skin than the typical Bantu, they belong to an aboriginal race of Africa and are regarded as Bantu for Population registration purposes.\(^{50}\)

The official use of the term ‘Black’ in the place of ‘Native’, also made Khoe-San considered as ‘Aboriginal Natives’ liable to be classified as ‘Black’. As indicated in the 1980\(^{51}\) (as well as in 1985\(^{52}\) and 1991\(^{53}\) census, the category ‘Black’ referred to people who spoke Bantu-speaking languages like Xhosa, Zulu, Swazi, Ndebele, Sotho-Tswana, Tsonga, Venda as well as “other Blacks” that is, “persons who belong[ed] to groups other than the aforementioned”.

Inconsistency and confusion in the official deployment of population categories not only reflected a lack of consensus over the meaning of (some) categories, but also shifting meanings and differential appropriation of newer or altered meanings. Reflecting confusion in population classification, the 1921 census report indicated that

> notwithstanding the precise instructions issued and the provision of separate census schedules for the enumeration of each race to avoid confusion of race classification, a considerable number of coloured persons were enumerated on Native schedules and vice versa. To many white persons, the fine distinctions of race classification are not perceptible, and any person who is not “white” is considered to be a “Native.” Before tabulation could be proceeded with it was necessary to adjust these primary errors of classification. Another


\(^{49}\) RP 62-1963, p. v.

\(^{50}\) Cape Town Archives, Chief Magistrate, Transkei (CMT) 3/1450, 37/C, Part 1, Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Pretoria (29 April 1961), General Circular No. 15 1961.


possible error in classification was found in cases of intermarriage, as when a Chinaman had married a native girl.\footnote{UG 40-24, p. iv.}

Inconsistency in the applications of population categories made for confusion in practice. Thus, even though the perception that the Griqua were Coloured and not ‘Aboriginal Natives’ increased amongst government officials (as the century proceeded), Griqua were still liable to be regarded as ‘Natives’ in terms of certain laws whilst at the same time liable to be regarded as Coloureds in terms of other laws. Griqua were, for example, liable to be regarded as ‘Natives’ for tax purposes if they resided in “native location[s]” under the same conditions as … native[s]” in terms of the 1925 Natives Taxation and Development Act (No. 41), which required ‘Natives’ to pay a “general and local tax”. In terms of the Act

> “native” means any member of an aboriginal race or tribe of Africa but does not include a person in any degree of European descent (even if he be described as Hottentot, Griqua, Koranna or Bushmen) unless he is residing in a native location under the same conditions as a native.

By providing for any person residing in an area proclaimed a ‘Native area’ under the same conditions as a ‘Natives’ to be regarded as a ‘Native’, the 1927 Native Administration Act (No. 38) also made Griqua, Khoekhoe and San as well as Coloureds in ‘Native areas’ liable to be regarded as ‘Natives’ for the purpose of the law.

Whilst being liable to be regarded as ‘Natives’ if residing in ‘Native areas’, Griqua, Khoekhoe and San were at the same time liable to be excluded from some laws applicable to ‘Natives’. In terms of the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act (No.18) and the 1936 Representation of Natives Act (No. 45), ‘Native’ meant, \textit{inter alia},

> any member of any aboriginal race or tribe of Africa, other than a race, tribe or ethnic group in the Union representing the remnants of a race or tribe of South Africa which has ceased to exist as a race or tribe.

Thus, to the extent that Griqua, Khoekhoe and San in ‘Native areas’ were considered “remnants of a race or tribe … which has ceased to exist as a race or tribe”, they might not have been considered ‘Natives’ for the purpose of the Native Trust and Land Act and the Representation of Natives Act of 1936 although they were liable to be regarded as ‘Natives’ for the purpose of the 1925 Natives Taxation and Development Act and the 1927 Native Administration Act.

Categorization, both in law and in official censuses, was very much tied to attempts at establishing order. Establishing order under White ethno-‘racial’ rule required neat demarcation of populations. Attempts at neat demarcation were made difficult through, \textit{inter alia}, lack of consensus over the meaning of population categories, through social networks cutting across official categories and through contestation of the applicability of certain categories.

The official deployment of population categories in legislation and censuses tended to limit the identity choices of people, inducing them to locate themselves and others in terms of official categories. Categories or their meanings were, however, also subject to contestation, both amongst dominant and the subordinated communities. Divergent deployments of official categories amongst dominant classes, especially government officials, provided some support for subordinate people promoting the deployment of official categories in ways that suited them.

The meanings imputed on population categories by dominant groups could be internalized or rejected. Although categories of ‘Hottentot’, Coloured and ‘Native’ were first deployed by Whites in reference to other people (as indicated by the linguistic provenance of the latter two categories), they were not necessarily accepted by all people that they designated as self-referential categories or with the same meaning that Whites
imbued them. Although the term ‘Hottentot’ connoted for many Whites primitiveness, it could be affirmed with a measure of pride by some Khoe-San descendants, as exemplified in the Kat River settlement, between 1825 and 1851. Khoe-San heritage and memory, notably pre-colonial landownership, was invoked by Khoe-San descendants in the Eastern Cape mobilizing support to avert colonial restrictions.\(^{55}\)

Griqua and ‘Coloureds’ also attempted to invest the categories of Griqua, ‘Coloured’ and ‘Native’ with meanings that suited them that diverged from the deployment of these categories by some government officials and White members of the public. Whilst the individuals from subordinated communities could internalize official categories with the meanings the dominant classes imbued them with, their rejection of the categories or their meanings could also alter the officials deployment of categories. Thus, the increasing self-referential use of a restricted sense of the Coloured category (excluding Bantu-speakers) towards the end of the 1800s\(^{56}\) facilitated and sustained official deployment of the category in a restricted sense which in turn reinforced the restricted use of the category within dominated ethno-‘racial’ communities. As Vivian Bickford-Smith hinted,\(^{57}\) the deployment of official identity categories was very much the result of a dialectic between the ethno-‘racial’ underclasses and dominant classes in general and between government officials and ethno-racial underclasses in particular. This dialectic might entail classification by dominant groups influenced by prior sensibilities and identities amongst subordinated communities, followed by either internalization or rejection of official categories by individuals from subordinated communities, with rejection holding in a potential to induce an alteration in the deployment of categories by dominant groups.

**Boundaries of Griquanness**

Apartheid inclined Griqua nationalist leaders to articulate an identity that, to a large extent, fell in line with the ethno-racial ideology of the government. Whilst the articulation of Griqua identities by Griqua representatives often fell in line with apartheid ideology, the permeability of Griqua boundaries could at the same time frustrate the application of apartheid classifications and attended laws. Griqua identity remained open to outsiders. Outsiders could become Griqua through, *inter alia*, marriage and, at least in regard to Griqua under the GNC and those from East Griqualand, through membership of a Griqua church. However, Griqua from East Griqualand and those under the Le Fleur leadership preferred that only outsiders who were Coloured should be incorporated into their communities.

The constitution of the Griqua National Independent Church of Kokstad suggested very much who Griqua were inclined to accept as a fellow Griqua and to what extent. For the “purpose of the Church a member of the Griqua Volk” was “any coloured Griqua Burgher” who came to East Griqualand with Adam Kok III in 1862-3, or the descendants of such burghers, as well as “those who came from the neighbouring colonies, provided they” were “legally married and voting members”. Whilst the constitution excluded from membership of the Griqua *volk* “any kaffir tribes of South Africa”, it provided that “those members of the Baralong and Bahlaping tribes who came over to East Griqualand with the late Captain Adam Kok” and their descendants could become members the church. They were, however, subjected to discrimination in the church.\(^{58}\) Discrimination might have been especially applicable to Thlapping and Rolong who did not have burgher status.

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56 See chapter 2 and 3.


58 Separate services were to be held for Rolong and Tlhaping. They were also “not … entitled to vote upon any matters affecting the properties of the Church; the calling to or dismissal from the Church of any Minister; and the election of any Trustees, Elders, and Official Deacons”. They were “entitled to elect their own Deacons from amongst their own Tribe, who, however, shall not be members of the Kerkraad or Officials of the Church. They shall not be entitled to hold any office in the said Church”.

The tendency to associate genuine Griquaness with descent from “coloured Griqua burghers” suggested in the constitution of the Kokstad based Griqua National Independent Church, as well as the tendency of Griqua leaders during apartheid to deny that Bantu-speakers were incorporated into their communities, was manifested by RW Abrams of the East Griqualand Pioneers Council before the Constitutional Committee of the President’s Council in 1983:

[D]ie nagemaakte Griekwas wat nie gebore Griekwas is nie, is nie welkom in ons midde nie, want ek sien nie hoe kan ’n ander ras ’n Griekwa wees. ... Hy moet ’n gebore Griekwa wees, hy moet ’n agtergrond hê. Sy agtergrond moet Griewka wees. … [T]oe Adam Kok oorgekom het was daar ook Baralongs en daai Baralongs was ook aanvaar deur die Kerk maar hulle was nooit ’n Griekwa nie. ... Hulle moet teruggaan na hulle eie groep waar hulle tuishoort.59

Thus, some Griqua not only associated genuine Griquaness with descent from Griqua burghers; they were also inclined to deny that there were also Bantu-speaking Africans, notably Rolong and Tlhaping, who received Griqua burgher status and treatment in Griqua polities. Reverend Thompson from the Kokstad based Griqua church tampered expressions of Griqua exclusiveness, and in doing so reflected differential incorporation into the Griqua community; different notions of Griquaness, and contestation around Griquaness:

[A]ccording to the constitution of the church even people of outside race could become members of the church and with[in a] certain period of time be considered Griquas. I think that has stayed in some measure in the minds of the Griqua people to this day. … There was an opening for even Bantoe or Black people in the earlier days if they became members of the Griqua National Independent Church to be considered as Griqua and treated as such [sic].60

Among the Le Fleur Griqua individuals who joined their Griqua Independent Church (GIC) were also accepted as Griqua. Identification with the GIC required acceptance of a Christianity mediated through, and valorising AAS le Fleur I, Die Kneg. Membership of the GNC was supposed to be restricted to Griqua and Coloured.61 The GNC constitution, as amended in 1959, described the Griqua as follows:

Die Griekwa Volk besaan uit alle nasies in Suid Afrika, behalwe bantoes d.w.s. soos Basoetoes, Xosas, ens., en het Europese bloed in hulle are, asook inboorlinge en slawe bloed. Ook is hulle bestaan grootlik toe te skryf, aan die Outenikwa, Namakwa en Korraner stamme.62

In terms of the rules of the Griqua National Conference drawn up in 1943, as amended in 1965, membership of the GNC was only open to “Coloured persons of mixed European and Native descent, barring Asiatics and Aboriginal Natives”.63 It seems that the Le Fleur Griqua were more open than the Pioneers Council to embrace as fellow Griqua those Rolong and Tlhaping who were descendant from people who had burgher

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59 Oral evidence, Griqua delegation, Kokstad, Constitutional Committee of the President’s Council (CCPC): “Assignment regarding the needs and claims of Griquas”, Vol. XXVIII, 1983-04-19, p. 22-3.
59 Oral evidence, Griqua delegation, Kokstad, Constitutional Committee of the President’s Council (CCPC): “Memoranda: Needs and claims of the Griqua”, Vol. VII [1983], pp.7.12-7.34. The date when constitution was drawn up is not indicated. Reference to “the Province of Natal” (Article 6) indicates that the constitution was drawn up or reformulated after 1909. The constitution also has a 1943 amendment.
62 LC, Item 4.1, GNC Constitution.
status under Adam Kok III. Thus, although the GNC denied providing membership to Bantu-speakers, an exception was made with Rolong and Tlhaping descendants of Rolong and Tlhaping who were “granted exemption by Chief Adam Kok, if they continued to follow Griqua customs and traditions.” Whilst many Griqua leaders publicly disavowed Bantu-speakers being incorporated into Griqua communities, some leaders, for example Richard Foster, allegedly encouraged people who were not Griqua, including many Bantu-speakers, to become Griqua or to buy Griqua identity cards in order to augment their support-base.

The historical permeability of Griqua boundaries complicated the slotting of some Griqua in terms of apartheid ‘racial’ classification. Many Griqua were classified as Coloured after the promulgation of the Population Registration Act of 1950. A number were also classified as ‘Native’, particularly in the Northern Cape. Some difficulty was experienced by government officials in determining who was or was not Griqua, and whether Griqua identity claimants were to be slotted Coloured or ‘Native’/’Bantu’, resulting much from the somatic variety and admixture of Griqua identity claimants.

Through their interaction and intermarriages, Griqua were subject to incorporation into Bantu-speaking or Coloured communities. Intermarriages or unions with Bantu-speakers, notably in parts of the Northern Cape and East Griqualand where Griqua and Bantu-speakers were interspersed, allowed people of Bantu-speaking descent to be incorporated both into Griqua and Coloured communities. A number of Griqua became varying integrated into Bantu-speaking and Coloured communities, posing a dilemma for government officials who had to distinguish whether they were Griqua, ‘Bantu’ or Coloured. The assumption of a Griqua identity by people of Bantu-speaking origin was much facilitated by the Griqua burgher status accorded to some Bantu-speakers in past Griqua polities, notably Rolong and Tlhaping, which made it possible for their descendants to also be accepted as Griqua. Thus, whilst a Griqua identity had the potential to allow people of Bantu-speaking origin to become Coloured, a Tlhaping/Rolong-Griqua identity had the potential to allow non-Griqua Tlhaping/Rolong to become (or to claim to be) Griqua.

Griqua interaction with Bantu-speakers and Coloureds could blur the socio-cultural and somatic boundaries between the three populations and thus complicate apartheid identity distinctions and the application of apartheid segregation policies. Inter-group unions could engender multiple identities and shifts between identities (especially in regard to children from such unions), making it possible, for example, for individuals to affirm or deploy Griqua, Coloured or Bantu-speaking categories, as circumstances demanded. However, social interaction and mixing with especially Bantu-speakers made Griqua identity claimants liable to be disqualified officially as genuine Griqua. Griqua or Coloured identity claimants with somatic features associated with Bantu-speakers were also liable to be regarded as opportunistic impostors.

During discussions held on 7 January 1953 in Kimberley between representatives of the City Council, Native Affairs, Coloured Affairs (division of the Department of Interior Affairs), and the South African Police to resolve who was to be regarded as Griqua and who was not, officials indicated that there were only a few real (“werklike”) Griqua left in Kimberley and that the Griqua of the area were becoming ‘Native’ (i.e. ‘Bantu’). They thought that the alleged Griqua of Kimberley all lived in ‘Native locations’ and that their behaviour and

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64 PC 2/1983, p. 66.
65 BNS 1/1/586, 86/95, Rasklassifikasie van die Griekwa, Bevolkingsregister, Pretoria, to Sekretarits, Binnelandse Sake, Pretoria, 7 July 1958.
67 On burgher status and acceptance and treatment of Rolong and Tlhaping as Griqua, see, Cape Town Archives, Chief Magistrate, Chief Magistrate, East Griqualand (CMK) 5/15, Statements of Rauyampa, (p. 67) Klaas Makoalo (p. 70), and Jan Zwaartboy (p. 71), all dated 27 December 1894; National Archives, Pretoria, Secretary of Native Affairs (NTS) 79, 1/5, Proceedings of the Court of the Magistrate of Mount Currie in case of Trustees of Griqua church properties vs George Abrahams and others, 1914; *Griqua and Coloured People’s Opinion*, 27 March 1926.
lifestyles were similar to those of ‘Natives’. These views were supposedly supported by a study of Dr Van Haght from Coloured Affairs conducted sometime in the early 1950s that found that real Griqua were rare in Kimberley and that they were disappearing through mixing with Coloureds and ‘Natives’:

Die Griekwes het byna hulle identiteit weens vernemging en absorbering deur ander rasse verloor. Hulle moes hulle nedersettings weens verdringing deur ander raspe groepe prysgee. Hulle wild is vernietig en weens ekonomiese drukking moes hulle na die stede instroom en tans is hulle orals in die naturelle lokasies versperei.

Die sameboerdery het tot gemengde huwelike tussen die Griekwes en die Bantoe geleë. ... Hulle sal metterdyd met die naturelle of die kleurlinge saamsmelt. Ter stawing van hierdie gevolgtrekking moet ek na hulle huweliksgewoontes verwys. 20.8% van 260 huwelike was by wyse van [die ‘Bantoe’] lobola en die primitiewe metode van vat, en sit. ... Die Griekwes as sodanig sal nie in hierdie gebied bestaan nie. Hierdie verklaring is nie net ’n teorie nie, maar is deur feite gesteun. ... [D]ie Griekwa van Griekwaland-Wes as sodanig [is] aan die verdwyn. 70

Government officials were less responsive towards Griqua identity claimants who in their opinion lost elements of genuine Griquaness through mingling with Bantu-speaking people. Paramount Chief Daniel PJ Kanyiles, who was based at Ritchie near Kimberley, indicated in 1983 that the problem of the Griqua in Griqualand West was that they had a darker colour than Griqua from elsewhere. 71 Officials suspected that many people in Kimberly who assumed a Griqua identity were actually Bantu-speaking Africans and thus fictitious Griqua who assumed a Griqua identity to access social benefits open to Coloureds. 72

Griqua fears of being classified as ‘Native’ or ‘Bantu’ were intensified after a Population Registration official by the name of Morgan visited Kimberly in 1955 and classified many Griqua identity claimants as ‘Native’. By being classified as ‘Native’ or ‘Bantu’, Griqua would be subjected to some restrictions that Coloured were exempted from. As ‘Natives’ they would have to carry reference books, register service contracts, obey curfew regulations, draw pension at lower rates and pay poll tax; their children would fall under the Bantu Education Act and would have to be educated through the medium of a Bantu language. Whilst a number of Griqua were liable to be classified as ‘Native’, many other Griqua were regarded by government officials as Coloureds and treated as such. Such Griqua drew benefits that Coloured were entitled to. For example, they drew pensions at Coloured rates and held certificates of non-liability for ‘Native taxation’. Considered as Coloured, Griqua who lived in ‘Native’ locations could be granted a few rights that other residents did not enjoy, such as being entitled to buy liquor. Some Griqua were liable to be subjected to some privileges accorded to Coloureds and at the same time to some restrictions imposed on ‘Natives’. ‘They were not [“Native”] for the purposes of the Representation of Natives Act, yet could not qualify for the coloured voters’ roll. Some of them, while holding certificates of non-liability for Native taxation, [were] … issued with reference books [issued to ‘Natives’] making them liable to pay poll tax’. 74

Reshaping classification
Classification of Griqua identity claimants as ‘Native’ led to continued attempts by Griqua leaders, notably from 1955, to have Griqua reclassified as Griqua and to have the classification practice reconsidered. 75

70 BNS 1/1/586, 86/95, Bevolkingsregistrateur, Pretoria, to Sekretaris van Binnelandse Sake, Pretoria, 7 July 1958.
73 BNS 1/1/586, 86/95, RG Foster, Kimberly, to Senator Van Zyl, 29 May 1957.
75 BNS 1/1/586, 86/95, Bevolkingsregistrateur, Pretoria, to Sekretaris van Binnelandse Sake, Pretoria, 7 July 1958; See also correspondence of Opperhoof RG Foster of 29 May 1957 and 18 June 1957.
According to Kanyiles, so much harm was done to the Griqua in Griqualand West between 1955 and 1957 through their classification as ‘Bantu’ that they had to attempt over the following three decades to be reclassified from ‘Bantu’ to Griqua.76 Pressure on the government by Griqua leaders for provision for the classification of the Griqua as a distinct group did induce government officials to reconsider the viability of the Griqua category for population classification purposes.

In reconsidering the application of the Griqua category for population classification purposes, government officials had to consider the precise location of the Griqua category in relation to the Coloured category. Ambivalence within Griqua communities in regard to the relation between Griqua and Coloured identity categories was, to some extent, reflected in attempts by government officials at locating the Griqua category in relation to the Coloured category. Government officials had to consider whether the Griqua to were to be treated as a volk, ‘race’ or group distinct from Coloureds or whether they were to be treated as a Coloured sub-group. Although key government officials were generally willing to recognize the Griqua as a distinct group, they were less inclined to have them classified as a group separate from Coloureds. That is, to the extent that key government officials were willing to recognize the Griqua as a distinct group, they would be located as a distinct group within the Coloured category.

Appeals for the recognition and classification of the Griqua as a separate group were expressed in terms of apartheid ethno-‘racial’ discourse. Thus, at a meeting on 23 April 1956 with the minister of Interior Affairs, Dr TE Dönges, in regard to the classification of the Griqua, separate residential areas, the consequences of the Group Areas Act and “racial intermixture”, a “National Griqua Conference” delegation expressed Griqua approval of apartheid and voiced their concern about the implication of ‘racial mixing’ (“bloedvermenging”) for the Griqua. The delegation is reported to have attributed the classification of about 900 Griqua in Kimberley as ‘Natives’ to ‘racial mixing’ with ‘Natives’ and Indians. The delegation therefore requested that mixed marriages between Griqua, ‘Natives’ and Indians be legally prohibited.77

After representations by Griqua organizations like the GNC and the Griekwa Volks Organisasie the director of the Census indicated on 8 November 1955 that the Griqua would be classified as a separate group within the Coloured category. The minister of Interior Affairs also confirmed in 1957 that Griqua would be classified as one of the groups in the Coloured category.78 The minister also instructed that Griqua should be treated as a separate “racial” group and that their “racial” group be indicated on their identity cards. A number of identity cards were handed for distribution to the Le Fleur Griqua in the Kranshoek-Sanddrift area by the commissioner for Coloured Affairs.79 However, Griqua from the Kimberley, many of whom were suspected to be really Bantu-speakers and not Griqua, had difficulty obtaining Griqua identity cards, including the followers of AAS le Fleur II.80

Thus, by the end of the 1950s the government had resolved that the Griqua would be classified officially as a sub-group within the Coloured category. Proclamation 46 of 1959,81 which delimited the Coloured category for the purpose of the Population Registration Act, included Griqua as one of seven Coloured-subgroups. The proclamation indicated that “in the Griqua Group shall be included any person who in fact is, or is generally accepted as, a member of the race or class known as the Griquas”. Also included in the Coloured category were the Cape Coloured, Malay, Chinese, Indian, “Other Asiatic” and “Other Coloured” “groups”. Griqua

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77 Burger, 16 May 1956, p. 9.
78 Mentz report, par. 6.4; PC 2/1983, p. 79.
79 BNS 1/1/586, 86/95, Bevolkingsregistrateur, Pretoria, to Sekretaris van Binnelandse Sake, Pretoria, 7 July 1958.
80 BNS 1/1/586, 86/95, JL Simons, Kimberley, to Minister van Binnelandse Sake, Kaapstad, 30.3.1959.
81 Proclamation No. 46 of 1959 was revoked by Proclamation R 123, 1967 which also included the Griqua as one of seven groups within the Coloured category.
were also specified as a group within the Coloured category in the 1963 Coloured Rural Areas Act (No 24) and the 1964 Coloured Persons’ Representative Council Act (No 49).

After provisions were made for the classification of Griqua as a distinct group within the Coloured category for the purpose of the population register, many who claimed a Griqua identity, particularly those who were classified as ‘Bantu’, attempted to be classified as Griqua. Griqua nationalist leaders encouraged Griqua to apply for Griqua identity cards. Government officials on the other hand, were concerned that a number of people who received Griqua identity cards were not Griqua but ‘Natives’. A number of Coloureds also felt that there were ‘Bantu’ or ‘Natives’ amongst Griqua identity claimants.

The perception that Bantu-speakers assumed a Griqua identity to access Coloured privileges had the potential to erode the association of Griqua with Coloureds. The official slotting of the Griqua as a Coloured sub-category generated concern amongst some Coloured nationalist leaders who felt that the Griqua had no “affinity to the Coloured people” and that Bantu-speakers were gaining Coloured privileges from assuming a Griqua identity. They consequently insisted that Griqua should be excluded from the Coloured category and that they should be classified as a fourth ‘racial’ group. They complained that townships for Coloureds, particularly in the Northern Cape, were being swamped by people holding Griqua identity cards, which entitled them to reside in those townships. They also expressed fear for the future of their own group if large numbers of Griqua were admitted into Coloured townships.

People of Bantu-speaking descent from the vicinity of Kimberley continued throughout the apartheid period to assume a Griqua identity, leading to a Coloured identity, and to access resources meant for Coloureds. The somatic features of Griqua identity claimants of Bantu-speaking origin also continued to make them liable to be rejected as Griqua or Coloureds by government officials. Jardin, chairperson of the Coloured Management Committee of Kimberley indicted in 1983 that

Reclassification problems

Although provision was made for the classification of the Griqua as a distinct group within the Coloured category in 1959, many who wanted to be reclassified as Griqua had difficulties in meeting the requirements that were set down. Although a number of people were reclassified as Griqua many others were apparently not successful, leading to agitation for the easing of the requirements for reclassification. Griqua leaders felt that the procedure for reclassification was too complicated and cumbersome. They also felt that government officials handling identity registration were often insensitive, unsympathetic and even intentionally difficult. Griqua leaders claimed that officials frequently classified children of the same parents at their own discretion into different groups. According to Kanyiles:

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82 See Diamond Fields Advertiser, 10 May 1967.
83 BNS 1/1/586, 86/95, Bevolkingsregistrateur, Pretoria, to Sekretaris, Binnelandse Sake, Pretoria, 7 July 1958.
84 Diamond Fields Advertiser, 10 May 1967.
86 PC 2/1983, p. 82.
Ons het ’n voorbeeld gehad dat een familie, die oudste broer word geklassifiseer ’n Indiër. Die jonger broer van hom word geklassifiseer as ’n Kaapse Kleurling. Die ander broer van hom word geklassifiseer ’n Bantoe en die 4rde een word geklassifiseer ’n ander Kleurling.

A representative of the Kranshoek based GNC expressed similar concerns in 1983:

Nieteenstande die feit dat ons herhaalde vertoe … aan die Regerig gerig het vir die regstelling van ons identiteit op ons identiteitsdokumente, bly die aangeleentheid steeds ’n turksvysprobleem. Ons wil graag as Griekwas geklassifiseer wees. Huidiglik kry ons al meer te doen met gavalle waar kinders van die selfde pa en ma as Griekwa en kleurlinge onderskeidelik geklassifiseer word, ongeag die feit dat daar duidelik op die aansoek vorm aangedui word wat die persoon se klasifikasie behoort te wees.

Griqua leaders were also concerned about the implications of the slotting Griqua into different categories for their numerical representation:

Volgens sensusopnames vertoon ons getalle uiers gering op die sensus grafiek, maar ons is vas oortuig daarvan dat indien ons reg geklassifiseer word en die sensus beampies vul die rasse klasifikasie in die klasifikasie kollomme korrek in, ons getalle dramaties sal styg.

Concerned with difficulties caused by White officials, AAS le Fleur II lent support to the view that Griqua and Coloureds should be classified by their own people (during a session of the Coloured Persons’ Representative Council) in 1972. He argued that such deficiency was out of line with parallel development advocated by the government:

Ek stem saam dat ’n Kleurlingman en ’n Griekwa die beste mense is om na hulle nasie om te sien. Waarom laat die Regering nie toe dat ’n Kleurling Blanke klassifiseer nie? As ons by parallele ontwikkeling kom, dan moet die implimentering hier ook plaasvind. Ons mense wat bevoeg is moet die werk doen, en nie ’n Blanke man wat net daar sit nie. Hy het jou al klaar geklassifiseer as jy aankom. Hy stel nie belang in wat jy vir hom sê nie. Dit het al so veel kere gebeur dat baie van die Griekwas hulle kaartjies opgeskeur het, want toe hulle die vorms ingevul het, toe skryf hy: Griekwa-ma, Griekwa-pa, en toe die kaartjie terugkom, is hulle ’n “Ander Kleurling.”

Social and economic accommodation

Attempts by Griqua leaders to have the Griqua identity accommodated and applied at official level were linked to attempts at socio-economic accommodation within the apartheid order that varyingly suggested the influence of both the apartheid constitutional order and prior Griqua historical aspirations – drawing on memories of past Griqua polities. Holding in the hope of bringing about land ownership and independence that the Griqua associated with past Griqua polities, the government’s homeland/Bantustan policy inclined Griqua nationalist leaders to demand that land also be granted to them as a volk in Bantustan style. Attempts by Griqua leaders to secure social and economic benefits also reflected the ambivalent interconnection of Griqua and Coloureds, with demands at times made specifically for Griqua and at other times for both Griqua and Coloureds.

Griqua leaders made representations to the government directly and through official Coloured representative bodies like the Union Council for Coloured Affairs and its successor the Coloured Persons’ Representative Council (CRC). In participating in both bodies, Griqua leaders reinforced the perception that the Griqua were

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90 Rapport, 30 July 1978, p. 3.
loyal subjects opting to work peacefully within constitutional parameters. Apartheid and Coloured nationalist discourses that operated in such bodies influenced the articulation of Griqua identity and the nature of the appeals and demands that were made to the government. The presence of GNC-linked representatives on the UCCA and CRC contributed to the prominent profile of the GNC and to the affinity that developed between sections of the Griqua and establishment ideologies. Tom le Fleur, the youngest son of AAS le Fleur I, served on the UCCA. His nephews, Andrew AS le Fleur II and Eric Maxwell le Fleur both served on the CRC.

**Union Council for Coloured Affairs**

T le Fleur’s involvement with the UCCA reflected the conservatism and entanglement of many Griqua leaders with apartheid discourse. The UCCA was established in 1959\(^1\) to consult, advise, and make recommendations to the government in regard to the promotion of Coloured interests.\(^2\) It was to consist of 12 elected and 15 nominated members. Nominated members would include at least one Griqua and at least one Cape Malay.\(^3\) The establishment of the Council was in line with the policy of “separate parallel development” in terms of which Coloureds would, as a projected nation (in the making), be granted control over their own affairs. Prime Minister JF Verwoerd projected the UCCA as a harbinger of a representative body that would have full executive and legislative powers over certain affairs of Coloureds.\(^4\)

The major Coloured organizations were opposed to the establishment of separate official bodies to represent the interest of Coloureds, interests that they regarded as indivisible from those of Whites. They consequently boycotted the UCCA elections.\(^5\) Largely due to apathy and an active boycott, all 12 members who stood for elections were unopposed. The broader Coloured population showed little interest in subsequent developments on the UCCA.\(^6\)

Griqua entanglement with the official ideology was reflected in representations that were made to the government by Griqua organizations, directly or through their representative in the UCCA. As a Griqua representative, T le Fleur made requests to the UCCA reflecting his own Griqua-Coloured nationalist leanings. For example, he requested in 1960 that the UCCA approach the government for the purchase land in East Griqualand that would serve as a settlement for Griqua and Coloureds residing in “Bantu areas”; that the government be approached in regard to the replacement of Griqua land in “Bantu areas” with land in the Mount Currie district of East Griqualand and that a similar exchange be made in the Free State. In regard to the latter exchange T le Fleur reasoned that the failure to affect such an exchange hampered separate development of “White and Non White”.

T le Fleur requested the UCCA to approach the population registrar to bring about a change in the practice of issuing passbooks (meant for those considered to be “Native”/”Bantu”) to Griqua in the Free State instead of identity cards. He also appealed for the revision of the classification practice, particularly in regard to the Griqua “sienie daar baie Grikwas as Bantu en Kleurling geklassifiseer is, en anders om”. He urged that the UCCA should see that provision be made for separate schools for Griqua and Coloured children in the Free State where “Kleurling, Griekwa en Bantu” received education together.

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\(^1\) The UCCA was established through the application of the Separate Representation of Voters Act (No. 46 of 1951) that placed Coloured voters of the Western Province on a separate roll. The establishment of the UCCA was gazetted on 22 May 1959 in terms of Proclamation 110.

\(^2\) RP 38/1976, p. 344.


GNC and Pioneers Council and apartheid

As a member of the GNC, T le Fleur reflected very much a line of thinking that was predominant in the GNC during the 1950s and 1960s. His thinking reflected how GNC leaders appropriated or deployed the official apartheid discourse in their attempt to gain socio-economic benefits. In appropriating apartheid discourse to advance their own interests, Griqua nationalists were also liable to reinforce apartheid separatism. The GNC hoped, in light of the consideration of a homeland for Coloureds by the ruling NP, that provision would be made for a Griqua homeland so that the Griqua volk’s identity could be preserved.98 The current of thinking predominant in the GNC in the 1950s and 1960s was also manifested in the East Griqualand Pioneers Council.

Leaders of the East Griqualand Pioneers Council also used a language that was in line with the apartheid policy to advance their interests. Griqua nationalist in the Pioneers Council were also inclined to use both the Griqua and Coloured categories in referring to the Griqua, to promote the interests of both Griqua and Coloureds, and to subsume the Griqua category in the Coloured category, thus reinforcing the privileged position of the Griqua relative to ‘Natives’ arising from their association with Coloureds.

The Pioneers Council appealed to the government in 1959, via the commissioner for Coloured Affairs, Dr. ID du Plessis, to treat all groups justly in terms of the official apartheid policy and not to neglect “Griquas and Coloureds”.99 It urged the government to create a “Coloured Area or Reserve in the Mount Currie District of East Griqualand for the use of Griqua and Coloureds of Griqualand and surrounding districts … on similar lines as those set aside for the Natives”.100 The Pioneers Council expressed concern about the loss of Griqua identity in consequences of living in places declared as “Bantu Locations” and through mingling with Bantu-speakers:

Hierin voel hulle dat die Regering geen beskerming bied aan die Griekwasi en indringers van ’n ander rassegroep toelaat om hulle te verdui binne hulle eie gebiede. Volgens hulle medeling, bring dit mee vermengde huwelike en sal hulle daardeur gedwing word om hulle identiteit as Griekwasi te moet verloor.101

In addition to appealing for land, the Pioneers Council also requested the government to “open more avenues of employment for the Coloured youth”. In line with separate development the Pioneers Council urged that separate amenities be provided for “Coloureds” and expressed disapproval of a broad distinction being made between “Europeans and non-White”, thus subsuming Coloureds in a “non-European” category together with Bantu-speakers:

We respectfully request that: … Government press the various Councils to provide separate amenities for the Coloured people, such as separate wards for the Coloureds in the hospital, separate public latrines in the towns and on railway stations, etc. … and [t]hat the S.A.R&H be pressed [to] provide separate waiting rooms and portholes for buying tickets at the station etc.

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97 LC, Item 7. 9, T le Fleur, Wynberg, to Sekretaris, Uniale Raad vir Kleurlingsake, Kaapstad, 10 March 1960.
98 LC, AAS le Fleur correspondence file, Griekwa Nasionale Konferensie van Suid Afrika, Elsiesrivier, to Eerste Minister, Dr. HF Verwoerd, Kaapstad, 28.1.1961.
99 LC, Item 6.3, Secretary, East Griqualand Pioneers Council, Kokstad to Commissioner, Coloured Affairs, Cape Town, 28.10.1959.
100 LC, Item 6.3, Secretary, East Griqualand Pioneers Council, Kokstad to Dr. ID du Plessis, Commissioner of Coloured Affairs, Durban, 15.10.1959; 28.10.1959.
101 LC, Item 7.10, T le Fleur, report to Uniale Raad van Kleurlingsake.
Our Council abhors the idea of a broad division of Europeans and Non-Europeans [i.e. including Griqua and Coloured with Bantu-speakers in one broad “non-European” category] and feels that amenities should be provided separately for Europeans, Coloureds and Natives.\textsuperscript{102}

The Pioneers Council opposed the preferential treatment of Whites at the expense of Griqua and Coloureds in East Griqualand and the disproportionate allocation of resources between Griqua-Coloureds and Whites. It opposed the application of apartheid in East Griqualand in so far as it harmed Griqua and Coloureds. It favoured the implementation of apartheid policy in so far as Griqua and Coloureds would be benefited. A number of segregationist resolutions on employment, education, social amenities and sport were passed at a meeting held in Kokstad under the auspices of the Pioneers Council on 5 April 1960 reflecting the organizations’ appropriation and deployment of apartheid language, for example:

- That the Government be urged to open up more avenues of employment, in Kokstad and East Griqualand, for the Coloureds. …
- That Coloured nurses be engaged at the Kokstad hospital to cater for the needs of the Coloureds & to ensure better treatment of the Coloured patients. …
- That separate [hospital] wards be allotted or built for the exclusive use of the Coloureds.
- That a Coloured clerk be appointed at the Kokstad station to serve the Coloured community.

A resolution was also passed “that the S.A.R&H. be asked why there is a difference in pay for Coloureds working at Franklin and those working at Kokstad, and, why there is no difference in the uniforms worn by Coloureds and those worn by [Bantu-speaking] Africans employed by the Railways”.\textsuperscript{103}

**Apartheid-accommodation and divergence**

Whilst Griqua aspirations were articulated much in line the apartheid discourse, they were also influenced to some extent by anti-apartheid discourses. The issue of land remained a key Griqua concern throughout the apartheid period that was readily expressed in apartheid discourse. Although Griqua appeals for land did not meet much success, attempts to secure land, drawing on past semi-independent Griqua polities of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century as well as apartheid discourse, persisted. Although much shaped by apartheid, Griqua leaders could also articulate aspirations for land and self-governance that, in their view, diverged from apartheid practice. Although there were common longstanding concerns among Griqua leaders, for example, acquisition of land and the survival of the Griqua identity, Griqua leaders diverged amongst themselves in regard to the parameters in which these ideals were to be actualized. In regard to land, Griqua leaders differed about the form it should take. Some deployed the homeland discourse in appealing for land whilst others opposed the idea of a Griqua homeland, suggesting thus a measure of influence by anti-apartheid discourses. In regard to Griqua identity, Griqua leaders differed, for example, on the relation of Griqua to the Coloured category; some stressed that Griqua were Coloureds whilst others preferred that they be regarded as a group apart from Coloureds.

Suggesting the appropriation of an apartheid homeland discourse – deployed by apartheid apologists as deviating from apartheid – a Griqua Action Committee (apparently also known as, or linked to the Griqua Land Resettlement Committee) from East Griqualand agitated for the establishment of a “Griquastan” that would, as worded in the *Natal Witness*, “form the nucleus of the country’s first Colouredstan”. The Griqua Action Committee apparently sent a petition of a hundred signatures to the minister of Coloured Affairs in 1974 for the establishment of a “Griquastan”. A thousand square miles of fertile land near Kokstad was demanded. The “Griquastan” would “as a start” comprise land in the Cedarville, Franklin, Swartberg and Kingscote areas. The proposed Griquastan would supposedly not mirror apartheid policies internally. Suggesting a negotiation between apartheid and anti-apartheid discourses; the influence of attempts at

\textsuperscript{102} LC, Item 6.3, East Griqualand Pioneers Council, Kokstad, to Dr. ID du Plessis, Commissioner of Coloured Affairs, Durban 15.10.1959.

\textsuperscript{103} LC, Item 6.1, “Public meeting held on 5.4.60”.

conferring respectability to a discredited homeland system, and the redeployment of longstanding Griqua ideals for independence, the “vice-chairman” of the Griqua Land Resettlement Committee, W Marais, mentioned that once a sufficient measure of self-government was attained by the Griqua, apartheid would be abolished in the region. “We would welcome everyone but of course acknowledge that at first we would be responsible to the Pretoria Government”.104

Accommodation and divergence with aspects of apartheid could coexist within individuals and organizations. Accommodation or divergence could also vary individually and organizationally. Griqua divergences were acutely manifested in 1970 in Griqualand West. Concerned with Griqua access to land Captain Adam Kok IV agitated for the establishment of a Griqua settlement at Schmidtsdrift. Kok expressed his desire for “a place where we can be ourselves” at a meeting on Campbell on Sunday 1 March 1970.105 Kok apparently also deployed the homeland language.106 Jan Speak, an 85 year old “sub-leader”, likewise expressed concern at the meeting that it seems as if there is no future for Griquas. All we want is a homeland for ourselves and for our children – for ever.

Reflecting a desire amongst Griqua nationalists for Griqua recognition as a separate ‘race’ in a way that was out of line with official positioning of the Griqua as a sub-group of the Coloured category supported by other Griqua, Reverend AP Browers, a “minister of the local Griqua Independent Church”,107 was loudly cheered as he mentioned that Griqua did not want to be part of the “Coloured or Bantu groups” but simply wanted to be Griqua. Thus, whilst Griqua were inclined to affirm the interconnection of Griquaness and Colouredness in the pre-1950 period due to their liability of being classified as ‘Native’, once the Griqua category was firmly linked to the Coloured category, Griqua leaders became more open to attempt to have the Griqua identity applied officially as a separate category from the Coloured one. In expressing their aspirations Griqua leaders at the above meeting typically reaffirmed that Griqua were law-abiding subjects and further urged Griqua to remain obedient to Whites and the government.108

Paramount Chief Daniel Kanyiles (a supporter of Sonny Leon and the Labour Party) who claimed to have supreme authority over all Griqua in Griqualand West, “rejected Captain Adam Kok’s plea for a Griqua homeland at Schmidtsdrift”. He mentioned that his main concern was the provision of more schools for his people. He insisted that “[w]e [should] have education before we could run a homeland now”. He indicated, however, that he was not averse to something similar to the “Coloured settlement at Oppermansgronde”.

Reverend JL Simons, a representative of the Kranshoek based GNC who resided in Greenpoint in Kimberley, also expressed support for the idea of a settlement as long as it was in Griqualand West.109 Simons expressed hope that the Griqua residing at places like Vloere, Homestead, Homeval, Groenpunt, Galeshewe, and Ronaldsvlei would all live in one residential area, that is, Groenpunt.110 Appeals for a ‘settlement’, ‘separate area’, ‘homeland’, or ‘growthpoint’ for the Griqua were made throughout the 1970s by representatives of different factions in Griqualand West.111

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110 Unisa library (archival division), Sony Leon Collection, Item 8.15.1, JL Simons, Groenpunt, Kimberley to LS Leon, Kimberley, 23 February 1971.
111 Sonny Leon Collection, Item 8.15.1, P Steenkamp, Kimberley: “Griekwa Nationale Konferensie Burger Nedersetting” (n.d); “[M]emorandum aan die Verteenwoordiger van die Diamant-setel”, by Browers and P Steenkamp (n.d). *Debates*
AAS le Fleur II made somewhat similar expressions to those made at the meeting of 1 March 1970 on a visit to Griqualand West in April 1972. He expressed his hope that the government would provide farming opportunities at a big gathering at Homevale Secondary School. He characteristically urged the gathering not to become involved in boycotting and urged parents to send their children to schools and universities so that they should become an asset to their people and to the country. In the Orange Free State the Reverend CG Gordon of the Dutch Reformed Mission Church at Heidedal, a Coloured residential area in Bloemfontein, kept Griqua agitation for land alive during the 1970s. Gordon was less modest than Griqua leaders in abovementioned instances in articulating publicly the longstanding Griqua desire for land. He insisted that all land that was not legally purchased from Griqua and incorporated into the Free State in the 1800s should be returned to the Griqua volk. Gordon thought that more than twenty Griqua farms were not included in the land-transaction between Adam Kok (III) and the Free State Republic and were thus illegally acquired.

Divergences amongst Griqua leaders in regard to apartheid, the relation between Griqua and Coloured categories and the idea of a Griqua homeland, came especially to the fore after the replacement of the UCCA by the CRC in 1969, as shown in the next chapter. Rival Coloured political parties entered the Griqua political landscape in search of potential voters and in turn influenced the socio-political orientation of contending Griqua factions which sought to use parties to promote their position in the Griqua socio-political landscape.

Conclusion
Although the association between the Griqua and Coloured categories became reinforced officially during apartheid, the two categories remained in an ambivalent relation. With the Griqua category firmly linked officially with the Coloured category, Griqua nationalist leaders became more open to attempt to have the Griqua identity applied officially as a category separate from the Coloured one, without the measure of fear of the pre-1950 period of being consequently slotted into the ‘Native’ category. Whilst some Griqua leaders became inclined to promote the Griqua as a distinctive ethnic and ‘racial’ group others continued to locate them within the Coloured category. The projection of the Griqua as distinct volk was also attended with appeals for ethno-specific resource allocation, notably land. However, at the same time as there were Griqua leaders who projected Griqua as a volk distinct from Bantu-speakers, Coloureds and Whites, Griqua leaders were also inclined to project Griqua as Coloureds, and, in appealing for resources, to include both Griqua and Coloureds, reflecting thus the ambivalent entanglement of the two categories. Though Griqua identity and socio-political positioning by Griqua leaders often fell in line with apartheid discourse, Griqua leaders being inclined to reaffirm Griqua loyalty to the government and to express support for apartheid ethno-‘racial’ segmentation, interaction and unions with Coloureds and people of Bantu-speaking origin and the attendant multiple and shifting identities, undermined apartheid ethno-‘racial’ segmentation.

112 Volksblad, 5 April 1972.
113 Volksblad, 10 November 1977, p. 10.
Chapter 8: The Griqua and Coloured party politics (1965-1980)

Whilst the previous chapter showed the proclivity of Griqua leaders to be acquiescent during apartheid, this chapter shows how Griqua acquiescence manifested itself in Griqua participation in Coloured political parties between 1965 and 1980. Griqua leaders attempted to realize diverse Griqua interests through Coloured political parties. They also attempted to bolster their own personal and organizational position in the Griqua socio-political landscape through alliances with contending political parties. The participation of Griqua leaders in Coloured political parties in turn subjected them to contending apartheid and anti-apartheid discourses that varyingly influenced their social, economic and political expressions – which were consistently within constitutional parameters. The split in the Griqua National Conference (GNC), and the association of the leaders of the two GNC factions with contending Coloured political parties led to increasing socio-political differentiation between these two factions that reflected broader differential Griqua positioning in regard to apartheid policies and non-Griqua identity categories. Thus, whilst involvement in contending Coloured political parties and the Coloured Persons’ Representative Council provided arenas in which Griqua leaders could reassert longstanding Griqua aspirations, it also influenced the way in which Griqua leaders articulated their aspirations. Ideological and policy shifts in contending Coloured political parties were also, to some extent, manifested in the socio-political expressions of Griqua leaders. However, Griqua nationalism was uneasily accommodated in Coloured political parties, with Coloured parties at times expressing support for Griqua demands but also being averse to Griqua identity aspirations perceived to be encouraging Coloured fragmentation. The articulation of Griqua identities and Griqua representations of their past were from the late 1970s also much influenced by constitutional reformism. Whilst the position of Griqua leaders to the government’s reform proposals were much in line with the position taken by their parties, Griqua nationalist (or separatist) leaders were inclined to reaffirm the specificity of Griqua as a distinct ethnic group with specific ethnic needs in their engagement with government officials around constitutional reforms in a manner that undermined the ideal of Coloured unity held by the Federal Coloured People’s Party – a party to which principal Griqua nationalist leaders were aligned in the 1970s.

Party politics

The relative openness of the apartheid government to Griqua leaders created an opportunity for greater Griqua interaction with the government. It also provided for Griqua representation on Coloured bodies like the Union Council for Coloured Affairs (UCCA) and the Coloured Persons’ Representative Council (CRC) that in turn encouraged greater interaction and cooperation between Griqua from different factions with official Griqua representatives. The replacement of the UCCA by the CRC in 1969 and the involvement of Griqua leaders in political parties that participated in the CRC contributed much to changes in the Griqua political landscape. Whilst provision for Griqua representation on Coloured bodies could encourage greater interaction and cooperation between Griqua (from different factions) with official Griqua representatives, the association of rival Griqua leaders with contending political parties, on the other hand, increased intra-Griqua tension and divergences. Griqua attempted to have their ideals met through representations via Griqua representatives on the CRC as well as through contending Coloured political parties.

Within the GNC a leadership struggle between the Paramount Chief Andrew AS le Fleur II and his brother Volkspresident Eric le Fleur – fuelled by alleged moral impropriety of the former – ensued from 1967 culminating in 1969 in the split of the GNC into two groups under each of the two Le Fleur brothers, with each group using the same name and having its own Griqua Independent Church. A le Fleur, leader of the Kranshoek based GNC, aligned himself with the pro-government inclined Federal Coloured People’s Party (FP) whilst E le Fleur, leader of the Knysna based GNC, aligned himself to the professedly anti-apartheid Labour Party (LP). Conflict between the two brothers contributed much to a reconstitution of the Griqua political landscape. In 1969 A le Fleur was nominated with Abraham JL Winnaar to serve on the CRC by the State President as representatives of the Griqua population. A le Fleur’s nomination to the CRC reflected the government’s recognition of his leadership and further elevated his stature. Divergences
between the two Le Fleur brothers were manifested in the CRC after E le Fleur was elected to the Council in 1975 as a LP member.

The association of Griqua leaders with contending political parties had the potential to enhance their leadership aspirations. It also generated divisions amongst Griqua along party political lines. Tension developed between A le Fleur and E le Fleur as well as between A le Fleur and his uncle Tom le Fleur, the leader of the Coloured People’s Republican Party (RP). Such tension in turn had a bearing on their adherents. For example, Griqua from Beeswater near Vredendal became divided along support for the LP and the RP.  

**Socio-political divergences**

The association of Griqua leaders with contending political parties varyingly influenced their socio-political pronouncements and articulation of Griqua aspirations. A le Fleur’s association with the FP reinforced the pro-government inclination of the Kranshoek based GNC whilst E le Fleur’s association with the LP inclined him to assume a more critical approach to the government. Differences between A le Fleur and E le Fleur in regard to apartheid, homelands, and Coloured identity reflected differences between other Griqua leaders and factions. The Kranshoek based GNC leadership favoured the establishment of a Griqua homeland (or semi-autonomous enclave). The East Griqualand Pioneers Council also favoured the establishment of a homeland, albeit a Griqua-Coloured homeland. Representatives of the Kranshoek based GNC in particular tended to express support for the idea of the Griqua category being applied officially separately from the Coloured category, with calls for such separation becoming especially pronounced after the NP government undertook constitutional reform in the late 1970s.  

However, E le Fleur and Paramount Chief Daniel Kanyiles, the leader of the Griekwa Volks Organisasie from Griqualand West and Albanie region, were inclined during the 1970s and 1980s to oppose the establishment of a specifically Griqua homeland. E le Fleur reasoned in 1975 that the homeland idea was “Apartheid in its greatest form” and that A le Fleur’s advocacy of a homeland was “simply because … his leadership … [was] waning and [because] he … [wanted] to establish himself as the Leader”. E le Fleur was concerned that if the idea of a homeland materialized A le Fleur could become the Griqua homeland leader.

Hy [propageer die tuisland idee] … met die gedagte dat hy dan die groot Leier sal wees en almal dan geforseer sal wees om onder sy gesag te staan. Daarvoor is ek nie te vinde nie ….  

E le Fleur also criticized the homeland idea on practical grounds:

’n Tuisland is ook nie prakties moontlik nie want dan sit ons vasgekeer en dood van die honger en versnipper ons ons mooi land Suid Afrika en sal ons in ’n gebied vasgepen wees en ’n permit moet verkry om in ons

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1 T le Fleur apparently had a role in the departure to the vicinity of Knysna of “sixty families” from Beeswater who were disillusioned with the leadership of A le Fleur. T le Fleur and E le Fleur subsequently sought accommodation for them, as well as employment at saw mills at The Crags near Plettenberg Bay. Many of those Griqua were eventually settled at The Crags. *Debates and proceedings of the Coloured Persons’ Representative Council (CRC)*, Second Council, Third Session: 13-19 October 1976, Vol. 35, p. 1196; 20-27 October 1976, Vol. 36, pp. 1296-7.
2 See chapter 9.
3 University of South Africa library (archival division), Pretoria, Le Fleur Collection (LC), Correspondence file, PJ Kanyiles, Ritchie to Eric le Fleur, Kaapstad, 15.7.79; EMS le Fleur, Knysna to Opperhoof DJ Kanyiles, Ritchie, 26 Julie 1979; Department of Coloured Affairs: “Report of the Interdepartmental Committee of Inquiry into the Identity of the Griquas” (Mentz Report), 27 October 1980, par. 5.4, 5.6 – 5.8
4 University of South Africa Library (archival division), Sonny Leon Collection, Item 8.15.1, EMS le Fleur, Plettenberg Bay, to LS Leon, National leader, Labour Party, Kimberley, 29. 4. 1975.
land Suid Afrika na ons vriende of families te gaan. ... Hierdie hele gedagte is ’n winsgejaag wat nie ons Griekwa mense enigsins sal bevorder nie maar liever agteruitgang sal meebreng.\(^5\)

E le Fleur’s position in regard to the Coloured identity category puzzled government officials who apparently at times misrepresented his position when they contrasted his position to the one of his brother A le Fleur. E le Fleur generally opposed the official separation of the Griqua category from the Coloured category. He was not only of the opinion that the Griqua should become part of the Coloured community and cooperate with them, but maintained that there was “no difference between them”: They spoke the same language, and had the “same Christian beliefs. A “false picture was painted”, in his view, if it was stated otherwise.\(^6\) E le Fleur felt that whilst there were Griqua people with an identity of their own, that the Griqua had to a large extent merged with Coloureds through living together and through intermarriage. His group, which included a daughter of AAS le Fleur I, believed that it was AAS le Fleur I’s desire that all Coloureds should unite as one nation. E le Fleur reasoned that the Griqua were Coloureds and Coloureds Griqua.\(^7\)

E le Fleur affirmed his Griqua identity but was concerned that the official separation of Griqua from Coloureds could harm the Griqua. In his own words:

> Ek erken my agtergrond as Griekwa en is nie skaam daarvoor nie. Inteendeel is ek trots daarop, maar ek wil nie hê die Regering moet my klasifiseer as Griekwa nie en dan my Suid Afrikaanse burgerskap ontsê. Ek wil self sê ek is ’n Griekwa want as die Regering my klasifiseer as Griekwa dan is ek onderworpe aan die beleid van afsonderlikheid wat my mense seermaak en hulle minderwaardig maak.

E le Fleur also felt that it was not necessary for the existence of Griqua identity that it should appear on official identity documents as the Kranshoek based GNC leadership insisted:

> Duitsers, Jode, Engelse behou hul identiteit maar na 5 jaar is hulle Suid-Afrikaanse burgers maar op hul Identiteit Dokumente staan [nie] Duitser of Jood geskryf nie slegs Suid Afrikaner en tog behou hulle hul identiteit.\(^8\)

Although their articulations were varyingly influenced by their political associations, A le Fleur and E le Fleur fitted uneasily in their respective parties. The FP was a pro-government inclined Coloured party promoting Coloured unity. A le Fleur was inclined to promote, with a measure of ambivalence, the specificity of the Griqua. The leadership of the FP were averse to narrow particularistic ethnic approaches by segments in the Coloured category, fearing that such approaches could undermine Coloured unity. The LP, in contrast to the Coloured nationalist FP and RP, took an explicit stance against apartheid. The leadership of the LP were at times inclined to articulate interests that extended beyond Coloureds. The LP’s policy inclined E le Fleur to subdue his particularistic Griqua sentiments and reinforced his promotion of a broad Coloured identity, with the Griqua as a sub-category. Tom le Fleur’s Coloured nationalist pro-apartheid inclined RP was ideologically much in line with the FP and as such not only competed with the FP for the support of relatively conservative Coloured voters but also served to reinforce conservatism and pro-government leanings within Griqua communities.

**Federal Coloured People’s Party (FP)**

Commonalities between Griqua ethno-nationalism and Coloured nationalism made the FP an attractive vehicle for the promotion of Griqua nationalist aspirations. The FP was formed in 1964 by the chairperson of the UCCA, Tom Swartz, and his associates in the Council after the passing of the Coloured Persons’

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\(^5\) LC, Correspondence file, EMS le Fleur, Knysna, to Opperhoof DJ Kanyiles, Ritchie, 26 July 1979.


\(^7\) Mentz Report, par. 5.6.

\(^8\) LC, Correspondence file, EMS le Fleur, Knysna, to Opperhoof DJ Kanyiles, Ritchie, 26 July 1979.
Representative Act (No. 49 of 1964). The FP expressed support for apartheid, promoted Christianity and identity pride, as well as independence amongst Coloureds. Seeing Coloureds as part of ‘Western civilization’, it aimed to promote their interests in the spiritual, social, educational, cultural and economic areas leading them to the attainment of full citizenship within the framework of ‘separate’ or ‘parallel development’. The support-base of the FP was drawn largely from the ranks of Coloured businessmen, government appointees and those who benefited directly from Coloured labour preference policies or the reservation of separate business districts for Coloureds. The FP “became the chosen instrument of the government in the implementation of its parallel development policy” and managed, through government support, to become the largest of a number of conservative Coloured parties formed in the 1960s.

Labour Party of South Africa (LP)
A le Fleur’s association with the FP made the LP, with a much stronger support-base, an attractive option for E le Fleur. Concern that the FP could be seen as representing mainline Coloured opinion led to the founding of the LP in 1965 by a number of intellectuals connected to the Teachers Educational and Professional Association and to Congress Alliance organizations of the 1950s. Dr RE van der Ross was the first head of the LP. From the outset the LP expressed rejection of apartheid. The LP expressed support for the rule of law, individual liberties, free and equal education for all, and the creation of a ‘non-racial’, democratic and non-communist South Africa. The LP justified the openness of membership to Coloureds only on the ground that the Prevention of Political Interference Act prohibited it from opening its membership to all ‘races’. The LP did not, like the FP, regard the CRC as a viable instrument through which full citizenship could be achieved. In order not to be accused of legitimizing an unjust system by participation in it, LP leaders claimed that their intention was to make the CRC unworkable through gaining control of it and then refusing to cooperate with the government through it.

Republican Coloured Party of South Africa and South-West Africa (RP)
A few pro-separate development Coloured nationalist parties smaller than the FP were formed between 1965 and 1967. One that managed to obtain sizable support during the 1960s was the RP led by Tom le Fleur, son of AAS le Fleur I and a member of the GNC. The RP aimed to promote the welfare of Coloureds within the NP ethno-‘racial’ order. It favoured the application of the Group Areas Act and the establishment of a Coloured parliament. T le Fleur reflected thus the entanglement of Griquaness with Colouredness. The “southern section” of the South African Railways Coloured Staff Association, which claimed to have 30 000 members, pledged its support to the RP. Established in 1966, the RP claimed in 1967 to have 40 000 paid-up members.

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11 Lewis: Between the wire and the wall, p. 273.
13 Lewis: Between the wire and the wall, p. 273.
16 Tom le Fleur associated himself more with Eric le Fleur (leader of the Knysna based GNC) than Andrew le Fleur (leader of the Kranshoek based GNC) after the GNC split in two in 1969.
18 Sunday Express, 15 October 1967, p. 11.
19 UG 57-1937, p. 442.
20 Sunday Express, 15 October 1967, p. 11.
The RP reflected a Griqua and Coloured sensibility imbued with accommodationist leanings suggestive of White control, coexisting with sentiments resenting White domination. Thus, although some relatively conservative Griqua (as well as Coloureds) were subjected to, and varyingly influenced by values and a current of thinking opposing and resenting White control, they also at the same time varyingly internalized White supremacist values and thinking, reflecting thus the coexistence of conflicting values amongst Griqua (as well as Coloureds, or more broadly within dominated ethno-‘racial’ communities). As far as the Griqua leadership is concerned, it appears that White domination tended to tip the scale of conflicting values and thinking to pro-establishment and White supremacy values and thinking.

Suggesting the redeployment of AAS le Fleur I’s Griqua-Coloured Christian nationalism, the reworking of longstanding Griqua ideals for independence in the context of apartheid, and the entanglement of Griqua and Coloured categories, a RP manifesto indicated that the party acknowledged “the Supreme Authority and guidance of Almighty God in the destinies of countries, nations and peoples”, and that it strived to “unite the Coloured people of South Africa and South West Africa to the realization of their nationhood”. The RP also aimed at the “establishment of a Coloured Parliament or a system of representative democratic self-government, embodied in, and responsible to the Central Government”.

Reflecting the kind of thinking amongst Griqua leaders that made the apartheid government sensitive to their demands, the manifesto mentioned that the RP promised allegiance to the government and that it affirmed “the necessity of group-area removal and the re-allocation of residential areas in certain regions as important for the creation of a Coloured identity in order to strengthen such an identity”. The RP also expressed opposition to “miscegenation” and advocated an “Immorality Act to prohibit intermarriage between Coloured people and other non-whites”.

AAS le Fleur I’s advocacy of Griqua-Coloured self-reliance was also suggested in the RP. Although the RP acknowledged “the historical significance of the guardianship of … Whites of South Africa”, expressing gratitude “for the protection and services already obtained”; it “strive[d] … for the political, economical and social self-reliance of the Coloured community”. Reminiscent of AAS le Fleur I’s *Griqua and Coloured People’s Opinion*, the RP undertook in 1967 to launch its own weekly newspaper at the end of 1967. The newspaper was supposed to have capital of R52, 000. Shares of R1 would be sold to Coloureds. Three members of the party’s executive and a White journalist, who supposedly invested R26 000 in the project, would form the editorial board.

In promoting a broad Coloured nationalism, the RP would have located the Griqua as a segment of the Coloured population and opposed the Griqua separatism promoted by AAS le Fleur II during the 1970s and 1980s. T le Fleur’s advocacy of a broad Coloured nationalism was also in line with the GNC constitution as amended in 1959, reflecting thus the Griqua-Coloured nationalism promoted by AAS le Fleur I and his association of the Griqua and Coloured categories (tempered, however, by AAS le Fleur II):

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22 LC, Miscellaneous file, Republican Coloured Party of South Africa & SWA (undated) manifesto. See also Eastern Province Herald, 30 August 1968, p. 5.
24 LC, Miscellaneous file, Republican Coloured Party of South Africa & SWA manifesto.
25 *Sunday Express*, 15 October 1967, p. 11.
The RP, however, encountered opposition from the GNC paramount chief, AAS le Fleur II (a nephew of T le Fleur). A le Fleur opposed canvassing by political parties on settlements where the GNC operated, supposedly to keep the GNC from being linked to political parties. He informed T le Fleur in 1968 that the GNC was non-political; that it would not become involved with the RP, and that the RP would no longer be allowed on the Kranshoek and Beeswater Griqua settlements as it caused disunity in the Griqua volk. The RP, however, countered opposition from the GNC paramount chief, AAS le Fleur II (a nephew of T le Fleur). A le Fleur opposed canvassing by political parties on settlements where the GNC operated, supposedly to keep the GNC from being linked to political parties. He informed T le Fleur in 1968 that the GNC was non-political; that it would not become involved with the RP, and that the RP would no longer be allowed on the Kranshoek and Beeswater Griqua settlements as it caused disunity in the Griqua volk.

By 1969 A le Fleur had himself become actively involved in party politics, becoming a member of the Federal Party. His brother Eric le Fleur became a member of the Labour Party. Both parties wanted to draw on Griqua support. By 1974 E le Fleur was actively promoting the LP amongst the Griqua. Although A le Fleur and E le Fleur associated with contending political parties, their involvement with these parties was fairly in line with the constitutional approach to social change fostered in the GNC by their grandfather AAS le Fleur I. Coloured political parties were necessarily constituted to participate constitutionally within government representative structures. However, being a member of the LP, E le Fleur became liable to the influence of more radical but constitutional strategies of social change (i.e. boycott and non-cooperation) that some LP members were at times inclined to favour. However, although he assumed a more critical approach to the NP government and its ethno-racially discriminatory policies than A le Fleur, E le Fleur’s upbringing inclined him very much to support negotiation as a means to social change. The divergence between the two brothers was sharply manifested in the CRC.

**Coloured Persons’ Representative Council**

Reflecting the relative sensitivity of the NP government to the Griqua, special provision was made in both the CRC and the preceding UCCA for Griqua representation. No special provision was made for the Griqua in the Coloured Advisory Council of 1943-1950. The CRC was to consist of 60 members, 40 of whom were to be elected and 20 who were to be nominated by the state president. Two of the nominees were to represent Malays and another two the Griqua. Provision for the nomination of at least two Griqua to the CRC secured that their interest would be articulated on the council.

The limited authority accorded to the CRC contributed to a decline in support for Coloured parties after the 1969 CRC elections. The manner in which the CRC dealt with Griqua concerns also influenced Griqua attitudes to the body. Whilst the chairperson of the CRC was elected by council members, the chairperson of the executive committee, consisting of five members, was designated by the state president. Supposed to function as a means of contact and consultation between Coloureds and the government, mainly represented by the minister of Coloured Affairs, the CRC could advise the government or make recommendations in regard to all matters affecting the economic, social, political, and educational interests of Coloureds. The CRC could pass Bills that ultimately had to be approved the state president. The CRC can be seen as “an attempt by the Nationalist government to coopt Coloured support by providing them with a viable alternative to direct parliamentary representation within the framework of apartheid and thus to diffuse opposition to apartheid.”

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26 LC, Item 4.1, GNC constitution as amended in 1959.
27 LC, Item 4.3, A Stockenstrom le Fleur, Kranshoek, to T le Fleur, Wynberg, 7.10.68.
31 Lewis: *Between the wire and the wall*, p. 274.
The Theron Commission (1973-1976), found that the majority of Coloureds were dissatisfied with the CRC and that the council failed to develop “into an effective instrument through which the Coloured population … [could] participate and have [a] say in [socio-political] matters”. Participants in the CRC were severely criticized by those with strong anti-collaboration leanings, notably educated and politically critical Coloureds in the Western Cape. Terms like “kleurling parlementjie”, “white herrenvolk”, “quislings”, “collaborators”, “dummy representation”, “carpet-bagging opportunists”, “social parasites”, and servile, self-effacing unpersons” were used in reference to the CRC and participants in the council by opponents. Coloureds were also encouraged to boycott CRC elections.

**CRC elections**

The more conservative Coloured parties faired badly in the 1969 CRC elections. Despite extensive support from the Afrikaner Broederbond, the FP also suffered a heavy defeat. The LP received 136 845 votes and won 26 seats. The FP gained 90 055 votes and 11 seats. The RP, which contested only Cape seats, came third with 30 241 votes. The RP gained only one seat through SM Brown who represented Haarlem (near Knysna), described as a rural constituency of extreme poverty. The nomination of only FP members to the CRC, including Andrew le Fleur, by the state president gave the FP a majority in the council. However, in the March 1975 elections the LP managed to win by a clear majority that could not be affected by government nominations.

The 1969 and 1975 CRC elections suggested that the rural and economic class location of significant numbers of Griqua contributed much to historical Griqua conservatism. The lowest voting percentage polls in both elections were in the Cape Town area. The highest voting percentage polls in both elections were in rural areas. A large number of urban Coloureds boycotted the CRC elections. Supporters of the FP and other pro-separate development parties tended to be from rural areas and “represented people of middle to lower socio-economic status”. Those who voted for the LP “tended to be people of comparatively high socio-economic status, who were under 45 years of age … who lived in the urban areas … where the electorates were relatively politicised and where there was a considerable opposition to parallel development” and Coloured ethno-nationalism. Andrew le Fleur’s association with the FP and Eric le Fleur’s association with the LP apparently divided Griqua voting, thus eroding the support base of Tom le Fleur’s RP.

The support of the RP declined rapidly after 1969. The party failed to gain a seat in the 1975 elections. The decline of the support for the RP and other smaller parties promoting and appealing to Coloured ethnic consciousness may in part be attributable to their inability to formulate policies that distinguished them significantly from the FP. The RP and the FP apparently “differed only in their relative emphasis on certain policies that were already incorporated in the Federal Party’s platform”. The death of T le Fleur in 1974 also deprived the RP with a leader with a measure of appeal amongst rural Coloureds. The lack of support

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32 UG 57-1937, p. 467.
39 Saks: “Coloured Persons’ Representative Council,” p. 72. Those who were least inclined to vote were supposedly “those under 35 years of age, those with post-school training and those in the top income group. The majority of doctors, nurses, lectures and ministers of religion did apparently not vote while a majority in other occupational categories (especially teachers) did”. Saks: “Coloured Persons’ Representative Council”, p. 73.
from government sources may also have contributed to the decline of these parties. Government support sustained the FP and thus discouraged the further splitting of the conservative Coloured vote.\footnote{Saks: “Coloured Persons’ Representative Council”, pp. 69-71, 74-5.}

**Ideological and power reconfigurations**

Disillusionment with the CRC in consequence of its failure to bring about socio-political improvement for Coloureds, undermined support for Coloured political parties, particularly the more pro-apartheid inclined parties, thus allowing the LP to increase its influence relative to the FP. The greater support shown to the LP reflected, to an extent, disapproval of government policies on the part of a substantial number of Coloureds.\footnote{Saks: “Coloured Persons’ Representative Council”, pp. 72-3.} Greater support for the LP also allowed E le Fleur to voice himself more powerfully as a Griqua leader within the CRC and to present an alternative Griqua viewpoint to that of A le Fleur.

E le Fleur’s views during the 1970s were much in line with those of Sonny Leon who was critical of apartheid but whose accommodative and collaborationist streak led to his unpopularity in the late 1970s. Although E le Fleur was varyingingly influenced by ideological currents in the LP, his association with the party in the 1970s was very much influenced by the relatively moderate leadership of Leon, with E le Fleur eventually leaving the party in the early 1980s after becoming disillusioned by the relatively more forthright stance taken against the government by Leon’s 1978 successor, Reverend Allan Hendrickse. Having left the LP early in 1980,\footnote{Burger, 23 February 1980, p. 3.} E le Fleur became more open to express Griqua identity aspirations that were subdued whilst he was a LP member.\footnote{As shown in chapters 9-10.} Indeed, divergences within the LP, reflecting the effect of multi-discursive conditioning, undermined the cohesiveness of the party. LP members, for example, varied in their allegiance to the principle of non-cooperation, their opposition to separate development, and in regard to the Coloured identity category. A struggle took place in the LP for ascendance by individuals with differing ideological orientations. Leadership changes in the LP thus reflected ideological shifts and reconfigurations. MD Arendse, representing the more conservative pole in the LP, showing openness towards separate development by suggesting that the Western Cape be partitioned off from the rest of the country as a fully autonomous state, was voted out as party leader and replaced by Sonny Leon in 1970.\footnote{Saks: “Coloured Persons’ Representative Council”, pp. 82-3.}

Emerging in the late 1960s, Black Consciousness (BC) ideology promoting psychological and political liberation from White oppression and a trans-ethnic Black identity (amongst the oppressed ethno-‘racial’ communities), also contributed to shifts within the LP in regard to Coloured identity and reinforced the anti-collaborationist elements in the party. In 1972 and 1973 the party projected a Coloured identity as an imposition meant to foster the disunity of the oppressed for the benefit of White oppressors. A Black identity was projected as a more appropriate identity.\footnote{Cited in Goldin: *Making race*, pp. 156-7.} Identification as Coloured persisted, however, in the party. Attempts were also made by members of the LP to encourage Griqua to locate themselves not only as Coloured but also as Black, as manifested by JH Nash in the CRC in 1976:

> I have great respect for the Griqua community. They have intermarried with the Coloured group … . In 1969, when we first got into East Griqualand … there was a strong feeling between the Griqua and Coloured people. We have gone a long way towards breaking down this Griqua/Coloured feeling, and I hope that members on all sides of this House will realize that the Griqua people have a very strong heritage of which they can be proud. … Many of them are very proud of their heritage and I do not blame them, and I feel we should forget about this idea that the Griquas are apart from us, that they are a separate community. We should regard them as part of the Black community … .\footnote{CRC, Second Council, Third Session, 13-19 October 1976, Vol. 35, pp. 973-4.}
It seems, as shown further below, that a measure of BC influence on E le Fleur led him on occasion to speak on behalf of Bantu-speaking Africans in the CRC, thus further increasing the ideological differences between himself and A le Fleur. However, BC had a minor impact on E le Fleur, much like it was the case with many others in the LP who served on the CRC.

During the 1970s when there was a growing BC inspired opposition within Coloured communities to narrow ethnic identities, Griqua nationalists insisted that the Griqua did not want to be part of “Coloured or Bantu groups” but simply wanted to be Griqua.\(^{48}\) That is, some Griqua segments were uneasy about being incorporated in a broad Coloured category or broad Black category, and to thus lose their specificity as Griqua. To the extent that narrow identities like Griqua and Coloured were regarded as conflicting with broader identities, that is, to the extent that being Griqua and being Black were seen as excluding each other, Griqua who favoured broader identities were inclined to reject or suppress their Griqua identity. Similarly, to the extent that Griquanness was seen to be in conflict with ‘non-racialism’, Griqua who identified with ‘non-racialism’ would also be inclined to reject or suppress a Griqua identity.

By 1974 LP members with relatively strong leanings to a separate Coloured identity were supposedly “firmly in control and the party leadership had retreated from its romance with black consciousness”. The party again shifted to a preoccupation with Coloured politics, though not as explicitly as the FP.\(^{49}\) Though the influence of BC may have subsided by 1974, expressions of a broader Black identity continued to be made through the 1970s.

By 1978 the LP also shifted more from a boycott and confrontation strategy favoured by many BC leaders to a strategy of “more planned and purposeful negotiation and dialogue”. This shift was linked to a changed leadership and a new political climate created by the government’s willingness to re-examine the constitutional order which convinced LP leaders that more fruitful dialogue could take place. Although more critical to the government than his predecessor, LP leader Allan Hendrickse declared his party’s willingness to negotiate short term goals such as housing, local government and education without losing sight of long terms ones and to consult with all groupings, organizations and the government on the country’s future.\(^{50}\)

The transformation of the policy of the Federal Party during the 1970s also suggested the multi-discursive conditioning of the party’s members. The changes that the FP underwent reflected broader changes amongst Coloureds in regard to participation in the CRC and the FP’s attempts to remain relevant. The failure of the government to carry out resolutions of an FP dominated CRC also inclined many members of the FP to assume less conciliatory positions to the government. Though the FP persisted in the commitment to a group identity separate from Whites and Bantu-speaking Africans, it became more forthrightly critical of government policies.\(^{51}\) Indeed, from 1974 the FP increasingly made stronger articulations in opposition to separate development that reflected the party’s disillusionment with the government’s willingness to implement FP ideals and CRC resolutions.\(^{52}\)

The ideological confluence that developed between the LP and the FP had the potential to foster ideological confluence between the leaders of the two contending GNC’s. However, the participation of Andrew le Fleur and Eric le Fleur in the CRC consolidated their animosity and rivalry. The CRC became an arena for the occasional manifestation of the rivalry of the Le Fleur brothers.

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\(^{48}\) *Diamond Fields Advertiser*, 2 March 1970, p. 7; see also Mentz report, par. 3.7.1, k & m; Annexure A.

\(^{49}\) Goldin: *Making race*, p. 158.

\(^{50}\) SAIRR: *Survey of race relations in South Africa, 1979*, p. 19.


**FP–LP confluence**

During the mid-1970s the ideological gap between the LP and the FP narrowed, with LP leadership becoming more accommodationist and the FP leadership becoming more critical of apartheid. Despite evidence of growing disenchantment with the CRC amongst Coloureds the LP decided to continue to participate in the council.\(^{53}\) After the election victory of March 1975 the LP “came increasingly to be seen to have replaced the moribund Federal Party in the collaborationist role”.\(^{54}\) LP leader, Sonny Leon, who was part of the leadership that was installed after MD Arendse was ousted in 1970 for showing pro-separate development leanings, himself became unpopular for showing too much openness to the government and for acting in contravention of party resolutions. Leon eventually resigned as party leader in 1978, thus enabling Allan Hendrickse to become the new leader.\(^{55}\)

The declining FP, on the other hand, attempted to change its image and moved closer to the policy of the LP in the attempt to win more Coloured support. Dr Bergins, who succeeded Tom Swartz as FP leader in 1974,\(^{56}\) reasoned that Coloureds had to be convinced that the party was seriously striving for their freedom, hence the need for a name change.\(^{57}\) The Federal Party was thus renamed the Freedom Party at its national conference in January 1978. The party’s new constitution expressed support for a more just and ‘realistic’ classification system; the elimination of racism; equal pay and opportunities in the private and public sectors; anti-communism; a higher status for Coloured workers; citizenship for Coloured people on par with that of Whites, and a joint say in national affairs.\(^{58}\)

The affinity that developed between the Labour Party and the Federal Party was reflected in the joint drafting of an amendment motion (to a FP ‘motion of concern’) in the last CRC session in September 1979. The amendment motion was moved by the LP and accepted unanimously by the CRC. The motion called, *inter alia*, that South Africa be governed by all its peoples; that all discriminatory legislation be repealed; that the people of South Africa share the wealth of the country on a fair basis; that all enjoy the same privileges and protection before the law; that work opportunities be created and guaranteed for all, and that a national convention be called representative of all South Africans to draft a new constitution. The joint drafting of this motion was viewed as an historic act of unity between historical rivals.\(^{59}\)

**Griqua representations in the CRC**

Representations by Griqua in the CRC mirrored to some extent the ideologies of their parties. Ideological reconfigurations in the FP also influenced the expressions of Andrew le Fleur and Griqua-Coloured nationalist Winston J Hornsby who were at times also driven to openly express disillusionment with, and criticism of the government. Griqua nationalist aspirations which set uneasily with the LP and FP were also made in the CRC. As a government nominated member on the CRC, A le Fleur made a number of representations on behalf of the Griqua, with some of his representations made for Coloureds in general, reflecting thus the pull of Griqua nationalists between a narrow Griqua and broader Coloured identity category. Hornsby from Matatiele in East Griqualand who was nominated to the CRC in 1975 as a Griqua representative, made strong representations on behalf of Griqua but also made representations for Coloureds in general. Like A le Fleur, Hornsby was also member of the more acquiescent Coloured nationalist FP,

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\(^{55}\) Saks: “Coloured Persons’ Representative Council”, p. 27.


\(^{59}\) SAIIRR: *Survey of race relations in South Africa, 1979*, p. 27.

\(^{60}\) Mentz report, par. 9.4.
being nominated to the CRC after appeals by the East Griqualand Pioneers Council (to which he belonged) for representation on the Council. As one of the two nominated Griqua representatives on the CRC, Hornsby replaced AJL Winnaar, a member of the Kranshoek based GNC and FP – who had been nominated with A le Fleur to the council in 1969. Eric le Fleur, on the other hand, was elected to the council in 1975 as a LP candidate for the Haarlem constituency.

Representations and voting by Griqua representatives was often in line with the positions of their parties. Whilst Griqua motions were at times contested along party lines, at times some Griqua issues, particularly those concerning land, were supported across party lines, reflecting thus a measure of sympathy with the Griqua from contending parties, as well as competition between contending parties for Griqua support. Appeals for a separate Griqua identity could also be opposed across party lines by members of rival parties who were concerned about the segmentation of the Coloured community.

The socio-political articulations of A le Fleur, J Winnaar, W Hornsby and E le Fleur in the CRC were influenced by the policies of their respective parties as well as by longstanding Griqua aspirations. However, A le Fleur’s Griqua ethno-nationalism and his promotion of Griqua specificity, made his position in the FP uneasy. A le Fleur’s ambiguous Griqua separatist expressions also diverged from the Griqua-Coloured nationalism of his grandfather, AAS le Fleur I. Members of the FP were willing to support Griqua motions particularly if the Griqua were located as a segment of the Coloured category. Subjected to both narrow Griqua ethno-national and broader Coloured nationalist dynamics, A le Fleur was thus, at times, inclined to affirm the specificity of the Griqua to even reject the categorization of the Griqua as Coloured whilst also being inclined, at other times, to locate the Griqua as Coloured and to make representations for Coloureds. His membership of the FP and his participation in the CRC thus reinforced his ambivalence with the Coloured category. E le Fleur’s articulations in the CRC, on the other hand, were much in line with the anti-apartheid policy of the LP and were not marked by Griqua-Coloured ethnicity and tension between being Griqua and Coloured that characterized those of A le Fleur. Like E le Fleur, Hornsby, who made representations on behalf of Griqua and Coloureds, did not evince the tension between being Griqua and Coloured, thus reflecting a perception and acceptance amongst certain Griqua, notably those from East Griqualand, that the Griqua were a segment of the Coloured community.

Andrew le Fleur’s representations
A le Fleur’s first motion in the CRC in 1970 was framed within a broad Coloured discourse and did not refer explicitly to the Griqua. The motion requested the CRC’s Executive Committee to consider the possibility increasing land at the Eksteenskuil settlement for Coloured farmers and the granting of property rights to these farmers was passed. A le Fleur’s second motion delivered a few days later appealed, however, for Griqua distinctiveness. Le Fleur called for the explicit use of the Griqua category in official discourse where Griqua were subsumed in the Coloured category. He also appealed for land for Griqua occupation. Delivering his second motion, A le Fleur proposed that in the event of the proclamation of a settlement, rural area or land intended for the Griqua, that the term ‘Griqua’ be used instead of ‘Coloured’; he also proposed that the term ‘Griqua’ be included in all government and departmental dealings where

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61 Oral evidence, Kokstad Griqua delegation, Constitutional Committee of the President’s Council (CCPC): “Assignment regarding the needs and claims of Griquas”, Vol. XXIII, 19-4-1983, pp. 18-9. Although T Paulsen of the East Griqualand Pioneers Council claimed that Hornsby was a member of the organization (Ibid) and thus by implication a Griqua, Hornsby supposedly claimed before the Steyn Commission that he was not a Griqua but a Coloured. Oral evidence, Matatiele City Council, CCPC: “Needs and claims of Griquas”, Vol. XXIII, 1983-04-18, p. 15.
62 Andrew le Fleur’s fellow Griqua representative from the Griqua Independent Church, Reverend JL Winnaar, was much less vocal during CRC proceedings than other Griqua on the council.
only the word ‘Coloured’ appeared, that is, that the Griqua category be used adjacent to the Coloured category.  

A le Fleur’s motion for Griqua distinctiveness posed a dilemma for the majority FP in the CRC. The FP strived for the unity of Coloureds; appeals for Griqua distinctiveness could be perceived as undermining that unity. Members of the LP expressed opposition to the “breaking up of a people into small splinter groups and getting one group to fight against another.”

V Sass a LP member from Elsiesriver in the Western Cape indicated that “we are against this tribalising and fragmentation of the coloured people”. There were, however, individuals from both the FP and the LP who sympathized with some Griqua aspirations. Both parties also wanted to draw on Griqua support. Members of the FP were willing to express support to concessions for the Griqua especially if appeals for concessions located the Griqua within the broader Coloured category, as suggested by W Pieterse, a nominated CRC member:

> Die Griekwa-volksgroep binne ‘n groter raamwerk in ‘n Kleurlinggroep vra ‘n vergunning omdat hulle binne die perke of binne bestek van die groter groep ‘n eie identiteit vertoon. … Nou ja, hierdie identiteit is iets tradisioneel en juis omdat dit ‘n tradisie by hulle is, wil hulle die tradisie behou. Waarom moet ons, die groter groep dan vir hulle daardie reg ontël. ... [O]nthou ‘n groep binne ‘n groep beteken nog nie verbrokkeling van die groter groep nie.

Voting for A le Fleur’s 1970 motion for the official usage of the Griqua category was divided along party lines. The motion was, however, passed as support from FP members was adequate to carry it.

The issue of land for the Griqua could activate support from both FP and LP members. Members of both parties expressed support to A le Fleur’s motion in 1972 that Schmidtsdrift in Griqualand West be established as a farming growth-point for the Griqua community. In motivating his motion A le Fleur also took issue with the government’s view endorsed by JJ Loots, minister of Coloured Affairs in 1970, that the “idea of a coloured homeland for the Coloureds … was impracticable [sic] because there is no historical Coloured territory available”. In affirming that there was a historical Coloured territory A le Fleur identified the Griqua with Coloureds, even as he appealed for land that might promote Griqua specificity:

> [O]ns voel dat daar ... van die kant van die Blanke, met hierdie aparte ontwikkeling wat hy voorgestel het en wat ons aanvaar, die nodige konsessies gemaak moet word. ... Daar kan nou beweer word dat ek vir ‘n tuisiland preek. Hulle kan sê ek preek vir ‘n hartland. En dan sê ek, ja, ek preek dit namens die [Griekwa]
mense. As hulle voel dat hulle 'n tuisland wil hê, dan vra ek ook so iets. ... Al wat hierdie mense voor vra is op geskiedkundige grond, as die Regering kans sien op daardie geskiedkundige agtergrond om vir die Bantoes 'n tuisland te gee, gee vir ons ook wat aan ons behoort het.72

As suggested before, although the FP continued through the 1970s to have a strong pro-government leaning, the government’s non-committal to CRC resolutions led to a hardening in the attitude of a number of FP members whose approach became less conciliatory.73 This hardening of attitude in the pro-government and pro-separate development camp was also manifested in A le Fleur who assumed a more forceful posture on delivering his motion for Schmidtsdrift to be turned into a Griqua farming growth-point. A le Fleur’s very temporary relatively forceful posture was positively met by council members when he mentioned:

Die tyd het aangebreek dat ons nie nou dreigemente wil uitvoer nie, maar die tyd het aangebreek dat ons ook nie langer op ons knieë kan soebat nie.

LP members who sympathized with the Griqua were not at ease with A le Fleur’s appeal for land in terms of separate development and even tried to goad him to frame his appeal for land in a language that was not in line with separate development. Interjecting whilst A le Fleur was motivating his motion, David Curry indicated that

this is not separate development, this is justly belonged to these people.

MNR LE FLEUR: Dit het niks met tuislande te doen nie; dit is “just retribution”.

MR CURRY: That is right. That which justly belonged to the people.

MR T.R. SWARTZ [FP leader and chairperson of the CRC Executive Committee], L.U.B: Ons stem saam.

MR CURRY: That is not separate development.

MNR LE FLEUR: Dit is nie, maar al is dit ook, dan is ek nie bang om daarvan te praat namens my mense nie, om te sê dat ek dit vra as 'n tuisland nie.74

Compounding matters for those in the CRC sympathizing with Griqua appeals for land, but who were concerned about the fragmentation of the Coloured community or of ethnic particularism, A le Fleur, in motivating his motion, also indicated that the concerned Griqua “wil … nie Kleurlinge wees nie; hulle wil die identiteit van hulle voorvaders behou”.75 Emphasizing pride of identity and the ethno/tribal value of the Griqua category lacking in a Coloured category, A le Fleur explained later in a 1974 session why Griqua did not want to discard their identity and be called Coloured:

Nou wil ek ook sommer baie duidelik sê waarom die Griekwa, net soos die Grieke of enige ander nasie, al is hy in Suid Afrika, nie sy identiteit wil prysgee nie. Dit is nie soseer omdat dit ’n verbreking van volke veroorsaak nie, maar dit is sy trots en sy geskiedenis.

Dan gaan ek verder. As ons eerlik wil wees dan kan ons nie vandag sê dat die naam waarop die Blankes ons vandag noem, naamlik Kleurlinge, is iets wat ’n mens basies kan aangryp nie. Dit is nie ’n stamnaam nie, dit is ’n beskrywing, en daarom wil die Griekwaas nie van hulle stamnaam afsien nie. Hulle wil nie ’n beskrywing wees nie. Hulle is trots op hulle geskiedenis, op hulle agtergrond, op die boer in hom en wat hulle gehad het.76

Despite their concern with the potential divisiveness that could issue from passing A le Fleur’s 1972 motion that Schmidtsdrift be established as a farming growth-point for the Griqua, members of both the FP and the LP approved A le Fleur’s motion. CRC members could identify with the Griqua history of deprivation.

72 CRC, 31 August, 1 and 5 September, 1972, Vol. 20, pp. 1350-1, 1354.
74 CRC, 31 August, 1 and 5 September, 1972, Vol. 20, p. 1354.
75 CRC, 31 August, 1 and 5 September, 1972, Vol. 20, p. 1351.
They also saw a common land need amongst Griqua and Coloureds in certain parts of the country. In the words of JA Ferris, a nominated FP member:

Ek ondersteun die voorstel omdat dit ook maar die groot behoefte is van die Griekwas en die Kleurling, naamlik grond. Alhoewel ek nie ten gunste is van die verdeling van die volk nie, ondersteun ek die voorstel want dit is die groot behoefte in daardie dele van die land.\(^\text{77}\)

Members of both parties again expressed support for land to be availed to Griqua in 1973 when A le Fleur proposed that the Griqua not be deprived of certain plots in Kokstad held in trust for them.\(^\text{78}\) Expressing appreciation for the cross-party support for Le Fleur’s motion, the leader of the FP (Tom Swartz) reaffirmed his commitment to the Griqua land cause:

I want to give the Griqua people the assurance – and I am glad that we have the support of the Opposition – that we will stand by them, that we will fight for their rights, for their identity and for their land … . The honourable Mr. Le Fleur knows that I have been looking after the interests of the Griqua people for a long time already.\(^\text{79}\)

Swartz even used language that was more in line with the LP, suggesting discursive shifting and even the possible impact of his rivals in the LP on his thinking:

Mr. Chairman, there are these six [Griqua] erven [in Kokstad]; the Rev. Rossouw who is the minister there, cannot live in the same manse which belongs to the church, and this ground is threatened. Although at the moment it is in a controlled area, which means that it is safe, for the time being but the White man’s word

MR MIDDLETON: Careful
MR.TR. SWARTZ, C.E.: cannot be accepted any more. … This is perfectly correct, and I have said it before, and I will say it again. The White man has broken his word so often that the Griqua cannot be sure about controlled areas …
MR. JULLIES: He is talking like us.\(^\text{80}\)

Swartz attempted to “go a little further”:

We are keenly interested in the Griqua nation, and I think the time has arrived when there should be a commission to investigate the whole situation. … Their whole position should be investigated, because these people have not been treated well at all in South Africa.\(^\text{81}\)

Swartz reiterated:

I want to give the Griqua people the assurance that we, this whole Council, will do everything in our power to protect their land and to protect their rights.\(^\text{82}\)

A le Fleur’s motion was passed with much cross-party consensus. There was, however, mutual suspicion about the motives driving the support for Griqua land aspirations. Leaders of contending parties suggested that their rivals were really concerned with the Griqua vote.\(^\text{83}\)

\(^{77}\) CRC, 31 August, 1 and 5 September, 1972, Vol. 20, p. 1482.
Despite concerns of fragmentation of the Coloured population that had been expressed in the CRC, a 1974 motion of A le Fleur was also approved that members of the Griqua community who applied for identity documents be classified as Griqua and not as Coloured, and that Griqua with identity documents indicating that they were Coloured be issued with identity documents that indicated that they were Griqua.\(^{84}\) A 1974 motion of A le Fleur was also approved that the Council request the government to avail agricultural and pasture land to the Griqua since the majority of them were, according to A Le Fleur, agricultural and cattle farmers.\(^{85}\)

Support of A le Fleur’s motion in regard to classification of the Griqua by the FP leadership was, however, only temporary. The CRC’s Executive Committee took a critical position to A le Fleur’s motion on the classification of Griqua; it also assumed a critical position to his 1970 motion for the use of the term ‘Griqua’ in regard to areas intended specifically for the Griqua and for the use of the term in governmental matters where only the term ‘Coloured’ was used. The Executive Committee decided at a sitting on 12 March 1975 not to take such resolutions further, fearing that they would not promote the ideal of unity amongst Coloureds, contributing thus to growing disillusionment by Griqua nationalists with the CRC. The Executive Committee reasoned that if separate residential and rural settlements were to be provided for the Griqua, other groups included in the Coloured category could justly claim the same rights and opportunities which were for the Executive Committee undesirable, impractical and impossible to bring about. Insisting that there should be one Coloured group, the Executive Committee also reasoned that the different classifications would only cause confusion.\(^{86}\)

A le Fleur’s promotion of Griqua distinctiveness and his support of separate development manifested reworking of longstanding Griqua aspirations for a measure of independence and the appropriation of aspects of apartheid discourse in the attempt to gain some socio-economic benefits for the Griqua. Projecting separate development further back in Griqua history, A le Fleur found in the Griqua past legitimacy for his appeal for Griqua distinctiveness and separate development:

> [H]ul het met hul eie gewere en kanonne getrek tot daar by Mount Currie ... . Daar het die Griekwas hul eie goewerment opgestel en so ver gegaan om hul eie geld ook te hé. ‘n Aparte regering en daarom, dit is die rede waarom ons, die Griekwas, aparte ontwikkeling ondersteun as dit wetgewing is. Destyds het die Griekwas dit gedoen, maar hul was nie beskerm deur wetgewing nie en moes hulle dinge vernietig word deur ander rasse wat kans gesien het om in te klim waar hulle nie kon nie. … [I]n die tyd van die Griekwas was hulle die eerste mense wat gesien het dat dit die enigste manier is om te ontwikkel – aparte ontwikkeling.\(^{87}\)

A le Fleur insisted that if correctly carried out, separate development would benefit Griqua and Coloureds.\(^{88}\) He, however, expressed disappointment at the failure of the government in carrying out their policy of separate development:

> Die Regering het na vore gekom met ´n beleid van aparte ontwikkeling, van parallelle ontwikkeling, maar tot op die huidige oomblik is dit tog vir almal duidelik dat daardie ontwikkeling nooit plasgevind het nie – dit was net iets in naam. Vir ons mense sou dit van groot belang gewees het as die Regering daardie beleid kon uitvoer, want dan sou ek nie nou nodig gehad het om hierdie mosie [vir Griekwa weivelde end saagronde] in

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\(^{88}\) CRC, First Council, Fourth Session, 31 August, 5 and 6 September, 1972, Vol. 21, pp. 1676, 1678.
Consistent with the early FP, A le Fleur was inclined to think that Griqua and Coloureds should try to make the best within the framework of separate development. He was, like his grandfather AAS le Fleur I, inclined to think that White domination would persist for long in South Africa and that the best alternative for Griqua and Coloureds was to obtain land on which they could exercise a measure of self-governance. A le Fleur II thus expressed support for separate development in the hope of obtaining land for the Griqua. He indicated explicitly that he deployed the idea of a “tuisland” very much as a means for accessing land:

Die woord “Tuisland” laat ’n mens dink aan grond, en as dit ’n Griekwa Tuisland is, sover dit grond aangaan – ek gee nie om wat iemand van my sê in verband met ’n tuisland nie, want my Tuisland sal nie op dieselfde grond gebaseer wees as die ander mense s’n nie. Dit sal gebaseer wees op ons voorwaardes. So, as dit ’n Tuisland genoem word – so lank dit grond en weiveld is, laat dit ’n Tuisland wees.

Accused of supporting Group Areas, A le Fleur denied in 1976 that he ever asked for Group Areas unless the traditional Griqua areas that he requested were deemed Group Areas:

Ek het nog nooit vir Groepsgebiede gevra nie, nog nooit nie. Ek het gevra vir die mense se oorsprongklike gronde wat aan hulle behoort het, en as dit ... Groepsgebiede is, dan is dit goed.

Despite his uneasiness with the Coloured category, Le Fleur not only made representations on behalf of Griqua and Coloureds, but also located himself as Coloured in some of his representations, as indicated in his support of a motion for the proclamation of Cove as a Coloured settlement:

Ons vra dat daardie plek vir ons Kleurlingmense geproklameer word … . In daardie gebied is daar nêrens plek vir ons Kleurlingmense sover dit uitkampplekke aangaan nie. … Daar moet genoeg ruimte vir uitbreiding wees, anders beland ons Kleurlinge in ’n ou kolletjie …. Dit verwyder ons nog altyd in kolletjies, en waar ons as een familie bymekaar bly word ons naderhand verbrokkel, want daar is altyd ’n strook tussenin wat Blank moet wees.

A le Fleur also appealed for Coloured leadership unity in 1976 in a manner that located himself within the Coloured spectrum:

Mnr. Die Voorsitter, ons het onderlinge probleme en ons moet daardie probleme nou begin uitwys, en ons moet mekaar hier vind. Dit baat nie dat ons heeldag hier sit en praat oor dit en dat nie – ons sal niks met die Blanke man regkry terwyl ons verdeeld is nie, want hy sal ons teen mekaar gebruik. … Dit is ons wat bymekaar moet kom en die sake van Suid-Afrika, wat die Kleurlingmense aanbetref … hier moet bespreek.

_Eric le Fleur’s representations_

A le Fleur’s nationalist representations on behalf of the Griqua were somewhat tempered after Eric le Fleur won a CRC seat in the 1975 elections. The conflict between E le Fleur and A le Fleur and their respective

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95 The Republican Party contested seven seats, all in the Cape, but won none. The LP gained 151 410 votes and 31 seats, the FP 75 851 votes and 8 seats, and the RP only 2 934 votes after polling over 30 000 in 1969. The Haarlem
Griqua organizations was manifested during CRC proceedings. E le Fleur opposed the nomination of A le Fleur to the CRC, reasoning that he did not deserve the position as he was not a member of the majority LP and as he had done nothing to improve the lot of the Griqua people for the five years preceding his re-nomination in 1975.96

Reflecting the influence of the LP, E le Fleur’s representations in the CRC were not like those of A le Fleur punctuated by Griqua ethnicity and at times even transcended the Coloured category. Although E le Fleur raised issues affecting Griqua communities, his representations tended to be much less concerned with specific Griqua concerns. His representations in the CRC concerned issues like administration problems in his constituency, discrimination, and social needs such as education and health. He also made representations on behalf of labourers.97 For example, he spoke on behalf of state forestry labourers in regard to, inter alia, the representativeness and powers of liaison committees; he called for adequate clothing for labourers, housing for pensioners, and the early inclusion of labourers in pension schemes.98 In making representations on behalf of farm labourers in 1979 E le Fleur mentioned explicitly whom he had in mind:

Wanneer ek praat van arbeiders, dan praat ek nou nie in die sin van kleur nie, dit sluit Swart arbeiders in. Dit sluit almal in wat as arbeiders op hierdie plase werk. Ek het nog nie gehoor van ’n Blanke plaasarbeider nie ...

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E le Fleur’s maiden speech in the CRC was during a 1976 budget discussion in response to problems raised by A le Fleur pertaining to rural settlements, particularly Kranshoek. A le Fleur complained about a lack of dwelling space (plots) on rural settlements. He also indicated that the Kranshoek Advisory Council received numerous letters from the Department of Health asking them not to keep any more people at Kranshoek and expressed concern about where those people were to go.100 Reflecting leadership rivalry between the two GNC factions, E le Fleur took issue with A le Fleur and accused him of acting against his fellow Griqua:

Ons het nou hier gehoor van die probleme en van die dinge wat die vorige spreker [A le Fleur] ... genoem het. Hy het veral verwys na Kranshoek, maar ek wil vir u ’n heeltemal ander prentjie skilder van wat eintlik daar aangaan. … In die gebied van Kranshoek is daar oorwegend Griekwa-mense woonagtig, en nou onlangs het die Departement van Kleurlingsake die Superintendent van Concordia, ook ’n sogenaamde Griekwa, oorgeplaas na Kranshoek, en dit was daardeur agbare lid wat beswaar gemaak het. Hy wou eerder die Blanke man daar hé, hy wou nie hierdie Superintendent daar hé nie. Hy is toe oorgeplaas na die Haarlem Landelike Gebied, omdat hulle beswaar gemaak het. Hy het sy eie mense weggejaag, ’n man wat homself gaan bekwaam het en opgelei is as ’n Superintendent. … ’n Ou pensionaris … ene Mr. Kleinhaus, is weggejaag. Die Adviesraad het dit gedoen. Hulle het dit voorgestel, en hy is op die Adviesraad.101

E le Fleur suggested that the Kranshoek Advisory Council discriminated against those who did not vote for the FP102 and that A le Fleur was authoritarian. He also claimed later that “sixty families” left Beeswater constituency, the only seat won by RP in 1969, was taken by E le Fleur as a LP candidate. The RP was dissolved soon after the elections. Saks: “Coloured Persons’ Representative Council”, pp. 131-2.  
(for the Knysna region) as they could not stand A le Fleur’s “bully[ing]”, and that he exploited the traditionalism and loyalty of Griqua.\textsuperscript{\ref{fn:214}}

Whilst the Kranshoek based GNC leadership was inclined to identify with aspects of Afrikaner nationalism, E le Fleur, as a member of the LP, criticized Afrikaner nationalism and the articulation of identities in a manner that accorded with Afrikaner nationalism and separatism. In doing so he manifested a divergence from the ethno-nationalism and particularism often expressed by his grandfather AAS le Fleur I, at least whilst he (E le Fleur) was a member of the LP. He criticized the FP for supporting separate development and for promoting a version of Afrikaner nationalism. It appears that in criticizing the Afrikaner nationalism and the NP’s ‘racially’ discriminatory policies during a 1978 CRC session, that E le Fleur was moved to speak on behalf a broader ‘Black’ community, thus the suggesting a measure of influence by Black Consciousness (inspired) strands in the LP:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[] E le Fleur’s influence by, or identification with the LP policy was also manifested when he took issue with A le Fleur’s motion in the CRC that the council request the minister of Coloured, Rehoboth and Nama Relations to expedite the taking over of ‘Fingo lands’ in Humansdorp for Coloured settlement.\textsuperscript{\ref{fn:205}} E le Fleur reasoned that the motion of A le Fleur was unjust and racist and bound to create ‘racial’ hatred:

\begin{quote}
Mnr. die Voorsitter, ons lewe in ’n land waar Swartmense of Nie-Blankes gebuk moet gaan onder ’n beleid van afsonderlike ontwikkeling of apartheid, en as ons hierdie beleid ontleed dan vind ons hy het sekere bestanddele. Ek wil so ’n paar van die bestanddele van hierdie beleid wat die Herstigte Federale Party ondersteun. … [D]ie beheptheid met identiteit onder hierdie Afrikaners het ’n groot wrywingspunt geword. … Hoeom moet die Regering wette maak wat vir ander mense skadelik is en net vir hulle pas, en is dit goed? Swartes of Nie-Blankes het dit nie ’n wet nodig om byvoorbeeld die lobolastelsel te behou nie, ons sal nie vra dat dit in wetgewing vasgehe nie. … Is die reg om Suid-Afrika te regeer uitsluitlik vir Blankes bedoel, of woon ons ook in hierdie land, vorm ons ook deel van hierdie land?\textsuperscript{\ref{fn:204}}
\end{quote}

E le Fleur articulated, with much approval from LP dominated council, the ‘non-racial’ inspired sentiments in the LP opposing ethnic particularism. He also presented himself as a voice for the Fingo people:

\begin{quote}
Djie Hoofman van die Fingo’s, Hoofman Wumasonga, voel dat ek hom vandag hier moet ondersteun. … Dit is sy gevoel, want hy is in onseker en hy wil nie in onsekerheid leef nie. … Eks wil nie ontruim nie. … Van hierdie mense is daar sowat 150 gesinne verskuif na Keiskammahoek, naby King William’s Town, en van daardie mense het al reeds teruggekom na daardie grond toe.\textsuperscript{\ref{fn:206}}
\end{quote}

\begin{itemize}
  \item[] CRC, 13-19 October 1976, Vol. 35, p. 1185. “Fingo lands” were State-owned farms in the Humansdorp district that were formerly occupied by descendants of 1820-1850 Mfengu refugees who were resettled in the Queenstown district between 1971 and 1978, PC 2/1983, p. 130.
  \item[] CRC, 13-19 October 1976, Vol. 35, p. 1194.
\end{itemize}
ek wil hom aanhaal. Hy het gesê: Suid-Afrika het nie meer tyd vir leiers wat net belangstel in hulle eie etniese groepe nie. … En dit is waar, ons het nie tyd vir sulke leiers nie, en daarom voel ek dat ek hierdie mosie ten sterkste moet teëgaan, want dit sal net ons mense verongeluk. En soos ek sê, daardie Fingo-mense het nie eens ’n platform om te praat nie. Ek staan darem nou hierso op ’n soort van ’n platform.\(^{107}\)

In contrast to A le Fleur, E le Fleur was more hopeful about the ending White domination. He envisioned a South Africa under a Bantu-speaking government, and was therefore inclined to oppose ethno-‘racial’ discrimination and enmity amongst sections of subordinated communities:

Ek moet ook toesien dat hierdie Raad nie daarvan beskuldig kan word dat hulle hierdie mense laat verwyder het nie, want dit is net wat sal gebeur … . Die Raad sou die skuld gedra het as hierdie mense veskuif sou word. Ek wil vir u sê dat ons dit nie kan bekostig, ons, die verdrukte mense, om nog vyande onder mekaar te maak nie … want die een of ander tyd gaan die Swartman Suid-Afrika regeer, en waar gaan ons ons dan bevind as ons nou rassehaat aanblas?\(^{108}\)

Strong opposition was also expressed to A le Fleur’s motion on the ‘Fingo lands’ by other LP members, in addition to E le Fleur. JH Nash, a member of the LP from the Eastern Cape, moved that his motion be amended to read that the “Council requests that the people who occupy the area known as Fingo lands, be allowed to remain there permanently”.\(^{109}\) The amendment was approved after voting that was split along party lines – with FP members voting against the amendment.\(^{110}\)

E le Fleur attempted to bolster his influence on Griqua affairs through his membership of the majority party in the CRC. As an LP member, he requested Sonny Leon when still national leader of the LP, that any matter relating to the Griqua people should first be referred to him for his comment before any positive steps were taken. He felt that that “would teach the Government a lesson not to foist reps on our people that they don’t want” so that elected members should come to “handle all race groups in their respected Constituencies”, instead of A le Fleur and W Hornsby, the “two Government stooges nominated to propagate Government policy”.\(^{111}\)

**WJ Hornsby’s representations**

The impact of more critical ideological currents on Griqua leaders was also manifested in Winston Hornsby, a member of the FP nominated in 1975 to represent the Griqua community. Hornsby’s position in regard to the relation between Griqua and Coloureds was much more in line with E le Fleur’s position than with the one of A le Fleur. Like E le Fleur, Hornsby was inclined to locate the Griqua as a sub-group of the Coloured category. Hornsby was, however, less critical of apartheid than E le Fleur. Hornsby not only made representations on behalf of the Griqua for land but also gave input on social, economic and political issues on Coloureds in general.\(^{112}\) He reasoned in 1976 that Coloured leaders should try to improve the conditions of those they represented within the limits set by separate development:

> We know the policy of the Government, that it operates within a certain framework, but we have to a large degree a certain amount of latitude within that framework, and if we have that amount of latitude, we should try and think of alternative means to circumvent the problems with which our people are faced. The problems that I speak of are the dual problems of poverty and hunger, and also ignorance. … [W]e are limited by the

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policy of separate development. We are limited, and as I have said, nobody is satisfied, but we want to try and make progress.\textsuperscript{113}

Reflecting the ideological reorientation of the FP and the impact of that shift on Griqua members of the party, Hornsby, like others in the FP, felt by 1979 that they were misguided to put too much faith in the promises of change made by the “White man”:

\begin{quote}
[I]n discussing and requesting that we create equal opportunities, I must just draw the attention of this House to the fact that discrimination is an old thing in this country … . I would like to appeal to the hon. members on the other side of the House to accept that they do not have the monopoly of the truth. We can also change. … We are trying to change and to meet the changes, and I would like to apologize to them. I mean, this side of the House [FP] must admit to a certain degree that all along we were wrong. … [W]e tried to give White South Africa breathing space in which to rectify its mistakes. … But because of hypocritical lies perpetrated by the White man, we on this side of the House were misled. They kept on making promises which were never implemented. … In 1974 the present Minister of Foreign Affairs, when he was the diplomat at the United Nations, gave an undertaking that he would change, but what has happened during this period? Nothing! It looks as though – and here I must agree with the hon. Mr. Curry on the other side – everything was a window-dressing exercise.\textsuperscript{114}
\end{quote}

In 1979 Hornsby called not merely for the sharing of political power but also for the sharing of economic power within the free enterprise system. He asserted that “there must be a change in the free-enterprise system. One of the most important things that have to be done is that there must be profit-sharing. The profits of the companies must be shared with the workers”.\textsuperscript{115} Thus, though not explicitly rejecting capitalism, the call for profit-sharing between owners and workers suggested a modest impact of socialist thinking on some Griqua. The modest appropriation of class inspired thinking did not temper Hornsby’s proclivity to think in ethno-’racial’ terms much.

Hornsby also made a number of representations for Griqua and Coloureds in a manner that located the Griqua as Coloureds. For example, he moved a motion in 1976 that the

\begin{quote}
Council requests the appointment of a commission of inquiry with the following terms of reference to investigate the land question in East Griqualand as it affects the Coloured people:

(a) immediate expropriation and handing back for use and occupation by the Coloured community of all Crown land which was sold to members of the White community and which should have been held in trust for the Griqua community;
(b) the examining of all title deeds presently held by members of the White community and expropriation of those allegedly improperly acquired and giving it back to the Griquas; and
(c) adequate compensation in regard to all land presently occupied by Coloureds and which shall be incorporated into an Independent Transkei and the acquisition of more land within East Griqualand for Coloureds.\textsuperscript{116}
\end{quote}

Hornsby’s location of the Griqua within the Coloured category facilitated the support for his motion by CRC members concerned about Coloured splintering. His motion was unanimously passed.\textsuperscript{117}

\textsuperscript{114} CRC, Second Council, Seventh Session, 7-14 September 1979, Vol. 42, pp. 114-5.
\textsuperscript{115} CRC, 7-14 September 1979, Vol. 42, p. 116.
Collapse of CRC
Whilst many Coloureds expressed strong opposition to the CRC from its onset, some disillusionment was later also expressed by Griqua leaders with the body. Griqua nationalists felt that Coloured officials in the CRC despised the Griqua, dominated them, neglected their interests, frustrated their aspirations, and sowed discord amongst them. Much concern was expressed with the disapproval of a separate Griqua identity by members of the CRC. Dissatisfaction with the attitude of CRC members fuelled attempts by Griqua nationalists to remove the Griqua category from the “Coloured umbrella”. Griqua nationalists also felt that the Griqua should have their own national governing council.  

Coloured criticism of the CRC finally took its toll. The Labour Party came to terms with outside criticism of the CRC, conceding that it did not fulfil the political aspirations of Coloureds and that it was used only as a “debating chamber”. In February 1980 members of the CRC “resigned en masse”, thus forcing the CRC to collapse.  

Constitutional reforms
In addition to the influence of Griqua participation in Coloured political parties on their identity articulation and socio-political positioning, the articulation of Griqua identities were from the late 1970s also much influenced by constitutional reforms proposed by the government. The affirmation of Griquaness increased in the late 1970s. Government officials also perceived a renewed expression of pride in being Griqua during this period.

The government’s relative openness to Griqua concerns together with government attempts at constitutional reform from the late 1970s contributed to greater engagement of Griqua representatives with government officials that revealed longstanding aspirations and old areas of tension. Increasing political engagement with, and representations to the government manifested and consolidated divergences between rival Griqua leaders.

A measure of openness to the Griqua during the 1970s was partly linked to changes within the National Party and attempts by the government to gain Coloured support for its policies. Between 1976 and 1984 the NP introduced policy changes in regard to Coloureds driven much by increasing pressure on the apartheid policy (both from within and from outside South Africa), and the rejection of the CRC by many Coloureds. A major impetus towards a review of the NP’s policy towards Coloureds was provided by the participation of Coloured youth in a countrywide revolt activated on 16 June 1976 by protests of school children in the Soweto township near Johannesburg.

By the time of the second CRC elections in 1975 it had become clear that the council did not, as the government had hoped, diffuse Coloured opposition to apartheid or satisfied Coloured demands. Sections of the Coloured population rejected the ethnic particularism promoted by the NP government and found common cause with Bantu-speaking Africans. The steady erosion of the position of Coloured elites’ relative privilege since 1948 might have reduced the material incentives for a separate Coloured identity and encouraged a feeling of shared oppression with Bantu-speaking Africans. Nationalist manipulations of ethnic identities in the interest of White domination further encouraged a conscious rejection of a separate Coloured identity. The participation of Coloured youths in the 1976 uprisings reflected the measure

118 Mentz report, par. 3.7.3; Annexure A; PC 2/1983, p. 90.
121 Lewis: *Between the wire and the wall*, pp. 276-7.
identification by Coloured sections with Bantu-speaking Africans and the impact of Black Consciousness on Coloureds.\textsuperscript{122}

In light of increasing Coloured disillusionment with the ethno-‘racial’ order, accommodation and pacification of Coloureds became a key component of the NP government. Under PW Botha, who succeeded BJ Voster as prime minister in 1978, the government became entrusted to the State Security Council, “a shadowy committee on which close allies of Botha, including representatives of the military and big business, occupied key positions”. The state bureaucracy was reorganized, with government departments being reduced from 40 to 22, thus further centralizing control.\textsuperscript{123} Insisting that Coloured people were “allies of the Whites in the struggle for South Africa”, Botha undertook to co-opt the Coloured political leadership\textsuperscript{124} in a new constitutional order.

Constitutional alternatives broached by the government from 1977 were much influenced by the Theron Commission’s recommendation in 1976 of satisfactory forms of direct representation and a direct say for Coloureds at the various levels of government and on the various decision-making bodies.\textsuperscript{125} In terms of the new constitutional plan Whites, Coloureds and Indians would each have their own parliament that would legislate on matters pertaining to each category.\textsuperscript{126} Coloured political parties varied somewhat in their response to the constitutional proposals, with the position of Griqua leaders being much in line with that of their parties. From 1979 a series of constitutional committees under the supervision of the prime minister were formed to discuss South Africa’s constitutional alternatives, with the first one (chaired by Dr Alwyn Schlebusch)\textsuperscript{127} being appointed on 4 July 1979 to inquire into the introduction of a new constitution.\textsuperscript{128}

**Labour Party and Federal Party on constitutional reform**

The Federal Party accepted the new constitutional proposals as a basis for further negotiation to attain full citizenship for all South Africa’s peoples.\textsuperscript{129} The Labour Party was critical of the proposed constitutional changes in 1977. The National Executive of the LP reasoned that racism was being entrenched; that the state president would be given too much power in the new order; that all power would be concentrated in the NP, and that even if the alliance which the NP sought to create between Coloureds, Indians and Whites would comprise equal partners, ‘Blacks’ would be excluded, thus intensifying ‘racial’ conflict instead of eliminating it. It therefore rejected the proposed constitutional changes.\textsuperscript{130} However, prefiguring the position

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{122} Ian Goldin: *Making race*, p. 179; Lewis: *Between the wire and the wall*, pp. 276-8.
  \item \textsuperscript{123} Goldin: *Making race*, p. 185.
  \item \textsuperscript{124} Goldin: *Making race*, pp. 188-9.
  \item \textsuperscript{125} Saks: “Coloured Persons’ Representative Council”, pp. 159-60.
  \item \textsuperscript{127} Saks: “Coloured Persons’ Representative Council”, p. 174.
  \item \textsuperscript{128} SAIRR: *Survey of race relations in South Africa*, 1980, p. 4.
  \item On 6 May 1980 the Schlebusch commission presented an interim report to the State President. Like the Theron commission, the Schlebusch commission found that the Westminster system of government did not offer an equitable solution to South Africa’s constitutional problems. The Schlenusch commission also recommended that the Senate be replaced by a President’s Council (PC) of White, Coloured, Asian and Chinese members to advise the state president on all matters of national importance and specifically on a new constitution for the country. The government responded positively to these recommendations (SAIRR: *Survey of race relations in South Africa*, 1980, p. 4; *Official Yearbook of the Republic of South African 1989-90*, Pretoria: Bureau for Information [1990], p. 124).
  \item The Senate was abolished as from 1 January 1981 and replaced with the PC consisting of 60 members appointed for a five year period (*Official Yearbook of the Republic of South African 1989-90*, p. 124).
  \item PC members, which included Andrew le Fleur II, were already announced in October 1980. Le Fleur served on the PC until it was disbanded in June in 1984. SAIRR: *Survey of race relations in South Africa*, 1984, p. 135.
  \item \textsuperscript{129} Saks: “Coloured Persons’ Representative Council”, p. 170.
\end{itemize}
of the LP in the 1980s, some leading members of the LP like Sonny Leon indicated that they would be obliged to work within the new system if the constitutional proposals became law.\textsuperscript{131}

**E le Fleur on constitutional reforms**

In line with the LP, Eric le Fleur expressed reservations about proposed constitutional reforms in 1977 and 1978. He indicated in 1977 that he did not know precisely what the new order would entail but expressed opposition to the introduction of cosmetic changes to the old order and the persistence of what he deemed was its destructive policy of ethnic particularism and discrimination.\textsuperscript{132} He insisted in a 1978 CRC session: “Ons strew na ’n gelyke bedeling … . [n]ie ’n bedeling van drie Parlemente nie, ’n gelyke bedeling waar elke burger sy plek kan volstaan”.\textsuperscript{133}

In contrast to E le Fleur and the LP in general, Griqua nationalists were much more open to the constitutional proposals of the NP. Griqua nationalists consequently engaged in discussions with government officials on accommodation in the new constitutional order. E le Fleur took issue with discussions taking place between government representatives and the Griqua nationalist. He objected in a 1978 letter to the commissioner of Coloured Affairs about meetings that were taking place time and again “with only one group of the Griqua community”, reasoning that that they were one-sided. He insisted that the CRC was the appropriate body for Griqua representatives to make their representations to the government.\textsuperscript{134}

**Griqua nationalists on constitutional reforms**

Much at variance with the ideal of Coloured unity promoted by the FP, Griqua nationalists reaffirmed their aspirations to a separate Griqua identity, separate government institutions and land, and their willingness to cooperate with the government, in their representations to government officials and the Schlebusch Commission.\textsuperscript{135} Griqua nationalists involved in discussions with the government included members of the Kranshoek based GNC and the East Griqualand Pioneers Council as well as and representatives not linked to these organizations. Representatives from the Kranshoek based GNC predominated in discussions.\textsuperscript{136}

**Separate development and self-determination**

Griqua nationalist leaders typically framed their appeals to NP government in the apartheid language. In their representations to the minister of Coloured, Rehoboth and Nama Relations and other government officials between 1977 and 1979, Griqua nationalist leaders reaffirmed their aspiration to live as an independent nation within the framework of “separate-parallel development”. They affirmed that the Griqua were a separate group with its own national identity, history, religion, traditions, culture, flag, national anthem and chieftainship. The leaders expressed support to the government’s policy of self-determination for peoples and communities (at local and national levels) and maintained that the policy should be implemented in regard to the Griqua people.\textsuperscript{137}

\textsuperscript{132} CRC, Second Council, Fourth Session, 9-16 September 1977, Vol. 37, pp. 173-5.
\textsuperscript{133} CRC, 8-20 September 1978, Vol. 40, p. 200.
\textsuperscript{134} MSB 469, 3/5/6/3/9, Part 1, EMS le Fleur, President, Griekwa Nasionale Konferensie van Suid Afrika, Knysna to Kommissaris van Kleurlingsake, Kaapstad, 31 October 1978.
\textsuperscript{135} For Griqua representations between 1977 and 1979 see Mentz report par 3.7 and Annexure A, especially “Samespreking tussen die Minister van Kleurling, Rehoboth en Namabetrekkings en ’n afvaardiging uit die geledere van die Griekwa groep … Kaapstad … 17 February 1977”, and “Notule van samesprekings gehou op 23 Januarie 1979 tussen leiers van die Griekwagemeenskappe … en lede van kabinetskomitee rakende die nuwe grondwetlike bedeling te Kaapstad”; PC 2/1983, pp. 85-6, 90-93; MSB 469, 3/5/6/3/9, Part 1, See e.g. Leonnid van Wyk, Griekwa Nasionale Konferensie, to Ministerie van Kleurling Betrekkinge, 9 August 1979.
\textsuperscript{136} E.g. Messrs WJ Hornsby, AAS le Fleur, AP Browsers, S Cloete, Reverend C Gordon, SW Jansen, AP Paulse, TC Paulsen, P Steenkamp, L van Wyk, RD Wicomb, L Saaymans and HM Carolus. Mentz report, Annexure A.
\textsuperscript{137} Mentz report, par. 3.7; Annexure A.
National and cultural erosion
Griqua leaders lamented that the Griqua national identity was being stifled as they were a minority group scattered within a heterogeneous Coloured population. The leaders claimed that that the upbringing of Griqua children in a Griqua tradition, religion, culture and value system was neutralized and broken down by them (Griqua) being swallowed up in Coloured masses outside of the confines of their homes. Griqua nationalists felt that the implementation of the policy of separate development provided Griqua with an opportunity to live as a nation and to retain what they considered valuable. Griqua nationalist leaders also expressed concern that their nationhood was eroded through the classification of the Griqua as a sub-group of the Coloured category. They therefore requested that provision be made for the classification of the Griqua as a separate population group in addition to the ‘Black’, ‘Coloured’ and ‘White’ official population groups.

Political representation
Griqua nationalists pleaded for the establishment of a fully recognized 30 member Griqua National Council similar to the CRC to deal with Griqua affairs. The proposed council would liaise and negotiate directly with the White government. The Kranshoek based GNC proposed in a memorandum to the Schlebusch Commission in 1979 that a Griqua National Council should “provisionally administer Griqua affairs under the (White) parliament, but that the Griqua authority should be vested with defined legislative and executive powers in its own areas” and that “provision should be made for this authority to develop into self-government”.

Land
In appealing for land Griqua nationalist affirmed their belief in the centrality of land for the actualization national independence and self-determination. They reasoned that the continued existence of the Griqua nation was threatened because they no longer had a territory of their own. They maintained that Griqua people had a historical right to their own homeland. They also expressed hope for a homeland in their historical areas where the Griqua people could be reunited and have the bonds of their community restored; where they could have their own identity, use their own language, and where their culture and traditions could find expression. The leaders maintained that the Griqua dispersed throughout South Africa would be prepared to move to such an area. Areas proposed for the establishment of a homeland included Griqualand West, East Griqualand, ‘Fingo lands’ in Humansdorp, and the area of Namaqualand between the mouth of the Oliphants River to the Gariep (or Orange) River.

Official response
The government was reluctant to meet Griqua demands for land, separate population classification and a separate representative body. Government officials nevertheless encouraged Griqua to promote their ethno-national specificity. The minister of Coloured, Rehoboth and Nama Relations informed Griqua nationalist leaders that the retention of their national identity depended on the Griqua people themselves. He therefore encouraged Griqua nationalist representatives to promote the feeling of solidarity and national consciousness amongst the Griqua and to retain contact with youth moving to urban areas.

Suggesting concern about international criticism of the homeland system, the minister discouraged Griqua nationalist leaders to speak about a homeland, indicating that such talk could be negatively portrayed by the

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138 Mentz report, par. 3.7.1, d – f; Annexure A.
139 Mentz report, par. 3.7.1, k & m; Annexure A.
140 Mentz report, par. 3.7.3; Annexure A; PC 2/1983, p. 90.
142 Mentz report, par. 3.7.2, a, b, f–g; Annexure A.
143 Mentz report, par. 3.7.5, b; Annexure A.
media. He further reasoned that it was unrealistic for the Griqua to aspire for a rural homeland since the Griqua people were scattered and since farming was no longer the adventurous, idyllic existence of the 19th century, but that it had developed into a science for which thorough training was needed. He advised that the Griqua should, instead of an extensive continuous homeland, consider the idea of private land ownership for which state aid was available. He reasoned that it was more realistic for the Griqua to consider various separate rural and urban growth-points where the Griqua could be concentrated and where they could realize their national ideals. Griqua nationalist leaders indeed took the advice of the minister to heart, avoiding much in subsequent engagements with government officials to explicitly call for a homeland. Though it became muted, the call for a homeland by Griqua nationalists like A le Fleur, did, however, subsequently occasionally crop up.

The minister expressed his appreciation for Griqua aspirations for independence and self-determination. He indicated, however, that their numbers did not allow for separate governing bodies or parliaments. Inline with the request by Griqua representatives for a commission of inquiry into their concerns, the Cabinet approved in March 1979 that an inter-departmental committee be established to investigate the identity concerns of the Griqua.

Griqua concerns about their identity and classification and government sensitivity to Griqua concerns led to greater engagement between Griqua and government officials which contributed to the development of Griqua leadership and rivalries. Constitutional reforms undertaken in the late 1970s also encourage greater engagement with the government. The engagement of Griqua leaders with the government, and hope of gaining some concessions from the government, in turn influenced the articulation of Griqua identity. Many Griqua re-evaluated their identity, reaffirmed their Griquanness and projected pride in being Griqua. The Afrikaner media in particular played an important role in publicizing Griqua aspirations and the engagements of Griqua leaders with the government and thus also impacted on the re-evaluation and projection of Griquanness.

Summation

Whilst participation in Coloured political parties provided Griqua a forum for articulating longstanding aspirations for land and the promotion of their identity, the association of Griqua leaders with contending Coloured parties reinforced the ambivalent association of the Griqua with a Coloured identity category and varyingly influenced their socio-political pronouncements. Griqua tended, however, to fit uneasily within Coloured political parties concerned with the fragmentation of the Coloured community. Andrew le Fleur’s association with the Federal Party reinforced the pro-government approach of the Kranshoek based GNC whilst Eric le Fleur’s association with the Labour Party inclined him to assume a more critical approach to the government. E le Fleur’s membership of the LP also inclined him to subdue his particularistic Griqua sentiments and reinforced his promotion of a broad Coloured identity, with the Griqua as a sub-category. The prospects of constitutional reforms in the late 1970s inclined Griqua nationalists like A le Fleur to reassert Griqua separatists aspirations that undermined the ideal of Coloured unity promoted by the Federal Party of which he was a member.

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144 Mentz report, Annexure A. Samespreking tussen die Minisiter van Kleurling, Rehoboth en Namabetrekkinge en ’n afvaardiging uit die “geledere van die Griekwa groep … Kaapstad … 17 February 1977”.
145 Mentz report, par. 3.7.5, c–e, Annexure A.
146 As shown in chapters 8-9.
147 Mentz report, par. 3.7.4, 3.7.5, g & h; Annexure A.
148 Mentz report, par. 3.7.4, 3.7.5, g & h; Annexure A.
Chapter 9: Griqua inquiries (1980-1983)

The previous chapter showed the manifestation of Griqua leadership divergences in rival Coloured political parties and the effect of participation in rival political parties on Griqua leaders and their socio-political and identity articulations. This chapter shows the shifts, divergences and commonalities in the positioning of Griqua leaders as manifested in government inquiries into the Griqua during the early 1980s. The chapter also shows the potential of government commissions of inquiry to influence the very articulation of identities, demands and aspirations they are meant to explore, depending especially on the incentives for affirming identities, or conversely, on the disadvantages of affirming specific identities. The articulation of Griqua identities and Griqua representations of their past during the early 1980s were manifested and at the same time influenced by official inquiries into the Griqua established during a process of constitutional change. Prospects of social and economic upliftment and acquisition of land contributed to the reaffirmation of the specificity of the Griqua as a distinct ethnic group with its own culture and historical land. Policy shifts of Griqua organizations, rivalries and divergences as well as commonalities and confluences between Griqua factions and their leaders were also manifested in official inquiries. Whilst rivalries and factionalism were manifested in inquiries, Griqua leaders also affirmed the unity of the Griqua as a volk and the willingness of rivals to cooperate. Whilst there developed much confluence amongst Griqua leaders on the need to promote a Griqua identity, and in regard to political representation in the new (tri-cameral) constitutional order, differences, which stemmed partly from prior ideological divergences between leaders and which were in part reinforced by leadership rivalry, remained in regard to social and spacial segmentation of the Griqua as a distinct group. Support for Griqua identity politics by the government encouraged Griqua leaders to make continual but unsuccessful demands for land as well as for political representation in the National Party constitutional order of the 1980s. Whilst lingering Griqua calls for access to land were not impelling to the government, the confluence of Griqua nationalist identity politics and Afrikaner nationalist identity politics generated government support for their ethnic aspirations manifested in reports of official Griqua inquiries. The unwillingness of the government to meet much of the demands of Griqua leaders contributed to shifts in the formulation of their aspirations as demands were modified to be more acceptable or executable by the government, thus manifesting a historical dialectic between Griqua demands government policy and government receptivity. In regard to the post-apartheid Khoe-San revivalism, the 1983 inquiry into the Griqua is significant for revealing marginal elements attending the articulation of Griqua identities that became prominent in the early post-apartheid period. As such, some of the representations made by members of the Kranshoek based Griqua National Conference prefigured the post-apartheid positioning of the Griqua as Khoekhoe and as a First-Nation, the call for the constitutional accommodation of traditional leadership and the invocation of United Nations declarations on the rights of ethno-cultural groups.

Increasing representations by Griqua nationalists to the government for a separate group identity and separate government institutions after the government announced its intention to introduce constitutional reforms in 1977, led to the establishment of two official inquiries into Griqua affairs in the early 1980s that revealed the positions of Griqua factions and the transformations that occurred in regard to their claims – in consequence of interaction with government officials. Following repeated representations by Griqua nationalist leaders between 1977 and 1979 for the recognition of a separate Griqua identity, and in line with the request by Griqua representatives for a commission of inquiry into their concerns, the Cabinet approved in March 1979 that the Department of Coloured Affairs establish an inter-departmental committee to investigate the identity concerns of the Griqua. The related official enquiries of 1980 and 1983 can be seen as symbolic rewards (promising little substance in relation to the magnitude of Griqua demands) for Griqua loyalty and obedience towards the apartheid government and for Griqua nationalists for having articulated identity aspirations that mirrored those of Afrikaner nationalists.

1 Department of Coloured Affairs: “Report of the Interdepartmental Committee of Inquiry into the Identity of the Griquas” (Mentz report), 27 October 1980, par. 3.7.4, 3.7.5, g & h; Annexure A.
The inquiries of 1980 and 1983 were more than just investigations into the identity concerns of the Griqua. They were also in their operation and through their recommendations, means of reinforcing Griqua compliance with the apartheid regime; the commissions were also means of shaping or reshaping the identities, needs and demand of the Griqua. Commissioners at times attempted to influence the articulation of Griqua demands so that they could appear more ‘reasonable’ or implementable. Inquiries and meetings with government officials made it clear what kind of demands could be made, or what kind of demands would be taken seriously. Though subject to modification, some key Griqua aspirations and demands continued to exceed the limits of official rationality or feasibility. Through generating hope about a possible better future at the hands of ostensibly benign authorities, inquiries could consolidate Griqua loyalty and attachment to the government. However, unmet recommendations could and did generate disillusionment with the new constitutional order.

Thus, Griqua inquiries could reactivate (or open Griqua to) historical identity and land aspirations and grievances that could be deployed for the legitimatization/sanctioning or de-legitimatization/rejection of the new constitutional order.

**Interdepartmental Committee of Inquiry into the Identity of the Griquas**

On 21 February 1980 the Interdepartmental Committee of Inquiry into the Identity of the Griquas was finally appointed under the chairmanship of JF Mentz. The committee had to examine whether it was desirable or necessary for the Griqua to have and to retain their own group identity separate from Coloureds. If desirable or necessary for them to have and identity of their own, a) how it could be protected; whether further steps were needed to give it legal status and b) whether or not any area(s) of land should be identified as (a) Griqua area(s). The committee also had to advice on measures that were necessary to ensure that Griqua interests would receive attention in the proposed new political dispensation. Some Griqua nationalists might have hoped that the inquiry would be a prelude to the establishment of a Griqua homeland. However, explicit Griqua demands for a homeland had become much muted by 1980. No Griqua or Coloured person was appointed to the committee of inquiry, apparently at the request of Griqua representatives who felt that the committee should, as such, be independent.

Committee members were relatively favourably disposed towards the Griqua. They visited places of Griqua concentration around the country like Kranshoek, The Crags, Kokstad, Bloemfontein, Griquatown, Campbell, Philippolis, Oppermansgronde, Koffiefontein, Kimberley, Pniël, Vredendal as well as Cape Town and Johannesburg, interviewing Griqua representatives, local government functionaries and White farmers. Griqua representatives interviewed included Paramount Chief Andrew AS le Fleur II and Volkspresident Eric Le Fleur from the two Griqua National Conference (GNC) factions, Paramount Chief Daniel Kanyiles of the Griekwa Volks Oganisasie, AW Abrams and T Paulsen, who were respectively chairperson and secretary of the East Griqualand Pioneers Council. The religiosity of the Griqua whom they visited, the respect and loyalty shown to the government, their disavowal of violent confrontation and preference for cooperation and consultation, as well as their perceived commonalities with the Afrikaners, impressed the committee and made it more open to the aspirations of the Griqua.

**Griqua representations**

Commonalities as well as divergent socio-political positions, particularly between the Le Fleur factions, were once again manifested through representations made to the Mentz committee. Outside of the context and identity constraints of the Coloured Persons’ Representative Council (CRC) and Coloured political parties,

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3 On Griqua disillusionment with the 1980s tri-cameral constitutional order, see chapter 10.
4 Mentz report, par. 2.
7 Mentz report, par. 4-5.
8 Mentz report, par. 5.9-5.10.
and in light of hope of demands being favourably met by the government, A le Fleur and other Griqua with nationalist inclinations were even more willing to affirm Griqua aspirations for the promotion of their identity; the formal separation of the Griqua category from the Coloured category; the provision of land for Griqua, and the creation of separate Griqua residential areas and institutions. Representations of Griqua leaders were in general much like those for A le Fleur, with the exception E le Fleur.  

Much of the representations by Griqua nationalists were inline with those made in the late 1970s. Representing the outlook of Griqua nationalists – with separatists inclinations – A le Fleur reaffirmed Griqua faithfulness and loyalty towards their volk and their pride in their identity, church, traditions, flag and the sacrifices of their ancestors. He called for the protection of Griqua identity through legislation and expressed opposition to Griqua being subsumed under the Coloured category. He also disassociated Griqua from Coloureds who supported the “Black Power movement”. Manifesting a longstanding desire for a measure of self-government, A le Fleur proposed the appointment of Griqua council to liaise with the government. He also called for the elimination of Griqua domination by other groups; the introduction of measures to ensure that their interests would receive attention in the proposed new political dispensation; the development of an administration exclusively for the Griqua as in the case of Bantu-speaking Africans, as well as an area (or areas) where Griqua could have their own schools, training centres, churches and community centres where they could give expression to their traditions. Reflecting a longstanding Griqua grievance in regard to historical land loss, A le Fleur also proposed an investigation into (a) land treaties affecting traditional territories such as Griqualand West and East Griqualand; (b) land entrusted to missionaries, and (c) treaties between the old Griqua government and other peoples/governments in South Africa.  

**Identity**

All Griqua witnesses affirmed that the Griqua were a people with their own identity. With the exception of E le Fleur, Griqua witnesses indicated that they wished to get out of the ‘Coloured umbrella’ and to be on their own in all respects. Though D Kanyiles and E le Fleur would take a similar position in regard to the relation between Griqua and Coloured identities in their umbrella organization, the Griekwa Nasionale Raad (formed on in 1981), Kanyiles’ Griekwa Volks Organisasie also expressed desire in a memorandum to the Mentz committee of that the Griqua should have an identity separate from Coloureds.  

With the exception of E le Fleur all (51 of) the other Griqua witnesses indicated, according the Mentz report, that they desired the identity of the Griqua to be protected by an amendment to the Population Registration Act of 1950 providing for the Griqua to be indicated as a separate grouping in addition to ‘Black’, ‘Coloured’, and ‘White’ official group categories. Concern was expressed about the negative cultural effects of the Griqua being scattered amongst Coloureds. The desire was expressed for Griqua to live together as communities where they could bring up and train their children in the ways of their ancestors. Like A le Fleur, other nationalists also appealed for an own Griqua council operating separately from bodies like the former CRC that Griqua nationalists regarded as having neglected their interests. 

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9 Mentz report, par. 5.4.  
10 Shown in chapter 8.  
11 Mentz report, par. 5.3; Annexure C, Memorandum of AAS le Fleur, 31 March 1980.  
12 Mentz report, par. 5.5.  
13 Mentz report, par. 5.7.  
15 Mentz report, par. 6.13.  
16 Mentz report, par. 5.9.  
17 Mentz report, par. 5.7.
Land
Although Griqua representatives refrained from appealing explicitly for a Griqua homeland, as was done during the previous decades, appeals were made that land be availed in traditional Griqua areas.\textsuperscript{18} Lamenting the loss of historical Griqua land in Philippolis and East Griqualand and expressing revivalist aspirations in its memorandum to the Mentz committee, the East Griqualand Pioneers Council insisted:

\begin{quote}
Dit is ’n onbetwisbare feit [dat] Griekwland-Oos aan die Griekwas behoort [sic] en ons eis dit as die natuurlike tuiste van die Griekwas wat oor die lengte en breedte van die Republiek verspreid is. Met die herstigting van hul geboorteland sal die Griekwa volk herlewe, hul identiteit herwin en weer begin om die erwe van hul vadere [te] bewerk tot die beswil van almal.\textsuperscript{19}
\end{quote}

Whilst aspirations might not have been expressed explicitly for a Griqua homeland, the idea of a homeland still had support amongst Griqua sections, with individuals from the same factions having divergent positions on the idea of a homeland. Winston Hornsby, a member of the East Griqualand Pioneers Council, indicated just before the Mentz committee had started to interview Griqua representatives that he was primarily concerned with the Griqua community’s historical land claims, but that he would not agitate for the creation of a separate Griqua homeland. TC Paulsen, secretary of the Pioneers Council, indicated however that “[i]f the Government wants to give us a separate homeland, we will take it with both hands. We are a separate people and we want our land back”.\textsuperscript{20} Although Griqua representatives avoided making explicit appeals for a Griqua homeland before the Mentz committee, the idea of a homeland was occasionally promoted in public by some leaders. A le Fleur stated on 16 September 1980 (shortly before the Mentz committee submitted its report to the government) that his people should have their own homeland and identified East Griqualand and Griqualand West as the areas for the creation of a Griqua homeland.\textsuperscript{21} Differences were possible not only between factions or rivals, but also within the leadership of different factions. Views of individual leaders were subject to change or to different emphases under varying circumstances. Whilst individual leaders might make specific expressions at a particular time on behalf of their organizations, other leaders or followers could hold divergent views. Calls for a Griqua homeland were, however, generally not as pronounced in the 1980s as before.

Reflecting a dialectical relation between the expression of Griqua aspirations and government receptivity, the Mentz committee claimed to have succeeded to instil some sense into people like Hornsby and Reverend CG Gordon (of the Dutch Reformed Mission Church in Bloemfontein) who made claims that were “completely exaggerated”. Gordon and Hornsby claimed land covering much of Griqualand West, including Kimberley and the southern Free State, as well as land covering much of East Griqualand.\textsuperscript{22}

\begin{quote}
After members of the Committee had drawn their attention to the implications of these demands the two gentlemen agreed that they were being unrealistic and subscribed to the view that there should be separate rural and urban areas for the Griqua people that need not necessarily form one unbroken unit.\textsuperscript{23}
\end{quote}

\section*{Eric le Fleur and Daniel Kanyiles}
As in the 1970s, Eric le Fleur expressed opposition to a Griqua homeland and separate areas for the Griqua. He also opposed the separation of the Griqua identity category from a Coloured category. According to the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{18} Mentz report, par. 5.8.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Mentz report, Annexure C, Memorandum of Griekwaland-Oos Baanbrekersraad (n.d).
\item \textsuperscript{20} Daily News, 22 February 1980, p. 3.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Burger, 17 September 1980, p. 6.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Mentz report, par. 5.8. Gordon indicated just before the Mentz Committee started their investigation that Griqua claimed, \textit{inter alia}, Kimberley – with all its diamonds – and surrounding places such as Douglas, Campbell, Griquatown, as well as land in the Free State stretching from Philippolis until Wurasoord near Bloemfontein. Gordon also indicated that Griqua claimed the whole East Griqualand. \textit{Volksblad}, 2 February 1980, p.1.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Mentz report, par. 5.8.
\end{itemize}
Mentz report, the E le Fleur group was not only of the opinion that the Griqua should become part of the Coloured community and cooperate with them, but that the Griqua had to a large extent merged with Coloureds through living together and through intermarriage. E Le Fleur believed that it was the desire of AAS le Fleur I that all Coloureds should unite and form a single nation. He insisted that the Griqua were Coloureds.

E le Fleur’s associate, Kanyiles, expressed his opposition to the idea of a homeland but was not opposed to the creation of a rural area for Griqua in the vicinity of Kimberley. He felt that the most pressing need for the Griqua was to develop their own identity. It would appear, from the Mentz report, that whilst E le Fleur and Kanyiles converged much on their stand against the idea of a homeland, that E le Fleur was more strongly opposed to the separation of the Griqua from Coloureds than Kanyiles was.

**Discursive entanglement – E le Fleur?**

The position of E le Fleur in regard on the relation between Griqua and Coloured identity categories was somewhat puzzling, maintaining (approvingly) through the 1970s and in 1980 that the Griqua were part of the Coloured community. In 1981 E le Fleur apparently both affirmed approvingly that the Griqua were part of the Coloured community and that they should have a separate identity and not be regarded as a Coloured subgroup. In 1983 he suggested that Griqua should not be reduced to Coloureds but asserted approvingly that the Griqua and Coloureds were intimately connected.

The 1983 Constitutional Committee of the President’s Council included Eric le Fleur amongst Griqua who affirmed that the Griqua traditionally had a separate identity but who were of the opinion that it should not be maintained, secured or developed. The most conspicuous group which holds these views consists of those who regard themselves as followers of Mr Eric le Fleur. They feel that the Griquas must become part of the Coloured community, not *vice versa*, because they have already, in large measure, merged with the Coloureds through living together, intermarriage, etc. All coloured people should unite in one nation.

These views were held to conflict with (some of) the aims of the Griekwa Nasionale Raad of E le Fleur and Kanyiles as expressed in the organization’s constitution. The aims of the organization were, *inter alia*,

- to unite and to bring to nationhood all Griquas and Coloureds in South Africa …;
- to promote the religious background and traditions of the Griquas; … to acquire farms for Griqua and Coloured farmers…;
- to act as a mouthpiece of the Griquas and to carry on negotiations with the Government on their behalf …;
- to further all Griqua interests.

The constitution of the Griekwa Nasionale Raad also declared that the organization “believes that the Coloureds are really also Griquas because they are descendant from Griquas” and provided membership for Griqua as well as Coloureds who accepted a Griqua identity.

During the 1970s E le Fleur generally favoured the promotion of a Griqua identity as long as the Griqua were not regarded as separate from Coloureds. He generally maintained that the Griqua were part of the Coloured community and opposed attempts to create rigid boundaries between the two identities. He also opposed the promotion of a Griqua identity through the establishment of a Griqua homeland or through constitutional

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24 Mentz report, par.5.4.
25 Mentz report, par. 5.6.
26 Mentz report, par. 5.8.
27 Quoted in PC 2/1983, p. 68.
means. E le Fleur and Kanyiles consistently opposed the idea of a Griqua homeland during the 1970s, in opposition to A le Fleur and other Griqua nationalists.

Although he approved the location of the Griqua as a Coloured subgroup in the 1970s, E le Fleur, supposedly stated on 7 September 1981 – in response to a question by Minister of Interior Affairs, JC Heunis, at a meeting between the Griekwa Nasionale Raad and government representatives – that he thought that the Griqua should no longer be classified as a Coloured subgroup, but that a separate identity should preferably be granted to them. 29

After his election as national chairman of the Coloured based Congress of the People (COPE) in 1982, E le Fleur reiterated the view of the GNR on the homeland idea as well as his old view on the relation between Griqua and Coloureds (i.e. of Griqua being Coloureds):

The Griqua people, who are spread throughout South Africa, reject the concept of a homeland in toto. We have no need of a homeland, as we are members of the greater coloured group and part of the general South African society. We thought that the homeland idea was dead, but now we are made aware that the President’s Council is still discussing it. That is not the way we want South Africa to go. We don’t believe in people living on reservations. 30

In 1983 E le Fleur submitted a memorandum to the Constitutional Committee of the President’s Council on behalf of the Griekwa Nasionale Raad in support of the maintenance of the Griqua identity. He expressed concern of the Griqua being reduced to Coloureds but still affirmed the interconnection of Griqua and Coloureds. 31

Reflecting dynamics other Griqua were exposed to, E le Fleur appears to have been subjected to, and varying influenced by a number of competing discourses, some of which he attempted to reconcile, for example, Griqua nationalist separatist discourses, Coloured nationalist discourses, as well as discourses opposing ethnicism and racism. One or some of the discourses came to the fore at certain times with the other discourses being more prominent at other times. E le Fleur’s membership of the Labour Party countered his Griqua nationalist influences. His departure from the LP allowed his Griqua nationalist influences to become more manifest whilst his participation in COPE opened him more to Coloured nationalist influences. The rivalry between E le Fleur and A le Fleur apparently contributed to E le Fleur’s openness to diverse discourses. A le Fleur’s association with the Federal Party and his nomination to the Coloured Persons’ Representative Council in 1969 encouraged E le Fleur to associate with the Labour Party and to form an alliance with Kanyiles. A le Fleur’s appointment to the President’s Council encouraged E le Fleur to associate (or to strengthen his relationship) with Lofty Adams, a non-Griqua on the President’s Council who also led COPE after its formation in 1980. 32 Whilst Le Fleur’s involvement with COPE encouraged his linking of the Griqua and Coloured categories, it did not impede E le Fleur’s Griqua nationalism as much as his membership of the Labour Party did in the 1970s. The Labour Party had stronger trans-ethnic elements than COPE.

E le Fleur and A le Fleur both exemplified different aspects of their grandfather, AAS le Fleur I. AAS le Fleur I was uneasy with the Coloured category but found it necessary to use it in mobilizing Coloureds. He was also inclined to affirm that the Griqua were Coloureds and in so doing reinforced the disassociation of the Griqua category from the ‘Native’ category which allowed Griqua to avoid restrictions imposed on ‘Natives’. E le Fleur tended to valorise AAS le Fleur I’s association of the Griqua and Coloured categories. A le Fleur II, on the other hand, exemplified, in an exaggerated manner, their grandfather’s uneasiness with the Coloured

30 Eastern Province Herald, 30 December, 1982, p. 4.
32 Chapter 10 provides more information on COPE.
category. All three Le Fleurs manifested ambivalence to the Coloured category, but A le Fleur II was especially inclined to reject the association of the Griqua and Coloured categories.

**Committee findings**

Griqua visited by the Mentz committee reaffirmed and projected their ethno-national specificity and pride of identity to members of the committee in a manner that impressed the committee much. Most committee members appear to have been already predisposed to valorise ethno-nationalist elements among the Griqua, thus reflecting their own ethno-nationalistic aspirations. Reflecting the goodwill and support of most committee members – notably JF Mentz the committee chairperson – to the Griqua and their Afrikaner-like ethno-national aspirations, “the Committee concluded that the Griqua nation existed in the past, was still in existence and like its emblem (the kanniedood\(^{33}\)) would continue to exist”, and that the Griqua satisfied the basic requirements and conditions set for a national identity in terms of the definitions of the concepts of ethnicity and identity:

> The Griquas have a unique history covering their origins, development and sufferings. In the course of their development, outward and inner characteristics developed in their own country (language, culture, religion, world view and constitutional, administrative and social traditions) that sharply distinguish them from the other Coloured population groups. In the history of their development into a nation there are unmistakable differences from but also remarkable similarities to the origins of the Afrikaner national identity. Although the Griquas lost their common country and became dispersed they still have a strong desire to return to their historical dwelling places. Their loyalty, pride in their people and patriotism cannot be questioned. The Committee was also struck by the Griquas’ historical sense of destiny, sense of vocation and attitudes such as their patriotism, sense of independence, desire for self-determination, sense of religion and feeling of responsibility, which form the spiritual basis of ethnicity and give a people and a culture the impetus and vigour to survive.

The fact that wherever the Committee paid a visit it heard earnest appeals for the Griquas to be taken out from under the Coloured umbrella is a further proof of the sense of identity of the Griquas and of their “nasielikheid” (nationhood) and “Griekwageit” (Griquaness), as they call it.\(^{34}\)

The committee acknowledged that it could be argued that the Griqua were subject to disintegration as an ethnic group because: they were divided into four groups under different leaders, had “given up much of their “Griekwageit”’ and had identified with Coloureds. Supporting the aspiration of the Griqua to be seen as a surviving ethnic group, the committee pointed out, however, that “since the middle of the previous century, a large number of them have not fallen by the wayside”.\(^{35}\)

Reflecting diversgences amongst government functionaries and the perception of a number of them that ‘pure’ Griqua were declining through intermarriages with Bantu-speaking Africans and Coloureds and that many who claimed to be Griqua were “detribalised blacks” (or “detribalised” Bantu-speaking Africans), the representative of the Department of Interior Affairs on the Mentz committee expressed serious reservations as to whether it was reasonable to talk about a “Griqua people” in South Africa. The representative asked whether they were not merely dealing with “vestiges of the Griqua people”.\(^{36}\)

\(^{33}\) I.e. an aloe. Translated from Afrikaans “kanniedood” means diehard.

\(^{34}\) Mentz report, par. 6.7-6.8.

\(^{35}\) Mentz report, par. 6.11-12.

\(^{36}\) Mentz report, par. 6.12.1.

The representative from Interior Affairs indicated that on 8 November 1978 the secretary for Interior Affairs pointed out to the secretary for Coloured, Rehoboth and Nama Relations that “intermarrying with Blacks and Coloureds has resulted in a considerable percentage of the so-called Griquas being by no means of pure Griqua descent. It has even been found that many of them are in reality detribalised Blacks”. The official also mentioned “that during discussions in the past with delegations from this group it was concluded that the leaders did not hesitate to recommend Blacks or Coloured for Griqua classification with a view to increasing the number of their followers”. Mentz report, par. 6.12.1.
The representative from Interior Affairs pointed out that his department suspected that the ranks of Griqua communities could be supplemented by non-Griqua, “even to the point that later there would no longer be predominantly Griqua communities with a Griqua character but predominantly Coloured communities with vestiges of a Griqua character”. The rest of the committee, however, regarded the question of whether there was still a Griqua nation or only vestiges of a Griqua nation, as only of “academic” importance. The crucial issue for them was that there were “Brown people” who were “spread throughout the country in Coloured communities and who unequivocally identify[ed] themselves with a Griqua national identity and ask[ed] for an opportunity to restore the bonds of national unity”.

Committee recommendations
The committee’s recommendations reflected the support of most of its members to the ethno-national aspirations of the Griqua.

Nationhood and unity
The committee recommended that “all possible steps be taken by the authorities to stabilise this very conservative part of the Brown community” and that the unity of the various Griqua groups be promoted “so that they can once again flourish as a people and continue their traditional way of life, which also benefit the state”. However, committee members thought that there was not sufficient justification to amend the Population Registration Act as Griqua nationalists requested as Proclamation R.123 of 1967 made adequate provision for the recognition of the Griqua as a separate population group. They reasoned that the identity of the Griqua could be protected by amending laws applicable to Coloureds so as to provide for the definition of the Griqua as a separate group. For example, the tile of the 1963 Coloured Persons’ Education Act could be amended to read “The Coloured Persons, Malay and Griquas Education Act”.

Land
Although reasoning that the Griqua did not have a lawful claim on the basis of which land could be availed to them, the committee proposed that the government should, as a start, purchase properties that would be developed as Griqua growth-points with the right of ownership provisionally held in trust for the Griqua by the government, that is, 300 hectare adjacent to Kranshoek (as an extension of Kranshoek), agricultural land in East Griqualand that would be availed to a community of Griqua and not on an individual basis; a farm near Kimberley, and agricultural land at Campbell that would be also be availed on a communal basis. The committee also recommended that wherever possible, Griqua who were in reasonable numbers, be placed in “separate residential areas within proclaimed coloured group areas, where they would have the opportunity of living together as a community and of realising and propagating their Griqua culture”.

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37 Mentz report, par. 6.12.1.
38 Mentz report, par. 6.12.1, a.
39 Mentz report, par. 6.12. Though not opposing the recommendation, the representative from the Department of Interior indicated that he would not be able to subscribe to the idea of the government reviving Griqua communities. He rejected the use of statutory measures to promote Griqua nationhood but affirmed his belief that there should be recognition and respect for the earnest aspirations of the various Griqua communities for the preservation of their national traditions and culture. Mentz report, par. 6.12.1.
40 Mentz report, par. 6.14.
41 Mentz report, par. 6.15.
42 Mentz report, par. 8.10.
43 Mentz report, par. 8.12, b.
44 Mentz report, par. 8.12.6.
48 Mentz report, par. 8.12, a.
Political representation
The committee reasoned like many Griqua representatives that the Griqua “are a small minority group and if they have to remain under the “Coloured umbrella” in the political field in future they will always be dependent on the favours of a large majority group that … is not always favourably disposed towards them”.\textsuperscript{49} The committee therefore recommended that an advisory/consultative council of 13 members be established for the Griqua.\textsuperscript{50}

Afrikaner nationalist support
The support given by most members of the Mentz committee to Griqua appeals for the recognition of their separate identity and their concerns about cultural loss under the ‘Coloured umbrella’ was encouraged through Griqua leaders articulating their aspirations in a manner that fell in line with the identity politics of the politically dominant Afrikaner nationalists. Afrikaner nationalists found validation for their own identity politics in Griqua ethno-national representations that were themselves partly influenced by Afrikaner nationalist identity politics. Griqua nationalists consequently found a measure of support in the Afrikaner nationalist media. Sentiments influencing the support given to the Griqua in Afrikaner nationalist media suggested sentiments in the Mentz committee. Finding confirmation for Afrikaner ethnic politics in Griqua ethno-national appeals, the \textit{Volksblad} admonished those who despised ethno-nationalism:

Laat dit ‘n les wees vir mense wat etnisiteit, groepsljaliteit en volkstroo in Suid-Afrika minag en wegwens. Hierin lê geestesgesteldhede en emosies opgesluit wat hulle nie laat oorwoeker nie. As dit die geval is by Griekwes wat dieselfde taal praat as Kleurlinge en kultureel na aan hulle staan, hoeveel te meer is die permanente „ontstamming” of verlies van volkstroo onder byvoorbeeld swartes in blanke gebied, met verskillende tale en gebruiken, in die oorgrote meerderheid van gevalle ’n blote illusie wat hom onverwags kan wreek?\textsuperscript{51}

Afrikaner nationalists not only saw historical commonalities between themselves and the Griqua, but also found in the Griqua an example of what could befall Afrikaners if adequate measures were not taken to secure the survival of Afrikaner culture, as suggested in the \textit{Vaderland}:

Die vergete Afrikaners. Só kan die Griekwes – afstammelinge van die Hottentotte en die blanke volksplanters wat in die laaste helfte van die sewentienende eeu Tafelbaai voet aan waal gesit het – vandag beskryf word. Hulle tradisie van Afrikaans praat en Afrikaans wees is net so oud as die eerste blanke Afrikaners s’n. Daar kan selfs merkwaardig op ooreenkomste tussen hulle geskiedenis en die van die blanke Afrikanerdom getrek word. Hulle het byvoorbeeld nes die blanke Afrikaners met ossewaens die pad na die ongetemde binneland oogtrapt om ’n eie plek in die son af te baken. Vandag is die Griekwes egter tweedeklas, stemlose Afrikaners – hoofsaaklik weens die bevolkingsregistrasiewet en die ander apartheidswette … \textsuperscript{52}

Die unieke dialek van Afrikaans wat die Griekwes praat, is aan die uitsterf. … Dieselfde faktore wat vir die verval van die Griekwes se dialek verwantwoordelik is, is hou vir Afrikaans gevaar in. Dit is onder meer die stryd teen Engels, die verarming van die platteland en die gevolglike trek na die stede. Hoe dit ook al sy, Afrikaans bly nog steeds die moedertaal van die Griekwes – die taal waarin hulle bid, droom en hul eerste geluide maak, sê prof. De Klerk. Goeie Afrikaners het hulle … gebly, met tipiese Afrikaner-eienskappe:

- Hulle is Christene wat steeds by die oorspronklike kerk, die Griekwa Nasionale Independente Kerk aanbid.
- Hulle is goeie rassiste, hulle het nie ooghare vir die Khosas nie en het daarom nooit van hulle bediendes gemaak nie.
- Laastens glo hulle aan spoke, die soort wat by ou murasies en plekke soos Rietfontein se leidam wandel.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{49} Mentz report, par. 9.7.
\textsuperscript{50} Mentz report, par. 9.9.
\textsuperscript{51} \textit{Volksblad}, 22 February 1980, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Vaderland}, 24 June 1981, p. 17.
The Mentz committee submitted its report to the minister of Interior Affairs on 27 October 1980. The government did not take any decisions in regard to the recommendations of the Mentz committee. The report was referred to the President’s Council so that the position of Griqua could be looked at in regard to broader constitutional reforms that were envisaged. The Constitutional Committee of the President’s Council was in turn charged to inquire into the needs and demands of the Griqua.

**Inquiry of the Constitutional Committee of the President’s Council**

At the instruction of the state president (issued in June 1982) the President’s Council’s Constitutional Committee started its inquiry into the political, economic and social needs and demands of the Griqua early in 1983. The enquiry was much circumscribed by guidelines for a new constitutional dispensation announced on 30 July 1982 by the prime minister. The guidelines envisaged a tri-cameral parliament for Coloureds, Indians and Whites allowing each community to deal with its own affairs.

The Constitutional Committee thus undertook to consider the representations of Griqua in terms of their location as a component of the Coloured population. Griqua leaders from all factions were fairly supportive of the constitutional guidelines announced in 1982. A mandate was given to A le Fleur II at an annual New Year’s Eve gathering of the Kranshoek based GNC, held at Robberg (where AAS le Fleur I was buried), to approve the guidelines for a new constitutional dispensation, on condition that the Griqua be given statutory protection as a minority group. Statements were issued at the gathering reflecting the concern that Griqua factionalism eroded the credibility of their claims towards nationhood; the statements also manifested a desire for Griqua unity and cooperation that persisted amidst rivalry and leadership legitimacy contestations. For example, a statement was issued that all Griqua were united behind A le Fleur II. A call was also made to Eric le Fleur – claimed to have held a simultaneous meeting at Knysna – for cooperation in the interest of the supposed 100 000 Griqua so that there could be one combined nation living out its own culture, tradition and religion. The Griekwa Nasionale Raad of Eric le Fleur and Daniel Kanyiles also accepted the constitutional guidelines as a basis for negotiation at a meeting in Maitland in September 1982 held in commemoration of the 62nd anniversary of the Griqua National Conference.

The state president’s 1982 instruction that an inquiry be undertaken into the needs of Griqua raised the hopes of Griqua leaders that some of their demands could be met in a new dispensation. In line with the religiosity of Griqua under the GNC, some even perceived God to be at work. In the words of A le Fleur:

Met die opdrag van die Staatspresident het die Griekwas weer ‘n bietjie vlam gevat, want hulle voel hier is môre, hier het God die dag aan die bring en ons voel dat ons deelname aan dit moet hê.
The Constitutional Committee visited areas of Griqua concentration in the northern and western Cape and Natal, interviewing Griqua leaders, town and divisional councils and White farming associations.66

**Griqua representations**

Griqua representations to the Constitutional Committee reflected much the Griqua political landscape and the articulation of Griquanness in the 1980s. Representations pertaining to identity and land manifested longstanding concerns that would continue to be expressed in the post-apartheid period. Some representations also revealed marginal elements attending the articulation of Griqua identities that would become prominent in the early post-apartheid period, for example, the positioning of the Griqua as Khoekhoe and as a First-Nation (or First People), and the call for the constitutional accommodation of traditional Griqua (and Khoe-San) leaders. The uneasiness expressed by Griqua representatives with the Coloured category also prefigured uneasiness with the category in the post-apartheid period. However, the post-apartheid rejection of the Coloured category by Griqua representatives (from different factions) and neo-Khoe-San revivalist organizations would be somewhat less ambiguous and more forthright than before.

As with their previous representations to government officials, Griqua representations to the Constitutional Committee revealed confluences, commonalities, continuities and shifts in the socio-political and identity articulations of Griqua leaders as well as differences and tensions between Griqua factions. The Griqua nationalism of Eric le Fleur that was suppressed or eroded during the 1970s came more to the fore after he left the Labour Party in 1980. E le Fleur did, however, not move to the extreme position of the Kranshoek based GNC leadership by advocating separate Griqua residential areas and educational institutions. Rival factions continued to avoid calling explicitly for a Griqua homeland. Contestation in regard to legitimate leadership of the Griqua continued. Representations by members of the Kranshoek based GNC comprised the majority of Griqua representations, followed by the representations by members of the Griekwa Nasionale Raad. Representations by Griqua from East Griqualand Pioneers Council were less than those of the other two organizations.67

**Identity and classification**

By 1983 the term ‘Khoikhoi’ had started to (re-)enter Griqua genealogical representations. The term was, however, not generally used by Griqua witnesses before the Constitutional Committee. Though its use by Reverend JL Simons (a member of the Kranshoek based GNC who resided at Greenpoint, Kimberley), was still a rarity, it was nevertheless a significant departure in the articulation of Griqua identity. Simons captured the thinking and sentiments of Griqua nationalists but also prefigured Griqua self-designation in the early post-apartheid period through connecting the Griqua to the ‘Khoikhoi’ (as opposed to the ‘Hottentots’). Simons also prefigured the early post-apartheid ‘First Nation’ discourse and attendant land claims:

Lank voor die wit emmegrante [sic] ooit op Suid-Afrika gekom het was die voorgangers van die GRIEKWAS die KHOIKHOI. Daar was nooit HOTTENTOTTE nie. Die volk was KAPTEIN OTTOTO sê Volk, bekend as die KHOIKHOI. Daar moet weg gedoen word met die naam HOTTENTOT, DAAR IS NET GRIEKWAS. ...

Ons is Suid-Afrika se Eerste Volk op hierdie bodem. Ons kan nie op een hoek vas gekeer word nie, ons is verpereid. Ons vorige gebiede en Provinsies moet terug aan ons versorg word, naamlik, GRIEKWALAND-WES, TRANS-ORANJE, GRIEKWALAND-OOS. LANDELIKE GEBIEDE:- KRANSHOEK, PELE, OPPERMANSGRONDE, THABAPACHO en andere. Die grense moet behoorlik bepaal word, wetlik geproklameer word. Namakwaland ook. Die gronde moet Griekwa eiendom wees. ...

68 The terms ‘Khoikhoi’ and ‘San’ had become increasingly used in academic world in the place of “Hottentot” and Bushman. The terms had also entered official discourse by the 1980s, as reflected in the 1983 Report of the Constitutional Committee of the President’s Council on the needs and claims of the Griquas (PC 2/1983), pp. 18-19, 53, 58.
Simons was shifting from the tendency (among twentieth century Griqua) to locate the Griqua as merely descendants of ‘Hottentots’ but not themselves as ‘Hottentots’. In acknowledging, prior to the 1990s, that they had ‘Hottentot’ (or ‘Khoikhoi’) ancestry the Griqua did not generally claim to be actually ‘Hottentots’/‘Khoikhoi’. Simons’ deployment of the term ‘Khoikhoi’ and his statement: “Ons is Suid-Afrika se Eerste Volk op hierdie bodem”, manifested a move towards the explicit re-location of the Griqua as ‘Khoikhoi’. Despite the negative connotations attached to the term ‘Hottentot’, R Wicomb from Vredendal asserted before the Constitutional Committee that he was not of Coloured descent nor a Griqua (or i.e. of Griqua descent) but that he was a ‘Hottentot’. Wicomb suggested that he was a Griqua by virtue of his membership of the Griqua Independent Church.

Griqua leaders continued through the 1980s to complain about the process of identity classification and reclassification. Many who made representations to the Constitutional Committee complained that the reclassification procedure was too complicated and time-consuming and that public servants failed to apply the provisions of the Population Registration Act properly. Representatives felt that the Griqua category was ignored by authorities and that attempts by Griqua to uphold and promote their group identity and group interests were consequently seriously undermined. Griqua nationalists complained that the Griqua were still regarded as Coloureds and classified as such:

[Djie [registrasie] amptenare gee voor daar is nie rede om as ’n Griekwa te wees nie want ’n Griekwa is ’n kleurling en ’n kleurling is ’n Griekwa op grond dat ’n kleurling nog blanke nog swart nog Asiaat is, en dus al die ander gekleurdes in hierdie klas geklassifiseer moet word. Weens hierdie toedrag van sake het die Griekwas

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70 E.g.
MNR BOOYENS [Member of Commission]
MNR WICOMB, is u van afkoms ’n Kleurling?
MNR WICOMB
Nee, ek is ’n Hottentot.
MNR BOOYENS
Nie ’n Griekwa nie?
MNR WICOMB
Nee, ek is Hottentot.
MNR BOOYENS
Is u Griekwa omdat u lid is van die Independistiese Kerk?
MNR WICOMB
Ja meneer.
MNR BOOYENS
As u, kan enige persoon, maak nie saak wat hy is nie, lid word van hierdie kerk, Independistiese kerk. Kan ’n gewone gekleurde, gewone Kleurling wat nie afkomstig van die Griekwa is nie, kan hy ’n lid word van die kerk?
MNR WICOMB
Huidiglik. Ons kan maar omtrent sê ja meneer.
MNR BOOYENS
U is Griekwa, maar u sê u is nie Griekwa nie.
MNR WICOMB
Nee, ek is Hottentot.
71 PC 2/1983, pp. 75-86.
Different Griqua factions continued to lament the threat that Coloureds posed for the survival of the Griqua identity and volk. Nationalists therefore called not only for the de-linking of the Griqua category from the Coloured category but also, as shown further below, for spacial separation of Griqua from Coloureds. To legitimate appeals for the accommodation of the needs of the Griqua as a group distinct from Coloureds, the cultural, religious, social and political differences between the two were emphasized, as indicated by Lennie van Wyk, a member of the Kranshoek based GNC (who resided in Johannesburg):73

[D]aar is verskidenheid tussen die Kleurling en die Griekwa. As ons hierdie verskidenheid kyk, dat die Giekwa glo in etnisiteit, die Griekwa weet wat sy afkoms, die Griekwa besit kultuur, die Griekwa het ’n vaderland gehad, die Griekwa het ’n historiese lotsverbondenis. Die Griekwa besit ’n roepingsbewustheid. Die Griekwa besist ’n emosionele ingesteldheid. Dus, dis selfstandigheid, selfbesikking, voortbestaan. Die emosionele basis van etnisiteit het die Griekwavolk en sy kultuur, tradisies, onvernietigbaar en verskaf die voortsturende krag om eeu van wisseling te oorleef, veral in die tye van proewe en bedreiging, bedruiging soos huidig. Ons identiteit word bedreig, deur oorheersende koppeling van die naam Kleurling.

… Die Griekwa het ’n loyaliteit teenoor sy volk, teenoor sy medemens. … [D]aar is … verskille op taalgebied wat die Kleurling nie besit nie. Daar is die godsdienstige ding, ons eie politiek, ons sosio-ekonomiese en lewensbeskouingsgebied verskil van die Kleurling af, dus voel ons dat ons kan nie onder hierdie saambreu verskyn nie, want ons is gegroepeer in verskillende gebiede, saamgesnoer en dus voel ons ontuis daar, want ons kultuur en tradisies verskil.74

Invoking Griqua loyalty to the government in making his appeals, Van Wyk emphasized that the Coloureds were, unlike the Griqua, inclined to vacillate politically:

[D]ie Bruinman het iets by hom wat hy nie wil wees wat hy eintlik is nie. Hy is gewoond waar ’n mens ’n voetbalspan op ’n veld het, waar hy van die een voet na die ander voet toe kan gaan. So een slag sal hy met die Swartman staan en more sal hy met die Blanke man staan, so hy is soos ’n voetbaal. So jy kan nie iets by hom bring nie. Wat hy wel het, hy is godsdienstig en hy is so ver verwesters dat hy glo dat hy na aan die Blanke man is en hy wil dit as sulks hê en niks anders nie. So om iets by hom te bring gaan swaar wees. … [Die Blanke man is ons bondgenoot] want ons kom al 350 jaar saam, so het ons saam bloedspore getrap.75

Although the leadership of the Kranshoek based GNC was inclined to emphasize their distinctiveness from Coloureds and to increasingly appeal for separation from Coloureds – residentially and in regard to official classification and political representation – there was still a measure of hope that Coloureds could be transformed into Griqua, much in line with the aspiration of the AAS le Fleur I. There was a perception, at least amongst some in the Kranshoek based GNC leadership, that the Griqua ‘way’ pointed to the “salvation” of Coloureds. In the words of Van Wyk:

We are not thinking only like people think, that we are racists, no we are not. If we make a start and the Griqua people can prove that it can be done, we might just be the salvation to show the Coloured people which way to go. Because at the moment there is no way, so if the Griqua community can put its foot down and it can be proved and they can make a start, it will also give the solution to the South African Government. Then the

73 CCPC: “Memoranda: needs and claims of Griquas”, Vol. VI, p. 6.2. Copy of report on meeting between Griqua delegation and Minister of Interior Affairs, 2 .7-1981 compiled by W Steenkamp.
Coloured people will be left alone to decide which way to go. They might just find why don’t we also go to the Griqua people and join up with them, and become productive, economically stable.  

Most Griqua who made representations to the Constitutional Committee maintained that the Griqua valued their history and cultural traditions and wanted to maintain their distinctiveness as a people. For many the most imminent threat was their submersion in a Coloured identity through their classification as Coloured. Even E le Fleur who opposed attempts to distance Griqua from Coloureds as a Labour Party member in the 1970s had shifted his position in the early 1980s to periodically affirm (in public) the need for Griqua to have an identity of their own and not to be reduced to Coloureds.

In delivering their appeals for treatment as a specific ethnic group Griqua leaders were inclined to stress the positive aspects of Griqua specificity in relation to Coloureds and to emphasize the negative aspects of the Coloured community, Coloureds being represented as lacking positive aspects of Griqua communities. Coloureds were projected as fragmented, subject to divergent ideologies and to lack the order, national identity and religious background that Griqua nationalists valued highly. E le Fleur reasoned that the Griqua had a socio-political regulating and stabilizing effect on the Coloured community, and that that effect would be lost if the Griqua were assimilated and reduced to Coloureds. It would thus, in his view, be foolish to assimilate the Griqua into a Coloured identity and to deprive them from their ethnic identity. Despite leadership rivalries and factionalism, E le Fleur was, like other Griqua leaders, inclined to stress the commonalities tying the Griqua:

Dit sal dwaas wees om Griekwas as ’n volk met sy historiese verlede en tradidies te laat uitsterf deur vereenselwiging met anderkleuriges. Net so min as wat Afrikanerdom sy identiteit wil prysgee en bloot gekenmerk staan as Blankes, net so min wil die Griekwas ’n Kleurling mantel om sy skouers hang. … Jare van nasionale trots en opoffering kan nie oorrug oorboord gegooi word nie. Dit is juis hierdie historiese verlede van Nasionale vlag, oorwerflike leiersfiguur, Kerkeenheid wat saak maak. ’n Griekwa voel eie aan alle ander Griekwas, ryk of arm, geleerd of ongeletterd. Ons aanbid in een kerk en beoefen een kultuur.

Despite his affirmation of the need for the promotion of a Griqua identity, E le Fleur still reasoned that the Griqua and Coloureds were interconnected; he also affirmed that he was himself a Coloured. He accepted that the Griqua were integrated with Coloureds; indicated that he was not opposed to such integration, but emphasized the need for the maintenance of a Griqua identity. In affirming the interconnection between Griqua and Coloureds Le Fleur even (re-)asserted:

[O]ns glo in werkelikheid dat ’n Griekwa is ’n Kleurling en ’n Kleurling is ’n Griekwa. Die woordeboek sê ook so.

E le Fleur reasoned, like his grandfather AAS le Fleur I, that Griqua and Coloureds were alike in the sense that they were of mixed ‘racial’ descent. E le Fleur also reasoned that there were Coloureds who became

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81 E.g: “Nou kry ons baie Kleurlinge wat aansluit by die organisasie [GNR] en hulle identifiseer [as Griekwa]. Behalwe ondertrouery, alliansie van vennootskap of so, is die Griekwas en Kleurlinge so te sê geïntegreerd [p. 11]. [B]aie wat vandag as Kleurlinge genoem word, is in werkelikheid Griekwas wat … [uit die Griekwa-trek] uit stam. [D]ie Griekwas was eintlik die eerste gemengde ras wat ontstaan het in Suid Afrika [p. 43]. [M]et die trek en met die beweging het baie Kleurlinge ook maar aangesluit, selfs van die Korannastamme, Hottentotstamme en so en almal het een groep geword. As gevolg van dit is die Griekwas eintlik bekend as ’n nasie van gemengde bloed, of ’n gemengde ras, wat ook weer aan die anderkant beteken Kleurling. Die woord Kleurling, die woord “ling” is mos nou kind, tweeling of drieling. Nou
Griqua and that there were people classified as Coloured who were Griqua. Given his perception that Griqua and Coloureds were deeply integrated, he opposed attempts at Griqua-Coloured social separation. He felt, however, that the Griqua had a distinct cultural identity to (non-Griqua) Coloureds, and that it should not be eradicated but retained and promoted. There was for him no distinction between Griqua and Coloureds, “[b]ehalwe nou op die godsdienstige, kulturele en tradisionele gebied”.

Although E le Fleur and the GNR opposed the (social) division of Griqua and Coloureds, regarding the term ‘Coloured’ as also applicable to the Griqua, they were not totally at ease with the Coloured category. The GNR leadership reasoned that the term had negative connotations. E le Fleur indicated that

[d]ie standpunt van die Raad [is] dat die woord [Kleurling] eintlik nie aanvaarbaar is nie, nie vir ons nie. ... [D]ie woord Kleurling sê eintlik, laat ek dit nou maar so stel, dis niemand. Maar die woord Griekwa sê dis iemand.

The leadership of the East Griqualand Pioneers Council shared, at least in 1983, the position of E le Fleur in regard to the relation between Griqua and Coloureds. The leadership disapproved the idea of Griqua moving out of the ‘Coloured umbrella’, marking their divergence from the position that they articulated to the Mentz Committee in 1980. Regarding Coloureds as relatives of Griqua, they favoured working with them in one council and in one parliament.

As with Griqua representations in previous years, and much like Griqua and neo-Khoe-San calls in the early post-apartheid period, representations in regard to the protection and promotion of Griqua identity were liked to aspirations for political representation, economic empowerment and land claims. Griqua leaders reasoned that Griqua identity would be much promoted and more easily accepted if the government responded positively to their aspirations, conferring recognition to Griqua identity and meeting their material needs. In the words of E le Fleur:

[O]or die jare heen het baie van die Griekwamense … byna hulle identiteit verloor omdat daar ’n agterstand by hulle bygekom het. Baie keer het hulle gevoel hulle wil hulle ook maar skaar nou onder die breër benaming van Kleurling, want dit het voorgerek asof vir die Griekwes nie eintlik iets gedoen word nie en hulle nou meer onder die Kleurlingsambrel as sulks gaan. Baie het hulle persoonskaarte en so maar ingevul as Kleurling. Daar is honderde duisende Griekwes, maar volgens die sensussyfers stern dit nie ooreen nie, want wanneer die persoon nou daardie vorm invul, dan sê hy die term Kleurling in en nie spesifiek Griekwa nie. … Dit is hoekom ons nou bly sal wees as aan die behoeftes van die Griekwamense nou aandag aan gegee kan word

die woord sê eintlik kind van kleur, Kleurling. Waar die woord Griekwa was destyds geneem uit die ou Griekse beskawing as van die Blanke en die Kwa-stamme [sic]. Ons het hier gehad die Hetsikwa, die Namakwa, die Outenikwa, en so meer. Al die stamme was bekend as Kwa’s. Toe is die woord geneem uit die ou Griekse beskawing as Blank en die Kwa-stamme wat hier bestaan het as nie-Blank en Griekwa meen dus vermenging tussen Blank en die Kwa-stamme, of Blank en Kleurling [sic]. Ek defineer nou maar net min of meer wat die woord behels. … [D]ie sendelinge destyds … het gesê kyk, julle is Basters en volgens hulle uit die Bybel, die basters kan nie in die Koninkryk kom nie … daar is nie plek vir basters nie. Gevolglik het hulle gevoel daar moet ’n ander benaming wees. En omdat dit ’n bastergeslag is of ’n Kleurlingras toe was, het hulle gevoel om die name dan nou aanmeekaar – toe het hulle soos ek sê die Griekse beskawing gevast as die oudste Blanke en dan die Kwa-stamme. Maar dit was om die woord “baster” uit die pad uit te kry [ pp. 10-11]”. Oral evidence, EMS le Fleur and PDJ Kanyiles, CCPC: “Needs and claims of Griquas”, Vol. I.

van die Regeringsweë, sodat baie mense dan nou voel dit is – moet ek dit byna so stel, dit is nie ’n skande om ’n Griekwa te wees nie, dit is ’n eer, ky kan trots daarop wees. En ... [as daar] dan ook iets vir die Griekwa gedaan word, dan sal die mense meer na vore kom, wat nou maar bloot net gaan sit het weens dat hy gevoel het hier is maar altyd ’n agterstand wat die Griekwa betref.  

Vredendal based Cecil le Fleur, a member of the Kranshoek based GNC and a cousin of Eric and Andrew le Fleur, reasoned in a similar vein:

[E]k voel dat as daar ’n bietjie meer erkennig … aan die Griekwa verleen word [en as]… daar iets daadwerkliks aan Griekwas gegee word, dat die mense kan sien ... daar word in hulle belang gestel, daar word ontwikkeling onder hulle aangemoedig, ens. Dan … sal die mense weer, glo … weer terugkom, die afvalliges.  

**Political representation**

Griqua demands for political representation in the new constitutional dispensation were, like their identity demands, much influenced by their official treatment as part of the Coloured community. Griqua leaders hoped that provision would be made for the nomination of representatives in the envisaged tri-cameral parliament as they feared they would not be able to get adequate representation by contesting seats in elections for the Coloured parliamentary house.  

There was also some aspiration for the constitutional recognition of Griqua chieftainship, thus prefiguring demands by Griqua in the early post-apartheid period for the constitutional recognition of traditional Khoi-San leadership.  

JL Simons projected Andrew AS le Fleur II as the king of all the Griqua and requested that he be legally recognized as such by parliament:

Die Griekwas is ’n Volk nie ’n Groep nie. Ons KONING IS ANDREW AS LE FLEUR II wat vir die laaste 30 jaar lui [sic]. ... [D]ie GRIEKWA VOLK [“versoek”] dat die Regering KONING AAS LE FLEUR WETLIK ERKEN DEUR PARLEMENT.  

However, in the pre-1994 period, calls for the recognition of Griqua paramountship were rather muted, with representations generally being made either for the creation of officially sanctioned Griqua self-governing or advisory bodies or for provisions of Griqua representation on Coloured representative government bodies.

Griqua representatives regarded representation on government bodies as significant for the voicing of their needs and aspirations, especially in light of concerns that Coloureds on government bodies did not adequately deal with Griqua concerns. The leadership of the Kranshoek based GNC, the Grieka Nasionale Raad of Eric le Fleur and Daniel Kanyiles, as well as the leadership of the East Griqualand Pioneers Council, all appealed for the representation of the Griqua on government bodies. By 1983 Griqua leaders from different factions had shifted from appealing for a separate official Griqua representative body (managing Griqua affairs) but instead requested direct representation in the Coloured parliamentary house. Griqua leaders also appealed for representation on provincial councils and local authorities.  

Concerned about domination by Coloureds in the new constitutional order, representatives of the Kranshoek based GNC called for provisions...
that would allow Griqua to make decisions in the envisaged Coloured parliament on “Griqua own affairs”, manifesting thus the longstanding Griqua desire for a measure of self-governance.

Prefiguring post-1994 activities of the two rival GNC’s and Khoe-San organizations and their invocation of United Nations declarations on the rights of ‘indigenous peoples’ or First Nations, SW Jansen, vice president of the Griqua Independent Church linked to the Kranshoek based GNC, cited (in his memorandum to the Constitutional Committee) international declarations affirming the right of ethno-cultural groups for self-determination in appealing for the recognition and respect of the Griqua as a volk.

**Land and own areas**

Griqua nationalists ultimately aspired to have a Griqua governed region, particularly on historical Griqua land, in which Griqua identity and culture could be promoted and where farming would be practiced. The reluctance of the government to avail a Griqua governed region inclined Griqua nationalists to modify their land demands. Whilst Griqua nationalists appealed for a Griqua homeland during the 1970s, they refrained from appealing for a homeland before the 1980 Mentz committee and expressly criticized the idea in 1983 during the Constitutional Committee’s inquiry into the needs and demands of the Griqua. Griqua nationalists thus attempted to enhance the potential for the accommodation of their aspirations and demands which were modified to become more in line with government policy and practice (in regard to the Griqua).

Appealing for a homeland was just one of the ways in which Griqua articulated their aspiration for land and a measure of self-governance. Unable to get a homeland or Griqua governed region, Griqua nationalists making representations to the Constitutional Committee were inclined to merely request farming land, the establishment of Griqua rural settlements, the extension of existing Griqua areas, and the creation of Griqua residential areas — where Griqua ethno-national aspirations could be actualized. A small number of nationalists did appeal for the return of lost historical land, especially those from the Northern Cape, without explicitly calling for a Griqua homeland. The areas that these representatives had in mind were the Oppermansgronde, Modderrivier, Douglas, Griekwastad, Campbell, Fonteinjie, Schmidtsrift, Pniel, Gongong and Danielskuil. In appealing for separate Griqua areas, Griqua nationalists argued that Griqua identity and culture was eroded through Griqua residing among other communities and through marriages with people

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95 See e.g. Memorandum by Le Fleur and Cloete, in CCPC: “Memoranda: Needs and claims of the Griquas”, Vol. VI, p. 11.2. By taking charge of “own affairs” Cecil le Fleur and S Cloete meant: die beheer, bestuur en administrasie van ons eie grondgebiede. Ons beoog om daar ten volle onutonne reg te hé en slegs aan die sentrale overheid verslag te doen oor ons bedrywighede aldaar. Hier dink ons byvoorbeeld aan die beheer van ons eie skole in die gebiede, munisipale verpligtinge en ons eie raad vir ons streek sake soos paie, gesonheiddienste ens.


99 On calls for separate residential areas see e.g. Memorandum by Le Fleur and Cloete in CCPC: “Memoranda: needs and claims of Griquas”, Vol. VI, p. 11.2.

100 On explicit appeals for the restoration of lost historical land, see e.g. Memorandum of P Browers (p. 1) and P Steenkamp (p. 11), in CCPC: “Memoranda: Needs and claims of Griquas”, Vol. 1; Oral evidence, Kimberley Griqua delegation, CCPC: “Needs and claims of Griquas”, Vol. XV, pp. 5, 9, 11, 17-18.

who were not Griqua. Separate areas were also deemed necessary to counter Griqua dispersal and fragmentation.\textsuperscript{102} Nationalists also called for separate social and educational institutions.\textsuperscript{103}

In contrast to the (more extreme) nationalists, E le Fleur and D Kanyiles maintained that the Griqua had their own historical areas like Griqualand West and East Griqualand in the past but that they did not want them back.\textsuperscript{104} They not only opposed the idea of a homeland, but also the idea of own residential areas for Griqua.\textsuperscript{105} They opposed the idea of own residential areas as it could, in their view, insinuate a homeland:

Ons wil nie eie woongebiede hê nie maar die bestaande gebiede moet uitgebrei en ontwikkel word. Omdat eie woongebiede die idee van 'n tuisland kan insinueer ... word dit van die hand gewys en word gevra vir die uitbreiding van bestaande woongebiede.\textsuperscript{106}

E le Fleur also opposed the idea of separate social and educational institutions for the Griqua.\textsuperscript{107} Whilst E le Fleur opposed the idea of a homeland and separate Griqua residential areas, he supported the extension and development of existing Griqua areas like Kranshoek and the granting of land to the Griqua for agricultural production in areas where there were big concentrations of Griqua, like the Knysna-Tsitiskamma-Humansdorp region, the Griqualand West region and the Van Rhynsdorp-Klawer-Vredendal region.\textsuperscript{108}

As in the 1970s, E le Fleur was more inclined to assume a more critical position to aspects of apartheid than the Kranshoek based GNC leadership were. E le Fleur and the GNR were also more critical of the Group Areas Act. Much in line with the sentiments that he expressed in the 1970s as a Labour Party member, E le Fleur expressed disapproval of all discriminatory legislative measures before the Constitutional Committee.\textsuperscript{109} He pointed to the harm caused by Group Areas Act and reasoned that individuals should not be forced by legislation to live in particular areas:

[D]ie Groepsgebiedewet het reeds baie ontwrigting en hartseer veroorsaak. ... Mense van dieselfde kultuur hou seker daarvan om saam te woon. In daardie opsig voel ek miskien moet dit maar vry gelaat word vir die mense om deur hulle eie oortuings te woon waar hulle wil woon, of saam te trek waar hulle wil saamtrek, maar dat dit nie van owerhuidsweë afgedwing moet word nie, of op die statutêre wetboek geplaas word nie.\textsuperscript{110}

Although critical of discriminatory legislation and separate group areas, E le Fleur felt that an exception should be made in regard to land that was to be held by Griqua on a communal basis:

In gevalle waar gemeenskaplike besit toegpas word, is dit wenslik dat grond dan in so 'n geval waar dit gemeenskaplik is, kommunale besit, dan voel ons moet dit eksklusief vir die Griekwas wees, dat daar nou nie


\textsuperscript{103} On calls for separate schools see Oral evidence, AAS le Fleur, L van Wyk and HM Carolus, CCPC: “Needs and claims of Griquas”, Vol. VIII, pp. 57-8.

\textsuperscript{104} Griekwa Nasionale Raad memorandum in CCPC: “Memoranda: Needs and claims of Griquas”, Vol. 1, p. 3.1.


\textsuperscript{106} Griekwa Nasionale Raad memorandum in CCPC: “Memoranda: Needs and claims of Griquas”, Vol.1, p. 3.2.

\textsuperscript{107} E le Fleur felt that it was practically impossible to school Griqua children separately from Coloured children:

Ons ... [skakel] met die breër Kleurlinggemeenskap se behoeftes wat onderwysgeriewe betref, want die Griekwa-kinders gaan mos nou maar in die skole wat vir Kleurlinge daar is volgens die Wet op Kleurlingonderwys, daarom skakel ons maar daar in, wat opleiding en onderwysfasilitate betref. Ons glo aan 'n universiële onderwysstelsel.


Griqua fragmentation and unity

Griqua representations to the Constitutional Committee revealed commonalities, differences and rivalry between leaders from different factions as well as aspirations and attempts at forging intra-Griqua unity. In promoting themselves and their organizations, leaders from different factions attempted to discredit their rivals whilst they articulated, at the same time, aspirations for Griqua unity. Rivalries reflected historical tension between factions. Projections of intra-Griqua commonality, on the other hand, reflected a historical desire for Griqua unity made especially urgent by a perception that Griqua factionalism and lack of unity undermined their ethno-national integrity. Rivalry, factionalism and divergent representations by rival leaders also made it problematic for the government to find the ‘authentic’ leaders in dealing with Griqua demands. Rivalry between the two GNC’s in particular caused much confusion for government officials. In the words of the chairperson of the Constitutional Committee of the President’s Council, Dr SW van der Merwe:

[D]ie Regering kan nie vasstel presies watter van die twee die egte is nie.\(^{112}\)

Ons vra ... vrae omdat ons ’n probleem [het]… om die Griekwaleiers te identifiseer. Sodat ’n mens uiteindelik weet wie is die mondstukke van die mense. O ja, ons het ’n hele aantal gevind, maar dit is die probleem, ons het soms meer leiers as volgelinge.\(^{113}\)

Despite rivalry and divergences, Griqua leaders were inclined to affirm their aspiration for Griqua unity; to emphasize the commonality of Griqua, and, like government officials, to project factionalism and the existence of numerous leaders as a problem.\(^{114}\) Articulating the aspiration for unity and cooperation Cecil le Fleur maintained that

[о]ns sal poog huidiglik om enigheid met hierdie ander groepe te kry om te verenig met die mense beter later van skakeling in kontak te kry omdat ons voel ons is almal een Griekwa nasie. Ons volg dieselfde padjie ook in die verlede \(sic\). … In die toekoms mag dit heelwat verander \([I]\)ndien ons nooier kontak met mekaar kry voel ons dan kan ons nie oomge dat byvoorbeeld ’n verteenwoordiger uit Kokstad aangestel word vir verteenwoordiging op eerste vlak regering nie.\(^{115}\)

In their attempt to forge Griqua unity and cooperation the Kromhoek based GNC advanced the idea of a Griqua advisory council on which all factions would be represented.\(^{116}\) E le Fleur also affirmed his willingness to cooperate with leaders from different factions. He, however, indicated that there was greater potential for cooperation between the Griekwa Nasionale Raad and the leadership of the East Griqualand Pioneers Council than between the Griekwa Nasionale Raad and the Kromhoek based GNC.\(^{117}\) Although there was a degree of cooperation between the Le Fleurs and the Pioneers Council,\(^{118}\) there was also historical tension between the two that inclined the Pioneers Council to reject the legitimacy of the chieftainship of AAS le Fleur I and his successors. As Van Wyk explained:

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\(^{118}\) See e.g. Oral evidence, AAS le Fleur, L van Wyk and HM Carolus, CCPC: “Needs and claims of Griquas”, Vol. VIII, p. 50.
The leadership of the Pioneers Council maintained that their organization was the true successor to the council of Adam Kok III who was, for them, the last Griqua chief. There was a perception amongst adherents of the Pioneers Council that the body emerged out of the council (of 12) of Captain Adam Kok III, and that the Pioneers Council thus had greater legitimacy as a Griqua representative entity than the Le Fleurs. They regarded the Griqua under the Le Fleur family as splinter group.

The relation between the leadership of Kranhoek based GNC and Daniel Kanyiles of the Griekwa Volks Organisasie (and the GNR) was also very strained. Andrew AS le Fleur II was, in the view of Griqua from the Kranhoek based GNC, the only legitimate Griqua paramount chief. They not only questioned the legitimacy of Kanyiles as a Griqua leader but also his authenticity as a Griqua. Many in the Kranhoek based GNC believed that he was really a Tswana. Like his associates in the Kranshoek GNC, HM Carolus suspected that Kanyiles tricked Nicolaas Waterboer II to sign over his authority to him as his successor:

Die ou man het ’n smaak gehad om gin te drink. Dus het hulle [Kanyiles and B Jafta] ’n halwe bottle gin gekoop vir hom en hy was siek in die bed [sic]. Hy het in ’n sinkhuisie gebly. Dus het hulle hom gaan kuier die een aand en vir hom eers onder die invloed gekry en dis hoe daardie dokument wat daar vandag is, nou daar is.

Griqua from the two GNC’s both invoked AAS le Fleur I, believed by them to be the legitimate heir of Adam Kok III, in order to legitimate his heirs and their position within the broader Griqua political landscape. Citing the GNC’s constitution, Carolus claimed that

[i]n 1904 het die hoofskap van opperhoof kaptein Adam Kok ingeval na opperhoof AAS le Fleur I gekom.

JL Simons could thus project AAS le Fleur II as the king of all the Griqua and request that he be recognized as such by parliament. GNC representatives also legitimated the positioning of AAS le Fleur II as the

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paramount chief of all Griqua on the basis of an alleged treaty drawn up by Nicolaas Waterboer II which placed Griqua from Griqualand West under the authority of A le Fleur II.\textsuperscript{124}

To discredit the legitimacy of E le Fleur, the prophecies attributed to AAS le Fleur I, were also invoked. Carolus maintained that in 1935 AAS le Fleur I brought AAS le Fleur II before the volk at a conference in Maitland and stated that he would succeed him and become paramount chief of the volk and that the Griqua at the conference responded approvingly.

Thus,

\[n\]ou kan ek ek nie sien wie die reg het nou om hierdie, AAS le Fleur se hoofskap te betwis nie, want ons as die Griekwes het hom erken, sy nominering deur sy oupa en hy is ook in 1952 geïnstalleer as sulks, as die opperhoof van die Griekwavolk [sic].\textsuperscript{125}

Most of the Griqua who gave evidence before the Constitutional Committee expressed hope that Griqua disunity would one day come to an end. Because they regarded factionalism as a domestic affair, none of the Griqua who gave evidence before the Constitutional Committee requested that divisions be inquired into by the Committee in order to put an end to them.\textsuperscript{126}

The leadership contestations that unfolded before the Constitutional Committee were also relayed to the public by the media. Attacks on the legitimacy of certain Griqua leaders thus had potentially broader public repercussions. Media reports also allowed contending factions not present at Committee sessions to get an idea about the views of their rivals. Kanyiles, for example, found out about the accusations levelled against the legitimacy of his paramountship by HM Carolus and Lennie van Wyk of the Kranshoek based GNC through an article in the Cape Times (of 18 March 1983).

Kanyiles subsequently attempted to prove his legitimacy to the Constitutional Committee. He submitted a memorandum stating that Captain Nicolaas Waterboer II signed a document on 3 January 1960 before two witnesses indicating that he (Kanyiles) was appointed permanent paramount chief of Griqualand West and Albanie at a volkskonferensie. He also mentioned that Waterboer took the authorisation to Griquatown to obtain an official stamp from the magistrate. He also provided a copy of the “bemagting brief” (authorization letter) to the Constitutional Committee.\textsuperscript{127} Kanyiles dismissed the accusations of Carolus and Van Wyk as lies:

\begin{quote}
Carolus and Lennie van Wyk het glad nie geslaag om my naam te beswadder nie, daar hulle getuienes ’n klomp leuens is [sic], hulle het in daardie kamer gegaan om beledigings teen my te maak [maar] hulle het geen getuienes gehad nie, onthou hulle was dieselfde persone wie aansoek gedoen het vir ’n Tuisland vir Griekwes. Die Mnre. het albei die kat beet ... .\textsuperscript{128}
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
Committee recommendations
\end{flushright}

The Constitutional Committee tabled its report on the needs and demands of Griqua in the President’s Council on 15 November 1983. Though dismissive of Griqua land claims, the members of the Constitutional Committee were, like members of the preceding Mentz inquiry, much supportive of the promotion of Griqua

\begin{footnotes}
\item[126] PC 2/1983, p. 72.
\item[127] CCPC: “Memoranda: Needs and claims of Griquas”, Vol. VI, pp. 3.1-3.5.
\item[128] CCPC: “Memoranda: Needs and claims of Griquas”, Vol. VI, p. 3.1.
\end{footnotes}
identity and cultural specificity, manifesting thus the desire by Afrikaner nationalists to deploy Griqua ethnicity to support Afrikaner nationalist identity politics.

**Identity and culture**

Favouring the development of a Griqua community with a strong culture and identity, albeit as a Coloured sub-group, the Constitutional Committee recommended “the tactful handling and the speeding up of the registration of births, and of applications for reclassification”. The Constitutional Committee also maintained that strenuous efforts should be made to preserve and promote the material and cultural heritage of the Griqua, not only for the Griqua but for general public interest. It recommended that state heritage institutions preserve the cultural heritage of the Griqua and that “possible outside assistance be brought to the attention of the most important Griqua organizations” “to enable the Griquas to mount their own efforts to preserve their culture and to develop it further”.

**Political representation**

Guided by the government’s guidelines for the new constitutional order, and accepting “the tri-cameral parliament in which the Griqua are included in the Coloured segment as a realistic basis for determining Griqua representation in the constitutional sphere”, the committee did “not foresee a constitutional dispensation for” the Griqua “separate from the dispensation for the Coloured group”. Rather than recommending that special measures be taken to secure Griqua representation in the Coloured parliamentary house as Griqua leaders desired, the Constitutional Committee recommended that members of parliament be directly elected by the voters in constituencies and that “with a view to securing direct election in parliamentary elections for the House of Representatives, Griquas should themselves participate in elections at the party political level.” The Constitutional Committee also dismissed the request for the statutory recognition of Griqua chieftainship as it did “not accord with the proposed democratic dispensation for Whites, Coloureds and Indians”.

**Land**

The position assumed by the Constitutional Committee in regard to Griqua land claims reflected a confluence of interests between the committee and Whites in general, particularly farmers. Deputations representing White farming associations in areas like Griqualand West, East Griqualand, Plettenberg Bay and Vredendal objected to the state purchasing agricultural land on behalf of the Griqua but tended to express support for the acquisition land by Griqua on an individual basis in terms of the free market system, on the same conditions that applied to Whites. They tended to oppose the ‘block’ purchase of agricultural land by the state for the Griqua.

Suggesting vested interest encouraging the suppression of Khoe-San identities, some Whites preferred that the Griqua not be treated as a group separate from Coloureds in order to suppress claims that could be unleashed

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129 See e.g. AM van Schoor, Memorandum, CCPC: “Needs and claims of Griquas” [1983], p. 10; PC 2/1983, pp. 72, 200-3.
132 PC 2/1983, p. 73.
137 PC 2/1983, p.149; Memoranda: East Griqualand Regional Development Association (pp. 5.1-5.3), Cedar and Mvenyane Farmer’s Association (pp. 5.4-5.6) in CCPC: “Memoranda: Needs and claims of Griquas”, Vol. VII.
by the recognition of the Griqua as a distinct ethnic group, manifesting thus a concern very much relevant to post-apartheid South Africa. The Divisional Council of Hay in Griekwastad reasoned that the recognition of the Griqua could inspire other descendants of the Khoe-San to also agitate for recognition and attendant rights:

Dit blyk vir vir hierdie Raad dat die erkenning van identiteit vir die Griekwa geweldige hoofbrekens tot gevolg kan hé ... en die moontlikheid bestaan dat indien die Griekwa erkenning sou verkry 'n presedent geskep sou word en kleiner drukgroep, soos byvoorbeeld Strandlopers en Hottentotte nasate sowel as Boesmans, wat ook op dieselfde regte aanspraak maak kan vele probleme veroorsaak.140

WM Sutton, a member of the Constitutional Committee, maintained that “[t]he circumstances of the Griqua before their Trek from Philippiolis, their subsequent impoverishment on the Trek, and the further decline of Griqua power in East Griqualand are matters of history”, because

[I]n South Africa, to claim that ground was unjustly seized by Whites, or bought under fraudulent circumstances, is to open a Pandora’s Box that will not be easily closed again. The Zulu will equally well claim that they were defrauded of a great portion of their territory by the establishment of the Republic of Vryheid after the Battle of Ntshameni Mountain against Zibedu had been won with the help of Lukas Meyer and the Transvaal Boers. The ramifications are endless and become increasingly dangerous. The truth is ... [that] valid titles in law are held for all properties in East Griqualand, whether in White hands or in Griqua hands and any attempts to upset such titles would result in chaos, ...What is being asked for is in effect an ex gratia grant to a particular section of the population on specific historical grounds. These grounds appear extremely shaky and could with some justice be claimed by the entire indigenous population of South Africa. The principle of restitution on these grounds itself appears to be extremely shaky and would be politically disastrous if accepted.

Sutton felt that it was “desirable to settle this ghost once and for all by a firm denial that any claim exist” as a firm denial “would leave the Griqua community with the chance to organize their lives free from the chimera of restitution, and on a much sounder basis”.141 The Constitutional Committee accepted his advice and rejected the legal validity of Griqua claims for historical land.142

The Constitutional Committee, however, proposed the easing of regulations that made it difficult for Griqua to access agricultural land. It advised that the operation of the permit system in East Griqualand, Griqualand West and the Districts of Knysna and Vredendal, “as far as it concerns the purchase and leasing of agricultural land by Coloureds for bona fide agricultural purposes, should receive serious attention”.143 The committee also recommended “that those aspects of the Group Areas Act (Act 36 of 1966), which prejudicially influence the acquisition and leasing of agricultural land for bona fide purposes by Coloureds should be urgently inquired into on a national basis, with particular reference to the districts of Mount Currie, Vredendal, Kimberley, Herbert, Hay, Barkley West, Postmasburg and Kuruman”.144

The Constitutional Committee also proposed minor land concessions to the Griqua. Although dismissing the legal validity of Griqua claims for land, in regard to Griqua farms incorporated into Transkei, the committee reasoned that the “State may have a moral obligation to the Griquas to find land of approximately the same agricultural value elsewhere, in view of the fact that these farms were allocated on a communal basis and held in trust for the Griquas by the state”. The committee felt similarly about the farm Rietvlei. The farm was originally a mission station of the Kokstad based Griqua National Independent Church. Title to the farm was

later granted to 138 Griqua who used the commonage on a communal basis. Rietvlei became a ‘Native reserve’ in 1919.\footnote{PC 2/1983, p.153.}

The committee also recommended that “the State should compensate the Griqua community for the farms Dawn, Dawn Annexe, Eastlands and Rietvlei by the purchase of land of approximately the same agricultural value bordering on, or near to, existing Griqua land in the Cedarville Flats area”. The committee also recommended that land thus “acquired by the State for Griquas/Coloureds should be held in trust”.\footnote{PC 2/1983, p. 156.} In regard to Griqualand West, the committee recommended that the White properties in Campbell, where only 35 Whites lived in 1983, be purchased over a period of three years and that the village be declared a Coloured group area.\footnote{PC 2/1983, p. 171.} The committee also recommended that where Griqua numbers justified it and where possible, Griqua in certain urban centres (e.g. Kokstad, Matatiele, Kimberly, Vredendal), be enabled to live together on a voluntary basis in Coloured residential areas.\footnote{PC 2/1983, pp. 157, 172, 189, 201.}

**Griqua response to report of Constitutional Committee**

The Constitutional Committee tabled its report on the needs and demands of the Griqua in the President’s Council on 15 November 1983. Andrew le Fleur, a Griqua member of the President’s Council, accepted on behalf of the Griqua the report in principle on the understanding that the government and the Griqua people should hold discussions and reach agreement on the implementation of the report.\footnote{PC 2/1983, p. 157.} Many Griqua, including Eric Le Fleur, were, however, disappointed that the request by Griqua that the nomination of Griqua representatives to the envisaged Coloured parliamentary house be made mandatory was dismissed.

E le Fleur indicated that the fact that Griqua nomination was not made mandatory generated a feeling amongst Griqua that their minority rights were disregarded. He also claimed that there were Griqua who insisted on voting ‘no’ in the event of a referendum for ‘Brown’ people on the new constitutional dispensation.\footnote{Argus, 23 January 1984, p. 7.} Peter Marais, leader of the People’s Congress Party after the resignation of Lofty Adams as national leader, and also a Griqua descendant, mentioned in January 1984 that the national pride of the Griqua was hurt by the report of the Constitutional Committee for suggesting that the Griqua consisted only of “loose groups” and that they should be “absorbed by the coloured community”.\footnote{MSB 568, 3/5/6/3/9, Part 2, Memorandum by AH van Wyk, Direkteur Generaal, Departement van Staatkundige Ontwikkeling en Beplanning on “Griekwas: Presidentsverslag en vertoeë deur belanghebendes”, 14 April 1985.} The report of the President’s Council’s Constitutional Committee was referred to the Coloured House of Representatives in December 1984 and was to be ultimately submitted to the Cabinet after the Minister’s Council of the House of Representatives had taken a position on the report.\footnote{Argus, 23 January 1984, p. 7.}

**Conclusion**

The inquiries of 1980 and 1983 revealed widely shared longstanding Griqua aspirations for the maintenance of a Griqua identity and access to land. However, shared aspirations were varyingly articulated. Some leaders like Eric le Fleur were inclined to promote a Griqua identity within the broader Coloured category. Others like Andrew le Fleur were inclined to demand separation from a Coloured identity category. The constitutional framework and government policy in regard to the Griqua influenced very much the way in which longstanding aspirations were articulated, at least to the government, directly or via official inquiries, and contributed to the measure of confluence that developed among leaders from different Griqua factions in the 1980s. The unfavourable response of the government to calls for a Griqua homeland promoted by Griqua...
nationalists before 1980 muted calls for Griqua homeland and inclined some to explicitly reject the idea of a homeland before the Constitutional Committee in 1983, thus bringing them in line with the position of longstanding opponents of a Griqua homeland like Daniel Kanyiles and E le Fleur. Griqua nationalists continued, however, to promote moderated separatist ideals in calling for the creation of Griqua farming areas, and separate Griqua residential areas and educational institutions. Shared concern about the position of the Griqua in the new dispensation and concern about Griqua disregard in a Coloured dominated government representative body in the tri-cameral parliament also generated calls from leaders of all Griqua factions that Griqua representation in the new tri-cameral constitutional dispensation be secured. As shown in the next chapter, shared concern about domination in the Coloured tri-cameral representative body prepared the ground for a brief Griqua political unity forged in light of the 1984 House of Representative elections.
Chapter 10: Between fragmentation and unity
This chapter highlights historical tendencies within Griqua communities for both fragmentation and unity. Although focussing much on the 1980s, the chapter also shows previous tendencies towards unity and fragmentation – as a background to developments in the 1980s. The chapter shows how the tri-cameral constitutional order of the 1980s induced Griqua factions to put aside their differences and to cooperate in the attempt to secure political representation in the new order, thus reflecting coexisting tendencies within the Griqua communities for unity, cooperation and factionalism. Failure at securing the desired representation in the tri-cameral parliament reinforced disillusionment with the new constitutional order and encouraged the re-manifestation of factional differences. Despite the reluctance of the apartheid government and its predecessors to meet Griqua land claims, Griqua continued to make calls for the redress of their land claims.

Divergence and unity – pre-1980's
Rivalry that characterized the Griqua socio-political landscape was temporarily put in abeyance as Griqua leaders attempted to secure political representation through supporting a single party contesting the 1984 House of Representative elections for Coloureds. The move to cooperation and unity was preceded by intense leadership contestation as rivals attempted to gain public and government recognition as the rightful representatives of the Griqua.

Aspirations for unity drew much on an idealized past of unity and land ownership in independent Griqua polities. Calls for unity were also influenced by a social expectation that volke were to be close-knitted entities. Divergent representations and leadership contestations generated confusion and uncertainty in government circles about the aspirations and demands of Griqua, thus also inducing Griqua leaders to establish common positions.¹

Despite historical tensions and divergences between Griqua factions, Griqua leaders historically expressed a desire for cooperation and unity. The founder of the Griqua National Conference, AAS le Fleur I, aspired to a broad Coloured unity and for the transformation of Coloureds into a united Griqua nation. However, the failure of his 1917 settlement venture in the vicinity of Touws River, involving mainly Griqua from East Griqualand, contributed much to the opposition that he later faced in East Griqualand and to the subsequent tension between the leadership of the Griqua in that area (notably those in the East Griqualand Pioneers Council) and his heirs.

AAS le Fleur I’s successor, Abraham le Fleur, his oldest son, also expressed a desire for Griqua unity. In contrast to claims made by some GNC representatives in later decades in regard to the sphere of the GNC paramount chief (which fuelled intra-Griqua tensions), Abraham le Fleur did not regard himself as the paramount chief of all the Griqua. He did, however, manifest the desire of Griqua to be united.²

Attempts were made at forging unity between the GNC and Griqua organizations in the Northern Cape, a region which had a significant Griqua presence. It was reported in the Burger that more than 20 000 Griqua under the leadership of Paramount Chief Andrew AS le Fleur II were united with Griqua from Griqualand West under the leadership of Captain Nicolaas Waterboer II (grandchild of Andries Waterboer I) at a “Griqua Conference” between 30 March and 2 April 1956 where it was decided that the “Griqua [National?] Conference” would from then on be the representative body of the Griqua in South Africa.³ The Griqua faction from East Griqualand (lead mainly lead by DF Lubbe and Reverend Engelbrecht during the 1950s) was apparently not included in the

² See e.g. Burger, 24 January 1948, p. 5
³ Burger, 16 May 1956, p. 9.
unity attempt of April 1956. The unity between the Waterboer and the Le Fleur Griqua appears to have been brief.

Nicolaas Waterboer and his adherents chose Reverend Richard G Foster as paramount chief of the Griqua volk from Griqualand-West and Albanie in July 1956 at a conference at Danielskuil – where Foster resided. Foster claimed in 1957 that his sphere as paramount chief covered “Griqualand-West, Albanie, Gordonia, Kuruman, Bechuanaland” and South West Africa whilst the sphere of AAS le Fleur II as paramount chief included the Free State, Transvaal, Namaqualand and the area between De Aar to Cape Town. Suggesting an organizational affinity to the GNC, Foster’s organisation assumed the name Griekwalandwes Griewka Nasionale Konferensie van Suid Afrika. The leadership of the East Griqualand faction did not recognize the leadership of either AAS le Fleur II or Foster.

Foster’s relationship with what was stated to be his 85 year old uncle Nicolaas Waterboer was strained by 1957. Waterboer and LJ Simons apparently deposed Foster from his position as paramount chief in December 1957 and replaced him with Simons. Simon’s membership of the GNC would thus represent a rapprochement between the adherents Nicolaas Waterboer and the GNC. Simons was himself deposed in 1958 and succeeded by Daniel Kanyiles. In light of suspicion of his legitimacy, Kanyiles attempted to demonstrate that Nicolaas Waterboer signed a document on 3 January 1960 before two witnesses indicating that he was appointed permanent paramount chief Griqualand West and Albanie at a Griqua volkskonferensie. Kanyiles, who was previously the general secretary of the Griekwa Volks Organisasie, would thus have taken over leadership of the Griekwa Volks Organisasie formed by Nicolaas Waterboer II in 1955.

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4 Burger, 29 November 1957, p. 5.
5 It is reported in the Burger (of 29 November 1957, p. 5) that RG Foster’s supporters made him their Paramount Chief in July 1956. In a report of a meeting between a Griqua delegation and government officials held on 18 January 1957, it is stated that Waterboer confirmed that he and the Griqua volk appointed Reverend RG Foster as paramount chief of the Griqua volk in Griqualand-West and Albanie. University of South Africa library (archival division), Pretoria, Le Fleur Collection [LC], Miscellaneous file, M Julies, Sekretaris, Griekwa Volksraad, Griekwaland-Wes, “Verslag van die deputasie in onderhoud met Dr. I.D. du Plessis, Kommissaris van Kleurlingsake, en Dr. Bosman van Departemente van Kleurlingsake”, 18 January 1957.
6 Burger, 29 November 1957, p. 5.
7 Cape Argus, 28 December 1962, p.12.
9 National Archives, Sekretaris van Binnelandse Sake (BNS) 1/1/586, 86/95, Rasklassifikasie van die Griekwa, Opperhoof RG Foster, Griekwalandwes Griekwa Nasionale Konferensie van Suid Afrika, Kimberley, to Senator van Zyl, 29.5.57.
10 Burger, 29 November 1957, p. 5.
12 Burger, 29 November 1957, p. 5.
13 BNS 1/1/586 86/95, Bevolkingsregistrateur, Pretoria, to Sekretaris, Binnelandse Sake, Pretoria, 7 July 1958.
15 BNS 1/1/586 86/95, Bevolkingsregistrateur, Pretoria, to Sekretaris, Binnelandse Sake, Pretoria, 7 July 1958.
16 Constitutional Committee of the President’s Council (CCPC): “Memoranda: Needs and claims of Griquas”, Vol. VI [1983], pp. 3.1-3.5.
17 LC, Correspondence file, Kanyiles, Alg. Sekretaris [van] Kaptein Waterboer II, Griekwa Volksorganisasie, Kimberley, to die Privaat Sekretaris, St Pauls, No.3 Lokasie, 22/11/58.
Prior to his tenure as paramount chief, Kanyiles was employed as a police constable (between 1946 and 1964). CCPC: “Memoranda: Needs and claims of Griquas”, Vol. VI, p. 3.5, Copy of certificate of discharge.
18 Griqua research report compiled Andrew le Fleur for Department of Constitutional Development (DCD), 2000, p. 50. Andrew le Fleur (great-grandchild of Andrew AS le Fleur I and nephew of Andrew AS le Fleur II), Burgerpresident of the Knysna based Griqua National Conference allied to the Griekwa Volsk Organisasie, stated that Waterboer transferred the
Leadership contestation within specific factions had the potential to generate repeated splintering. In a context of heightened racialized consciousness, issues of ‘race’ could further feed into rivalries and contestation over leadership legitimacy. Many who were suspicious about the credentials of Kanyiles as a Griqua and as a paramount chief thought that he was really a Tswana. Kanyiles’ legitimacy as paramount chief was, however, supported by Nicolaas Waterboer II’s granddaughter, Anna Visser.

A leadership struggle that ensued in the GNC in the late 1960s between Paramount Chief Andrew le Fleur II and his brother Eric le Fleur impacted on the national Griqua political landscape. The leadership struggle culminated in 1969 in the splitting of the GNC into two organizations with the same name, each with its own Griqua Independent Church. The leadership of the two organizations subsequently manifested divergent identity articulations and socio-political positioning within the apartheid order. Conflict between the two Le Fleur brothers contributed much to the reconstitution of the Griqua political landscape. Shortly after the GNC split in 1969, the GNC under E le Fleur ironically undertook to put the issue of Griqua unity on the agenda of a 1970 conference. Thus, at the same times as intra-Griqua tensions and contestations were experienced, Griqua from different factions yearned for a purported lost unity that they identified with their ancestors.

Expressions of intra-Griqua unity drawing on an idealize past of land-ownership, independence and unity were also expressed in 1970 in Griqualand West. With Griqua facing difficulties accessing land in Griqualand West, Captain Adam Kok IV, agitated in 1970 for the establishment of a Griqua settlement at Schmidtsdrift by the government. A meeting was called at Campbell on 1 March 1970 to discuss “the Griqua’s problems”. Contrary moves promoting factionalism and unity were displayed during and after the meeting. The rivalry that was displayed suggested tension fuelled by projected historical leadership contestation in Griqualand West between members of the Kok family and Andries Waterboer in the 1800s – drawn on by later leadership rivals to legitimate themselves.

Adam Kok IV expressed his desire at the meeting for “a place where we can be ourselves”. Reverend AP Browsers from the “local Griqua Independent Church” and other speakers at that meeting lamented that Griqua leaders were divided and appealed for unity. However, Daniel Kanyiles, who occupied the Waterboer seat and claimed to have supreme authority over all Griqua in Griqualand West, argued that Kok’s authority was confined to Campbell and that he was thus not in a position to speak for Griqua outside his area of authority. Kanyiles also indicated that he longed for the day when the Griqua would be together as a nation and that “[o]nly then will we be able to approach the Government with one voice”. He questioned, however, why Browsers, who lamented that certain leaders “deprived their own people of getting together to seek common

leadership of the Griekwa Volks Organisasie to Kanyiles on 13 April 1959 (p. 50). A copy of a “bemagtings brief” supposedly signed by Waterboer on 13 April 1959 is also attached to the Griqua research report to the DCD (page not numbered). It is stated in that copy that Waterboer ‘certifies’ that Kanyiles was appointed as “Permanente Volksleier” at a volkskonferensie. Thus, the (abovementioned) “bemagtings brief” of 1959 indicates that Kanyiles was “Permanente Volksleier” and the one of 1960 that he was a “Permanente Opperhoof”. Both were supposedly stamped by a magistrate. Both copies do not indicate precisely when the volkskonferensie occurred that appointed Kanyiles. Kanyiles might have been appointed as the leader of the Griekwa Volks Organisasie sometime after the deposition of JL Simons in 1958. His position might have been altered or more precisely delimited in 1960.


See e.g. Natal Witness, 2 September 1972, p. 17.


ground” for cooperation in matters concerning the community,²⁶ had never gone to see him in regard to Griqua cooperation.²⁷

JL Simons agreed with Kanyiles that the meeting of 1 March 1970 was not arranged through proper channels. He argued that “[o]ur national leader is Paramount Chief Andrew A.S. le Fleur II, who is Paramount Chief of all Griquas of South Africa”.²⁸ A le Fleur was for him the only person entitled to appeal to the government in regard to a settlement for the Griqua. Simons indicated that he had given Le Fleur a memorandum on the settlement idea and that Le Fleur, as a member of the Coloured Persons’ Representative Council, would bring the matter before that council.²⁹ Reverend Browers in turn attacked Kanyiles and Simons. He argued that

[w]e did not challenge anybody’s authority by holding the meeting. We merely pledged out support to Capt. Kok’s motion for which we hope to get Government support.

Browers indicated that none of the people were at the meeting by official invitation and insisted that no Griqua was “compelled to ask permission to support something that is in the interest of the (Griqua) community”. He mentioned that he consulted Kanyiles and Simons many times in regard to cooperation “but to no avail”. Browers rejected as “laughable” the supreme powers attributed to A le Fleur and Kanyiles and mentioned that

I can only call upon the Griquas to get together and ignore these supreme powers who do not serve any useful purpose. … These two leaders have dominated Griqua affairs for a long time without achieving anything.³⁰

A le Fleur II also declared his aspirations for unity shortly after the split of the GNC in 1969. He informed a big gathering at the Homevale Secondary School in Griqualand West in April 1972 that if the Griqua wanted to advance, they should work together as a group.³¹ In line with aspirations for unity and cooperation, a Griqua gathering (“saamtrek”) was held in 1973 in Kimberley. DF Lubbe from Kokstad delivered a message encouraging unity (or “samesmelting”) of the Griqua. Also present at the gathering were representatives of the GNC under Paramount Chief A le Fleur II, Reverend C Gordon from Bloemfontein, Captain Adam Kok IV, Foster’s group, as well as a representative of the major of Kimberley. Manifesting the significance of AAS le Fleur I in the interpretation of the world by GNC Griqua, a circular from the GNC headed by A le Fleur II asserted that the unity being forged manifested the realization of his aspiration for Griqua unity:

Hierdie laaste saamtrek het bewys gelewer dat die Griekwas eensgesindheid aankleef. EENHEID. Nou word die Profaat [i.e. AAS le Fleur I] se strewe verwesenlik.³²

It appears, however, as if Kanyiles (or representatives of his Griekwa Volks Organisasie) and the leadership of the GNC under Eric le Fleur were not at the 1973 gathering.

The stigma attached to the Le Fleur name amongst Griqua in East Griqualand, the prominence of A le Fleur II, the measure of recognition that he received from the government, and the projection that he was the leader of all Griqua, contributed much to tension between his GNC and other Griqua factions. A le Fleur continued to consolidate his position as a government recognized Griqua leader, and in doing so encouraged some of his rivals to intensify criticism against him. In attempting to gain government support and recognition, government officials were regularly invited to (Kranshoek based) GNC gatherings, with their presence indeed contributing

²⁶ See Diamond Fields Advertiser, 27 February 1970.
³¹ Volksblad, 5 April 1972.
³² University of South Africa library (archival division), Sonny Leon Collection, Item 8.15.1, Griekwa Nasionale Konferensie van Suid Afrika, Plettenbergbaai, Omsendbrief, 5 Jun 1973.
to the stature of A le Fleur. For example, a gathering of about 1000 people from across the country in the Maitland Town Hall on Sunday 14 May 1978 in celebration of A le Fleur’s 55th birthday and the silver jubilee of his chieftainship, was also attended by the chairperson of the Coloured Persons’ Representative Council, Alathea Jansen and the minister for Coloured Relations HH Smit, as well as ID du Plessis a former commissioner of Coloured Affairs. Also present were WJ Begins leader of the Freedom Party and T Carse from the Department of Coloured Affairs who was described as a patron of the Griqua. Smit congratulated A le Fleur for his period of leadership and mentioned that it testified particular leadership strength and a stable ordered volk. Jansen also paid tribute to the leadership qualities of Le Fleur.’

**E le Fleur and D Kanyiles - Alliance**

The prominence of A le Fleur and the recognition that he received from the government contributed to the establishment of an alliance between the Knysna based GNC under E le Fleur and the Griekwa Volks Organisasie headed by D Kanyiles. E le Fleur and Kanyiles were both more inclined to oppose attempts to separate Griqua and Coloureds. The perception that Kanyiles was not a real Griqua and paramount chief, was, exploited by his opponents in the Kranshoek based GNC and undermined his recognition by government officials. In the words of Mr Kruger, the Town-clerk of Ritchie:

\[Ek het\] so ’n bietjie uitgevind … in verband met die man Kanyilis [sic]. … [V]roeër jare was hy in die SA Polisie gewees en as ’n polisieman was hy ’n Bantoe konstabel. Hy het later van tyd, ek verstaan by een of ander biskop grootgeword hier op Beaconsfield. Blykbaar het hy toe nou maar miskien dalk die biskop se nasionaliteit aanvaar. Maar ek betwyfel dit sterk of hy in werkelikheid ’n Griekwa is. … [Ek het] van verskillende bronne verneem … dat hy nooit ’n Griekwa was nie, dat hy eerder miskien dalk kon ’n Xhosa gewees het.\[34\]

Having some affinity in socio-political outlook, Kanyiles and E le Fleur were inclined to cooperate. Their predisposition for cooperation was further reinforced through having a common opponent in A le Fleur. One of the factors that brought E le Fleur and Kanyiles together in the late 1970s was the opposition of both to the idea of a homeland advocated by Griqua nationalists like A le Fleur. The Le Fleur stigma appears, however, to have generated some suspicion in Kanyiles in regard to genuineness of E le Fleur. Disillusioned with Griqua representatives on the Coloured Persons’ Representative Council (CRC), and hoping that Sonny Leon would support his nomination to the council, Kanyiles informed him early in 1980 before the dissolution of the council that

the Le Fleurs and the Horsnbys did absolutely nothing to promote the living standards or the political grounds of my people, they are there for their own gains, I wrote to Eric but the letters never bore any fruit so to my mind he is one of the Le Fleurs.\[35\]

The consolidation of A le Fleur’s position as a government recognized Griqua leader encouraged E le Fleur and Kanyiles to sustain their cooperation. Thus, despite the disillusionment with E le Fleur expressed by Kanyiles, the relation between them actually strengthened, with their two respective organizations being eventually united in the Griekwa Nasionale Raad in 1981.

A le Fleur’s official recognition as a Griqua leader was consolidated in 1981 through his membership of the President’s Council. E le Fleur and Kanyiles’ alliance provided them with an augmented organizational base posing a greater challenge to A le Fleur than through their individual organizations. E le Fleur and Kanyiles also found in Lofty Adams, a member of the President’s Council who previously served on the CRC, someone (although not a Griqua) who could articulate their position in the President’s Council. Although having some common views, the alliance between E le Fleur and Kanyiles further inclined them to articulate a common

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33 Oosterling, 15 May 1978, p. 3; Cape Herald, 20 May 1978, p. 3.
35 Sonny Collection, Item. C8.16, Kanyiles, Ritchie, to Sonny Leon, Cape Town, 10.2.80.
vision and to assume a similar position on socio-political matters and on the relation between Coloured and Griqua identity categories.

**Griekwa Nasionale Raad**

Kanyiles and E le Fleur’s two respective organizations were united in the formation of the Griekwa Nasional Raad (GNR) at a conference at the Knysna Community Hall held between 18 and 19 April 1981. 400 delegates from across South Africa attended the conference. E le Fleur was elected as chairperson of the organization and Kanyiles as vice-chairperson. The GNR leadership sought government recognition of their organization as a Griqua representative body. Having government officials at the inauguration meeting was thus important for them. The major of Knysna, DJ Campbell, was invited to the conference. The major gave the opening speech and approved the unity of the two organizations.36

Although the leadership of the GNR aimed to advance Griqua interests, they also displayed concern for the needs of Coloureds. Reminiscent of AAS le Fleur I earlier in the century, the aims of the organization were, *inter alia,*

> to unite and to bring to nationhood all Griquas and Coloureds in South Africa ...; to promote the religious background and traditions of the Griquas; ... to acquire farms for Griqua and coloured farmers...; to act as a mouthpiece of the Griquas and to carry on negotiations with the Government on their behalf ... [and] to further all Griqua interests.37

The concern expressed for the needs of Coloureds reflected E le Fleur and Kanyiles’ tendency to link the Griqua and Coloured identity categories. Kanyiles’ own position as chairperson of both the Coloured Management Committee and the Coloured taxpayers association at Ritchie,38 reflected his own identity positioning as a Griqua and a Coloured. Membership of GNR was open to Griqua and those Coloureds39 who wanted to accept a Griqua identity.40

E le Fleur indicated in 1983 that the GNR was meant to serve as an umbrella body of all Griqua organizations that would allow Griqua to speak to the government unanimously (“een storie praat”) through one organization (“een spreekbuis”).41 As an umbrella Griqua organization open to Coloureds that also promoted Coloured interest together with those of the Griqua, the GNR thus, to some extent, mirrored the identity politics of AAS le Fleur I – who displayed during the first half of the twentieth concern with Griqua-Coloured upliftment and strived to transform Coloureds into Griqua.

E le Fleur claimed that the GNR represented the majority of the Griqua. In the attempt to project their organization as a legitimate voice of the Griqua the numbers of those represented by the GNR were apparently exaggerated. Amounts of 18 00042 and 24 00043 were given in 1981. A le Fleur II, on the other hand, was said to have a following of only 6 000 living mainly in Plettenberg Bay.44 Like the GNR, the leadership of the Kranshoek based GNC also insisted that they represented the majority of the Griqua; they contested the

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36 *Outshoorn Courant en Het Suid-Westen*, 1 May 1981.
37 Quoted in PC 2/1983, p. 68.
40 PC 2/1983, p. 68.
44 *Cape Times*, 8 September 1981.
leadership legitimacy of their rivals and projected their own organization as the legitimate mouthpiece of the Griqua.\(^{45}\)

Not to be outdone by the rival Kranshoek based GNC in meetings with the government, an eight-member delegation from the GNR\(^{46}\) led by E le Fleur, met the minister of Interior Affairs, Chris Heunis, on 7 September 1981 after a delegation of ten Griqua nationalists,\(^{47}\) consisting mainly of members of the Kranshoek based GNC, held a meeting with Heunis on 2 July 1981. The meeting of 2 July was held at the request of Griqua nationalists. A le Fleur is reported to have again appealed for the creation of a Griqua homeland at the meeting.\(^{48}\)

On meeting Heunis on 7 September, E le Fleur indicated that the GNR represented the majority of Griqua throughout South Africa; that the people the GNR represented were very much against a Griqua homeland, and that they wanted full citizenship in a united South Africa. He indicated that the Kranshoek based GNC had no mandate to speak on behalf of the Griqua as they represented only a small component of the Griqua population.\(^{49}\) Manifesting a temporary personal resurgence of Griqua nationalism subdued in the 1970s, E le also apparently asserted that the Griqua should no longer be classified as a Coloured subgroup but that they should preferably be given a group identity of their own, that is, an identity apart from Coloureds.\(^{50}\)

A le Fleur later affirmed that he stood by the call he made to Heunis for a Griqua homeland and insisted that the Griqua people themselves wanted a homeland:

Die Griekwas het tuislande gehad – Griekwaland-Oos en Griekwaland-Wes – maar dit is van hulle weggeneem. Hulle het nou die begeerte om dit weer te hê. Kyk mens na die geskiedenis van die Griekwas is dit duidelijk waarom die mense weer ’n tuisland wil hê. Ons het grond gehad en as jy nou met Griekwas praat, sal jy gou agterkom dié mense wil grond van hul eie hê.\(^{51}\)

The leadership of the GNR also again rejected the idea of a Griqua homeland at a Griekwa Volks Organisasie assembly on 10 October in Griqua Town, the historical base of the Waterboer Griqua. E le Fleur and Lofty Adams took opportunity at the gathering, attended by around 800 people, to explain the “philosophy” of the Coloured based Congress of the People (COPE), led by Adams, reflecting thus dynamics further propelling E le Fleur and the GNR away from narrow Griqua focused politics to a broader Coloured political approach. The gathering unanimously expressed full support of COPE seen as the “only viable means of bringing about the socio-economic upliftment of all Coloured people through its various self-help schemes and its policy of constructive engagement and negotiation with the government of the day”.\(^{52}\) Adams also explained the


\(^{46}\) The Griekwa Nasionale Raad delegation consisted of Eric le Fleur (Knysna), DJ Kanyiles (Ritchie), P Kamnnies (Campbell), Tony Reidt (Kimberley), Willem Tura (The Craggs), John Cloete (The Craggs), James Jacobs (Kimberley) and Anne Jones. Cape Times, 8 September 1981, p. 2; Rapport, 3 September 1981, p. 3.

\(^{47}\) The delegation comprised AAS le Feur (Kranshoek) HM Carolus (Kraaifontein), C Gordon (Bloemfontein), S Cloete (Namaqualand), JL Simons (Kimberley), B Jaftha (Kimberley), L van Wyk (Johannesburg), C le Fleur (Vredendal), C Andrews (Pietermaritzburg) and R Wicomb (Vredendal). CCPC: “Memoranda: Needs and claims of Griquas”, Vol. VI, p. 6.2. Copy of report on meeting between Griqua delegation and Minister of Interior Affairs, 2-7-1981 compiled by W Steenkamp.


\(^{49}\) Cape Times, 8 September 1981, p. 2; Rapport, 13 September 1981, p. 3.

\(^{50}\) PC 2/1983, p. 77.

\(^{51}\) Rapport, 13 September 1981, p. 3.

\(^{52}\) National Archives, Pretoria, Ministerie van Staatkundige Beplanning (MSB) 469, 3/5/6/3/9, Part 1, Motion passed by Griekwa Volks Organisasie, 10 October 1981.
functions and workings of the government’s President’s Council of which he was a member. A motion of confidence was unanimously approved that the President’s Council was as an effective instrument for bringing about meaningful change and stable development in South Africa. The gathering decided to endorse the step taken by the Griekwa Nationale Raad in appointing Mr. Lofty Adams as its official spokesman in the Presidents Council, and further that we have the absolute confidence in Mr. Adams who has shown that he is more concerned with the socio-economic upliftment of all Coloured people than with preserving ethnicity.

Thus, in 1981, E le Fleur and Kanyiles’ attempt to legitimate their claims as Griqua representatives in contestation with rivals like A le Fleur, moved them to form the GNR allowing them to jointly speak for a constituency broader than their individual organizations. With A le Fleur being able to speak on behalf of the Griqua as a member of the government’s advisory President’s Council, the association with Lofty Adams, and his appointment as “official spokesman” of the GNR would allow an alternative Griqua voice in the President’s Council, even though mediated by a non-Griqua. The association with Adams and COPE further propelled the GNR and the two Griqua organizations in it, away from a narrow Griqua approach to a broader Griqua and Coloured approach.

Congress of the People
Even though he may have been moved in 1981 to argue that the Griqua should no longer be classified as a subgroup of the Coloured category, E le Fleur’s association with the Coloured based COPE, premised on the idea that the Griqua were actually Coloureds, reinforced his prior association of the Griqua and Coloured categories and restrained his Griqua nationalist drives. COPE was formed in September 1980, apparently at the initiative of Lofty Adams, the first leader of the organization. After its formation a steering committee was elected consisting of Adams, E le Fleur, Sonny Leon, Pieter Marais and Cecil Kippen. Adams, Le Fleur and Leon were all former member of the Labour Party and the CRC. Marais led COPE after the resignation of Adams as leader in 1982.

E le Fleur also expressed his disapproval of the homeland idea through COPE. COPE resolved at a conference at Knysna late in December 1982 to support the view of the GNR that a Griqua homeland was not acceptable. On his election as national chairman of COPE at the aforementioned conference, Le Fleur reiterated the view of the GNR on the homeland idea and on the relation between Griqua and Coloureds:

[t]he Griqua people, who are spread throughout South Africa, reject the concept of a homeland in toto. We have no need of a homeland, as we are members of the greater coloured group and part of the general South African society. … We thought that the homeland idea was dead, but now we are made aware that the President Council is still discussing it. That is not the way we want South Africa to go. We don’t believe in people living on reservations.

Tri-cameral politics and Griqua cooperation in the People’s Congress Party
By 1983 Griqua factions were temporarily induced to put aside their differences and to cooperate in light of the tri-cameral constitutional order in which there would be no special provision for Griqua representation – as it was in the CRC. With the Constitutional Committee of the President’s Council having commented on the lack of unity amongst the Griqua in its 1983 report on the needs and demands of Griqua, and having declined to recommend that they be recognized as a group separate from Coloureds, or that provision be made for the mandatory nomination of Griqua representatives in the House of Representatives in the envisaged tri-cameral parliament, Griqua leaders were inclined to cooperate in order to secure Griqua representation through election.

54 MSB 469, 3/5/6/3/9, Motion passed by Griekwa Volks Organisasie, 10 October 1981.
56 Eastern Province Herald, 30 December, 1982, p. 4.
Andrew le Fleur initiated unity with E le Fleur in January 1984, suggesting that they “must bury the hatchet and become reconciliated [sic] with each other”. E le Fleur responded positively, reasoning that “[b]eing divided, particularly at this stage in the country’s political development, is a luxury we cannot afford”. Preliminary talks between their two groups were held at Vredendal late in January 1984. The first round conciliatory meeting was planned for 18 February at Kranshoek. Attempts were made to unite the two factions behind the PCP (People’s Congress Party, previously called the Congress of the People). Pieter Marais, the PCP leader, was invited to the first conciliatory meeting. The leadership of the PCP expressed confidence that they could win significant representation in the House of Representatives elections with the support of the supposed 100 000 Griqua – through the backing of the Kranshoek based GNC and the GNR.

It was agreed at the meeting on 18 February that the leadership of the ‘reunited Griqua’ would be held on a joint basis. A joint statement was issued that most areas of contention were resolved at the meeting and that the next meeting would bring about complete conciliation. The main aim of the conciliation was, according to E le Fleur, to work out a future for the Griqua community, especially in view of the President’s Council’s report that the Griqua must be politically integrated with the Coloured community. E le Fleur also mentioned that the GNC would now also, as a result of the first round conciliatory (or “vrede”) negotiations, choose representatives for the “Nasionale Raad”.

Griqua support of the PCP was further consolidated at separate but simultaneously held conferences of the Kranshoek based GNC and the GNR between 20 and 22 April 1984. Marais addressed the GNC conference held at De Aar. The GNC conference was attended by (around) 600 delegates whilst the GNR conference, held at George, was attended by 300 delegates. By the end of April A le Fleur and E le Fleur signed an agreement with the PCP at hotel in Cape Town in which the (Kranshoek based) GNC and the GNR pledged their support to the PCP.

Chief Jonas Darries, head of the Baster people in Namaqualand also announced his support of the PCP on 15 July 1984. Marais, who portrayed the Basters as a Griqua offshoot, mentioned (or boasted) that he succeeded in uniting the Le Fleur factions and that he now intended to forge Griqua and Baster solidarity. Marais estimated that there were 30 000 to 40 000 Basters. Their expected support increased his confidence that the PCP could win significant representation in House of Representatives. The PCP also sought a support base that covering various communities included in the Coloured category. The party managed to get the support of a few Muslim community leaders, for example, Sheik Mohammed Abas Jassiem of the Loop Street Mosque in Cape Town, Imam Hussein Badien and Hadji Madnie Isaacs. Both Jassiem and Badien were members of the Secretariat for Muslim Affairs linked to the Cape Regional Council. Isaacs was a former member of the Athlone Management Committee. Hadji Yusuf Deers became the Cape chairperson of the PCP.

Marais’ attempt, as a Griqua descendant, at countering splintering within the Coloured community reflected the easy self-identification of some Griqua with the Coloured category. The PCP’s appeal to moderated Coloured...
nationalism also manifested pressures on Griqua nationalist like A le Fleur with an ambivalent aversion to the Coloured category to re-appropriate the category. The PCP’s appeal to moderated Coloured nationalism would also serve to encourage or reinforce Coloured nationalistic sentiments in E le Fleur who was somewhat inclined to subdue his Coloured and Griqua nationalistic sentiments as a Labour Party member during the 1970s.

House of Representatives elections
Five parties registered for the 22 August 1984 House of Representatives elections: the Labour Party, Freedom Party, Reformed Freedom Party, New Convention People’s Party and the People’s Congress Party. A le Fleur stood as PCP candidate in Haarlem, a rural constituency largely covering the Langkloof area. E le Fleur stood as a PCP candidate for the Outeniqua constituency that included the urban areas of Knysna, George and Plettenberg Bay. Peter Marais stood as a candidate in Bishop Lavis near Cape Town. Marais held more than 85 meetings across the country during the PCP election campaign, appealing to Coloured nationalism.

Appealing much to a moderated form of Coloured nationalism, the PCP could, however, on occasion, articulate a position extending beyond a narrow Coloured constituency, manifesting thus the uneven operation of ethnicist and trans-ethnic discourses in the party. The PCP leadership emphasized that the party’s primary consideration must be with Coloureds particularly in light of their view that constitutional structures already existed for Bantu-speaking Africans. The party called, *inter alia*, for:

- Greater Government help in combating poverty in the coloured community;
- Better housing and town planning;
- Better work opportunities for all South Africans, regardless of race, and legislation against discrimination in jobs both in the State and private sectors;
- Government help to raise the status of coloured teachers and the creation of more technikons;
- Strong action against crime in coloured areas.

The PCP leadership projected the tri-cameral parliament as the last chance for negotiation for a more just South Africa. In the words of Marais:

> We believe in a non-racial, federal system of government. We are going there to give South Africa a chance. If it fails, I will recommend to my party that we align with other groups that believe negotiation will not work.

The election period was marked protestation and school boycotts. Police clashed with protesters at some polling stations. A number of anti-election campaigners from the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Azanian Peoples Organization were arrested and detained across the country just prior to and during elections. Only 30% of eligible voters voted on 22 August. The UDF regarded the low turn out as an overwhelming victory for anti-election forces. The Labour Party won 76 of the 80 seats in the House of Representatives.

Only one PCP candidate managed to win a seat. A second seat was, however, later added when the Cape Supreme Court found irregularities in vote counting in a constituency. The PCP was also eligible to have two representatives on the President’s Council. E le Fleur and Peter Marais were apparently nominated by the PCP

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74 Rand Daily Mail, 28 April 1984, p. 4.
75 Eastern Province Herald, 23 August 1984, pp. 1-3.
to serve on the President’s Council. Though the names of both nominees were supposedly (or supposed to be) handed to President PW Botha, Peter Marais and Abdul Wahab Tiry were eventually granted seats on the President’s Council. Feeling betrayed by his associates, E le Fleur became disillusioned with the PCP and party politics in general.77

**Re-manifestation of factional differences**

Differences between E le Fleur and A le Fleur came again to the fore shortly after the 22 August elections. Like E le Fleur, A le Fleur also became disillusioned with the PCP and distanced himself from it. A le Fleur again advocated for a Griqua homeland. In calling for a Griqua homeland, A le Fleur pleaded on a South African Broadcasting Corporation television programme in November 1984 that his people should live together separate from other groups.78 E le Fleur and Marais in turn expressed their rejection of the idea of a “brown homeland”.79

Decisions in the House of Representatives encouraged ambivalence amongst Griqua in regard to the body and to Coloured party politics. On 24 October 1984 the Minister’s Council of the House of Representatives decided that the Griqua should not be regarded as a separate ethnic group and that they should be viewed as Coloureds in regard to constitutional, economic and social matters. Griqua nationalists were not at ease with the position of the Griqua in the tri-cameral constitutional order. The Kranshoek based GNC leadership attempted in 1985 to bypass the House of Representatives by having personal discussions with the minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, Chris J Heunis, in regard to the constitutional position of the Griqua.80

Much at variance with the position taken by the Minister’s Council of the House of Representatives, the Kranshoek based GNC reaffirmed their ethno-national aspirations in 1985:

> Ons strewe is om as [‘n] afsonderlike en selfstandige [volk] voort te bestaan binne die raamwerke van aparte ooreenstemmende ontwikkeling en om ‘n einde te maak aan die diaspora en degenerasie [van die Griekwa] sodat ons [ons] Volksgesindheid, Volkstradisie, Kultuur en Godsdiens kan uitbou. Dit is vir ons as volk van Konservatief [sic] belang om dit te behou wat vir ons kosbaar is. ...
> Ons voort bestaan word ... bedreg deur die feit dat ons overheid nie erkenning geniet nie en ook nie oor grongebied beskik waar ons as volk tot ons reg kan bekom nie. Ons strewe na die behoud van ons eie Identiteit en wil ons voortbestaan beskerm en uitbou. ...
> Ons versoek nou die regering om met samewerking met die Griekwa bevolking en met erkenning van ons gesagte se beginsels soortgelyke wetgewing kan opstel [sic] sodat ons met die nodige gesag en regerings instelling beklee sal wees om hierdie strewe uit te leef.81

Although LP leaders were averse to Griqua separatism, some LP members of the House of Representatives were fairly sensitive to Griqua land aspirations, particularly LP members from areas of Griqua concentration. The desire of the LP to draw Griqua support also encouraged some receptivity to Griqua land aspirations. On 3 March 1986 Eddy Dunn, LP member for the Natal Interior constituency, delivered a motion calling for the government to grant farming land to the Griqua. Dunn’s motion drew on recommendations in the 1983 *Report of the Constitutional Committee of the President’s Council on the needs and demands of the Griquas*. Dunn got

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much support from David Curry, the House of Representatives minister of Local Government, Housing and Agriculture; I Essop representing Griqualand West; FG Herwels representing the Outeniqua area, and P Meyer representing Vredendal.\textsuperscript{82} Concerned about Griqua separatism, LP members also attempted to disassociate the granting of farming land to the Griqua from apartheid ‘group areas’ and ‘homelands’, as indicated by I Essop:

What we propose today is that the socio-economic conditions of people classified as Griqua should be improved, while we propose that the land which was historically theirs should be restored. We do so not to entrench nationalism or any homeland but we believe that these people have been denied which should have been theirs historically. ... I stand here today unhappy and concerned because the people of Gong Gong, Pniel and Campbell in my constituency, are affected.\textsuperscript{83}

Curry mentioned in a similar vein that

\begin{quote}
[w]hen we look at the history of the Griqua people, which is a history of the Coloured people, it is one of dispossession of land. ... We are talking about a motion which clearly wants to settle this question. ... We are not asking for a group area but we are asking that the land should be given back to those from which it was taken.\textsuperscript{84}
\end{quote}

The LP also managed, as the controlling party in the House of Representatives, to acquire pieces of land for the Griqua. The House of Representatives purchased in 1986 the farm Jackalskraal for R700 000 as a farming settlement for the Griqua community at Kranshoek. The farm comprised 236 hectares of land (near Piesangrivier) 8 km west of Plettenberg Bay and 2 km from the Kranshoek. An office complex and a crèche were also built on the farm. The farm was intended to be used for growing vegetables and for stock-breeding. It was estimated that the farm would provide employment for 150 people. David Curry, who handed over the farm to the Kranshoek management council, also indicated that 345 plots, a school, church and a business area would be provided at Kranshoek.\textsuperscript{85}

Government concessions to the Griqua were quite modest relative to their demands, and did not do much to appease Griqua calls for land, particularly those sections not given any concessions. Calls for Griqua representation in the House of Representatives, and for land and the promotion of the Griqua identity, continued to be made by Griqua leaders throughout the late 1980’s. For example, on 18 October 1988 a Griekwa Volks Organisasie deputation met David Curry in regard to Griqua land claims in Griqualand West. Having been informed by Curry that the House of Representatives could not change the laws of the country, the organization submitted a memorandum to the President PW Botha in 1989 dealing with “own identity”, land claims and political representation, with the three issues presented by the organization as “belangrike faktore in die lewe van ’n volk”:

Edele, indien enige volk of nasie gebrek ly aan hierdie drie belangrike faktore dan is diè volk se voort bestaan tevergeefs, en hulle toekoms is dan blootgestel teen aanslaë, soos dit huidig met die Griekwavolk is....  

A memorandum of the Griekwa Volks Organisasie to David Curry (also provided to Eric le Fleur as chairperson of the GNR) in 1988 also suggested a Griqua repositioning in regard to indigeneity, that is, a shift from the tendency to describe Griqua as descendants of indigenous people to the positioning of Griqua as themselves being indigenous:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{82} Debates of the House of Representatives, Third Session – Eight Parliament, 3-6 March 1986, pp. 981-1015.
\item \textsuperscript{83} Debates of the House of Representatives, 3-6 March 1986, pp. 985-6.
\item \textsuperscript{84} Debates of the House of Representatives, 3-6 March 1986, pp. 1007-8.
\item \textsuperscript{85} Rapport (Extra), 4 January 1987, p. 2.
\item \textsuperscript{86} National Archives, Pretoria Department of Constitutional Development (DCD) 155, 6/6/6/3/9, Part 1, Memorandum by Griekwa Volks Organisasie, Ritchie, to Staats President PW Botha, Kaapstad, 22 March 1989.
\end{itemize}
Die Griekwas soos die swartman is ’n inboorling stam van Suid Afrika en ons kan dit nie betwis of ontken nie, die Griekwa geskiedenis staar duidelik alle volkere in die oë … .

[D]ie Griekwa [het] ’n belangrike rol gespeel in die opbou van die land Suid Afrika. Eerstens is hulle in [sic] inboorling stam, dit sé vir ons duidelik dat die Griekwa geen ander moederland het nie, maar net Suid Afrika.

The memorandum to Currie also suggested a de-linking of the Griqua and Coloured categories, at least within the leadership of the Griekwa Volks Organisasie that diverged from the official position of the GNR:

Nadat ons Uit/Raad, en lede op grond van Griekwaland Wes die verskillende aanbevelings deurgelees het vind ons dat alle Komites wat onderzoek ingestel het in Griekwa aangeleenthede, die Griekwa gekoppel het met die Kleurling. Ons wil dit derhalwe nou duidelik stel, dat die Kleurlinge van Suid Afrika nie deel uit maak van die Griekwas nie, dus aanvaar ons glad nie uitdrukking Griekwa/Kleurling nie, ons sal dit waardeer dat as daar in die toekoms gepraat moet ons van Griekwas praat.

Thus, the inability of the PCP to secure the desired Griqua representation in the House of Representatives in the 1984 elections, together with a perception that the House of Representatives and the government in general did not adequately deal with Griqua concerns, appears to have inclined Griqua leaders like Kanyiles to shift from promoting a broader Coloured category in which the Griqua were subsumed and to pursue a more narrow Griqua-centred approach. The de-linking of the Griqua and Coloured categories by the Griekwa Volks Organisasie leadership also suggested a loosening of nationalistic or separatist sentiments in Kanyiles that were subdued through his alliance with E le Fleur through the GNR, and their involvement in the PCP. It also suggested the crystallization of some ideological differences in the leadership of the GNR after the 1984 elections or a departure from official GNR policy.

The memorandum of the Griekwa Volks Organisasie to the President Botha in 1989 reflected the disillusionment of Griqua organizations with the new (tri-cameral) political and constitutional order:

Die Griekwavolk is verwaarloos en in ’n politieke woestyn geplaas nadat hulle eie identiteit hulle ontneem is, en om hulle nou onder die Kleurling ras se sambreel herberg moet kry, Edele u dra volle kennis dat, die Griekwavolk van Suid-Afrika wel ’n eie volk tot die diensbaarheid van ons hemelse vader is, tog is hierdie Volkie vandag vreemdelinge in die land van hulle geboorte.

Die volk glo ten volle dat daar niks vir hulle gedoen is nie, nadat hulle identiteit van hulle onteem is, is daar geen politieke verteenwoordiging wat hulle het nie, polities is hierdie volkie al klaar uitgewis, en tog het hierdie volkie gehelp om die nuwe Suid Afrika te bou, en hulle het nooit opstandig geword alhoewel al hulle regte hulle onteem is nie [sic] … [O]mdat die die EIE IDENTITEIT weggeneem was van die Griekwas kan hulle nie eers eise in stel sovòè dit die Griekwa gronde betref nie … .

The organization appealed strongly for the ‘restoration’ of the Griqua identity. It also appealed for the appointment of six Griqua leaders in the House of Representatives, lamenting that the Griqua were strangers in the land of their birth marginalized politically whilst aliens had political rights:

Edele, huidig is die Griekwas vreemdelinge in die land van hulle geboorte Suid-Afrika, die vreemdelinge het politieke regte terwyl die Griekwa in ’n politieke woestyn gedompel is deur die regering, omdat hulle nie eie identiteit het nie, is hulle politieke toekoms verdoem, daar hulle tant as ’n Subgroep onder die Kleurling resorteer [sic].

87 DCD 155, 6/5/6/3/9, Griekwa Volks Organisasie “Aan … D. Curry, Minister van Plaaslike Bestuur, Behuising en Landbou, en … Eric le Fleur, Voorsitter … Griekwa Nasionale Raad”. (n.d)
Representations by the Kranshoek based GNC and the Griekwa Volks Organisasie to the government in the middle and late 1980s reflected the disappointment and sense of betrayal felt by Griqua leaders from different factions with the redressal of their identity, political and land demands, especially in light of Griqua loyalty to the government and unmet recommendations from numerous government inquiries into the Griqua. Griqua leaders continued, however, to make demands for the recognition and promotion of their identity and for the restitution of land, both during the period of negotiation for a new democratic constitutional order (1990-1993) and in the post-apartheid period.

Bethany
From 1993 land claims by Griqua and Tswana families that formerly resided a Bethany Mission in the Free State, having links to the mission going back to the 1800s, featured in the press. The inhabitants of the mission station were removed from the area in waves from 1934. A number left the mission after a 1934 regulation required inhabitants of the farm to submit to the supervision of the Berlin Mission Society. About a thousand Tswanas were forced to leave in 1964 after the farm was declared a White area under the Group Areas Act. By 1993 only two Griqua families remained at Bethany as farmers.89 A Bethany Land Committee was formed in 1993 after former inhabitants learned that the Evangelical Lutheran Church of South Africa intended to sell the farm.90 The committee informed the Berlin Mission Society and the Lutheran Church that the farm should not be sold. The Griqua reasoned that the farm was only placed under the care of the Berlin Mission Society and that it actually belonged to the Griqua.91

The approach of the Bethany Griqua diverged somewhat from the approach of Griqua leaders during the preceding apartheid period. The Bethany Griqua combined with former Tswana inhabitants in their campaign to obtain ownership rights. The Bethany Griqua also discarded the compliance that characterized Griqua politics during the 1900s, prefiguring the approach of Griqua organizations from the Northern Cape that emerged in the early post-apartheid period.

The former inhabitants of Bethany also joined other communities in a ‘Back to the Land’ campaign at the World Trade Centre in Kempton Park on 23 August 1993 – where an interim constitution was being formulated – to protest against a clause in the interim Bill of Human Rights that protected the rights of present land owners. The protesters reasoned that the concerned clause deprived people of the right to land that they lost under apartheid.

In light of the possible sale of the farm, the Bethany Land Committee planned to resettle former inhabitants on the farm on 9 October 1993.92 The Lutheran Church in turn threatened to oppose the trek to the farm but Headman Johannes Kraalshoek, chairperson of the Bethany Land Committee (who also established links with the Kranshoek based GNC) was adamant that they would settle on the farm.93 The Lutheran Church Council decided, however, not to sell the farm. The trek to Bethany was postponed after the South African Police’s community relations division called a meeting with the Bethany Land Committee. The Bethany Land Committee accepted the offer by the Evangelical Lutheran Church to engage in negotiations.94 The post-apartheid African National Congress government eventually purchased the farm for the Griqua and Tswana communities (comprising 81 families) in 1998.95 In line with historical Griqua ethno-national aspirations for self-governance, Griqua at Bethany later regretted that the land was given to both Griqua and Rolong Tswana and that the Bethany community’s property association was dominated by Rolong. In the words of Kraalshoek:

90 Volksblad, 9 September 1993, p. 4.
91 Volksblad, 10 September 1993, p. 5.
92 Volksblad, 9 September 1993, p. 4.
93 Volksblad, 8 October 1993, p. 1.
94 Volksblad, 9 October 1993, p. 2.
Dit was ’n strik vir my toe ek in 1999 gesê het die grond moet tot die datum van 1965 geëis word, omdat dit makliker sou wees om die saak te wen. Toe kry ons die grond as ’n gemengde groep Baralongs en Griekwa saam in Bethanie se gemeenskapseiendomsvereniging (BGEV). Nou’s ons weêr die minderheidsgroep sonder ’n eie nedersetting. As die regmatige eerste eienaars van die grond, moet ons beter in die BGEV verteenwoordig wees. Maar nou is ons nie equal nie. Daar is meer ander in die hoofbestuur as Griekwa, wat ek ten sterkste kondêm. Nou word ons sommer weer doodgedruk. Totdat ons leiers weer as kapeins erken word, bly ons swak. Ons het nie vir ’n township gevra nie, maar vir die Griekwa om na hul grond te kan terugkom.96

**Conclusion**

The brief Griqua unity established in the attempt to secure political representation through supporting a single party contesting the 1984 House of Representative elections for Coloureds exemplified the fractious nature of broad Griqua alliances. Despite longstanding aspirations for Griqua unity, factionalism and leadership contestation was an enduring feature of the Griqua socio-political landscape. In legitimating their positions as the rightful heirs of historical leaders, projected historical rivalry between past Griqua captains could be invoked. Aspirations and calls for unity also drew much on an idealized Griqua unity associated with past Griqua captaincies. Calls for unity were also influenced by a perception, shared by government officials, that the existence of multiple Griqua power and leadership bases was problematic. By the end of the apartheid era, Griqua leaders were disappointed that much of their identity, political and land demands were not satisfactorily dealt with. A sense of betrayal was manifested, especially in light of Griqua loyalty to the government and unmet recommendations from numerous government inquiries into the Griqua. Griqua continued, however, to make demands for the recognition and promotion of their identity and for the restitution of dispossessed land. As South Africa entered a political transitional phase, Griqua carried with them old aspirations for Griqua unity, the recognition of their identity and the restitution of historical land.

PART THREE

POST-APARTHEID KHOE-SAN REVIVALISM
Chapter 11: Democratic transition and the re-articulation of Griqua identities

Toe Jan van Riebeeck in 1652 hier aan wal kom, was on hier! Toe die inheemse swart volke destyds suidwaarts hierheen getrek het, was ons hier! En ons is vandag presies ’n honderd jaar (in 1903) ná Le Fleur se vrylating steeds hier!

(Robert Appolis, Burger, 4 April 2003, p. 10)

Die struggle [leen apartheid] is verby, maar vir die Griekwa van Suid-Afrika hou dit aan. Vir altyd – of totdat die Griekwa-kinders van die land, wat nou so ’n bietjie-bietjie oral bly, se regte herstel is en hulle as ’n inheemse volk erken word en bemagtig is. Wanneer hulle weer ’n eie identiteit, taal en stemming het. En die stamboom weer heel is.

(Johannes Kraalshoek, Burger, 7 August 2004, p. 12)

The previous chapters on the Griqua during apartheid showed that they stood in an ambivalent relation to the Coloured category that they were officially slotted into. Representatives of some segments were inclined to appeal for the separation of the Griqua category from the Coloured category and for separate Griqua areas; representatives of other segments were inclined to oppose the separation of the Griqua from Coloureds; representatives also assumed changing positions in regard to the relation between the Griqua and Coloured identity categories. Fearing discrimination imposed on those considered as ‘Natives’, Griqua were inclined, notably from the late 1800s, to increasingly disassociate the Griqua category from ‘Aboriginality’/‘Nateness’ and from affirming that they were ‘Hottentots’. Griqua were inclined to emphasize having mixed-ancestry, that is, being of (part) ‘Hottentot’, European, and slave descent, thus intertwining the Griqua category with the Coloured category – distinguished from European/White category and the ‘Aboriginal’ or ‘Native’ categories that those considered to be ‘Hottentot’, ‘Bushman’, ‘Bantu’, ‘Kaffir’, ‘Black’ or ‘African’ were liable to be included in. Thus, although they would affirm a ‘Hottentot’ heritage, they were disinclined from affirming that they were themselves ‘Hottentot’; they were inclined to merely affirm that they had some ‘Hottentot’ ancestry. This chapter shows the re-articulation of Griqua identities activated by the democratic transition in South Africa. Disassociating themselves from the Coloured identity category, and repositioned as Khoekhoe, as an ‘indigenous’ volk, as a First Nation, and as African, Griqua segments embarked from 1995 on campaigns to have their demands for the recognition of their identity (as an indigenous group), traditional leaders, land claims and their desire for ‘self-determination’ accommodated by the government of the new democratic South Africa. These identity re-articulations were both necessitated and facilitated by the changed political and constitutional environment which opened Griqua to develop an indigenous identity drawing on previously marginal indigenous elements or associations of the Griqua category which were further reinforced by an international indigenous or First Nation indigenous rights discourse that was deployed to exert pressure on the government to deal with their demands. This chapter and subsequent ones thus show the impact of shifting cultural, political, discursive and ideological power relations on the re-articulation of Khoe-San identities.

Transformational pressures on the National Party (NP) government in the late 1980s led to momentous changes encouraging subjective, identity, socio-cultural and political reorientations amongst South Africans. Early in 1989 State President PW Botha met Nelson Mandela, the most prominent political prisoner and a key African National Congress (ANC) figure, at the presidential residence in Cape Town. The two agreed to promote peaceful solutions to South Africa’s political crisis, thus fuelling speculation around the world that Mandela would be released. Botha resigned from his position following a stroke. FW de Klerk became acting state president. The NP government subsequently entered elections committed to a ‘five year action plan’ aimed at creating a ‘new South Africa’ based on equality before the law. The NP hoped that the new South Africa would

1 The apartheid government preferred to use the terms ‘Bantu’, ‘Native’ and Black instead of African. The term African was more popular outside official discourse. Note e.g. South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR): *A survey of race relations, 1957-1958* (Johannesburg: SAIRR [1958]), p. 41.
be based on the principle of self-determination regarding own affairs, and that it would provide for joint decision-making on general affairs. De Klerk became state president after the elections held on 6 September 1989. Shortly after the elections restrictions on gatherings and protest were eased. In October the government released seven senior ANC leaders and a senior Pan African Congress (PAC) leader. In his opening parliamentary address on 2 February 1990 De Klerk made a number of announcements aimed at facilitating negotiations for a new political order, for example, the lifting of the ban on political organizations such as the ANC, PAC and the South African Communist Party, and the lifting of restrictions imposed in terms of the state of emergency on organizations such as the Azanian People’s Organization, the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the United Democratic Front. On 11 February Mandela was released after spending 27 years in prison. Official talks between the government and the ANC were held aimed at clearing obstacles to negotiations. Multiparty constitutional negotiations were eventually entered into producing an interim constitution in 1993 which took effect after the 27 April 1994 democratic elections won by the ANC. The 1994 elections were momentous, being the most inclusive in South African history thus far.

The democratic transition contributed much to the re-articulation of Griqua and other Khoe-San identities. The response of longstanding Khoe-San communities and organizations to the democratic transition contributed to the affirmation of Khoe-San identities by people not linked to longstanding Khoe-San communities, that is, the neo-Khoe-San. The measure of commonality of response between Griqua and neo-Khoe-San organizations reflected common concerns generated by the democratic transition.

The 1994 democratic transition brought a measure of uncertainty and anxiety about the present and future amongst Griqua communities and encouraged new ways of relating to the past and thus some shifts in the articulation of Griqua identities, aspirations and demands. Thus, concerns about the present and future encouraged a rethinking of the past; a shift in the relation of elements historically associated with Griquanness (or a shift in the emphasis of these elements), and the development of identity representations that were potentially empowering in the new order. Whilst Griqua were inclined during the pre-1994 period to affirm publicly that they were of mixed ‘Hottentot’, European and slave descent, they were inclined after 1994 to valorise the Khoekhoe part of their heritage. Some even developed an antipathy to (public) expressions of the idea that the Griqua were a group of mixed descent. That is, some preferred not only to affirm their Khoekhoe heritage but wished that others also valorise their Khoekhoe heritage and underplay, at least on public platforms, their multiple heritages or the idea that they were of mixed descent.

Longstanding aspirations such as official recognition of Griqua identity; the promotion of their culture; political representation (expressed in the call for constitutional accommodation of leaders), and the restoration of lost land were carried over into the new order but articulated in a modified manner. The public articulation of these aspirations were varyingly influenced by the displacement of a White dominated government; new constitutional mechanisms; official ideology, and the international ‘indigenous’ First Nation rights discourse. Some aspirations and demands exceeded constitutional provisions and the limits set by official ideology and official ‘rationality’ or feasibility. It was especially in regard to such demands that the rights of ‘indigenous’ peoples or First Nations affirmed in international bodies like the United Nations (UN), were deployed to legitimate Khoe-San demands and to exert pressure for the alteration of official policy and practice in regard to the Khoe-San.


\[4\] Compare for example the March 1997 issue of the *Griqua and Coloured People’s Opinion (GCPO)* and previous issues. The issue of March 1997 was a special commemoratory paper issued by the Kranshoek based Griqua National Conference. Previous GCPO issues appeared in the 1920s and 1930s. See also Pearl L Waldman: “The Griqua conundrum: political and socio-cultural identity in the Northern Cape, South Africa” (PhD thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 2001), pp. 135-6.
Griqua organizations varied in their appropriation and deployment of the international indigenous rights discourse. The Kranshoek based Griqua National Conference (GNC) appropriated and deployed the discourse earlier than the less conspicuous Knysna based GNC, as well as other longstanding Griqua organizations, that is, the East Griqualand Pioneers Council, the Griekwa Volks Organisasie, as well as newer organizations like Martin Engelbrecht’s United Griquas, the Adam Kok V Royal House, the Waterboer Royal House, the Barendse Griqua House of Minnie Barends-Kruger House, and the East Griqualand Development Committee. Whilst the Kranshoek based GNC had already appropriated and deployed the First Nation rights discourse by 1995, other Griqua organizations tended to deploy the discourse only later in the decade.

Variation in the appropriation and deployment of the international indigenous First Nation rights discourse suggested a differential relation and identification with the international indigenous movement. Those organizations with an earlier linkage with the international indigenous movement like the Kranshoek based GNC and the South African San Institute (SASI) were liable to develop earlier and stronger identification (at least at leadership level) with international First Nations. With a history of organization and coordination of countrywide branches and engagement with government officials, with operative national discourses being deployed in the past in the articulation of Griqua demands by representatives of the Kranshoek based GNC, the leadership of the organization was enabled to play a prominent role in the Griqua and broader Khoe-San socio-political landscape, and to become in tune with local and international discourses that could be deployed in advancing Khoe-San interests. With the exception of the smaller and less conspicuous Knysna based GNC, in contrast to other Griqua organizations, the Kranshoek based GNC had branches across South Africa, which inclined the organization to articulate concerns that were not localized. Although other organizations also made demands before 1994 for the Griqua in general, these organizations were inclined to be much more localized in focus. The broader focus of the Kranshoek based GNC facilitated the appropriation of international indigenous or First Nation rights discourse that was deployed in the articulation of Griqua and broader Khoe-San aspirations and demands.

With a history of engagement with government officials around Griqua concerns and demands, longstanding Griqua organizations were inclined to be more diplomatic in their engagement with the post-apartheid government, in contrast to the more recent Griqua organizations. The more recent Griqua organizations at times publicly expressed separatist sentiments that older organizations like the Kranshoek based GNC were inclined to express before 1994 but disassociated themselves from in the new order, in line with official ideology disavowing ethno-‘racial’ separatism promoted by the apartheid regime.

Whilst past engagements could open up organizations like the two GNC’s to new discourses and attended identities (e.g. First Nation), they also obstructed the appropriation of some discourses and identities that could be deployed for the advancement of Griqua aspirations. For example, Griqua organizations like the two GNC’s and the Pioneers Council were much less inclined than some newer Griqua organizations in the Northern Cape and North-Western provinces, especially newer ones, to appropriate and deploy the category of ‘African’ (associated much with Bantu-speakers prior to 1994); the older organizations were thus also less inclined to appropriate and deploy the African Renaissance discourse that became prominent under the ANC government, especially under the presidency of Thabo Mbeki.

The ending of direct White (ethnicist and racist) domination encouraged individuals and communities to reposition themselves in relation to Western and African culture and White supremacy values and thinking. Just

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as the Griqua and Khoe-San in general were liable to varyingly identify with international First Nations through their appropriation of the international First Nation rights discourse, they were also liable to varyingly develop identifications as ‘African’. However, the historical associations of the African category with Bantu-speaking communities disinclined especially the older Griqua organizations to appropriate and deploy the category. However, the reaffirmation of indigenous Khoe-San identities and the increasing non-exclusivist use of the African category after 1994, also encouraged many Griqua and other Khoe-San to locate themselves as African.

Griqua identity and cultural repositioning and strategy shifts became especially notable from early in 1995 through the publicity of their demands. The Kranshoek based GNC, as well as some other Khoe-San bodies, pursued a dual approach of exerting pressure on the government through applying constitutional provisions and through the use of international instruments availed by the UN. The GNC’s resort to international instruments was much encouraged by an unsatisfactory response of the government to some of their concerns and demands and a sense of being marginal in the new order. The fact that the Griqua were not represented during the 1991-1993 multi-party negotiations for new order already generated a sense of again being marginalized.

From January 1995 the Kranshoek based GNC embarked on a campaign to have their volk aspirations officially addressed. The organization subsequently engaged in a series of meetings with officials from the Department of Constitutional Development. Mansell Upham, when still a representative of the Kranshoek based GNC in 1997 captured the Griqua sense of marginality influencing their strategies:

Sedert 1995 het die GNK hernieude pogings aangewend om die Regering te oorreed om grondwetlike maar ook volkeregtelik die Griekwa ‘n plekkie in die reënboog nasie te gun. Hoekom was daar spesiale konstitutionele vergunnings bv aan die Zoeloe en die Afrikaner? As die Afrikaner en die Zoeloe nog steeds hul identiteit kan behou as mede-Suid-Afrikaners, hoekom nie die Griekwa, die Nama en die San nie? Hoe is dit dat die inheemse, aboriginale en Khoesan volkies nog steeds buitekant moet sit terwyl die groot base binnemuurs ook oor die Khoesan se lot besin?

The perception that the government was not aware or sensitive about the needs and concerns of the Griqua, provided impetus to their repositioning as ‘aboriginal’ ‘indigenous’ and as a ‘First Nation’, and to the utilization international instruments for First Nations. Thus, national and international developments contributed to the realignment of elements associated with Griquanness, with some elements being de-emphasized which tended to be stressed during the segregation (1910-1948) and apartheid (1948-1994) periods (e.g. having part European descent and having European culture) and with others being emphasized which were marginalized before (e.g. being aboriginal or of aboriginal descent and having an aboriginal culture). During apartheid Griqua were inclined when articulating their identities, to mention that they were of ‘Hottentot’, slave and European descent. In acknowledging their ‘Hottentot’ ancestry they did not generally affirm that they were Khoekhoe or ‘Hottentot’; they tended to merely acknowledge that they had ‘Hottentot’ ancestors. Griqua were also disinclined from affirming positively traditional Khoekhoe culture, especially those segments outside Griqualand West who represented the most Westernized Griqua. By 1995 Griqua were increasingly affirming that they were Khoekhoe and not merely of ‘Hottentot’ (or of partial ‘Hottentot’ descent); they were also much more positively affirming traditional Khoekhoe culture. Appropriating a term popularized by academics Griqua now also projected themselves as ‘Khoe-San’.

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New Griqua formations
The year 1995 was not only marked by renewed activism by the Kranshoek based GNC but also marked the invigoration of Griqua politics in the Northern Cape by new Griqua activist like Martin Engelbrecht very much concerned with the restoration of lost land and traditional Griqua leadership. Indeed, a Griqua as well as a southern Kalahari San (i.e. the ≠Khomani) resurgence, was very much related to land claims in the Northern Cape which in turn provided an incentive for the affirmation of Khoekhoe and San identities by people who were not linked to longstanding Khoi-San communities. The demands and threats at times made by newer organizations evinced their multi-discursive conditioning and the articulation and contestation of opposing discourses, notably ethno-nationalistic separatism and trans-ethnic nation-building discourses.

Newer Griqua organizations were much concerned with localized issues of land restitution, sovereignty and the restoration of the Griqua monarchy. Being novices in Griqua politics, newer organizations were inclined to deal with issues that older organizations had already attempted to deal with. As novices in Griqua affairs, newer organizations were also not as open to deploy newer devices such as the international First Nation indigenous rights discourse as early and thus as extensively (at least during the 1990s) as organizations such as the Kranshoek based GNC with a broader national as well as international focus, were. The youthful excitement of the newer organizations was manifested in their rather ambiguous separatist expressions (suggestive both of longstanding Griqua aspirations for independence and the discredited apartheid homeland discourse) apparently in part deployed to win more modest concessions. In making separatist expressions, newer organizations diverged from the approach of older organizations inclined towards diplomacy. The new Griqua activists and organizations and their demands and threats manifested the response to the new constitutional order of some of those Griqua who were not previously active in Griqua organizations and politics. Though much localized in their demands, the activity of new Griqua organizations also provided an impetus to a countrywide neo-Khoe-San resurgence.

Northern Cape
A key figure in the Griqua resurgence in the Northern Cape was Martin Engelbrecht. Engelbrecht conducted research on Griqua history and acquired information that he used to activate interest in Griqua identity politics. Engelbrecht deemed it significant to revive the Kok chieftainship or captaincy in order to consolidate Griqua restitution demands in the Northern Cape. He therefore prompted the Adam Kok V, “an unemployed school assistant” from Campbell given to inebriation, to assume the title of captain. Engelbrecht became involved in a number of the Griqua and Khoi-San bodies that were formed in the Northern Cape from 1995 onwards. Some organizations formed in Northern Cape appear to have been bodies (of a leader and supporters) with changing names often linked in unstable unity attempts with other bodies, reflecting thus the fluid and turbulent nature of Griqua and Khoi-San politics and alliances in the region and as well as a long history of contested Griqua leadership.

Engelbrecht played a leading role in structures such as the ‘Griquas of Adam Kok V’ and the Khoisan Representative Council (KRC) created around 1995. The KRC was an attempt at a unity structure envisioned to encompass Griqua and other Khoi-San like the !Xu, Khwe and Nama. In 1996 the Griquas of Adam Kok V and the longstanding Griekwa Volks Organisasie of Paramount Chief Daniel Kanyiles were united through the creation of the United Griquas of Griqualand West, with Kanyiles as chairperson and Engelbrecht as secretary. The Knysna based GNC under Volkspresident Anthony le Fleur, a longstanding ally of the Griekwa Volks Organisasie, was also drawn into this new alliance. The unity between the Griqua of Adam Kok V and the Griqua Volks Organisasie (through the United Griquas of Griqualand West) was brief. Engelbrecht headed a reconstituted United Griquas after the alliance was ruptured. By 1997 Engelbrecht also assumed the title of chief or captain after being rejected by Adam Kok V whom he had encouraged to assume the title of captain.

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9 Waldman: “Griqua conundrum”, p. 54.
11 Waldman: “Griqua conundrum”, p. 78.
The Khoisan Liberation Movement (KLM), with Barend van Staden (surname later changed to Van Wyk) as its secretary, was also formed around 1995. The organization claimed (in 1995) to represent 40,000 Griqua, Nama and San,\(^\text{12}\) no doubt a huge exaggeration. The Griqualand West Liberation Movement, led by Van Staden, was formed in 2000.\(^\text{13}\) Van Staden also became a spokesperson Adam Kok V’s Griqua Royal Administration and Royal House and pushed for government recognition of Adam Kok V as a traditional leader.\(^\text{14}\)

Figures like Engelbrecht and Van Wyk contributed to a renewed interest amongst Griqua in the Northern Cape in traditional Griqua leadership in their attempt to position certain individuals as legitimate leaders, attendant with the discrediting of rivals. Thus, descendants of historical Griqua captains or chiefs were brought into leadership contestation for revived chieftainships. An attempt was made by the likes of Engelbrecht to position Adam Kok V as the legitimate royal leader and head of the Griqua, in opposition to the paramount chieftainship claims of Kanyiles of the Griekwa Volks Organisasie and Andrew AS le Fleur II of the Kranshoek based GNC.

Johannes Jakobus Waterboer and his followers also contested the legitimacy of the paramountship of Daniel Kanyiles who set on the Waterboer seat. Having formed the Waterboer Royal House, the Griquatown based Jakobus Waterboer and his supporters claimed that Kanyiles was only appointed as regent since the heirs of Nicolaas Waterboer II were still minors when he died in 1962.\(^\text{15}\) Whilst there was contestation for the Waterboer seat, the legitimacy of the seat was itself rejected by some Griqua linked to the Adam Kok V Royal House. The operation of the Kranshoek based GNC in the Northern Cape and the projection of AAS le Fleur II as a Griqua paramount chief also contributed to intra-Griqua rivalry in the province. Despite Griqua rivalries in the Northern Cape, attempts were made to mobilize the support of all organizations in the province around land and political demands.

Longstanding Griqua aspirations for land restoration and a measure self-governance were rearticulated in the new order by new Griqua formations, with new chiefly claimants behaving and making demands in ways that reinforced their aspired status. By 1997 Adam Kok V had given up drinking. He took his title as a chief seriously, even showing a measure of ‘independence’ by spurning his mentor Engelbrecht and acquiring new advisors.\(^\text{16}\) Having accepted his projection as a chief, Adam Kok V assumed a public posture befitting his position. In his millennium message as a chief, Kok affirmed that the Griqua demonstrated by their experience of oppression under the British and South Africa governments that they were a “kanniedood” (or die-hard) people. He bemoaned, however, that the Griqua were still exiles (“bannelinge”) in their own country under the new government. He expressed frustration that the Northern Cape government was not serious about their concerns and that people without royal origin were claiming chiefly authority. Expressing the hope he shared with those who pushed him to a chiefly position, Kok mentioned that Griqua would regain traditional government in the new millennium. He also declared that the most important priorities for him for the future were liberation, independence, restoration of land, sovereignty and self-government. Kok also manifested renewed post-1994 rejection of the Coloured category amongst Griqua and also displayed a religiosity much associated with the Griqua:

\[
\text{Jare lank is aanvaar dat die Griekwas sogenaamde Kleurlinge is en dat hulle nooit weer op hul erfenis, grondrechte, inheemse reg en status aanspraak sal kan maak nie, maar ons het grootgeword en slim geraak. Griekwa bloed vloei in ons are en danky die genade van die Here is daar van ons afstammelinge wat vandag nog leef.}^{17}\]

\(^{12}\) *Diamond Fields Advertiser*, 26 October 1995, p. 3.

\(^{13}\) *Beeld*, 11 August 2000, p. 2.


\(^{15}\) *Mail & Guardian*, 21 May 1999.

\(^{16}\) Waldman: “Griqua conundrum”, p. 55.

\(^{17}\) *Rapport*, 2 January 2000, p. 12.
The North West province, East Griqualand and the Free State
Diverging from newer Griqua organizations in not displaying a separatist leaning, the Vryburg (North West province) based Barendse Griqua House, had also emerged by 2001. The organization was headed by Minnie Barendse-Kruger, a descendant of Griqua Captain Barend Barends of the 1800s. Barendse-Kruger was prompted to head a revived Barends royal seat by William Langeveldt, a Vryburg based Griqua activist and businessman. Their organization devoted itself to raising awareness about Khoe-San heritage and engaged in upliftment projects in the Vryburg region which were in part calculated to attract developmental funding.

Renewed interest in Griqua politics in East Griqualand was, like in Griqualand West, accompanied by tension between old and new organizations. At the same time aspirations for cooperation and unity were also expressed. The longstanding Kokstad based East Griqualand Pioneers Council lead by Paul Pienaar (chairperson) in the 1990s was rivalled by the youthful East Griqualand Development Committee that was led by Gariel Marais and Glen Joubert after its formation in 1999. Marais resigned, however, from the Development Council in 2001. Echoing separatist expressions in the Northern Cape, Glen Joubert called for the restoration of the ‘Kingdom of East Griqualand’. Both Pienaar and Joubert were elected to serve on the council of the National Khoisan Consultative Conference established in 2001. Paul Pienaar was in addition a member of the National Khoisan Council.

Renewed Griqua activism in the Free State resulted in the establishment of the Free State Griqua Council in September 2002. The organization aimed to promote Griqua identity, culture and socio-economic development. Like many Khoekhoe identity claimants in South Africa, the Free State Griqua Council favoured the promotion of the Nama language as the national language of South African Khoekhoe. As Nama was closely related to extinct Khoekhoe dialects, the promotion of the language within all Khoekhoe communities was seen as important for Khoekhoe cultural and identity reconstruction.18

Key Griqua concerns
Despite leadership rivalries and factionalism, Griqua shared many common concerns that encouraged moves towards cooperation and a much elusive unity. Prominent volk concerns expressed by different factions were recognition as an indigenous group, constitutional accommodation of Griqua leaders and land restitution.

Land demands
The passing of the Restitution of Land Rights Act in 1994 and the ensuing Commission on the Restitution of Land Rights and Land Claims Court gave new impetus to Griqua land claims. Griqua organizations undertook to lodge land claims in regard to historical Griqua land in East Griqualand and Griqualand West.19 The Restitution of Land Rights Act provided for the restitution of land lost after June 1913 as a result of ‘racially’ discriminatory legislation without just compensation. The Act provided for a Commission on the Restitution of Land Rights to deal with restitution claims and to assist claimants. The Act also provided for a Land Claims Court to adjudicate claims.20 The 1913 cut-off date for land claims coincided with the institution of the 1913 Native Land Act which prohibited ‘Natives’ from purchasing or leasing land outside designated ‘Native reserves’ covering initially only 7% of the land in South Africa.21 The cut-off date for the submission of claims was 31 December 1998.

Griqua (and neo-Khoe-San) took issue with the 1913 limit which fostered a sense of marginalization in the new political order as Khoe-San were subject to massive land dispossession long before 1913. Cecil le Fleur, grandson of AAS le Fleur I, and chairperson of the Executive Council of the Kranshoek based GNC, indicated in August 1994 that

18 Volksblad, 7 December 2002, p. 7.
onregte [teenoor die Griekwa is] al voor 1913 gepleeg … . In gevalle het dit tot so vroeg as 1850 en 1880 gebeur. ‘n Mens mag nie ‘n sekere groep se grondeise nou met ‘n sperdatum uitsluit nie. Ons vermoed dat daar grondbesitters is wat nie eens kuur en transport vir die grond het nie. In gevalle is grond aan kerke, soos die Lutherse Kerk, gegaan om te gebruik vir die bearbeiding van die mense daar. Nou maak die Kerk of hy die grond, soos by Bethulie suid van Bloemfontein en Pniel in Noord-Kaap, besit.22

Reflecting a wide Griqua and neo-Khoe-San perception, the leadership of the Kranshoek based GNC reasoned that new ethno-‘racial’ power relations and the self-interests of the relatively influential Whites and the majority Bantu-speaking Africans conditioned what was deemed politically and economically permissible:

Die marginalisie politiek is so ver gevorder in Suid-Afrika dat die wat reeds politieke mag het, huiwierig is om die grootste onreg van die verlede reg te stel. Die eintlike beweegredes vir die 1913-afsnypunt vir grondeise is nooit werklik geopenbaar nie. … Die uitwissing van die Khoesan, wat nie voltooi is nie, is geskiedkundig en politieke so ver wettig gekonkel dat swart en wit Suid-Afrikaners nie meer ‘n saak met die hervordering van die Suid-Afrikaanse bodem met die oorblyfsels van die oorspronklike Khoesan mense het nie.23

Manifesting the reworking of a lingering hope and aspiration for independence the Kranshoek based GNC reasserted Griqua land claims in 1995 and also called for ‘self-determination’. Reflecting the diplomatic approach of the organization in a political order under an ANC government closed off to ethnic separatism, aspirations for land and self-determination were disassociated from discredited apartheid separatism and from the appeal for a volkstaat. Cecil le Fleur insisted (in 1998) that the Griqua did “not want to live separately from the rest of South Africa” but just wanted their land returned to them so that they could “decide on matters affecting indigenous people”.24

Ons wil beslis nie ‘n volkstaat van tuisland hê nie. Ons wil slegs gronde wat tradisioneel en histories eie aan ons is, terug hê. Voorts wil ons ook die reg hê om oor sake wat ons as inheemse, eie sake beskou, self besluite neem. Soos kulturele erfenis en historiese grondeise.25

Griqua demands for land restitution were especially brought to public attention through the publicity of the demands for extensive land and monetary reparation made by Griqua from the Northern Cape. After 1994 the view that the British government was responsible for the deprivation of Griqua land and Griqua impoverishment in the Northern Cape and Orange Free State was given new life. In order to advance Griqua land claims, the Griekwa Volks Organisasie formally requested the Constitutional Court on 4 September 1996 on behalf of Griqua, to declare the Restitution of Land Rights Act as unconstitutional as it only served the interests of certain groups:

[d]ie Griekwa en sy tradisionele leiers in Griekwaland-Wes en Albanië (Noord-Kaap-provinsie) is nie deur die Regering geken in die formulering van die betrokke wet nie … . Die Griekwa vra ‘n regverdige geleenheid om ons saak so spoeding doenlik voor die Konstitutionele hof te mag stel. Die Griekwa is by magte om die betrokke wet as onkonstitutioneel te bewys. Voorts le die Griekwa die wet uit as sou dit net die belange van sekere groepe aanroer en herstel. Net 2 persent van die individuele Griekwa-eise vir grondherstelling word deur die wet geakkommodeer. Ons is die afgelope 36 jaar besig om Griekwa-strewes en Griekwa-toegang tot sy verlore grond te bewerkstelling.26

Reasserting itself as an important Griqua organization at a period when there was a surge of new Griqua organizations in the Northern Cape, the Griekwa Volks Organisasie also demanded compensation from the

23 GCPO, March 1997, p. 5.
British government for damages. The organization undertook to sue the British government for £1,4 billion (about R10 billion in 1996) for “robbing and driving” their “ancestors off their land and property”. It also undertook to sue De Beers Consolidated Mines for R8,7 billion for royalties on the mineral rights of the company’s Northern Cape and Free State diamond mines situated on historical Griqua land. William Wellen, spokesperson of the organization insisted:

We have a righteous and just claim to any property or land in possession of De Beers Consolidated Mines in the historically Griqua areas of the Northern Cape and Free State. … We hold the British government responsible for damages from the loss of life and property … incurred during the seizing of our ancestral land in the Northern Cape and Orange Free State by the British. The British robbed our ancestors of thousands of hectares of land. The Griqua people demand compensation for damages and want the land, where possible, transferred back to the descendants of the communities.27

The Griekwa Volks Organisasie filed papers against De Beers in the Constitutional Court on 7 October 1996.28 The Constitutional Court ruled, however, that it was not, as the country’s highest appeal court, the proper place to hear the case first. The response on the part of De Beers Consolidated Mines was also predictably dismissive. The company denied that it deprived the Griqua of their land or mineral rights. It insisted that it had acquired rights to the contested land and minerals legally.29

Griqua from East Griqualand who, like their counterparts in Griqualand West, had presented their land claims before previous governments, also renewed their land claims in terms of the 1994 Restitution of Land Rights Act. Shortly before the passing of the date for the lodging land claims in terms of the Act (i.e. 31 December 1998), Cyril George Gangerdine, “a facilitator for the Pioneer Committee”, filed claims on behalf of more than a 100 Griqua descendants of Griqua from Mount Currie in East Griqualand “for over 250 farms and 500 town properties that were [allegedly] appropriated when the Group Areas Act came into effect”.30

Griqua land claims allowed contending Griqua organizations to both increase their profile and support-bases and to cooperate with each other. They also provided an opportunity for contending political parties to attempt to gain Griqua support, particularly in the Northern Cape. The Griqua were thus also encouraged to position themselves in relation to contending political parties. With the return of land to the ‘indigenous’ people being one of its main objectives, the Pan African Congress (PAC) insisted that “all indigenous Africans who were deprived of land should claim compensation for their forced removal”. The PAC also expressed support for the Northern Cape Griqua claims against De Beers and the British royal house. The paramount chief of the Kranshoek based GNC rejected, however, the PAC’s “meddling” in and “manipulation” of Griqua affairs. He insisted that the “sovereign Griqua volk” would not allow that it be “manipulated by political parties”. Martin Engelbrecht, on the other hand, indicated that “they appreciated the moral support and cooperation of any organization, whether political or non-political”.31

Land grants
The granting of land to some Griqua communities had a potential to endear Griqua to the ANC, at least for a while. Indeed a number of grants were made to Griqua and Khoe-San communities by the ANC government from the late 1990s, notably just before the 1999 general elections and the 2000 local government elections.

27 Cape Argus, 8 October 1996, pp. 1, 3. In 1998 five elderly women from Durban added their names to a national list of Griqua who sued De Beers and the British government. There was also an undertaking to lodge claims in regard to other places where the Griqua were dispossessed. Daily News, 18 June 1998, p. 2; Cape Argus, 18 June 1998, p. 12; Leader, 3 July 1998.
28 Argus, 8 October 1996, pp. 1, 3
29 Volksblad, 16 October 1996, p. 4.
31 Volksblad, 26 October 1996, p. 4, quotes translated.
The government undertook in Bloemfontein on 19 June 1998 to pay the Evangelical Lutheran Church of South Africa R1.8 million for the mission farm Bethany in the Free State on behalf of Griqua and Tswana families. Griqua and Tswanas were forced off the farm in waves from 1934, in line with the tradition associated with their forebears in past independent Griqua polities. The claimants were finally given a title deed for the farm on 21 March 2000. Headman Johannes (Doenkie) Kraalshoek indicated after they were given the title deed that the event marked the fulfilment of his mother’s wish, whose last words on her death bed in 1973 to him was that “‘n Griekwa sonder grond is nie ‘n Griekwa nie”.

On 15 September 2000 representatives of Griqua communities claiming Schmidtsdrift signed an agreement with government officials in Roodepan, Kimberley, in terms of which the state would pay the Griqua R14 million for the Schmidtsdrift land that they were deprived of. The R14 million was to be utilized for the purchase of alternative land. Martin Engelbrecht was ecstatic. He stated that the day reflected the kanniepold (die-hard) character of the Griqua volk and that the new South Africa gave them opportunities to again be human (“mense”). Engelbrecht felt that the agreement affirmed and advanced the revival of the Griqua:

Die ooreenkoms het die wederkoms van ‘n nuwe volk wat opgestaan het, bewerkstellig. Ons het ons identiteit en respek teruggekry. Niemand kan meer op ons neersien nie. Ek dank die tradisionele leiers vir hul volharding in die stryd.

The goodwill towards the government generated by the restitution agreement was later undermined. The excitement of Engelbrecht and his associates turned into disillusionment. Reflecting tendencies for intra-Griqua and intra-Khoe-San discord in the Northern Cape, Manne Dupico, the Northern Cape premier, told the Griqua on the occasion of the restitution agreement that they would not get any of the R14 million if they did not formulate an action plan, and that they should stand together so that the money obtained should not lead to the “flow of blood”. A management committee was supposed to formulate an action plan for the land that was to be purchased. Despite Dupico’s advice, disputes emerged. Sections among the Griqua encountered problems with the selected management committee and the composition of a trust for the claimant communities. Meetings of the management committee were regularly disrupted. There was a perception that both the management committee and trust members were not representative of all the claimant communities. The United House of Griquas of Griqualand West of Engelbrecht disapproved certain people on the trust, reasoning that they belonged to the Fonteintjie group whose land claims were aligned to the Tlhaping Tswana community in Schmidtsdrift. Engelbrecht also accused the government of delaying to pay out the promised R14 million.

The Le Fleur Griqua also benefited from land restitution. On 1 May 1999 Derek Hanekom, Minister of Land Affairs, granted the farm Luiperskop (called Ratelgat by GNC Griqua) near Vanrhynsdorp to a “group of 85 families together with the Griqua National Conference (GNC) of South Africa, under the leadership of Paramount Chief AAS le Fleur II”. Ratelgat was of great spiritual significance for the GNC. The founder of the GNC, AAS le Fleur I, lived periodically at Ratelgat in the 1930s. His followers believed that he occasionally isolated himself at Ratelgat where he also prophesized future events.

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34 Volksblad, 20 November 1998, p. 3.
38 Diamond Fields Advertiser, 6 December 2002, p. 7; 17 January 2003, p. 5.
On 17 November 2001 A le Fleur II and his wife Shirley received, on behalf of the Kranshoek Griqua, title deeds for the 236ha Jackalskraal farm in the Piesangrivier Valley near Plettenberg Bay from Cecil Herandien, the acting Western Cape premier and provincial minister of Housing. Although the farm was already purchased on behalf of the Kranshoek Griqua in 1986 by the Coloured based House of Representatives, the Griqua did not then receive the title deeds for the property. The provincial government wrote off a loan of R3.5 million that was incurred by the Rural Development Corporation (RDC) shortly before transferring ownership of the farm to the Kranshoek Griqua community in August 2001. GNC Griqua believed that AAS le Fleur I prophesized in 1939 that “[m]ore sal Jackalskraal die spens van die Griekwa volk wees”. The purchase of Jackalskraal, the cultivation of land at the farm, and the acquisition of cattle the by the RDC and its attempt since 1990 to establish a dairy on the farm on behalf of the Griqua, were seen as confirmation of the prophecy about the farm.41

Whilst the granting of land to some Griqua communities had a potential to endear Griqua to the ANC, the magnitude of unrealized and unrealizable land claims also sustained Griqua disillusionment with the new political order and the ANC government. Land granted to the Griqua in the first decade after the 1994 democratic transition was very modest in relation to their land aspirations and demands. Although Griqua might have made demands for relatively extensive land, it appears as if Griqua (or their leaders) did not have much confidence in the mass restitution of lost Griqua land. It appears thus that some made relatively huge claims in the hope of getting at least modest returns. The huge claims, which highlighted the magnitude of their privation, do appear to have facilitated their acquisition of relatively minor concessions from the government.

Indigenous status
Although they may not have been much confident in massive land restitution, Griqua were more hopeful that their demand for recognition as an indigenous group by the government would be met. Calls for recognition as an indigenous community were also seen as important for bolstering land claims and the recognition of Griqua leaders as traditional leaders. Recognition as an indigenous population was also seen as providing support for claims that could be made to the government in terms of UN declarations and conventions on the rights of First Nations. Reflecting the aspiration for the survival of the Griqua as a volk, the moderated expectation in regard to land restitution, and the importance of their recognition as an indigenous population, Katie Cloete, secretary of the Kranshoek based GNC indicated late in 1995:

I don’t believe we will get back what we lost. But we want to be recognised. The emblem of the Griquas is a desert plant, the kanniedood (cannot die). I am optimistic. We are a kanniedood plant.42

From early in 1995 Griqua representatives started campaigning for official recognition as an indigenous people. Appeals for recognition as indigenous people were tied to demands for the official recognition of their leaders as traditional leaders and for government compliance with international standards pertaining to indigenous peoples as framed in UN declarations and conventions. Calls for the recognition of the Griqua had implications for other Khoe-San communities of South Africa.

Recognition of traditional leadership
Reflecting their repositioning in the new constitutional order as bearers of indigenous traditions, as well as a material incentive to chieftainship claims and the upsurge of a multitude of Khoe-San chiefs after 1994, Griqua and Nama leaders submitted letters to the parliamentary select committee on constitutional affairs in light of the Remuneration of Traditional Leaders Bill presented to parliament in June 1995. In terms of the Bill, central government would determine the remuneration of traditional leaders who would receive government salaries. Representatives of the Kranshoek based GNC, Griekwa Volks Organisasie and Nama from Richtersveld argued that their traditional leaders should also be paid like the Bantu-speaking African traditional leaders originally

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 earmarked by the Remuneration of Traditional Leaders Bill. In the context of the demand for remuneration the credentials of rival Griqua leaders were also affirmed. For example, Katie Cloete emphasized that Andrew le Fleur II was a descendant of Adam Kok and the recognized Griqua leader. Daniel Kanyiles of the Griekwa Volks Organisasie emphasized that he was the lawful successor to Nicolaas Waterboer II and leader of Griqua living in Griqualand West and Albany. Apart from the incentive provided by a potential government salary, calls for the recognition and constitutional accommodation of Griqua and other Khoe-San leaders within an officially sanctioned authoritative traditional leadership structure, was also a means for Khoe-San leaders to secure a measure of political influence in the post-apartheid environment in which many Khoe-San identity claimants felt politically powerless and marginal.

Appeals for recognition of the Griqua leadership were made to the Department of Constitutional Development and to President Nelson Mandela. On 12 September 1995 about twenty representatives of Griqua, Nama and San communities appealed to Roelf Meyer, minister of Constitutional Development, for the recognition of their leaders in a similar way as traditional leaders from Bantu-speaking African communities were recognized in the 1994 constitution. Roelf Meyer subsequently ordered an investigation to determine whether leaders of Griqua, Nama and San communities could be accorded the status of traditional authorities in terms of the constitution.

Meyer was, however, not confident that the Khoe-San could meet the criteria set for recognition as traditional leaders as it did not appear that they had a system of indigenous law or tradition preceding 1994, as required by the interim constitution for the granting of status as a traditional authority. At least some in the delegation that met Meyer doubted that Khoe-San leaders would be recognized as traditional leaders. In the words of Cecil le Fleur:

-Ons is deur die jare, eers deur die Britte en later deur ander regerings, ons tradisionele regte en gebruikte ontnem. Ons is later onder dwang geverkleuring en doelbewus van ons identiteit ontnem. Stap vandag by 'n huis in en daar kry jy Griewka-ouers met 'n Kleurlingseun, 'n Griekwadogter en nog een wat as 'n Kaapse Kleurling of sommer net 'n 'Ander Kleurling' geklassifiseer is. Dit is logies dat ons nie die toets slaag nie. Ons is bang ons word weer stief behandel, want toe die Grondwet geskryf is, is sekere mense se unieke stelsel behandel, maar nie dié van andere nie. Nou word ons teen daardie agtergrond getoets.-

Leaders from different Griqua factions appealed to President Mandela on his visit to Griquatown on 24 September 1995 for recognition as traditional leaders. Mandela promised the Griqua that their traditional leaders would be recognized. He also invited Khoe-San leaders to a meeting in Genadendal for discussion and requested them to present their aspirations in a memorandum. A memorandum was eventually handed to the President’s Office on 14 December 1995 reflecting the various concerns of the Griqua and Khoe-San in general.

The memorandum of 14 December manifested the identity repositioning of the Griqua and their deployment of the international indigenous/First Nation discourse in a local setting. In the memorandum the Kranshoek based GNC drew on the international discourse on the rights of indigenous peoples/First Nations and minorities and challenged the government to comply with international standards and indigenous peoples rights.

The memorandum described the Griqua as the “autochthonous aboriginal and indigenous people of Southern Africa that had existed before the colonial era” who are now “displaced and in disarray”. It appealed for the recognition of the Khoe-San as a sovereign indigenous First Nation; Khoe-San representation on all levels of government; recognition of Khoe-San traditional leadership, and the restoration of violated treaties. Appealing

45 Sunday Independent, 22 October 1995, p. 11.
for the recognition of Griqua land claims, the memorandum rejected the 1913 cut-off date for land claims and called for the return of land dispossessed by colonial powers. It also appealed for compensation for Khoe-San suffering, genocide and ethnocide. ⁴⁹ The memorandum “reminded” the “drafters of the proposed [new] constitution and the Government of National Unity … that the sovereignty of the colonially contrived nation-state of South Africa is limited, restricted and subject to international law and universal standards pertaining to human rights, indigenous peoples’ rights and self-determination”. ⁵⁰

Thus, although the Griqua, together with Nama and San attempted to take advantage of constitutional provisions in advancing their aspirations and demands, there was a perception on their part that they approached the government as people with concerns and aspirations that the 1994 and 1996 constitutions were not devised for; there was a perception on their part that they were socio-political marginals requiring additional leverage for the realization of their aspirations. Utilizing international instruments for the promotion of the rights of First Nations thus provided an important means of exerting pressure on the government to redress their aspirations and demands.

**Sarah Bartmann**

Sarah Bartmann, the Khoekhoe woman whose bodily remains were held at the Musee de l’Homme in France after her death around 1815, was pivotal in the attempt of the Kranshoek based GNC at exerting pressure nationally and internationally on the government. ⁵¹ Bartmann was used to demonstrate the presence of the Griqua and Khoe-San generally and to highlight their historical loss and their need for recognition, constitutional accommodation and land restitution; the demand for Bartmann’s return was connected with demands for the recognition of the Griqua and Khoe-San, land reparation and constitutional accommodation.

Thus, partly because of perceptions of political marginalization in South Africa, Griqua from the Kranshoek based GNC were driven to develop an international profile and to highlight the position of the South African Khoe-San in international forums like the United Nations. The GNC saw in Bartmann a figure that they could use to raise awareness about the South African Khoe-San, nationally and internationally. For the GNC, Bartmann symbolized Khoe-San material and spiritual violations in the past and in the present. Her remains in France reflected the perpetuation of European colonial hegemony and the violation of the rights and dignity of other peoples. Bartmann was used to highlight the position of the Khoe-San in regard to (past and present) “colonial and post-colonial hegemony over genocidally- and ethnocidally-challenged indigenous peoples as well as their position in regard to the rights of indigenous peoples” or First Nations. Her return would thus signify the acknowledgement and affirmation of her humanity as well as the presence, dignity and rights of the Khoe-San. Manifesting the re-articulation of Griqua identities, the campaign for the return of the remains of Bartmann also provided an opportunity for the Kranshoek based GNC to project the Griqua as an indigenous Khoe-San people. In January 1995 a campaign was launched for the return and burial of the remains of Bartmann by the Kranshoek based GNC’s advisor advocate Mansell Upham. ⁵²

Calls for the return of the remains of Bartmann also inspired calls for the return of other Khoe-San remains – which were also tied to broader restitution demands. The GNC also undertook early in 1996 to demand the return of Khoe-San heads and skulls that were discovered by Cape Town artist Pipa Skotnes in the Britain’s National History Museum whilst doing research for an exhibition and book on the San. ⁵³ The Kranshoek based GNC also appealed to Mandela to support demands that the University of the Witwatersrand release the bones

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⁵¹ Chapter 13 provides more information on the campaign for the return of Bartmann.
of Cornelis Kok II exhumed for scientific research in 1961 with 39 other corpses at Campbell with the consent of Adam Kok IV.\textsuperscript{54}

The bones of Cornelius Kok II were finally handed back to the family of Adam Kok V at a ceremony at the University of the Witwatersrand on 20 August 1996. The ceremony allowed Griqua activists to make general restitution demands. Adam Kok V took the opportunity at the handing-over ceremony to demand the return and full compensation of land lost in the vicinity of Campbell\textsuperscript{55} for which a land claim was lodged under the Restitution of Land Rights Act. Adam Kok V also criticized the government’s land restitution policy and in doing so manifested the repositioning of the Griqua not only as ‘indigenous’ but also as Africans:

As indigenous Africans we reject the Kempton Park negotiated settlement in so far as it gives rights until 1913 to colonialists who stole our land. We totally reject the ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ policy announced by Minister Derek Hanekom. … All we want is that which rightfully belongs to us as indigenous people.

Martin Engelbrecht took opportunity at the handing-over ceremony to call for the return of the remains of Bartmann. Engelbrecht also indicated that there were Griqua who contemplated going to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to testify about the “identity genocide” carried out against the Griqua by successive colonial and apartheid regimes.\textsuperscript{56}

\textbf{International forums}

The development of an international approach by the Kranshoek based GNC was much facilitated by Mansell Upham, a non-Griqua advocate with a measure of exposure to the utilization bodies like the UN by First Nations to advance their goals. In part through advocate Mansell Upham, the Kranshoek based GNC leadership were encouraged to present their concerns at international forums for First Nations and to challenge the South African government by appealing to international declarations and conventions on the rights of First Nation and minorities. Upham was apparently attached to the South African embassy in Japan for some time prior to 1995 where he became in tune with the plight of the Ainu minority of Japan and with the politics and methods of agitation of First Nations. Upham became a legal advisor for the Kranshoek based GNC. Unusual for someone regarded as White, Upham also acted as a spokesperson for the Kranshoek based GNC. Upham developed an acute understanding of the socio-political situation of the Kranshoek based GNC which, coupled with his academic, legal and international background made him influential within the organization. By claiming to be a descendant of the Khoekhoe woman Krotoa or Eva\textsuperscript{57} (who served a servant and interpreter for Jan Van Riebeeck in the 1650s), Upham manifested a general but varying reorientation amongst South Africans in regard to indigeneity after 1994.

\textbf{UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations}

Much guided by Upham, from 1995 onwards Griqua delegations attended annual sessions of the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP) established to allow ‘indigenous’ groups or First Nations around the world to articulate their concerns and aspirations and to become involved in the formulation of policy by their governments for their protection. The visit of the Griqua to Geneva was characteristically given prophetic significance by Griqua under the GNC. They believed that AAS le Fleur I predicted that his people would go to Geneva. Le Fleur supposedly did not say what the purpose of the visit would be.\textsuperscript{58}

Griqua delegations attended the 13 and 14\textsuperscript{th} sessions of the WGIP held in July of 1995 and 1996 to “inform the international community on how backward South Africa remained in regard to international progress on the

\textsuperscript{54} Mail \& Guardian, 2 February 1996, p. 5; Citizen, 21 August 1996, p. 12; GCPO, March 1997.
\textsuperscript{55} Citizen, 21 August 1996, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{56} City Press, 25 August 1996, p. 28.
\textsuperscript{57} Upham reputedly concluded after tracing his genealogy that he was a descendant of Krotoa.
\textsuperscript{58} Eastern Province Herald, 9 May 1998, p. 9.
human rights of indigenous peoples [“volke”] worldwide”.59 Addressing the WGIP on 27 July 1995, a Kranshoek based GNC representative called on the South African government to comply urgently with the universal standards on the rights of First Nations.60 Accompanied by three GNC representatives, Cecil le Fleur recounted the misery and deprivation of the Griqua at the hands of colonizers and called for support of their land and cultural demands at the WGIP in 1998:

Considering the deceit, humiliation, genocide, dispossession and economic disempowerment suffered at the hands of Great Britain and the apartheid regime, we would like to appeal to the world community to assist us in requesting the South African government to recognise traditional Khoisan territories, where indigenous, first nation languages could be taught and developed in schools.61

The Kranshoek based GNC attempted to bolster the position of Griqua in negotiations with the government by obtaining First Nation status at the UN, which they were finally awarded in July 1998 at a WGIP session.62 There mere articulation of their demands at the WGIP was also adequate to make the government more sensitive to their aspirations and demands. The expressions of Khoe-San before the WGIP were potentially embarrassing to a post-apartheid ANC government projecting itself as a champion of human rights and historically marginalized communities. After the Kranshoek based GNC called on the South African government to comply urgently with the universal standards on the rights of First Nations at the WGIP on 27 July 1995,63 President Mandela visited Griquatown on 24 September 1995 and invited Griqua leaders to Genadendal for aforementioned discussions which led to the formulation of a memorandum expressing Griqua aspirations.64 The Department of Constitutional Development was also encouraged to negotiate with the Griqua.

National Griqua Forum
In its attempt to ease negotiations with the Griqua and to encourage intra-Griqua consensus, the Department of Constitutional Development supported the formation of a national Griqua representative body,65 “inspired by … anthropologist” in the department keen to find some way out of Griqua factionalism and leadership rivalry compounding negotiations.66 The National Griqua Forum (NGF) was consequently formed on 1 July 1997 in Kimberley at a meeting between government officials and Griqua representatives. The government was represented the minister of Constitutional Development Valli Moosa (who had replaced Roelf Meyer), premier of the Northern Cape Manne Dupico, and the director general of the Presidential Office, Jakes Gerwel. The NGF was to be a representative body for all Griqua people that would negotiate in a unanimous voice with the national government on issues such as constitutional accommodation and the rights of ‘indigenous’ minorities. Thus, on the occasion of the formation of the NGF the government expressed, through the DCD, its recognition of the Griqua as an indigenous community.67 In the words of Cecil le Fleur, vice-chairperson of the NGF:

Die Regering het nou by monde van Moosa aan Suid-Afrika en die wêreld erken dat die Griekwas’ n eie identiteit in die volkerebestel van die wêreld het en een van Suid-Afrika se inheemse volke is. Die NGF sal beding vir die Griekwas se belange op nasionale vlak en indringenee onderhandelinge met die Regering aanknoo.68

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60 *GCPO*, March 1997, p. 19
63 *GCPO*, March 1997, p. 19
64 *GCPO*, March 1997, p. 4.
With other Khoe-San groupings also demanding constitutional accommodation, the NGF was replaced by a new negotiation body (the National Khoisan Forum, later renamed the National Khoisan Council) in 1999 comprising representatives of Griqua and other longstanding as well as new Khoe-San groupings.

Exploiting empowerment desires – political parties

On 21 March 1999 the southern Kalahari San (or #Khomani) acquired ownership of about 40 000 ha private and state land south of the Kalahari Gemsbok National Park (KGNP) and partial control over about 25 000 ha in the park. On 1 May 1999 the minister of Land Affairs, Derek Hanekom, granted the farm Luiperskomp near Vanrhynsdorp to Griqua under the GNC. On 19 May 1999 President Nelson Mandela personally handed the title-deed of the Platfontein farm to !Xu and Khwe San representatives. The farm was purchased for the relocation of the !Xu and Khwe from Schmidtshof after Griqua and Tlhaping lodged a claim for the farm. These land restitution acts exemplified a tendency of ANC government officials to make important social delivery gestures before elections in order to draw voters. National elections were scheduled to take place on 2 June 1999. The restitution acts also manifested a measure of receptivity on the part of the Land Affairs Department of Hanekom to Khoekhoe-San land aspirations. The acts were also gestures of support to the cultural renewal and economic empowerment of the Khoekhoe-San.

Complementing the government for the #Khomani land settlement at the well publicized restitution ceremony of 21 March 1999, Petrus Vaalbooi, a #Khomani leader, asserted that “[n]ow we are being picked up by our democratic government. We the =Khomani community, the lowest of all communities, have today received recognition”. The restitution ceremony allowed Deputy President Mbeki, a signatory to the restitution settlement, to make amends after offending Khoekhoe and San on 8 May 1996 on the occasion of the adoption of a new constitution for South Africa, by suggesting that they were extinct. Mbeki then stated that their “desolate souls haunt the great expanses of the beautiful Cape”; that “they … fell victim to the most merciless genocide our native land has ever seen”; that “they … were the first to lose their lives in the struggle to defend our freedom and dependence”; and that they “as a people, perished in the result”. Mbeki declared in revivalist and developmental fashion in front of a crowd of about 2 000 people at the 21 March 1999 restitution ceremony that the #Khomani are “an ancient people of Africa who regained not only their freedom but their identity” and that

[This land claim, I am sure, will stand out among all land claims. It stands out because this land claim is about the rebirth of a people. When we say ‘Here is your land, have it’, we say too that you must reclaim a proud history and rebuild a rich culture. This land is a place to rebuild a community. That which we are doing here in the Northern Cape is an example to many other people around the world. It must be one of the greatest prizes of our freedom that the Khoekhoe and San, who became the first victims of colonialism, above all should emerge as the greatest beneficiaries of our liberation in 1994.]

However, the South African Human Rights Commission found in 2005 that the government had neglected the #Khomani after the 1999 land settlement. The local government failed to provide adequate developmental assistance, despite receiving funds to do so. The six farms that were given to the community in 1999 “were in shambles, bringing no financial benefit to the community”. Substance abuse was rampant in the community.

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69 Cape Argus, 22 March 1999, p. 3; Cape Times, 22 March 1999, p. 11.
70 Griqua Development Trust: “Marketing- and business plan for Ratelgat Development Project”.
71 Beeld, 19 May 1999, p. 2; Sunday Independent, 23 May 1999, p. 5.
72 Cape Times, 22 March 1999, p. 11.
74 Cape Argus, 22 March 1999, p. 3.
The community was also harassed by police. Contrary to Mbeki’s suggestion that the #Khomani “emerge[d] as the greatest beneficiaries of our liberation in 1994”, they were in 2005 “still languishing on the margins of society”.

With the re-articulation of Khoe-San identities tied to empowerment aspirations, political parties were inclined to exploit Khoe-San empowerment desires with empowerment promises, especially around elections in order gain Khoe-San votes. A region that was especially targeted was the Northern Cape where Khoe-San numbers were substantial and where the ANC just narrowly managed to beat the NP in the 1994 elections. The ANC, Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), New National Party (NNP) and some of the smaller parties were very eager to obtain the support of rival Griqua leaders during their campaigns for the June 1999 general elections. It seems that (at least for some time) the ANC obtained the support of Johannes J Waterboer, the NNP the support of Daniel Kanyiles and the IFP the support of Adam Kok V.

The power balance in the Northern Cape made politicians especially sensitive to Khoe-San demands before elections. Whilst elections inclined rival parties to woe potential Khoe-San voters, there were also Khoe-San who were inclined to take advantage of election fever by making threats to win some concessions. Election fever thus provided an opportunity for the projection of Griqua concerns, aspirations and demands. However, the perceived exploitation of the Khoe-San for election purposes, particularly by the ruling ANC, reinforced Khoe-San disillusionment and (further) fuelled separatist expressions or threats.

Martin Engelbrecht’s Khoisan Representative Council threatened boycotting the 1999 general elections in order to draw attention to, inter alia, their aspiration for recognition, constitutional accommodation of traditional leaders, and the neglect of Khoe-San language rights and land claims. The KRC decided at a meeting held in Kimberley in April 1999 to urge Khoe-San people not to participate in the elections of 2 June 1999 unless their existence was publicly recognized by the government and their indigenous heritage and rights respected. Lamenting the perceived constitutional disregard of the Khoe-San, the KRC pointed out that the previous interim constitution was drafted “as if we, the Khoisan people were dead and extinct”. Thus,

[w]e cannot take part in this election because our heritage and cultural custodians have no constitutional standing or voice in government … because the Khoisan are not part of the economic empowerment programme of government and (our) state as a landless, poor proletariat (is) not recognised by government.

Insisting that the Khoe-San were “forcefully reclassified as Coloured” by the apartheid government, the KRC also lamented that the ANC government had not addressed Khoe-San classification as Coloured, thus manifesting post-1994 moves within the Khoe-San communities to disassociated themselves from a Coloured identity category.

In a move that was also most probably calculated, at least in part, to put pressure on the government, the KRC further manifested their disillusionment with government policy on the Khoe-San when Martin Engelbrecht and Constand Viljoen signed a cooperation agreement in Pretoria on 21 May 1999 on behalf of the KRC and the Afrikaner nationalist Freedom Front (FF). In terms of the agreement both groups would join forces to promote the concept of self-determination. FF advisers would assist the Khoe-San in furthering their cause in parliament. A steering group would also be established to promote self-determination for the Khoe-San. Engelbrecht explained his action by reiterating that the Khoe-San were not represented during negotiations for a democratic South Africa; they did therefore not gain recognition in the constitution; it was since then not possible to talk

77 Mail & Guardian, 21 May 1999, p. 22.
78 Citizen, 21 April 1999, p. 8; Burger, 21 April 1999, p. 3.
80 Citizen, 22 May 1999, p. 4; Beeld, 22 May 1999.
with the government; the Khoe-San therefore turned to the FF. Engelbrecht also insisted that the Khoe-San wanted their languages and cultural heritage to be recognized and protected in the constitution and that

[ons as Khoisan-gemeensakpe wil ons seggenskap terugê. Ons wil ons sê sê oor die lot van die rotstekeninge. Ons wil ook 'n sê hê oor ons grond in die Griekwaland-Wes, Boesmanland, die Karoo en die Hantam, en oor ons taal en kulturele erfenis.]

The strategy of Engelbrecht was, however, opposed by some Khoe-San. The National Khoisan Forum (NKF) opposed the call for a boycott of the 2 June elections at its inaugural meeting on 27 May. Joseph Little, chairperson of the NKF, mentioned that the fear that the government would not fulfil promises it had made, formerly led to calls that people should not participate in the elections. He suggested that Khoe-San leaders had changed their position on a boycott and now encouraged participation in the democratic process of the country:

Ons moet deel wees van die demokratiese proses deur Woensdag te gaan stem. ... Kom laat ons gaan stem.

Desire for a measure of self-governance expressed in a separatist language was also strongly made in 2000 by Campbell based Barend van Staden in his capacity as a spokesperson Adam Kok V’s Griqua Royal House. Marking a significant divergence from the approach of the more diplomatic older Griqua organizations, Van Staden threatened mass action in order to get the government to respond appropriately to their concerns. He indicated in March 2000 that

Ons is nou keelvol vir die ANC-regering se miskenning, verdrukking, minagting en vernedering van ons leier, Adam Kok V en sy volksgenote. Derhalwe het ons besluit om tot massa-aksie oor te gaan.

Van Staden reasoned that although a National Khoisan Council was set up for negotiation at national level for constitutional accommodation, the Northern Cape government never really tried to accommodate traditional communities in the province. The Adam Kok V Griqua Royal House was displeased that Kok V was not recognized as a traditional leader and that he did not receive government remuneration like officially recognized Bantu-speaking traditional leaders. The Griqua Royal Administration indicated on 23 March 2000 that non-violent protests would take place at the end of the month and the beginning of April in order to draw attention to their demands for the restoration of ancestral land and the recognition of their royal leader, Adam Kok V. The Griqua Royal Administration undertook to block the main routes through the Campbell area and more generally through Griqualand West, including roads around Kimberley; it would not to allow any “vehicles, whether private, business or state to move in our territorial area”. The road blockade would involve Griqua youth, old policeman and soldiers. Suggesting the magnitude of Griqua disillusionment with the government Van Staden mentioned that

[t]he Griqua, as first indigenous inhabitants of South Africa, say so far and no further. We would go to jail or die for our land and heritage. …

[f]or our indigenous traditions, for the restoration of our humanity, we are prepared to pay the price.

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81 Beeld, 22 May 1999.
82 Beeld, 1 June 1999, p. 8.
85 Citizen, 24 March 2000, p. 9
The protestations did not take place, suggesting thus that the threats might have been made to win more modest concessions or that there was a lack of coordination or support for the protestations. Public expressions by representatives of the Griqua Royal Administration reflected how they drew on international experiences of First Nations in making local demands. Van Staden stated, for example, that their historic territory, annexed by the British in 1871 to secure its diamond wealth, covered a tract of land between Kimberley, Hopetown, Prieska, Danielskuil and Warrenton, and that the Griqua would be satisfied if 65 percent of that land – which included state land, farms and mining land – was restored to them and put under traditional authority in the same way that the Inuit in Canada and the Maoris in New Zealand ran their own affairs.89

Manifesting Christian nationalist sentiments and disillusionment with the ruling ANC, and depicting the Griqua as a marginalized First Nation, the thinking and language deployed by Van Staden and his associates appears to have been informed by strands from apartheid discourse mingled with the international First Nation discourse and longstanding Griqua aspirations for self-governance.

To advance their goals, Van Staden and his associates formed the Griqualand West Liberation Movement (GWLM) in Kimberley on 10 August 2000 in Roodepan, Kimberley. Van Staden was elected as the leader of the organization. The organization was described as a liberation movement for the “eerste inheemse Afrikaners” and as a political vehicle for “brown people”. Van Staden and his GWLB depicted the Griqua as outcasts and reasoned that “brown people” constituted the majority in the Northern Cape but were suffering from “reverse apartheid” and oppression; though the majority in Northern Cape, they did not have influence in the government of the province. Most housing and reconstruction programmes benefited other minority communities. The organization endeavoured to “liberate, restore and empower” “brown people” politically and economically. The organization also strived to get rid of “reverse discrimination” in the Northern Cape.89 Disillusioned with the treatment of Griqua demands, the GWLM called for the restoration of the sovereignty of Griqualand West. The organization also undertook to prioritize Christian evangelical principles in South African politics.91

Whilst indicating that “[d]ie hoofdoel van dié vryheidsbeweging is intensiewe onderhandeling vir onafhanklikheid” of the area between “Kimberley, Jan Kempdorp, Danielskuil, Postmasburg, Groblershoop, Prieska, Hopetown en Modderrivier”, Van Staden also indicated that the Griqua would fight for an independent region if they did not become part of the Northern Cape government,92 thus affirming that calls for independence were partly calculated to win more modest concessions, such as positions of authority in government or minor land grants. Attempting to confer a measure of respectability to the call for ‘independence’, Van Staden disassociated the notion from the idea of a volkstaat, manifesting thus a rather ambiguous separatist positioning:

Dit is nie die gedagte om ’n volkstaat te begin nie. Ons wil net as ’n buin gemeenskap toesien dat die meerderheidsgroep van die gebied regeer in ’n demokratiese bestel van die Khoisan-koningkryk. Die nasionale regering sowel as die Noord-Kaapse regering ignoreer ons versoeke vir onderhandeling. … Die ANC-regering in die Noord-Kaap gee geen gehoor aan ons nie, daarom sal ons teen 2 Januarie 2001 ’n aankondiging maak oor die herstel en onafhanklikheid van die Griekwa-gebied. Ons mense is net ‘swart’ as dit verkieatingsstyd is, daarna word ons vergeet. Die bruin gemeenskap gaan gebuk onder omgekeerde apartheid en het in drank verval omdat werkloosheid hooggety vier.

To capitalise on government sensitivity generated by the December 2000 local government elections, and to prompt the government to deal with Khoe-San demands, Van Staden asserted publicly that “[o]ns mense is net ‘swart’ as dit verkieingsstyd is, daarna word ons vergeet”,93 manifesting thus a perception of many people
within Coloured/Brown communities that they only became important during election periods for politicians seeking their vote.

Reflecting the sense of marginalization that encouraged the rethinking of Colouredness and the re-articulation of Griqua and Khoe-San identities Van Staden complained that that

[d]ie meeste behuisings- en heropbouprojekte bevoordeel ander minderheidsgemeenskappe. Ons kry niks nie. Dis waarom ons besluit het om nou op te staan en ’n eie beweging te begin. ... Suid-Afrika het tans ’n demokrasie, maar as ’n meerderheidsgroep in ’n gebied word ons nie bevoordeel nie. Ons voel bedrieg en het nie gekry wat ons belowe is nie. Ons grond word steeds geïnfiltreer soos in die ou bedeling. As ons nie gou gaan stry nie, gaan ons nog vir baie jare onder die juk van die ANC-kommunistiese alliansie wees. ... Ontslag van al sy politieke en administratiewe posisies en die opleiding van sy personeel het ons kry van ons gewerk toe ons ons gehoorsaamheid betoon. As ons nie nou gaan stry nie, gaan ons onder die juk van die ANC-kommunistiese alliansie wees. ... Griekwaland-West moet onafhanklikheid kry omdat die huidige bestel, soos die ou bestel, ons grondgebied binnedring. ... Die grond behoort aan ons en dit het tyd geword dat ons daaroor regeer.

The GWLM was supposedly supported by the Adam Kok V Royal House, the United Griquas of Martin Engelbrecht, the Waterboer Royal House and the Griekwa Volks Organisasie of Daniel Kanyile.

Contestation and unity

Thus, the Griqua resurgence altered the Griqua political landscape, spurning new organizations willing to make demands and threats that potentially challenged the new order and attempts at trans-ethnic nation-building, much at variance with the diplomatic and more accommodative approach of longstanding Griqua organizations. New Griqua activists also contributed to intra-Griqua tension and factionalism, with leaders of longstanding organizations being subjected to new contestations. At the same time aspiration for unity was expressed and moves made towards Griqua as well as broader Khoe-San cooperation. A Griqua resurgence and renewed Griqua activism also encouraged the emergence neo-Khoe-San from Coloured communities thus further altering the Khoe-San socio-political landscape, alliances and contestations.

Neo-Khoekhoe leaders were varyingly received by longstanding Griqua organizations. They consequently formed cooperative relations with supportive factions thus altering the influence of prior existing Khoekhoe factions. Old but numerically weaker Griqua factions like the Griekwa Volks Organisasie and the Knysna based GNC were especially open to support new Khoekhoe groupings, thus enhancing their influence in the Khoe-San socio-political landscape. An upsurge of neo-Khoe-San chiefs also disturbed some representatives of longstanding Khoe-San communities, notably the Kranshoek based GNC and the South African San Institute, who feared that their own positions and demands would be trivialized through the antics and demands of those suspect chiefs. Some tension subsequently developed between neo-Khoekhoe organizations and representatives of the Kranshoek based GNC. Khoe-San organizations also found it necessary to establish broad cooperative relations in order to effectively assert their demands to the government.

94 Rapport, 20 August 2000, p. 11.
95 Impak, 18 August 2000, p. 4.
96 Rapport, 20 August 2000, p. 11.
97 Impak, 18 August 2000, p. 4.
98 Rapport, 20 August 2000, p. 11.
Intra-Griqua cooperation and unity was also encouraged by government officials. Faced with rival leadership claims, government officials repeatedly demanded that the Griqua present a unified front\textsuperscript{100} and resolve who their principal leader was. President Mandela himself urged the Griqua on his visit to Griquatown in September 1995 to “hurry up and decide who the leader of the Griqua is”.\textsuperscript{101} Mandela encouraged Griqua to protect their culture and language but asserted that their disunity was unnecessary.\textsuperscript{102} Adding his support for Griqua as well as broader Khoe-San unanimity, Northern Cape Premier Manne Dupico mentioned in 1999 that “we are constantly faced with contradictory claims from different people. We can’t all be leaders, we have to learn that”.\textsuperscript{103} Indeed, government officials in the new order, much like their apartheid predecessors, were inclined to associate genuine Griqua peoplehood with unity and one overarching leader or representative; they also expected Griqua to have similar demands. The expectations that Griqua were to have an overarching leader and a unified voice in turn fed into longstanding Griqua aspirations for unity.\textsuperscript{104}

Moves towards unity and cooperation assumed segmental and inclusive forms. Segmental moves were shown in alliance formation amongst specific organizations, formed in part to counter the influence of rivals. Inclusive moves were manifested in the establishment of the National Griqua Forum in 1997, encompassing all or most Griqua bodies that were then in existence. The NGF does appear to have done much for Griqua unity and cooperation. Through the NGF, Griqua “leaders began to examine seriously the question of their constitutional accommodation and, despite the seemingly impossibility of unity, to co-operate and work together”. The Forum encouraged rivals to become actively involved in joint discussions.\textsuperscript{105}

Segmental unity moves were much more conspicuous and enduring than inclusive or all-embracing unity and cooperation moves. Manifesting a rather segmental attempt at unity and cooperation, an agreement was made at a “Griqua reunion” in Kokstad on 23 March 1996 to “work towards [the] amalgamation” of the (Kranshoek) based GNC and the East Griqualand Pioneers Council,\textsuperscript{106} despite historical tension between the two stemming from the latter’s resentment of leadership by the Le Fleurs. Early in October 1996 the Kranshoek based GNC and the Rehoboth Basters from Namibia agreed to cooperate in light of the proposed UN declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples, reflecting thus the impact of international developments on Griqua and Khoe-San politics. The Rehoboth Basters and the GNC would cooperate on, \textit{inter alia}, the restitution of ancestral land.\textsuperscript{107}

Late in November 1996 a formal “international treaty” on future cooperation and the advancement of the rights of First Nations globally, was signed in Upington between the Kranshoek based GNC, the East Griqualand Pioneers Council, elders and leaders of the Nama (Nama Representative Council), as well as the Rehoboth Baster Community from Namibia.\textsuperscript{108} Paul Pienaar represented the Pioneers Council, Paul de Wet the Nama and Hans Diergaardt the Rehoboth Basters.\textsuperscript{109} Griqua organizations excluded from the treaty also embarked on cooperation with each other. In 1996 the United Griquas of Griqualand West was created, comprising the Griquas of Adam Kok V, the Griekwa Volks Organisasie of Paramount Chief Reverend Daniel Kanyiles, as well as the Knysna based GNC, by virtue of its longstanding association with the Griqua Volks Organisasie.\textsuperscript{110}

The rivalry between the two GNC’s played an important role in the configuration of Griqua and broader Khoe-San alliances in the post-apartheid period, with each of the two organizations being inclined to form alliances with organizations that the other was not allied to. Thus, whilst the Kranshoek based GNC established links

\textsuperscript{100}Waldman: “Griqua conundrum”, pp. 42-6.
\textsuperscript{101}Quoted in Waldman: “Griqua conundrum”, p. 44.
\textsuperscript{103}\textit{Sunday World}, 14 March 1999, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{104}On dynamics for Griqua unity see also Waldman: “Griqua conundrum”, pp. 47-9.
\textsuperscript{105}Waldman: “Griqua conundrum”, p. 78.
\textsuperscript{106}GNC: “The origin of the Griqua National Conference of South Africa”.
\textsuperscript{107}\textit{Volkshlad}, 7 October 1996, p. 2.
with the Nama Representative Council, the Rehoboth Basters and the Pioneers Council, the Knysna based GNC established links with the Griekwa Volks Organisasie (from 1981 already), the United Griquas of Griqualand West and the Griqua of Adam Kok V, manifesting thus an attempt at enhancing influence in the Khoe-San socio-political landscape and to contain the influence of rivals. Andrew le Fleur II of the Kranshoek based GNC acknowledged Andries Waterboer, nephew of Nicolaas Waterboer II who established the Griekwa Volks Organisasie headed by Kanyiles since around 1959, as the leader of the Griqua people in Griquatown, reflecting thus an attempt at eroding the influence of Kanyiles as well as the influence of the Knysna based GNC. Notions of ‘racial’ authenticity were also liable to be invoked to challenge the legitimacy of some leaders. For example, Martin Engelbrecht, a newcomer on the Griqua political landscape, remarked in 1995 when Griqua leaders were appealing for recognition as traditional leaders, that the Le Fleur Griqua were “more bastards, … coloureds … [and] not real Griquas”.

Rivalry and alliance formation was also manifested when the leadership of the National Griqua Forum was considered in 1997. Whilst government anthropologists nominated Cecil le Fleur of the Kranshoek based GNC as chairperson for the Griqua Forum, other organizations declined from supporting his nomination, fearing it seems, further consolidating the leading position of his organization by supporting his nomination. Anthony le Fleur, the leader of the smaller Knysna based GNC was thus also nominated and finally elected chairperson, with C le Fleur becoming vice-chairperson.

Thus, the leadership contestation and factionalism existing prior to 1994 was carried over into the new democratic order with new organizations being drawn in after 1994. Indeed, there was a tendency within Griqua communities both before and after 1994, was “towards factionalism and the creation of multiple organisations”. There was, at the same time, also a persistent aspiration for, and periodic moves towards both segmental and all-embracing unity and cooperation partly drawing on an idealized past of unity associated with past Griqua captaincies, reinforced by official expectations and desire for a unified Griqua position, as well as by attempts at consolidating influence within the Griqua socio-political landscape through alliance formation.

Moves were made not only to establish cooperation and unity between the Griqua but also between Griqua and other Khoe-San. Griqua from the Northern Cape made overtures of unity with San communities in the region, as exemplified by the creation of the Khoisan Representative Council. The KRC claimed to represent a broad alliance of Khoe-San communities, for example Griqua, Korana and San. Some San, however, rejected the KRC, claiming that that it was dominated by non-San. Expressions of brotherhood with the !Xu and Khwe San based at the Schmidtsdrift farm were made by Griqua from Douglas who claimed Fonteintjie, a portion of Schmidtsdrift. Tlhaping Tswana, however, also claimed Schmidtsdrift and wanted the !Xu and Khwe to evacuate the farm. Expressing solidarity with the !Xu and

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111 Waldman: “Griqua conundrum”, pp. 70-1.
113 Sunday Independent, 22 October 1995, p. 11.
118 A Tlhaping population was removed from Schmidtsdrift by the apartheid government in the 1960s. In 1990 !Xu and Khwe San who served in the South African Defence Force’s ‘Bushman’ Battalions in the 1980s were relocated with their dependents to Schmidtsdrift. Some months after they arrived at Schmidtsdrift a Tlhaping group demanded that Schmidtsdrift be return to them. The group also refused to share the land with the !Xu and Khwe once they (Tlhaping) were granted ownership. In 1996 the government availed funds for the !Xu and Khwe for alternative land. The farm Platfontein was subsequently purchased for the !Xu and Khwe for R7.5 million in the same year. Cape Argus, 21 July 1997, p. 8; Stuart Douglas: “Reflections on state intervention and the Schmidtsdrift Bushmen”, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 15, 1 (1997), pp. 45-9; John Sharp and Stuart Douglass: “Prisoners of their reputation? The veterans of the
Khwe, Griqua leader Isak van Nel threatened a joint Griqua and San march (together with over 300 goats and cattle) to parliament to demand settlement on Fonteintjie. Van Nel also asserted that:

[t]he San people are our brothers and we will stand by them through thick and thin. We are claiming a part of Schmidtsdrift and if the San prefer to stay there it is fine with us. From now on we are going to stand together.

William Wellen another Griqua leader from the Northern Cape (linked to Griekwa Volks Organisasie) mentioned in a similar vein that:

[a]s traditional inhabitants of Fonteintjie the plight of the San is our plight. It breaks our hearts to see our brothers being forced to live in such shocking conditions in the new South Africa.\(^{119}\)

**Griqua and Afrikaner nationalist cooperation**

People with separatist aspirations, particularly Afrikaner nationalists, were encouraged by the ethno-national and separatist expressions made by leaders of new Griqua formations in the Northern Cape and hoped for joint pressure for the realization of separatist aspirations. Moves were indeed made to establish cooperation between Griqua organizations and Afrikaner nationalist organizations. On 9 January 1997, the Griqua ‘Council of Griqualand West and the Northern Cape’ represented by Martin Engelbrecht, held an informal meeting with the Volkstaat Council (a statutory body mandated to advice the government on the feasibility of Afrikaner self-determination, in particular an Afrikaner volkstaat\(^{20}\)). Issues such as self-determination, international examples of minorities, and common cultural concerns were discussed.\(^{121}\) General Constant Viljoen, leader of the Freedom Front, also held discussions with Griqua representatives.\(^{122}\) Periodic meetings occurred between the Engelbrecht and the Freedom Front over the years, with Engelbrecht and Constand Viljoen signing a cooperation agreement in Pretoria on 21 May 1999 on behalf of the KRC and the FF.\(^{123}\) The Afrikaner Eenheidsbeweging (AEB) lead by Cassie Aucamp also welcomed the formation of the Giqualand West Liberation Movement (GWLM) in 2000 and its aim at achieving independence. The AEB saw the GWLM as a potentially important ally in its own strive for self-determination.\(^{124}\) Unlike the new Griqua organizations, the Kranshoek based GNC, which called for the establishment of a Griqua homeland for much of the apartheid period, expressed opposition to the idea of a volkstaat as well as other separatist ideas.\(^{125}\) Attempts at cooperation between Griqua and Afrikaner nationalist organizations proved to be a much more temporary phenomenon than attempts at cooperation between different (old and new) Khoe-San.

**Summation**

The democratic transition inclined many Griqua to reconnect with their indigenous heritage, a reconnection that was further reinforced through an international First Nation rights discourse deployed to pressure government to deal with Griqua demands. By encouraging the emergence of new Griqua organizations, the democratic transition also contributed much to the invigoration and transformation of the Griqua political landscape characterized by factionalism and often shifting alliances. Although there were common Griqua concerns around recognition as an indigenous community or people, recognition of traditional leadership and land restitution, there were some strategic differences between newer and older organizations. Older organizations were more inclined to pursue a diplomatic approach. Newer organizations were more inclined to make separatist articulations made partly to gain more modest restitution concessions. Renewed Griqua activism and

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\(^{120}\) Cape Argus, 21 June 1997, p. 8.


\(^{122}\) Volksblad, 10 January 1997, p. 2; Patriot, 17 January 1997, p. 4.

\(^{123}\) Volksblad, 10 January 1997, p. 2.

\(^{124}\) Citizen, 22 May 1999, p. 4; Beeld, 22 May 1999.

\(^{125}\) Impak, 1 September 2000, p. 4.

\(^{126}\) Volksblad, 7 February 1997, p. 8.
Griqua restitution demands, together with their deployment of a First Nation rights discourse contributed to interest in the Khoe-San heritage amongst Coloured segments and to the neo-Khoe-San resurgence explored in the next chapter.
Chapter 12: The neo-Khoe-San


(Dr Willa [Willem] Boezak, Rapport (Metro), 11 July 1999, p. 7)

Introduction

This chapter shows the response of some Coloured segments to conditions generated by the democratic transition in South Africa. The democratic transition led to a significant change in the way in which individuals from Coloured communities articulated their identities, with a relatively small but growing number opting to use names of Khoekhoe groups of the early colonial period in identifying themselves. Projecting themselves as indigenous, First Nations and African, many old and neo-Khoe-San rejected a Coloured identity as an inauthentic apartheid imposition. With the Khoekhoe resurgence following the re-introduction and repositioning of South Africa into the international arena, newer Khoekhoe organizations followed organizations of longstanding Khoekhoe communities in utilizing both national and international forums to publicize themselves and their concerns, thus serving to activate some government responsiveness as they attempted to shape socio-economic and political transformation in a manner that suited their interests. Whilst the changed constitutional and political environment opened Griqua to reaffirm indigenous connotations of the Griqua category, some Coloureds were inclined to construct Khoekhoe indigenous identities drawing on previously marginal indigenous associations of the Coloured category. Whilst neo-Khoe-San disassociated themselves from a Coloured category, neo-Khoe-San identities manifested attempts at finding identity terms that were useful for the promotion of Coloured socio-economic, political and psychological concerns which delimitied the articulation of neo-Khoe-San identities, tying them to Colouredness at the same time as the affirmation of Khoekhoe identities challenged a Coloured identity. Given the social and educational backgrounds on neo-Khoe-San leaders, this chapter and the subsequent one also shows the significance of Coloured educated elites¹ in the neo-Khoe-San resurgence.

After the 1994 democratic transition a small but growing number of Coloureds who were not attached to longstanding Khoekhoe communities started to promote a Khoekhoe, San, Khoekhoe, ‘indigenous’, First Nation and African identity, reflecting thus a process of psychological and socio-political repositioning within the national and international order. Post-apartheid Khoekhoe and San identity re-articulations were attended with

¹ The founder of the Cape Cultural heritage Development Council (CCHDC) which played an important role in neo-Khoekhoe revivalism, used to be a lecturer in mechanical engineering at the Peninsula Technikon in Bellville near Cape Town. Chiefs affiliated to the CCHDC tended to be fairly well educated. A few of those active in the neo-Khoe-San social landscape also had PhD degrees, for example, Willem Boezak, George Brink and N Swart, all linked to the CCHDC.
aspirations for government recognition, land restitution, and constitutional accommodation of Khoe-San leaders.

The affirmation of a Khoe-San heritage was muted in apartheid South Africa, with only a relatively small number of people having acknowledged and/or affirmed their Khoekhoe and San indigenous origins and identities, for example, individuals from the Griqua and Nama Khoekhoe and southern Kalahari San communities. Khoe-San did not feature in the pre-1994 South African constitutional and legal discourse as legitimate communities with identities, cultures and historical claims that deserved to be sustained. Although most Khoe-San descendants were officially slotted into Coloured and ‘Native’ categories, Khoe-San descent was generally associated with segments in Coloured communities before 1994, usually in a negative manner. Official and public stigma attached to Khoe-San identities, languages and cultures; the disadvantage of assuming Khoekhoe and San identities, and the benefits of assuming other identities within the context of colonial cultural and racialized hierarchies – locating the Khoe-San at the bottom – inclined distancing from Khoekhoe identities and culture. A significant change thus occurred in the 1990s.

The demise of formal apartheid and the replacement of a White government with one in which Bantu-speaking Africans predominated, together with anxiety about the future, generated psychological space for some Coloureds, Whites and others from communities not generally called African in the pre-1994 period, to re-evaluate their heritage and to (re)affirm or invent an indigenous ancestral heritage, contributing thus to a rethinking of what it meant to be indigenous and African. There were renewed talks within Coloured communities about the inappropriateness of a Coloured identity projected as an inadequate apartheid imposition; there were increasing talks about the need to develop a more appropriate identity. After the 1994 democratic transition a relatively small but growing number of Coloureds opted to promote a Khoe-San identity (as well as sub-identities) that they presented as the ‘real’ identity of Coloureds, thus reaffirming previously rather unpalatable historical associations of Coloureds with (partial) Khoe-San ancestry and contributing to a rethinking of what it meant to be Khoekhoe and San (in the post-apartheid period).

As with the post-apartheid re-articulation of Griqua identities, post-apartheid neo-Khoekhoe and neo-San identity articulations were very much influenced by the changed constitutional and political order. Post-apartheid neo-Khoekhoe and neo-San identity articulations were also much influenced by the presence as well as the response of longstanding Khoekhoe and San communities to the new order. Griqua organizations, particularly the Kranshoek based GNC, together with WIMSA (Working Group for Indigenous Minorities in Southern Africa) and its South African arm, SASI (South African San Institute) became principal catalysts in the affirmation of an indigenous/First Nation status and in the agitation for ‘indigenous’/First People’s rights. WIMSA and SASI contributed much to the conscientization and politicization amongst the San but the demands that they made and the discourse that they deployed found resonance amongst some Coloureds in search of empowering post-apartheid identities. The changed constitutional order; the activities and restitution campaigns of organizations of longstanding Khoe-San communities (e.g. GNC, WIMSA, SASI), highlighted particularly at conferences organized by academics from 1996; a resurgence amongst longstanding Khoe-San communities in the Northern Cape, provided an impetus for the emergence of the neo-Khoe-San. Prospects of material benefits, notably a government salary for recognized Khoe-San chiefs, as well as attempts at securing a measure of political influence in the post-apartheid political environment in which many Coloureds felt powerless and marginal, provided much impetus for the emergence of a multitude of Khoe-San chiefs from the late 1990s and to demands that they be accommodated in a government sanctioned authoritative traditional leadership structure. Thus, in August 1996 the neo-Khoekhoe Cape Cultural Heritage Development Council (CCHDC) was registered as a Section 21 (non-profit company), a few months after the opening of the controversial and well publicized Miscast Khoe-San exhibition. The CCHDC cultivated neo-Khoekhoe branches with their own chiefs and demanded the recognition of their chiefs. Though its grassroots support was numerically weak, the CCHDC, became a significant rival to the Kranshoek based GNC and consolidated its position within the Khoe-

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2 On the Miscast exhibition, see chapter 13.
San socio-political landscape through alliances with traditional rivals of the Kranshoek based GNC, thus leading to a significant reconstitution of the South African Khoe-San socio-political landscape. Having later expanded its sphere of activity beyond the Cape into provinces such as Gauteng, by 2005 the term Khoi Cultural Heritage Development Council was used instead of Cape Cultural Heritage Development Council to reflect the expanded sphere of the organization’s activity. The resurgence of Khoe-San identities and the establishment of Khoe-San organizations in the 1990s coincided with a number of international processes and events that occurred around the time of the democratic transition in South Africa, that also impacted on the articulation of Khoe-San identities, for example, the United Nations’ (UN) declaration of 1995-2004 as an International Decade of the World’s Indigenous People, which brought greater global focus on ‘indigenous’ or ‘First Peoples’. Renewed Western fascination with, and romanticization of indigenous cultures beyond the West and the attended boom in the cultural tourism also provided an incentive for the staging of Khoe-San indigeneity.

**WIMSA and SASI**

A resurgence among the southern Kalahari San (or the #Khomani) in the Northern Cape was much influenced by prospects of land restitution in the Kalahari Gemsbok National Park (KGNP) and the activities of organizations like the Working Group for Indigenous Minorities in Southern Africa and the South African San Institute, both established in 1996. Though SASI was formally established in 1996, some individuals who became involved with the organization were already active amongst the San before 1996, for example Roger Chennells, a lawyer who became involved in the southern Kalahari San land claim in the KGNP.

The San resurgence in South Africa was tied to the growing San organization in southern Africa stimulated in part by the United Nations proclaiming 1993 an International Year of the World’s Indigenous People and subsequently declaring an International Decade of the World’s Indigenous People. These declarations generated greater sensitivity to, and support for the politics and concerns of First Nations. International support not only stimulated greater activism among First Nations like Khoekhoe and San identity claimants in southern Africa but also encouraged the deployment of identities in ways that facilitated support, financial or otherwise. In 1994 a !Xu and Khwe delegation from Schmidtsdrift that apparently got some support from Whites who became involved in the creation of WIMSA and SASI, attended the proceedings of the United Nations linked International Working Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) at Geneva. The delegation not only set in discussions on the need to protect ‘indigenous peoples’ but also delivered two speeches appealing for international recognition of their indigeneity and for its conservation. The visit by the !Xu and Khwe delegation to IWGIA and subsequent ones by other Khoe-San was important in allowing for contacts with First Nations from elsewhere and for familiarization with the First Nations rights discourse. The visit by the !Xu and Khwe delegation also provided inspiration to other longstanding as well as and neo-Khoe-San.

Greater international sensitivity and support for First Nations contributed to the emergence of an ‘indigenous’ or First Nation industry in which highly educated and skilled individuals involved in San (educational, cultural

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3 Johny Steinberg’s 2004 book creates the impression that by 1992 Basil Coetzee, a ‘Coloured’ warden at Paardenberg prison in Paarl in the Western Cape, was already attempting to instil a Khoekhoe identity in Coloured prisoners, encouraging them reject a Coloured identity; to trace their decent to the historical Khoekhoe, and to develop pride in a much maligned Khoekhoe heritage (Johny Steinberg: *The number: One man’s search for identity in the Cape underworld and prison gangs*, Johannesburg and Cape Town: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2004, pp. 261-5). However, Coetzee only became involved in Kho-San conscientization from 1998 through the influence of Joseph Little. Coetzee was transferred to Polsmoor prison near Cape Town late in 1992 (Ibid. pp. 270-1). His Khoekhoe activities found support amongst a few fellow ‘Coloured’ wardens, some of whom became involved in the neo-Cochoqua organization headed by Coetzee who acted as chief of the Cochoqua group.


and economic) development projects (many being contracted as consultants) and in the promotion of San land rights, drew much funding from international sources for their activities among the San.\(^6\) The emergence of WIMSA and SASI not long after the UN declared an International Decade for the World’s Indigenous People, suggested an attempt at maximizing the opportunities afforded by the UN declaration by skilful educated Whites and San activist. According to WIMSA’s most probably calculated self-projection, the organization was established in January 1996 in Windhoek, Namibia, after San representatives from southern African countries expressed a need for the establishment of committees to represent them at local, national and international levels; for the effective exchange of information among their communities, and for participation in regional developmental processes. A number of objectives were supposedly defined for WIMSA by San delegates: WIMSA had to provide San communities with support to enable them to gain political recognition; it had to provide assistance that would secure their access to natural and financial resources, raise human rights awareness among their communities, and allow their communities to become self-sustainable through development projects; it also had to assist San communities to regain their identity and pride in their culture, thus enhancing their self-esteem. WIMSA provided training courses at its Windhoek office for young San. It also conducted a series of workshops with San ‘traditional authorities’ on land tenure, income-generating possibilities and specific community problems. The organization provided opportunities for San delegates from southern Africa to participate in regional workshops and international conferences.

By 2000 WIMSA had 15 member organizations from Botswana, Namibia and South Africa. WIMSA also had 11 support organizations which included regional as well as international institutions in Europe, the US and Africa. Regional support organizations provided professional expertise to WIMSA when called upon. International support organizations were much useful for bringing urgent matters to the attention of the media and governments in their countries, and in providing moral support.\(^7\)

SASI was established at the request of WIMSA as a service and support organization to WIMSA and its affiliated communities.\(^8\) WIMSA mandated SASI to create multidisciplinary development projects in areas such as education, leadership training, cultural resources management, land rights, intellectual property rights, oral history collection and community mobilization. SASI projected itself as aiming to give the San “permanent control over their lives, resources and destiny”.\(^9\) Thus, although very much at White run organization, Whites insisted that they were acting on behalf of, and in the interest of San purportedly being guided to take control of their own destiny.\(^10\)

To secure funding for their San indigenous industry, SASI and WIMSA deployed a primordial discourse playing on the strong interest of international donors in the survival of “vanishing cultures”. SASI and WIMSA were inclined to project San as a First People and to stress their continuity as hunter-gatherers.\(^11\) The deployment of a primordial discourse also contributed to the success of the southern Kalahari San claim for land in the Kalahari Gemsbok National Park.\(^12\) During the land claim process, the southern Kalahari San were

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\(^6\) See e.g. SASI: \textit{Annual Review: April 1997 – March 1998} (Rondebosch, SASI, 1998) p. 36.
\(^10\) See e.g. SASI: \textit{Annual Review: April 1998-March 1999} (Cape Town: SASI, 1999), p.16.
\(^12\) The southern Kalahari San land claim was lodged in 1995 with the assistance of Roger Chennells (Steven Robins, Elias Madzudzo, Matthias Brenzinger: \textit{An assessment of the status of the San in South Africa, Angola, Zambia and Zimbabwe}, Windhoek: Legal Assistance Centre, 2001, p. 7). Roger Chennells became a SASI lawyer after the organization was established in 1996. He was also involved in negotiations commenced in 1997 by the Land Claims Commissioner between the principal parties in the claim for land in the KGNP, that is, southern Kalahari San, South African National Parks (i.e.
projected as a highly marginalized but homogenous and cohesive hunter-gathering community with historical links to the KGNP. The southern Kalahari San claim did not only stimulate the reaffirmation of a San identity; it also boosted the profile of SASI as a San developmental organization, and its ability to draw funding.

With developmental funding secured, SASI embarked on wide-ranging projects projected as empowering San economically, culturally and politically. With the assistance of SASI the three prominent San communities in the Northern Cape, that is, the southern Kalahari San, !Xu and Khwe created community property associations facilitating San access to land. SASI also undertook projects concerned with linguistic and cultural preservation from 1997. SASI started a project to teach N/u (a southern Kalahari San language having only 23 confirmed speakers by the beginning of 2005) to young San. SASI and WIMSA also sought to capitalize on the growing cultural tourism industry. To “tap the vast tourist potential in Cape Town”, they undertook by 1997 setting up a “San Tourist Village” on the road to Cape Point near Cape Town. The San were excited about the idea of a San tourist village which provided an additional incentive for the affirmation of a San identity and culture.

SASI also started a San advocacy training project in August 1998, “in response to an urgent appeal by San communities in the Northern Cape requesting that SASI assist them in building advocacy capacity by stimulating the formation and organisational development of sustainable civil structures that defend the rights to equality and cultural upliftment of indigenous peoples”. The advocacy training project focused on the “advancement of socio-political rights for indigenous minorities through facilitating their participation in government and non-government structures at local, regional and ultimately national levels”. The communities targeted by SASI for the project were not only the !Xu, Khwe and southern Kalahari San, but also Nama Khoekhoe from Riemvasmaak.

Although shifting modestly from their focus on the San, SASI still confined its activities to communities they could market to international donors as having a measure of cultural and economic continuity with pre-colonial communities, either as hunter-gatherers (San) or as herders (Nama). Unlike many Nama, Nama from Riemvasmaak were viewed as being fairly in tune with Nama traditional culture and practices, making them fairly marketable to international donors. SASI was, however, very averse to promote broad cooperative relations between San from longstanding communities and neo-Khoe-San who lacked the marketable primordial socio-cultural attributes and the association with ultra-marginality that appealed to international donors. The association of neo-Khoe-San with somatic and cultural mixing and Westernisation, and thus with somatic and cultural inauthenticity, made them less likely to activate sympathy and support from international funding sources, especially those with romanticist primordial sentiments. The association of longstanding San with neo-Khoe-San could impute cultural and somatic mixing on them and thus potentially undermine their support by romanticist international donors.

Whilst a primordial San discourse deployed by SASI and WIMSA could secure international funding, it was also liable to reinforce primordial self-projections amongst the San that could engender or sustain tension and divisions within San communities between primordialist/traditionalist and modernizers, as well as tension and divisions between San and Khoekhoe. Whilst some San participated in intra-Khoe-San deliberative, cooperative
or unity structures like the National Khoisan Council and the National Khoisan Consultative Conference, some preferred separate San organizational structures, fearing domination by Khoekhoe in broader Khoe-San structures.\textsuperscript{19} San concern about domination by Khoekhoe was liable to be exploited by Whites uneasy with Khoe-San unity and cooperation.

Whilst SASI and WIMSA were reluctant to support broad unity and cooperation between old and new Khoe-San in South Africa, they were quite keen to support continental mobilization of ‘vulnerable indigenous minorities’. SASI and WIMSA organizers thought that a continental organization would strengthen the international presence of their organizations, particularly at the UN. At the 1997 sitting of the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP), delegations representing vulnerable indigenous communities of Africa like the Pygmies, Maasai, Hadzabe, Berbers as well as Khoekhoe and San, agreed to establish a coordinating committee to increase their cooperation and to help organize African communities to participate in world forums like WGIP. Roger Chennels was mandated to write a constitution for the envisaged Indigenous Peoples of Africa Co-ordinating Committee (IPACC). IPACC was eventually established in 1998 under patronage of SASI. The IPACC secretariat was based at SASI’s headquarters in Rondebosch, Cape Town.\textsuperscript{20}

Supported by individuals with a legal background and an understanding of international First Nation supporting bodies and indigenous rights affirmed by the UN, SASI and WIMSA were able to link San to international First Nation networks which in turn encouraged neo-Khoe-San to utilize international bodies and the international First Nation rights discourse locally. Given that SASI and WIMSA were very much White run organizations doing ‘developmental’ work amongst the San, allowing the San to link to international indigenous First Nation networks and thus to appropriate and deploy the First Nation discourse, the ensuing appropriation and self-identification would at least in part be a White mediated one. San self-identification as vulnerable First Nations and their participation in SASI and WIMSA funded projects would in turn facilitate the inflow of funding, thus sustaining work for ‘compassionate’ outsiders amongst the San. Access of funding by SASI and WIMSA in turn opened potential Khoe-San to the potential financial benefits of indigenous First Nation, San and Khoekhoe identities.

The leading role played by highly educated and skilled Whites in SASI and WIMSA apparently served to confer credibility on their activity amongst the San that enabled them to get funding they requested from international sources. Funding in turn enabled them to sustain and advance their projects, with progression encouraging further funding. However, the leading role played by Whites in SASI and WIMSA generated resentment amongst Khoe-San, especially Khoekhoe (identity claimants). Whilst some San resented the leading role played by Whites in SASI and WIMSA, their appreciation of the work done by these Whites and the funding that they were able to draw inclined them to contain their resentment.

Whilst White leadership in SASI and WIMSA caused resentment amongst the neo-Khoe-San, to the extent that Whites played a role in the re-affirmation of a San heritage and identity amongst individuals from longstanding San communities, notably the southern Kalahari San, which in turn impacted on the neo-Khoe-San resurgence, they would also have contributed to the affirmation of neo-Khoe-San identities.

**Neo-San: The San Diaspora**

The presence of Griqua, Nama and San from longstanding communities in the Northern Cape allowed Coloureds in the region to have a relatively stronger awareness of, and openness to a Khoe-San heritage than those from other regions, and to be thus especially pre-disposed to Khoe-San revivalism. The same situation also applied to some extent to the Free State which had strong historical associations with Griqua and Korana. Whilst a revivalism within longstanding Khoe-San communities stimulated Khoe-San revivalism amongst

\textsuperscript{19} *Mail & Guardian*, 26 April, 2001.

Coloureds not attached to longstanding Khoe-San communities, Khoe-San revivalism amongst such Coloureds was in turn liable to feed into revivalism within longstanding Khoe-San communities. Though not as attractive an option as Khoekhoe categories (at least outside the Northern Cape), some revivalists segments in the Northern Cape opted for a specifically San identity, notably the San Diaspora of Pastor Johannes Lawrence from Kimberley. Claiming to be a !Xam descendant, Lawrence assumed the title of San paramount chief. Formed, according to Lawrence, in 1995, the San Diaspora suggested the significance of the presence of longstanding Khoe-San communities in the Northern Cape for receptivity amongst Coloured segments there for Khoe-San revivalism. The organization also suggested opportunism that might be involved in claiming Khoekhoe and San identities, especially Khoekhoe and San chieftainship. Lawrence was supposedly at first a Griqua who became a San after falling out with his Griqua counterparts. Lawrence claimed, however, to have been born a San. Lawrence’s self-projection was also suggestive opportunistic movement between potential multiple identities stemming from multiple ethnic heritages.

Appropriating a San category associated with pre-eminent aboriginality allowed for ownership claims that could potentially trump all other ownership claims, including those of the Khoekhoe. Historical San associations with innocence, vulnerability, marginality and colonial genocide, that is, with ultimate victimhood, could also be deployed in the staking of San claims for reparation and in appeals for aid. Lawrence’s San Diaspora issued a media statement in 2000 in which it undertook to ask the government to prevent museums from removing ‘San title deeds’, that is, rock-art, from their original places and placing them in museums. The San Diaspora reasoned that rock-art was the only title deeds providing proof of the San Diaspora’s land rights and heritage. “Ons voorouers het dit in klip verewig sodat dit nooit afgesny kan word nie”. The organization also undertook to ask the government to assist the San to get back their ancestors’ skins and heads from other countries so that they could be buried at an appropriate place.

Playing on the notion of the San being ultimate victims, the San Diaspora emphasized: “[O]ns geskiedenis bevestig ons rodewig. Almal ken die afgryslike skendings”. The organization asked “[w]anneer gaan die ander rasse ophou om ons te besteel” and appealed to the public to help with the protection of the heritage of the San from exploitation. It mentioned that the San Diaspora were the most disadvantaged volk in the land and appealed for public donations, an office and computers, old clothes, tinned food, furniture, blankets and articles that were no longer used. The San Diaspora also called for the incorporation of San in official decision-making structures, including parliament.

Like neo-Khoekhoe, the leadership of the San Diaspora affirmed a broader Khoe-San identity. The leadership of the organization also identified with broad Khoe-San restitution demands and made statements on behalf of the broader Khoe-San population. The organization rejected the Coloured category and called on Coloureds to reclaim “their” Khoe-San heritage. Lawrence also joined other neo-Khoe-San leaders on the Sarah Bartmann bandwagon by expressing support for the return of her remains for burial in South Africa. After the French government announced early in 2002 that Bartmann’s remains would be returned, Lawrence called on the government on behalf of the Northern Cape Khoisan Council, “to honour Saartjie Baartman by erecting a life-size monument in her honour and [to] include her memoriam in National Women’s Day celebrations”.

Lawrence managed to generate some respect as a San leader. He became the media officer of the National Khoisan Council formed at the initiative of the Department of Constitutional Development in 1999 – to promote

21 Volksblad (Noord Kaap), 1 March 2000, p. 4.
dialogue with the government in regard to the constitutional accommodation of Khoe-San traditional leaders.\textsuperscript{25} The San Diaspora gained some recognition from the Northern Cape government which provided it with some support. The Northern Cape government, for example, sponsored a trip of a San Diaspora delegation to the Australian Rock Art Research Association congress (in Australia) in 2000, where they were supposed to make an input, even though the leadership of the San Diaspora at the congress were apparently not in tune with ancestral San traditions and lacked knowledge of San rock-art.

The measure of recognition and support accorded to Lawrence by the Northern Cape government and his self-positioning as the pre-eminent San leader, generated tension between him and the leadership of the !Xu and Khwe San who were brought to South Africa from Namibia by the apartheid South African Defence Force in 1990.\textsuperscript{26} The !Xu and Khwe leadership took issue with Lawrence for speaking on behalf of the whole San population of South Africa. They felt that the Northern Cape government pushed Lawrence forward as a leader, as manifested in the sponsoring of the trip of the San Diaspora delegation that attended the Australian Rock Art Research Association’s congress. Lawrence mentioned, however, after Mario Mahongo voiced the concerns of the !Xu and the Khwe through the press, that he (Lawrence) was only the spokesperson of San tribes in the San-Diaspora, which included, according to Lawrence, the !Xam, plains-San and the mountain San. He mentioned that the !Xu and the Khwe were not part of his structure as they were not indigenous tribes.\textsuperscript{27} SASI also refused to recognize Lawrence. Lawrence believed the reason for the refusal was the fear of competition for available funds.\textsuperscript{28} Indeed, SASI and WIMSA had created quite a lucrative indigenous industry amongst the San that could be threatened through an upsurge of what might be considered as questionable San.

\textbf{Neo-Khoekhoe}

Joseph Little and the Cape Cultural Heritage Development Council,\textsuperscript{29} registered in 1996 as a Section 21 (i.e. non-profit) company,\textsuperscript{30} played an important role in the organization of the neo-Khoekhoe, at first in the Western and Eastern Cape and later in other provinces. Little, the chief executive officer of the CCHDC, claimed in 1997 to be the chief of the Hancumqua and to be a Khoekhoe descendant through his grandmother “of the royal tribe” of the Hancumqua\textsuperscript{31} (a historical Khoekhoe group that might also have been referred to as the Inqua).\textsuperscript{32} Little later claimed to be chief of the Chainoqua. Little and his associates found some inspiration in the 1996 South African constitution in establishing the CCHDC, especially those sections providing for the protection.

\textsuperscript{26} 500 Xu and Khwe who served in the ‘Bushman’ Battalions of the South African Defense Force (SADF) were relocated together with their 3500 relocated from Namibia to a temporary tent camp at Schmidtsdrift military base about 80 km west of Kimberley in 1990. The !Xu and Khwe were granted South African citizenship soon after their arrival. Many !Xu and Khwe opted to remain in Namibia. Most of the adults relocated to Schmidtsdrift were originally from Angola; most of the adult !Xu were from the central part whilst most of the adult Khwe were from the south-eastern part of Angola. They were recruited by the Portuguese colonial military in the 1960s, the !Xu serving mostly as guards and the Khwe being given a more offensive role in military offensives against UNITA. Many of these !Xu and Khwe were recruited by the SADF after the Portuguese departed.
\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Volksblad}, 7 July 2000.
\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Deep divisions amongst SA Bushman groups"}, IOL, 30 March 2000.
\textsuperscript{29} Joseph Little and his associates had two connected structures, that is, a CCHDC and a CCHDO (Cape Cultural Heritage Development Organization). The CCHDC became much more prominent than the CCHDO. Some information on the CCHDO (also applicable to the CCHDC) is provided in George W Brink: “A historical analysis of the constitutional development of groups within the Cape Cultural Heritage Development Organisation” (Research paper for Department of Constitutional Development, 2000), esp. pp. 19-20, 51-3.
\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Mail & Guardian}, 25 July 1997, p. 12.
and promotion of Khoe-San languages (section 6); for persons belonging to cultural, religious or linguistic communities to practice their cultures, religions and languages and to form cultural, religious and linguistic associations (section 31); for the creation of a Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities (section 185); for traditional leadership (section 212), and for “self-determination to any community sharing a common cultural and language heritage” (section 235).  

Coloured concerns delimiting the articulation of neo-Khoe-San identities were evident in the formulation of the objectives of the CCHDC. Little mentioned explicitly in July 1997 that the body was launched in “response to the government’s affirmative action policies: under the previous dispensation we [Coloureds] weren’t white enough, with the next we weren’t brown enough”. Manifesting the impact of cultural chauvinism imputing identity and cultural inadequacy and inauthenticity on Coloureds, thus propelling some to seek authenticity by invoking a Khoi-San heritage, Jean Burgess, chief of the neo-Khoekhoe Gonaqua ‘tribe’ and former United Democratic Front activist based in Grahamstown in the Eastern Cape, rationalized her acceptance of a Khoekhoe identity in terms of perceptions of many Bantu-speaking Africans that Coloureds lacked a cultural heritage. Burgess claimed to have been part of the Black Consciousness Movement and to have always seen herself as Black but that on Heritage Day in 1996

> a Xhosa man asked me, in front of all the people in the hall, where my culture and heritage was … . It made me feel like nothing. I couldn’t answer him. I started searching for it … . I wanted it so badly, I would have done anything for it. It’s difficult to explain what it means to have one’s culture denied.

Having affirmed a Khoekhoe heritage and identity, Burgess suggested that she felt her dignity had been restored and that she saw her role as a “spiritual responsibility to make coloured people see they aren’t just a mixture of black and white”. Little also manifested the impact of those who were not from Coloured communities on the search for an alternative to a Coloured identity: “Black people have no respect for us [Coloureds] because we have no ancestral roots”.

Coloured concerns generated by the democratic political transition, together with the historical association of Coloureds with Khoe-San, provided some receptivity to Khoe-San identity entrepreneurs like Little and his associates marketing Khoe-San identities as psychologically, politically and materially beneficial. Re-evaluating the historical association of Coloureds with partial Khoi-San ancestry, the CCHDC and its affiliates developed interpretations of Coloureds emphasizing an indigenous heritage and de-emphasizing (at least in public) a mixed heritage, particularly the notion that Coloureds were products of sexual liaisons between Whites and indigenous peoples. It was now emphasized that the majority of Coloureds were descendants of the Khoi-San, with a slave heritage occasionally acknowledged in public.

The CCHDC aimed, according to Little, to “foster unity among historically coloured people and [to] give them pride in their [indigenous] origin”. According its (1996) spokesperson, David Andrews, the CCHDC sought to restore Coloured people’s heritage to its former pre-1652 glory. Aiming to reconstruct Coloured people’s indigenous culture and ‘tribal’ identifications, the CCHDC opened branches in the Western and Eastern Cape under (male and female) chiefs. Functioning as an umbrella organization, the CCHDC was supposed to comprise organizations or ‘tribes’ under Cape neo-Khoekhoe chiefs. CCHDC affiliates campaigned for the recognition of their ‘tribes’ as ‘indigenous’ people, for the recognition of their chiefs as traditional leaders, and

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for a constitutionally recognized Khoe-San traditional leadership structure. The CCHDC also planned, according to Andrews, to identify and claim land that originally belonged to Khoekhoe ‘tribes’ and to capitalize on the cultural heritage industry:

In many areas, indigenous people are living in squalor while other interested [sic] groups are making money from their history. We will submit land claims to the Land Claims Court to get the land back and have them declared national heritage sites. We will develop it, with the co-operation of the people, into sustainable hives of activity which would enable the people to economically empower themselves while at the same time tap the tourism potential.

Claims by neo-Khoe-San chiefs reflected the material as well psychological imperatives of the neo-Khoe-San resurgence. Jean Burgess criticized the Land Claims Commission (LCC) and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) for not recognizing the Khoekhoe in their activities at a CCHDC gathering in Outdshoorn in May 1999. She also criticized the TRC for only focusing on cases of injustice committed from 1948 and the LCC for only helping people who were deprived of land since 1913. Suggesting a basis for Khoekhoe ownership claims, Burgess stated that ‘Harry die Strandloper’ (or Autshumato) was the first political prisoner on Robben Island and that Krotoa (Eva) died on the island, thus: “[d]it maak die Koikoi die eienaars van Robbeneciland en ons eis dit”.

Reasoning that “Coloureds were an apartheid creation”, Basil Coetzee, chief of the CCHDC-linked Cochoqua ‘tribe’, also expressed the neo-Khoekhoe desire for cultural renewal as well as for restitution of land on the basis of neo-Khoekhoe aboriginality:

Whoever came here, from wherever, found us here. We are the original inhabitants of this land. We want our land back and our languages recognized. If we can have land, we can end this cultural slavery. We were a sovereign people before the Europeans came here.

The demand for land was, as Coetzee indicated, often qualified or moderated so as to appear reasonable and practicable. The CCHDC did not, according to Coetzee, seek complete restoration of Khoe-San historical land or a homeland or Khoe-San state:

How can we ask for a homeland in our own country? But we’re not saying all immigrants should leave the country. There’s enough land for all of us.

In asserting the presence neo-Khoekhoe, the CCHDC also demanded that Khoe-San history be inserted significantly into the school curriculum. Burgess reasoned at De Hoek in 1999 that the there could not be peace in South Africa if the whole history of the Khoekhoe was not recognized. It was affirmed at the CCHDC gathering at De Hoek that the early African religion of the Khoekhoe and San should be taught nationally as part of the religious study plan in curriculum 2005 and that information on the Khoekhoe and San as well as the school history study-plan on the Khoekhoe be broadened.

**Tension: CCHDC and GNC**

The antics and claims of some of the new chiefs disturbed some representatives of longstanding Khoe-San communities, notably the Kranshoek based GNC and SASI, who feared that their own positions and demands would be undermined through the upsurge of what might be considered questionable chiefs and Khoe-San.

41 *Burger*, 13 May 1999, p. 15.
43 *Burger*, 13 May 1999, p. 15.
Some tension subsequently developed between neo-Khoekhoe organizations and representatives of the Kranshoek based GNC.

Mansell Upham, the legal advisor of the Kranshoek GNC, indicated in 1997 when the CCHDC was propelled to public view by the media, that there was a willingness to talk about neo-Khoekhoe chieftainship claims but not to legitimate them. The actions of individuals like Joseph Little made Upham and the GNC concerned that there was “a danger of people with genuine historic claims being minimalised and trivialized, leading to their continued marginalization”. The disinclination of the Kranshoek based GNC to embrace and legitimate Little and his associates in the CCHDC encouraged Little to seek allies among Griqua foes of the Kranshoek based GNC, some of whom were quite eager to embrace Little and his associates in order to increase their own influence in the Griqua and broader Khoe-San socio-political landscape. Little managed – largely by aligning his organization with the Khoekhoe opponents of the Kranshoek based GNC – to achieve a prominent leadership role on the Khoe-San socio-political landscape and to be elected as the chairperson of the government initiated National Khoisan Council formed in 1999. The activities of Little and his neo-Khoekhoe chiefs invigorated the Khoe-San socio-political landscape and encouraged a number of people with links to longstanding communities to re-affirm their Khoekhoe heritage. However, by 2005, some individuals from post-1994 Nama and Griqua organizations, attempted to bolster the position of specific leaders on the basis of their purported royal descent, in light of the upsurge of Khoe-San chiefs. The invocation of royal descent had the potential to weaken the influence of neo-Khoekhoe chiefs within the Khoe-San socio-political landscape and to fuel tension between Khoe-San leaders and factions.

**National Council of Khoikhoi Chiefs**

To bolster their standing as Khoekhoe chiefs, Little and his associates aligned the CCHDC to Paramount Chief Daniel Kanyiles of the Griekwa Volks Organisasie. As the Griekwa Volks Organisasie was united since 1981 with the Knysna based GNC in their umbrella body, the Griekwa Nationale Raad, the CCHDC’s alliance with Kanyiles extended to the Knysna based GNC. To legitimate the chieftainship claims of neo-Khoekhoe leaders, the CCHDC and Kanyiles established the National Council of Khoikhoi Chiefs (NCKC) under the leadership Kanyiles who was made the paramount chief of the NCKC. The NCKC also demanded that Kanyiles be accepted and respected in his capacity as paramount chief of the council by the government. New Khoekhoe chiefs linked to the CCHDC were inducted by Kanyiles at special revived or invented ritual or ‘!nau’ ceremonies from 1998.

The NCKC served to consolidate the joint position of the Griekwa Volks Organisasie and the CCHDC within the Khoekhoe socio-political landscape. The NCKC also manifested much of the concerns and the revivalist and economic aims of old and neo-Khoe-San. The council also indicated that it wanted to gain full control over the cultural heritage of the Khoekhoe in line with UN principles that applied to the heritage of “indigenous nations”.

**‘!Nau’: Reinventing ritual**

The CCHDC embarked on various measures to enhance the credibility and respectability of neo-Khoekhoe chiefs and their claims. Special rituals were devised, notably for the ritual induction of neo-Khoekhoe chiefs, that were associated with Khoekhoe tradition. The CCHDC’s association with longstanding Paramount Chief Kanyiles, who was allocated a paternal role in the NCKC and in rituals devised for the induction of new chiefs, not only served to provide a semblance of authenticity and legitimacy but also enhanced the power base of the CCHDC. To enhance the status of neo-Khoekhoe chiefs and the CCHDC itself, government officials were also invited to induction ceremonies where a special attempt was made to project performed rituals as part of an indigenous tradition.

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The Western Cape premier, Gerald Morkel, and officials from the Department of Provincial and Local Government (previously the Department of Constitutional Development) as well as officials from the French Embassy were, for example, invited to the third ‘!Nau’ (induction ritual ceremony) held in Oudtshoorn between 23 and 25 June 2000 where four new Khoekhoe chiefs and a number of ‘tribal council’ members were sworn in. Anthony le Fleur, volks-president of the Knysna based GNC, was also at the ceremony attended by about 150 delegates. A serious attempt was made at the ceremony to impress visitors and the media that the neo-Khoekhoe were not only striving for a cultural resurgence but that they were also in tune with the cultural heritage manifested by the ritual performance.

Preparations for the induction ceremony began at midnight on Friday 23 June with the cleansing of a ‘holy kraal’ and the slaughter of a ram. Fires were then lit which were to burn until sunrise. Special offerings were made in preparation of the swearing-in rite of Saturday. Kanyiles led those who were to be sworn in into a special kraal on Saturday. The feet of the inductees were dipped in blood in a sink container. The inductees then moved in circles in the kraal. Their feet were afterwards washed with water. Boegoe-water (herbal-water) was then placed on their tongues followed by honey. The final step in the ritual was an oath of loyalty. Those inducted were then led out and introduced to awaiting ‘tribe’ members as new ‘tribal’ chiefs and council members. ‘Khoe-San’ music was played during the ritual.

The different steps in the swearing-in ceremony were attributed with specific symbolic significance: The blood and fire was for cleansing. The footprints left in the kraal by the blood-dipped feet of inductees symbolized a blood-print supposedly running through history and the connection of humans with the earth giving life to everyone. The walk in circles in the kraal symbolized the Khoekhoe’s nomadic existence and the different paths that cross in life. The washing of blood from the feet symbolized humility whilst the boegoe (herb) on the tongues of inductees symbolized the bitterness of life. The honey that followed the boegoe was a reminder of the sweet supposedly following a bitter but successful struggle.

The ceremony provided an opportunity for attending politicians to win over Khoe-San support by expressing support for revivalist goals. Cecil Herandien, Western Cape minister of Housing, delivered a message on behalf of the provincial premier, Gerald Morkel, expressing support for the aims of the neo-Khoekhoe chiefs and encouraging the promotion of Khoe-San culture and identities. He also touched on a subject that caused great excitement amongst neo-Khoekhoe chiefly claimants by stating that they should be accorded the same political recognition and government allowance as their Xhosa and Zulu counterparts:

Dit is uiterst belangrik dat Suid-Afrika die Khoisan-identiteit, -erfenis en -kultuur waarlik erken en behoorlik vier as ons wil hé dat ons land ’n waardige eenheid moet vorm en ’n nasionale trots wil kweek. Daarom behoort Khoisan tradisionele leiers byvoorbeeld dieselfde politieke erkenning en regeringstoelaes as hul Xhosa- en Zoeloe-eweknie te kry.

In encouraging the affirmation of Khoe-San identity, Morkel indicated that

Die herontdekking en bewusmaking van die inheemse Khoisan-identiteit is al wat as teenvoeter kan ... dien [vir die aannale dat die “Khoisan uitgesterf het”], ... Jongmense van ’n Khoisan-herkoms behoort ook aangemoedig te word om meer navorsing oor die oorsprong, wese en inhou van hul kultuur en erfenis te doen. Alleenlik wanneer mense trots is op hul Khoisan-herkoms, sal dit deel van hul self-identiteit word en toenemend deel van die kleurvolle en eiesoortige identiteit van die Suid-Afrikaner.
There was loud applause as Herandien announced that Morkel had begun a pro-active attempt to have the remains of Sarah Bartmann returned to South Africa.\textsuperscript{52} Kanyiles also had his say on the need for the remains of Bartmann to be returned:

\textit{Ons wil Saartjie terughê – sy hoort hier. Ons het haar nodig en sy is ons s’n. Laat sy nou huis toekom.}\textsuperscript{53}

Although the first few neo-Khoekhoe chiefs linked to the CCHDC may have been selected and appointed by Joseph Little himself,\textsuperscript{54} later chiefs linked to the organization (or at least some of them) may have been elected by members of their ‘tribal’ organizations. For example, Poem Mooney, who was sworn in as Attaqua chief in 1999, claimed in 2000 that he was elected as chief by about 450 Attaqua members.\textsuperscript{55}

Although a number of neo-Khoekhoe organizations emerged in the Western and Eastern Cape at the initiative of the CCHDC leadership, a few neo-Khoekhoe organizations also emerged that were not connected to the CCHDC, for example, the Cape Town based !Hurikamma Cultural Movement and the Khoisan Awareness Initiative (KAI) based in the Eastern Cape. Though not connected to the CCHDC, organizations like KAI nevertheless shared much of the aspirations of the CCHDC, for example, the need for the displacement of a Coloured identity by a Kho-San identity, government recognition, land restitution, economic empowerment, cultural revival, promotion of Kho-San languages, and adequate inclusion of Kho-San history in the school curriculum.

A number of people in the Northern Cape and Orange Free State also started to assume a Korana identity after the 1994 democratic transition. Leaders with surnames of historical Korana leaders came to the fore, such as Hoogstander, Katz and Taaibosch. Neo-Korana leaders, like other neo-Khoe-San leaders, also came to affirm that they were a First Nation. They also demanded the restitution of some of their historical land and rejected the official 1913 cut-off date for claims lodged in terms of the 1994 Restitution of Land Rights Act for land lost on account of ‘racial’ discrimination.\textsuperscript{56}

Kho-San revivalism also took root in the Gauteng province. The Gauteng Khoi-San Tribes Youth Council was, for example, formed in 2002. The main objective of the organization was supposedly to re-establish the Kho-San culture, language, identity and traditions. The council also strived for government recognition of the Kho-San and their leadership and for constitutional rights for Kho-San people.\textsuperscript{57} The Gauteng Khoi-San Tribes Youth Council was, like the new Griqua organizations, strongly critical of the perceived marginalization of the Kho-San. Phillip Williams, president of the council, felt that the government was “deliberately marginalising” the Kho-San\textsuperscript{58} and that “[t]he arrogance of the present-day leadership in our society is destructive to healthy nation building. The African renaissance will fail the Khoi-San people and more so Africa”. He reasoned that “meaningful nation-building” could not take place “while the Khoi-San were marginalised”.\textsuperscript{59} As it was with the CCHDC, members of the Khoi-San Tribes Youth Council were inclined to represent Coloureds as descendants of the Khoi-San and Coloured identity as an illegitimate imposition that undermined the unity of Khoi-San descendants. In conflating the Coloured and Khoi-San categories people of diverse ethnic backgrounds were invested or imputed with a Khoi-San heritage. In the words of Williams:

\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Burger}, 26 June 2000, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Mail & Guardian}, 25 July 1997, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Burger}, 29 June 2000, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Diamond Fields Advertiser}, 30 August 2002, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Sowetan}, 6 December 2002, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Sowetan}, 8 December 2002, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{59} \textit{Sowetan}, 6 December 2002, p. 10.
Today there are about five million Khoi-San “coloureds” who speak English and Afrikaans. … European immigrants conquered the minds of the Khoi-San to the extent that they suffered from poor self-esteem and had an identity crisis. Khoi-San Africans are misled into focussing on their Eurocentric heritage and “coloureds” lack a serious sense of creativity, spending most of their time anxious, highly stressed and mostly drunk – with devastating consequences. The “coloured” suffers from self-hatred and therefore engages in self-destructive behaviour. They are proud of who they are not, but they are the most divided of people who can never unite without their original identity, language and culture. The Khoi-San, in their artificial identity as sophisticated “coloureds”, divide our people into an antagonistic “us” (Gauteng, Cape Town, etc) and them (Kalahari desert, Schmidtsdrift community and the Basarwa people of Botswana). We continually divorce ourselves from our African mother and cling to our European father. … It is imperative that we understand that colonialism, the mother of all thefts of all land and resources, is the real cause of societal divisions and conflict. South Africa, we plead with you to assist us in the quest for our “identity”.60

Whilst organizations emerged that readily associated with the Khoekhoe and Khoe-San categories, much fewer emerged associating themselves with only the San category or naming themselves after old San groups, despite the San category having historically been given greater aboriginal qualities in South Africa – with the Khoekhoe being projected as later immigrants. The lower status historically associated with the San (viewed as hunter-gatherers to have had less developed economic practices than the Khoekhoe who complemented herding with hunting and gathering) may have contributed to the greater association with a Khoekhoe category. As such, reputed San historical marginalization could have been repeated in the realm of identity in the post-apartheid Khoe-San revivalism. However, scarcity of detail on specific San groups may have been a decisive factor influencing the appropriation of Khoe-San group names amongst revivalist groups.

The impact of individuals of longstanding Khoe-San communities and their organizations on the neo-Khoe-San was manifested by the strategies pursued by neo-Khoe-San organizations. New Khoe-San organizations used methods similar to those used by more established organizations to build a public profile and to position themselves socio-politically. Following in the steps of San and Griqua activist, neo-Khoekhoe representatives attended national and international forums that dealt with First Nations where they expressed their concerns and demands. For example, in July 1999 Joseph Little, Willa Boezak, Basil Coetzee, Lilly Manuel, Felicity Smith and Mathilda Cairncross, all linked to the CCHDC, visited the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations in Geneva.61

Government responsiveness
The use of national and international forums by Khoe-San helped to make the South African government aware of their presence and more sensitive to their needs and aspirations. Agitation by the Griqua and other Khoe-San sections contributed to constitutional provision for the protection and promotion of Khoe-San languages.62 Concessions made to the Khoe-San; the incorporation of elements of Khoe-San heritage in national projects, and the willingness of the government to enter into discussions with Khoe-San leaders, in turn increased the hope of the Khoe-San that some of their unmet demands could be realized.

The Department of Constitutional Development (DCD) supported the formation of National Griqua Forum (NGF) in 1997 to represent the Griqua in discussions with the government around constitutional accommodation. In addition to the Griqua, the DCD also dealt with other groupings claiming an ‘indigenous’ identity, for example, the Nama, San, !Korana, and the Cape Cultural Heritage Development Council,63 all

demanding the constitutional accommodation of their leaders in a government recognized and funded traditional leadership structure, resulting thus in the replacement of the NGF by the National Khoisan Forum in 1999.

The main aim of the National Khoisan Forum was to represent Khoe-San communities in negotiations with the government around constitutional accommodation. There was hope amongst Khoe-San delegates and DCD officials that the National Khoisan Forum would foster unity and allow the Khoe-San leadership to speak to the government in a unanimous voice.\textsuperscript{64} The National Khoisan Forum (later renamed the National Khoisan Council) was officially inaugurated on 27 May 1999.\textsuperscript{65} Joseph Little was elected chairperson of the body, manifesting thus the CCHDC’s success in positioning itself in the Khoe-San political landscape as a significant player.\textsuperscript{66} The establishment of the National Khoisan Forum was occasioned with the expression of the government’s recognition of the Khoekhoe and as indigenous communities via Valli Moosa, minister of Constitutional Development.\textsuperscript{67} 

\textbf{‘Status Quo Process’}

The organizations represented in the National Khoisan Council (NKC) became involved in a projected yearlong process of research and investigation (referred to as the ‘status quo process’) into their background, leadership, structures and membership, carried under the auspices of the DCD, in order to assess the validity of claims that were made by Khoe-San leaders.\textsuperscript{68} The DCD also considered the viability of the establishment of a system of traditional leadership for the Khoe-San like the one for chiefs from Bantu-speaking communities.\textsuperscript{69} Khoe-San leaders raised and reiterated a number of issues during the research process that they regarded as important, revealing thus shared concerns amongst neo-Khoe-San and Khoe-San from longstanding communities, for example, formal recognition by the government of the Khoe-San as a First Nation ‘indigenous’ people; constitutional recognition of Khoe-San traditional leadership; representation in government; ratification of the International Labour Organization Convention No. 169; restoration of Khoe-San land rights; financial support from the government; cultural revival, and the adaptation of the education curriculum to accommodate Khoe-San history and languages.\textsuperscript{70} The South African Human Rights Commission also undertook research in 1999 to determine how the rights of the Khoekhoe and the San could be best protected, and in order to provide a basis for the formulation of a policy-framework for the government for dealing with their rights.\textsuperscript{71}

Despite official Khoe-San forums being established, Khoe-San organizations continued to exert pressure on the government by utilizing national and international fora to express their aspirations and demands. Steps taken by the government were, however, also acknowledged at local and international fora. Thus, the Khoe-San

\textsuperscript{65} Statement of the NKF, 17 May 1999.
\textsuperscript{66} Rapport (Metro), 6 June 1999, p. 1; Beeld, 1 June 1999, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{67} Rapport (Metro), 6 June 1999, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{68} Cape Argus, 1 August 2001, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{69} ILO: \textit{Indigenous peoples of South Africa}, pp. 4, 20.
\textsuperscript{70} Brian Vel (Provincial Secretary, Northern Cape Khoi-San Council, Kimberley): “Right the wrongs”, \textit{Diamond Fields Advertiser}, 11 April 2002, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{71} On the work of the South African Human Rights Commission (HRC) in regard to the Khoe-San see e.g. HRC: “Research Project: Indigenous Peoples’ Rights”, 2000. Reflecting further the measure of sensitivity developed by the South African government to old and neo-Khoe-San, the Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology (DACST) added a Khoisan Legacy Project to its nine other national legacy projects in 2000. Further contributing to Khoe-San revitalism, DACST also allocated funds, aimed at poverty alleviation, to rural based Khoe-San for sustainable art, craft, culture and heritage initiatives. A Khoe and San Language Body was set up in 1999 by the Pan South African Language Board. Willem Boezak (neo-Cochoqua) and William Langeveldt (Griqua) were, with 16 other individuals, appointed to the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities in 2003.
 delegation that attended the 17th Session of UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations in August 1999, expressed gratitude for the constitutional provision for the protection of the rights of cultural groups and for the establishment of the National Khoisan Forum. The delegation, however, also expressed concern with the government’s response to Khoe-San demands. Disappointment was expressed with the 1913 cut-off date for land restitution. Delegates also requested the UN to put pressure on the British and Dutch governments to compensate for Khoe-San land dispossession during the colonial period.\footnote{\textit{Rapport}, 8 August 1999.}

Participation in international forums encouraged trans-state Khoe-San identification, Khoe-San international networking and identification with First Nations from around the world. Networking encouraged at international forums reinforced attempts at local networking. The need for local and national networking was underscored at the National Khoisan Consultative Conference (NKCC) held in Oudtshoorn between 29 March and 1 April 2001. The NKCC was a significant event manifesting a Khoe-San desire for unity and cooperation. The need for building unity, both amongst the Khoe-San and in South Africa and for international networking was stressed at the conference.

**Delimiting the realm of Khoe-San demands and chieftainship**

Whilst advocating Khoe-San unity and cooperation, broad representative structures like the NKCC and the National Khoisan Council also served to delimit acceptable and unacceptable demands and chiefs. Leaders accorded some credibility though involvement in recognized organizations found it necessary to protect their credibility. Members of the NKCC Council and the NKC became concerned about claims and demands that could undermine public and government perceptions of the Khoe-San movement, much the same way as Kranshoeek based GNC representatives expressed concern soon after the emergence of neo-Khoekhoe chiefs like Joseph Little and his associates in the CCHDC that they posed a “a danger” to “people with genuine historic claims being minimalised and trivialized, leading to their continued marginalization”.\footnote{Upham quoted in \textit{Mail & Guardian}, 25 July 1997, p. 12.} Little managed, however, to achieve a prominent leadership role on the Khoe-San socio-political landscape and to be elected chairperson of the government initiated NKC. Having achieved a measure of recognition as a Khoekhoe leader, Little and his associates in the CCHDC also became concerned that the emergence of other neo-Khoekhoe chiefs, particularly those outside the ambit of the CCHDC, could make a farce of their claims towards chieftainship. In light of ridiculed claims of neo-Khoekhoe like self-styled Paramount Chief Calvyn Cornelius, Little, who was regarded by some as a sham Khoekhoe chief, insisted that many of those who claimed to be Khoe-San chiefs were bogus contenders.\footnote{\textit{Cape Argus}, 1 August 2001, p. 12.} Being regarded as farfetched, Calvin Cornelius’ claims could indeed lead to the trivialization of the neo-Khoe-San. Cornelius deployed the same First Nation rights discourse that neo-Khoe-San leaders used in making their generally more modest demands.

**Calvyn Cornelius**

The national and international recognition of the Khoe-San and the affirmation of the rights of First Nations by the UN WGIP heightened a sense of entitlement amongst some Khoe-San individuals. The return of some land to longstanding Khoe-San communities through the official land restitution process also raised the hope of some neo-Khoe-San, notably Calvyn Cornelius, of getting some historical Kho-San land. Calvyn Cornelius, who was encouraged by Joseph Little to assume a Khoekhoe identity, also became deeply affected by the First Nation rights discourse. Cornelius’ ambitions could, however, not be contained in the CCHDC. He left Little’s CCHDC and then assumed the title of paramount chief of the “Goringhaicona tribe”. Invoking the First Nation status granted by the UN to the Khoe-San, Cornelius announced in June 2001 that he was laying a claim under international law to land at the Victoria and Alfred Waterfront in Cape Town (described by Cornelius as the old fishing haunts Harry die Strandloper [Autshumato]). Cornelius also laid claim to land near Valkenberg (the site of the kraal of Chief Gogosoa in the mid-1600s), as well as to land in Malmesbury and at St Helena Bay. Cornelius believed that the granting of First Nation status to the Khoekhoe by the UN WGIP gave them the
right to their ancestral land. Big companies on their ancestral land were called on to pay royalties to Khoe-San descendants.\textsuperscript{75} In Cornelius’s words:

\begin{quote}
Having First Nation Status, we should be made custodians of the land on behalf of our people. We need to sit down with big companies such as the Waterfront that now occupy land that belonged to our people. We must come to an arrangement where these companies pay royalties which can be used to empower our people. … [W]e are not being confrontational. We want a win-win situation for all of us, and I believe big companies that now occupy land which belonged to us have a social responsibility. These companies should pay a royalty to our people.
\end{quote}

Manifesting the impact of official land restitution and the land claims campaign of the Griqua and southern Kalahari San on the neo-Khoe-San, Cornelius reasoned that it was due time that what had happened in the Northern and Eastern Cape should also happen in the Western Cape:

\begin{quote}
The government has already made land available to the traditional peoples of the Eastern and Northern Cape, and we are now pushing to have land in the Western Cape returned to us.\textsuperscript{76}
\end{quote}

By mid-August 2001 Cornelius’ land claim strategy had apparently assumed a new twist. Cornelius now planned to “formally annex”, under international law, a section of the Victoria and Alfred Waterfront. The land on which the Oceana Powerboat was situated at the Waterfront would be the first step. Other portions of land that he planned to annex were Valkenberg, Porter Estate near Constantia, the St Helena Bay “state-owned coast”, parts of Bloubergstrand, shell middens at Hendon Park, “and all other historical Khoi-owned land”. Once annexed, the land would be held in “custodianship for the benefit of the community”. Cornelius claimed to have the backing of the UN and the “tacit support” of President Thabo Mbeki. Cornelius also claimed to have read his ‘tribe’s’ intentions at a UN WGIP session in July 2001.\textsuperscript{77}

Cornelius made claims to generate an image of himself as an important Khoekhoe leader. His claims, however, generated an image of a misguided and deluded chiefly pretender. It was claimed that he was inaugurated as paramount chief by the chief magistrate of Cape Town in December 2001.\textsuperscript{78} Cornelius apparently also claimed to be the deputy chairperson of the Bantu-speaking based Council of Traditional Leaders of South Africa and an honorary member of the “Royal Xhosa Council”. According to Cornelius, his Goringhaicona “clan” had thousands of descendants living in the Cape whom he represented as their custodian. Cornelius admitted that few of these descendants realized their Goringhaicona ancestry:

\begin{quote}
Few coloured people realize that they are in fact descendants of this clan. We see ourselves as custodians of their rights and want to use the money collected as royalties for the upliftment of our people.\textsuperscript{79}
\end{quote}

Cornelius did not only speak on behalf of Goringhaicona descendants but also on behalf of the Khoe-San of the Cape. He became an embarrassment to other neo-Khoe-San activists, particularly those from the CCHDC. Attempts were made to discredit Cornelius and thus to prevent his claims from being extended to Khoekhoe and San leaders in general. Basil Coetzee, vice-chairperson of the Western Cape Khoisan Council and chief of the neo-Choochoqua, claimed that Cornelius was a deceiver seeking a position of power and “a short route to become a millionaire”.\textsuperscript{80}

\textsuperscript{75} Cape Argus, 24 June 2001, pp. 1, 18.
\textsuperscript{76} Cape Argus, 24 June 2001, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{77} Cape Argus, 19 August 2001, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{78} Burger, 22 December, 2001, p. 9
\textsuperscript{79} Cape Argus, 24 June, 2001, p.1.
Hy maak ’n bespotting van die Koisan-gemeenskap omdat almal weet die see het destyds tot teenaan die Kasteel gekom. Hoe kan hy sê dit [Victoria and Alfred Waterfront] behoort aan die Koisan as die grond toe onder die see was? Hy is arrogant. Niemand kan ’n stamhoof inhuldig nie. Dit is ’n structurele ding. Daar is net twee Koisan-opperhoofde in die hele land. Hulle is opperhoof Andrew le Fleur van die Griekwas en aartsbiskop Daniel Kanyiles van die Nasionale Raad van Ko-stamhoofde.

In 2002 Cornelius requested Western Cape Premier Pieter Marais, by letter, to evacuate his official residence at Leeuwenhof because he (Cornelius), as the paramount chief of the Khoe-San, wanted to move in the official residence. Coetzee was again prompted to respond:

Die man is ’n nar… . Hy het geen legitimiteit nie, verteenwoordig niemand nie en word nie deur die Khoisan as leier erken nie. Hy is besig om ’n verleentheid vir die res van die Khoisan-mense te word.

Cornelius was not daunted by the criticism that his opponents levelled against him. He was like some of them also on a special mission. Cornelius and his “Khoisan Cultural Movement” were at it again in 2003, attempting to “annex” a piece of land in Stellenbosch intended for industrial development.

**Public debate on neo-Khoe-San**
The emergence of the neo-Khoe-San, particularly the neo-Khoekhoe who were much more prominent in the media than the neo-San, activated some discussion among members of the public, including academics, in regard to the legitimacy of neo-Khoe-San chiefs; the authenticity and motives of the neo-Khoe-San; and the desirability, social impact and implications of the Khoe-San resurgence for trans-ethnic nation-building in the country. Neo-Khoe-San chiefs were liable to be seen as opportunists driven by material incentives. Many felt that the attempt by neo-Khoe-San chiefs to be recognized as traditional leaders was driven by the fact that recognized Bantu-speaking traditional leaders received salaries from the government. Thus, the demand for recognition of neo-Khoe-San chiefs, together with demands for restitution, could be seen as part of an enrichment drive by individuals opportunistically deploying Khoe-San labels. There was also concern that the Khoe-San resurgence could generate forms of ethnicity encouraging social divisions fostered under apartheid. Responses to the resurgence varied, with both positive and negative potentialities envisioned. Some of the questions and views that individuals developed in regard to Joseph Little had a bearing on other neo-Khoe-San. People developed divergent views about Little, perhaps thus also reflecting a plurality of motives and drives behind the emergence of chiefs and the neo-Khoe-San in general:

[M]any privately question his legitimacy as a self-proclaimed chief of the Hamcumqua and the chiefly status he has bestowed on others in his organisation, the Cape Cultural Heritage Development Council. His detractors say he’s an opportunist who has spotted a gap in the post-apartheid political flux and is marketing a potentially dangerous mix of historical fact and fantasy. But his supporters see him as a man who has sacrificed material comforts to pursue a vision of re-connecting people, fragmented and stripped of their identity under colonialism and apartheid, to their ancient root; at the same time reclaiming and popularizing a history that’s been hidden and denied.

The public debate on the neo-Khoe-San and its manifestation in newspapers reflected an attempt at shaping post-apartheid social and identity formation in line with operative values, discourses and ideologies. Criticism or support of the doings of specific individuals or groupings manifested attempts at channelling the association with a Khoe-San heritage in a ‘desirable’ direction, with directions being influenced by operative discourses.

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82 Burger, 10 April 2002, p. 2.
83 Cape Times, 8 January 2003; Burger, 9 January 2003, p. 9.
Shortly after Reverend Reggie Boesak and three other neo-Khoekhoe leaders were sworn in as chiefs in June 2000, with Dr Willem Boezak\textsuperscript{85} being sworn in as chaplain of the National Council of Khoikhoi Chiefs, Jakes Gerwel, a former rector of the University of the Western Cape, as well as former director-general of the President’s Office, accused Reggie Boesak and his brother Willem Boezak in \textit{Rapport} newspaper for their involvement in the revival of Khoekhoe traditions that he rejected as a recidivist neo-ethnicity that ran counter to trans-ethnic nation-building, the ‘national modernizing process’ in South Africa, and the ‘non-racial’ struggle fought by their brother Allan Boesak:

Hierdie gemaakte residivistiese terugvalling van die neo-Koi verdien geen aanmoediging van enigiemand wat die welvaart van Suid-Afrikaners in ‘n hoog mededingende moderne wêreld op die hart dra nie. Die Boesak-broers, om hulle maar net as voorbeeld te neem, kan baie beter doen deur die dapper nie-rassige spoor wat hul bekender broer gebaan het, te volg.\textsuperscript{86}

Presumably himself of part Khoe-San descent, Gerwel, with an intimate understanding of sentiments within Coloured communities, was well aware of the liability of Khoe-San labels to be utilized to drive Coloured nationalistic projects. His criticism clearly reflected an attempt at bringing the new Khoe-San identity claimants and chiefs in line with official ideology and trans-ethnic nation-building. Suggesting the opportunistic contrivedness of the neo-Khoekhoe reactivation of purported ancestral traditions, Gerwel sarcastically contrasted revived or (re)invented ritual performance of the neo-Khoekhoe with ritual performance by individuals from a longstanding Khoe-San community:

Nou die aand ’n televisieprogram gesien oor een van die oorblywende Koisan-groepe in Suider-Afrika. Wat beïndruk het, was die ritmiese wyse waarop die dansers hul agterstewes op die maat kon klop. As die dominee en doktore dit kan regkry, oorreed hulle my nog om volgende keer saam te kom feesvier.

Suggesting the opportunism of neo-Khoekhoe claims to chieftainship Gerwel mentioned in similar sarcastic fashion that

\[\text{[m]}\text{iskien maak ek nog aanspraak op die kapteinskap: ek het van vaderskant aantoonbare Gonaqua-wortels. En net indien die stryd met die “Xhosa-stamhoofde” te erg word, kan my Xhosa-wortels van moederskant miskien help. Straks moet ons nog met die volkstaters ’n lappie grond in die Noord-Kaap deel; ek het ook steweige Afrikaanse wortels vir daardie onderhandelinge.}\textsuperscript{87}

Gerwel was in turn attacked in \textit{Rapport} by Willem Boezak, neo-Khoekhoe Chief Bazil Coetzee, and neo-Khoekhoe Dr George Brink and imputed with ignorance and intolerance.\textsuperscript{88} Albert Venter, a professor in political science at the Randse Afrikaanse University, also looked at the activities of the neo-Khoekhoe in terms of the national political landscape, but unlike Gerwel manifested the position of those concerned about the future of ‘minorities’ fearing homogenization. Responding to Gerwel’s writing in \textit{Rapport}, Venter also expressed some caution in regard to elevated ethnic consciousness and its use for political mobilization. However, he also expressed concern with the homogenizing consequences of a conception of the South African nation in terms of a modernizing nation-building paradigm. He advocated a plural society and toleration of the right of minorities to be different and the cultivation of national identity through loyalty to the constitution. Thus,

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\textsuperscript{85} Willem Boezak changed his surname from Boesak to Boezak.
Reconfiguring Khoe-San history?

There was also some concern amongst Khoe-San that Khoe-San identifications could be used to fuel ethnic competition and exclusions. There was a related concern among some Khoe-San that history could be interpreted to fuel ethnic tension. Indeed, the Khoe-San resurgence was accompanied by a renewed interest in Khoe-San heritage and history. The fantastic genealogical claims made by some chiefly claimants that linked them to colonial Khoe-San chiefs suggested an interconnected reconstitution and (re)invention in the realms of identity, culture and history that attended Khoe-San revivalism. In asserting their presence Khoe-San organizations also demanded that Khoe-San history be inserted into the school curriculum and that “the true, full history of the Khoi tribes who were here when Van Riebeeck arrived in 1652 … be part of the school curricula”. It was hoped that a rewritten ‘true history’ included in the school curriculum would give “coloured people a sense of belonging”. Some Khoe-San themselves undertook historical research and embarked on (re)writing their own histories. Whilst neo-Khoe-San (textual) historical representations drew much on academic historiography, representations also emerged that were out of line with academic historiography. Neo-Khoe-San appropriations and representations of the past varyingly reflected divergent ideological orientations amongst Khoe-San, with some being fairly in line with academic historians and others being driven much by a narrow ethnic agenda.

Joe Marks from Retreat near Cape Town exemplified Khoe-San representations that were fairly in line with academic historians and much out of line with academic historiography. Marks, who was a member of the Democratic Party and a prominent figure in the anti-apartheid United Democratic Front (disbanded in 1991), projected himself as paramount chief of the Outeniqua and claimed that the historical “Kaptein Dikkop” from “Hoogekraal” was his “great-great-grandfather”. He attempted to dispel a number of fairly widely held historical views on the Khoekhoe and San as well as their relations with Bantu-speaking Africans. Thus, in regard to the genesis of the Khoe-San Marks mentioned that the Khoisan came into being 37 000 years ago under the first chief, called Magonya. This chief had four sons who formed the Khoisan tribe of the Outeiniqua, Griqua, Namaqua and Nama. These are the names of Magonya’s four sons. The San is a direct relative of Magonya and his children.

Invoking an old and somewhat romanticist anti-colonial historical interpretation, Marks suggested that the pre-colonial Khoe-San lived in harmony. He reasoned that representations stressing pre-colonial Khoe-San conflict rationalized colonialism by depicting the European arrival as beneficial for the purported warring ‘tribes’.

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91 Names used by neo-Khoe-San groups reflected the appropriation of academic history in the Khoe-San revival. Texts on Khoe-San history by Khoe-San (not based in academic institutions) also drew much on academic history. E.g. (Dr) William Langeveldt: Aluta continua! Ons stryd duur voort! (Vryburg: Khoisan Gemeeskapsforum, 1999). Research reports on historical Khoekhoe groups submitted to the Department of Constitutional Development in March 2000 by neo-Khoekhoe Willem Boezak (on the Nama) and George Brink (on the Cape Cultural Heritage Development Organization), as well as by neo-Khoekhoe R Beddy (on the Korana) relied on academic history and other writings by Whites which appears to have provided a measure of authority other sources might not have been able to confer. R Beddy: “Research paper on the Korana group for policy formation purposes”; Willem A Boesak: “The Nama”; Brink: Cape Cultural Heritage Development Organization.
Since the arrival of Europeans on our soil they have attempted to put the Khoisan people into various tribal groups so as to make them different. Often they have said that these groups were in a constant state of war. The arrival of Europeans in Africa therefore is seen as a blessing in disguise as they are supposed to have saved these tribes from killing each other.\(^{94}\)

Marks also projected harmonious relations between Bantu-speaking Africans and Khoe-San:

About a thousand years ago our black African brothers arrived at our national boundaries and made a request for land. Land, being a gift from our Creator, was therefore in our custodianship. We were responsible for taking care of it and to respect all creatures and plants that were part of Creation. We therefore obliged to consider giving them land, although it was also our right to refuse their request. Being Africans, we decided to give land to our black brothers. Our only condition was that they take care of the land in the same way that we did, and decided that they become part of us by ceremonial intermarriage. Land was thus granted to our brothers throughout the southern African region, where they still live today.

Marks attributed misfortunes of the “Khoisan” to Europeans:

The coming of Jan van Riebeeck was the beginning of a great tragedy for the Khoisan people. A majority group was hunted down and reduced to a minority group over a period of 200 years. The land was cleared of its people through murder, theft and rape, and animals entrusted to our care by our Creator diminished. … [The] notion that black South Africans participated in these crimes against humanity is wrong, as they represented a minority group in the colonial era and were militarily far weaker than us.\(^{95}\)

Many neo-Khoe-San, particularly those with an ethno-national agenda, were not inclined to identify with the harmony that Marks projected on past Khoekhoe, San and Bantu-speaking African interaction; many were inclined to project their ethno-national concerns on the past. Khoe-San revivalism was attended with historical inquiries into old groups, aspects of their culture and the places in which they lived. Many neo-Khoekhoe activists were inclined to project the Western Cape as a special Khoe-San historical area and most of its inhabitants (Coloureds) as descendants of Khoe-San and thus requiring special consideration for socio-cultural and economic empowerment in the area. As in other regions, many neo-Khoekhoe activists from the Western Cape resented what they perceived to be the promotion of Bantu-speaking Africans in employment at the expense of Coloureds. Many also resented what they perceived as the promotion of Xhosa language and culture in the region whilst Khoe-khoe language and culture was neglected.\(^{96}\)

**Conclusion**

Affirmations of neo-Khoe-San indigeneity and attendant demands for, inter alia, recognition, official representation, land restitution, promotion of Khoe-San cultures and languages, manifested the psychological space made by the 1994 democratic transition for Coloureds to reassess, (re)affirm or invent an indigenous heritage. Affirmations of indigeneity and neo-Khoe-San identities also manifested attempts at dealing with Coloured insecurity generated by the transition to a democratic order which eroded the measure of security generated the previous apartheid order (with its formally ethnified and racialized distributive system); that is, neo-Khoe-San identities and demands reflected attempts at reshaping the new order or the nature of transformation to meet individual and collectivized ethno-racialized concerns. The history of ethno-‘racially’ structured society generated concern within Coloured communities that the country could, as in the past, be again ethno-‘racially’ ordered, to their disadvantage. Thus, insecurity and fear of especially Bantu-speaking African favouratism and Coloured/Brown marginalization, reinforced by the perception that affirmative action

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95 Joe Marks: “Khoisan treated blacks as brothers”, *Cape Argus*, 23 March 2001, p. 15.
benefited mainly Bantu-speaking Africans, encouraged individuals and groupings to rethink and redefine their identities, their space, as well as their relations to others.\textsuperscript{97}

With the ending of apartheid, and the attendant reconfiguration of political, cultural, discursive and ideological relations, the Coloured category lost much of the psychological, socio-economic, ideological and political value it previously conferred, predisposing some Coloureds to distance themselves from a Coloured identity; to (re)affirm an indigenous heritage, and to promote a Khoe-San identity engendering and conferring the geographic rootedness, sense of belonging, group security, self-esteem, sense of entitlement and ownership, and ethno-cultural specificity, legitimacy, integrity and unity they desired. Although neo-Khoe-San expressed disapproval of a Coloured identity category, the Khoe-San category that they presented as an alternative was continually invested with Colouredness/Brownness, with the two categories tending to be articulated in a manner that placed them on a similar differential location in relation to other principal racialized categories (that is, Bantu-speaking African/Black and European/White) against which both categories were defined, thus reinforcing the association and entanglement of the two categories. This association and entanglement reflected the Coloured background of the neo-Khoe-San and the re-ethno-racialization of the Khoe-San.\textsuperscript{98}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[97] Daria Caliguire: “Voices from the communities”, in W James, D Caliguirle and K Cullinan (eds.): \textit{Now that we are free: Coloured communities in a democratic South Africa} (Cape Town: Idasa, 1996), p. 6.
\item[98] With Khoe-San revivalism, South African Khoe-San were, for example, subject to disassociation from somatic and cultural purity and invested with Colouredness, with the latter being reinvested with Khoe-Saness. Although old stereotypes of authentic Khoekhoe and San influenced very much public evaluations of the legitimacy of the neo-Khoe-San, there was also a slowly growing acceptance amongst sections of the public that individuals, especially those from Coloured communities, could be Khoekhoe and San even though they did not fit old stereotypes of authentic Khoekhoe and San.
\end{footnotes}
Chapter 13: Staging indigeneity

The assumption of Khoe-San identities after the 1994 democratic change was attended with public behaviour projecting indigenousness and ethno-cultural authenticity. Conferences and Khoe-San related public events were one of the early key arenas in which Khoe-San asserted their presence, projected their indigeneity and expressed their aspirations and demands. The succession of academic conferences and public events on the Khoe-San from 1996 to 2002 explored in this chapter, reflects an unfolding Khoe-San revivalism (and attendant social, psychological, economic, political and cultural repositioning), with newer players (inspired by earlier public stagings and demands) coming on stage to assert their presence and to also make demands as ‘indigenous,’ Khoe-San, and as First Nations. With public forums also being used for the promotion of leadership and influence within the Khoe-San socio-political landscape, these arenas manifested not only aspirations for Khoe-San cooperation and unity but also tensions and rivalry between Khoe-San groupings and leaders. The leadership of the Kranshoek based Griqua National Conference featured prominently in conferences and forums on the Khoe-San, attempting thereby not merely to stake claims as indigenous, but to also assert their leading role in the Khoe-San socio-political landscape. They were in turn challenged by their old and new rivals. In providing for Khoe-San identity performances, public forums became crucial in activating interest in a Khoe-San heritage particularly through the mediation of the media, thus contributing to Khoe-San revivalism. Khoe-San stagings manifested the Coloured socio-political and psychological/identity concerns generated by the 1994 democratic transition that propelled the Khoe-San revival; they reflected identity shifts within Coloured communities and a Khoe-San permutation of Colouredness. Public forums on the Khoe-San varyingly manifested the articulation of narrow ethnic and broader trans-ethnic nation-building dynamics, with Khoe-Sanness at times expressed in a manner that challenged trans-ethnic nation-building, and at other times in a manner that accorded with trans-ethnic nation-building, reflecting thus a shifting differential ambivalent location of Khoe-San identity claimants in the post-apartheid order.

Khoe-San and indigeneity in southern Africa

In projecting themselves as indigenous in the post-apartheid period, Khoe-San identity claimants appropriated a term that was much associated with Bantu-speaking peoples in South Africa during the apartheid period. Within Khoe-San organizations the term became dissociated with being a Bantu-speaking African, at least as far as southern Africa was concerned. Many old and neo-Khoe-San claimed to have been in southern Africa before other peoples and thus to be indigenous to the region, or more indigenous than anyone else. This logic conferring elevated aboriginality on Khoekhoe and San identity claimants also inclined those South Africans who appropriated Khoekhoe categories to also promote a broader Khoe-San category, thus appropriating the ultra-indigenous associations of the San category stemming from the perception that the San were the earliest people(s) in South Africa, with Khoekhoe herders arriving only about 2000 thousand years ago.

The popularity of the term ‘indigenous’ within Khoe-San organizations arose very much out of the rights affirmed for ‘indigenous peoples’ or First Nations at the United Nations which were deployed to exert pressure on governments in dealing with the demands of First Nations. UN linked International Labour Organization’s Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention no. 169 (of 1989) in particular was seen as a significant convention that the South African government was also called on to ratify. The convention had potentially far-reaching implications for the treatment of Khoe-San across southern Africa as it required ratifying states to institute special measures with the participation of ‘indigenous people’ for their benefit which safeguarded their rights, integrity, cultures, values, institutions, practices, labour, property, and ownership and possession of land that they traditionally occupy.

The convention required that to be defined as an indigenous people, a group should have a history of existence before colonialism and conquest. The exclusive association of ‘indigenous’ with the Khoe-San in regard to southern Africa was problematic. African politicians were inclined to reason that all “black Africans” were indigenous to Africa, thus making the ratification of the Convention no. 169 by African states problematic. 1

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problematic nature of the term ‘indigenous’ in South Africa inclined Khoe-San to also deploy the terms of First People and First Nation in staking their demands.

**Miscast: Negotiating Khoisan History and Material Culture**

Opened on Saturday 13 April 1996 and running for five months in the South African National Gallery in Cape Town, the exhibition *Miscast: Negotiating Khoisan History and Material Culture* was one of the early public arenas in the post-apartheid period in which the presence of Khoe-San was asserted. The exhibition provided a stage for the Khoe-San to assert their indigeneity, aspirations and demands. The exhibition itself was officially opened by /’Angn!ao/’Un, chairperson of the Nyae Nyae Farmers Cooperative of Namibia who declared: “We do not want to be slaves again in our own land”.2

A group of #Khomani who attracted much attention in the press attended the opening in ‘ultra traditional’ skin dress,3 thus affirming their authenticity by projecting qualities much associated with genuine but extinct ‘Bushmen’. However, the association of Khoe-Sanness with an ancient or ‘primitive’ culture and ‘racial’ purity, was also unsettled through the presence of people in contemporary Western clothing who affirmed Khoekhoe and San identities, many of whom did not fit popular ‘racial’ or somatic stereotypes of Khoe-San authenticity.

The coming together of Khoe-San from Namibia, Botswana and South Africa was part of a significant process of awareness raising, networking and mobilization. San organizations were especially well represented, given that the exhibition focussed on ‘Bushmen’ depictions. San from outside South Africa represented were the Nyae Nyae Farmer’s Cooperative from Namibia and the Kuru Development Trust from Botswana. The trans-national San focused Working Group for Indigenous Minorities was also represented.4 Khoe-San from South Africa included Griqua, #Khomani, Nama, !Xu and Khwe, with a number of local Khoe-San organizations being represented, for example, the Kranshoek based Griqua National Conference, the neo-Khoe-San Cape Town based !Hurikamma Cultural Movement, the Northern Cape based Khoisan Representative Council as well as a nascent South African San Institute.5 Although the occasion provided an opportunity for trans-national Khoe-San networking, intra-Khoe-San tension was also manifested at the opening, much fuelled by the deliberate focus of the exhibition designer on ‘Bushmen’ as opposed to Khoekhoe and San/‘Bushmen’.

The publicity of the *Miscast* exhibition, driven much by the controversy raised by the way some Khoe-San (or ‘Bushmen’) images were displayed, served to generate some public interest in the Khoe-San past and presence and thus contributed to the Khoe-San revivalist impulse. A few months after the opening of the exhibition the founder of the Cape Cultural Heritage Development Council, Joseph Little, started to feature in the media and in Khoe-San related conferences as an important Khoekhoe chief. Indeed, it was after the opening of the *Miscast* exhibition that neo-Khoekhoe chiefs became notable in the Western and Eastern Cape.6

Designed and curated by Pippa Skotnes, a professor in the Michaelis School of Fine Art at the University of Cape Town, the *Miscast* exhibition was projected as (if it was) a ‘post-colonial’ intervention challenging the coloniality of ‘Bushmen’ representation in the South African (natural history) Museum in Cape Town. Skotnes “chose the South African National Gallery for the venue”, “[t]raditionally a bastion of white “high” art”, which only “recently begun to show more African material”, so that she could get “as far away as possible from an

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ethnographic or natural history context”.7 Aimed, through the nature and order of its display items, at “challenging the ahistoricity of the San diorama” (in the South African Museum) which depicted the San in a natural environment, and to put the archive on display, the Miscast exhibition deliberately engaged with key museum functions that were also displayed.8

The exhibition space was “divided into discrete areas, each of which characterized an important function of the museum: to create displays, to curate collections (and store parts of them), and to educate”. The display also suggested Skotnes’ ideal of museum practice. One room was set up as a library, thus reflecting the educational function of museums. It had a table on which were hundreds of documents and newspaper articles that were used in the research for the exhibition.9 The front section of the main room reflected the display function of museums.

In contrast to the timeless representation of ‘Bushmen’ in the diorama in the natural history museum, a history of colonial depredation against the Khoe-San and specifically against the ‘Bushmen’, was deliberately reflected in the main room as well as in two other connected rooms used for the exhibition. On the front wall of the main room hung thirteen cases containing objects created by Khoe-San. Facing the wall was a semi-circle of thirteen casts of headless body parts (torsos, legs and genitalia) mounted on pedestals. The centrepiece comprised thirteen rifles stacked upright in circle formation flanked on each side by a cast of a severed head – made from a trophies taken from slain Khoe-San in the nineteenth century. Above the images in the main room was a text printed in red letters: “There is no escape from the politics of knowledge”.10

The display at the back of the main room depicted the curatory function of museums. The back section had two piles of casts of body parts, six metal shelves with cardboard boxes designed to resemble (archival) boxes that were used for the storage of human remains in many museums. There were also two cabinets of objects and scientific instruments of measurement and dissection associated with nineteen and early-twentieth-century physical anthropology (in particular craniology), thus implicating physical anthropology together with museums in the dehumanization of the Khoe-San.11

In a room adjacent to the main one hung a series of photographs by Paul Weinberg taken between 1984 and 1995 “with the cooperation of Bushmen subjects in Botswana, Namibia, and Smitsdrift”. The floor of the room was covered with vinyl tiles reproducing newspaper articles, archival photos, and reports of commando raids and other official documents. “The intention, as with other parts of the exhibit, was to make the experience of viewing active, rather than passive”.12 This display space was very much suggestive of Skotnes’ own ideal of museum practice (centring on the notion of cooperation), indicated by the positioning of Weinberg’s framed San images on the wall. In contrast, images and reports by colonial officials manifesting the dehumanization and violation of ‘Bushmen’ were relegated to the floor, with visitors thus being forced to walk (or trample) on them, thus symbolizing a rejection of ‘Bushmen’ dehumanization represented by the colonial images and texts but also ironically implicating the visitors in the dehumanization of the ‘Bushmen’, and thus inviting them to rethink their own relation to the ‘Bushmen’ and to reject any continued complicity in ‘Bushmen’ dehumanization or violation. ‘Bushmen’ visiting the exhibition were thus ironically also forced to become ‘complicit’ in ‘Bushmen’ dehumanization and to (re-)reject ‘Bushmen’ dehumanization and violation like the White beneficiaries of ‘Bushmen’ genocide whose generalized ‘colonial’ sensibilities the display was most probably in the main meant to challenge.

9 Skotnes: “Politics of Bushman representation”, p. 266.
The kind of interaction and the reflective process invited by the display suggested Skotnes’ own position and possible dilemma as a scholar, artist and White beneficiary of Khoe-San genocide continually wrestling with colonial and anti-colonial sensibilities, and directly benefiting as a scholar and artist through engaging with items bequeathed from direct Khoe-San (or ‘Bushmen’/San) violations and genocide, thus being continually impelled to reflect on, and reject her own possible complicity in the dehumanization or violation of ‘Bushmen’.

**Reception of exhibition**

The *Miscast* exhibition was aimed at problematizing Khoe-San and more specifically ‘Bushmen’ representations in the past and to reflect the genocide that they were subjected to. The exhibition generated much controversy with censure and support expressed by Khoe-San. Khoe-San had mixed feelings about the exhibit. Approval was expressed for the way the exhibit showed brutality historically inflicted on the Khoe-San that, it was felt, should never be repeated. The exhibition was, however, also faulted for perpetuating violations against the Khoe-San. Whilst some Khoe-San expressed both approval and disapproval of aspects of the exhibition, others emphasized or manifested either disapproval or disapproval. Khoe-San also used the platform occasioned by the exhibition to denounce their present violations and to express their aspirations and demands.

The staging of the exhibition indeed served as a platform for various groups claiming some association with the Khoe-San “to present themselves by commenting on – and criticising – the exhibition”.

The violations imputed on the exhibit were linked to purported current violations and marginalization of Khoe-San. Strong criticism was especially levelled by the Kranshoek based GNC and the !Hurikamma Cultural Movement. Much of the views of the Khoe-San were voiced at a ‘public forum’ held the day after the opening of the exhibition for the discussion of issues of common concern to many Khoe-San groups. Over 700 hundred people attended the forum. Discussions at the public forum included organizational building and economic and community development, with the overriding shared concerns being land restitution and the right to self-determination.

The Kransthoek based GNC, represented by Mansell Upham (a White lawyer), who delivered a prepared address at the public forum on behalf of the organization, used the occasion to express Griqua and Khoe-San demands and grievances with the government. The severity of the criticism levelled on behalf of the GNC suggested the authority that GNC was projecting as a leading organization within the Griqua and broader Khoe-San socio-political landscape. The criticism also suggested disillusionment with the government’s response to Griqua demands as well as the GNC’s resentment of the disregard of Griqua and Khoe-San in state heritage institutions and the use of Khoe-San heritage for the benefit of those who were not Khoe-San.

The GNC charged that the ‘public forum’, not initially planned to follow the opening of the *Miscast* exhibition, was “merely a tokenist after-thought and patronizing attempt that pretends to give Indigenous People ostensible, albeit belated, participatory, consultative and severely restricted empowerment”. However, the organization also welcomed the opportunity afforded by the public forum for the meeting of Khoe-San groups.

The GNC also charged that the exhibition was a neo-colonial usurpation of Khoe-San material culture and history. Though the GNC leadership also “welcomed all attempts to expose the devastating colonial impact on the Khoisan”, they were “saddened by the non-indigenous people’s persistence in hijacking and exposing our past for their own absolution”. The GNC leadership “perceived a re-entrenchment of academic and intellectual hegemony, self-aggrandisement and re-appropriation and re-colonisation of our material culture and history”,

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17 Griqua and Coloured People’s Opinion (GCPO), March 1997, p. 20.
18 Mail & Guardian, 19 April 1996.
and “deplore[d] any attempts by non-indigenous intelligentsia to absolve themselves in terms of their own special and newly entrenched brand of political correctness”. The GNC also lamented the absence of the Griqua from the exhibit and Miscast book:

Notwithstanding the major historically continuous role played by the GRIQUA throughout southern Africa’s tragic colonial history and in consistently resisting – right up to the present – the bushmanisation, dispossession and ethnocide of the GRIQUA and their aboriginal KHOISAN ancestors, the GRIQUA are mostly ignored in the exhibition and the book.

In taking issue with the government, the GNC deployed the First Nation rights discourse. The organization urged the government to comply with standards and the rights of First Nations affirmed by the United Nations, lamenting that

we fail to see any real commitment to the human rights and democratic re-empowerment of Indigenous Peoples and those of the First Nations of southern Africa – which rights are being currently codified in terms of the Draft Declarations of the Rights of Indigenous People at the United Nations in terms of International Law and universal standards.

Suggesting the government’s unsatisfactory response to demands that propelled Griqua and other Khoe-San to approach the United Nations, the “absence of President Mandela and of any substantial official/nation-state representation at the official opening of the exhibition” was also noted. The GNC also noted the “non-participation and absence of representatives from colonial nation-states that have been instrumental in advancing ethnocide in the past”, with the exception of the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany.

Reflecting moves towards trans-national Khoe-San ‘indigenous’/First Nation identification and cooperation, The GNC also expressed the hope that other First Nations would join forces with the GNC and use “the legal framework that has already been devised for negotiations with the colonially-descended nation-state – governments of southern Africa”.

Mansall Upham’s association with the leadership of the Kranshoek based GNC not only facilitated their appropriation of the First Nation rights discourse but also had a radicalizing potential. His association with the Kranshoek GNC between 1994 and 1998 gave its pronouncements at times, as manifested at conferences where Upham represented the organization, a more critical edge deviating from the more modest and polite complaints that have characterized the organization. The organization’s public pronouncements reverted to characteristic diplomacy after its relation with Upham was severed.

The !Hurikamma Cultural Movement of Yvette Abrahams charged that the exhibition was complicit in the objectification and dehumanization of Khoe-San and faulted it for not opposing forces “tying to conquer” the Khoe-San. The organization also charged that the exhibition was another symbol of the status of the Khoe-San as a conquered people:

We are sick and tired of naked brown people being exposed to the curious glances of rich whites in search of dinner-table conversation. At the exhibition we were exposed to yet another attempt to treat brown people as

objects. The exhibition does nothing to oppose forces which tried, and are still trying to conquer the Khoisan. Instead it is yet another symbol of our status as conquered people.

Selina Magu of the Kuru Development Trust disapproved the showing of naked bodies and the display of graphic photos on the floor, commenting that “I was walking on my own people”, and that their suffering is too important to have been shown on the floor … . This is a big insult on us; will this be how our children will remember us?26

Paul de Wet who represented Nama from Richtersveld mentioned in a similar vein:

They stole my forefathers and put their faces on paper and now I have to walk on those faces on the floor. 27

Martin Engelbrecht of the Khoisan Representative Council sensed that the exhibit would play an important role in the “awakening” of Khoe-San identity politics:

We may be endangered, but we’re not yet extinct. Sunday gave us a platform to raise our concerns and remind South Africa that Khoisan people are still alive today. … This is the beginning of the Khoisan wake-up call. 28

The value of the exhibition in providing opportunity for networking and cooperation was emphasized by Khoe-San representatives. Reverend Mario Mahongo, representing the !Xu and Khwe from the Northern Cape, stressed at the public forum the importance of the meeting for bringing many groups together. He also stressed the need for the “indigenous movements of southern Africa to address the whole question of colonialism and cultural dispossession”.29 Wrapping up discussion at the public forum, Hunter Sixpence, the public relations officer of the Kuru Development Trust, mentioned that “[t]here must be a next exhibition that will show our STRUGGLE OF TODAY”.30

Although the occasion of the opening of the Miscast exhibition provided an opportunity for trans-national Khoe-San networking, intra-Khoe-San tension was also fuelled by the ‘Bushmen’ focus of the exhibition. Reflecting as sense of marginalization at the exhibit, a Griqua group expressed concern that there were “too many Bushman”.31 Still, a “general sense of heightened solidarity between different groups” was discernable at the public meeting on 14 April.32

The opening of the Miscast exhibition and the public forum of 14 April not only cultivated a sense of solidarity amongst Khoe-San that were present but also allowed Coloureds to affirm publicly a Khoe-San heritage and to identify with the broad Khoe-San population. Both occasions were indeed attended by Coloureds as well as some Whites who claimed a Khoe-San heritage. The occasion of the opening of the Miscast exhibition thus provided Coloureds with an impetus for the cultivation of Khoe-San identities, and also exposed them to the First Nation rights discourse deployed by organizations of longstanding Khoe-San communities like the Kranshoek based GNC and the newly formed WIMSA (dealing with longstanding San communities).

The attendance of the opening of the Miscast exhibition by people who affirmed Khoekhoe and San identities, many of whom did not neatly fit popular stereotypes of Khoe-San cultural and somatic authenticity, facilitated the assumption of Khoe-San labels by Coloureds, many of whom did also not fit popular stereotypes associated

26 Quoted in Lane: “Exhibiting Khoisan in southern African museums”.
28 Mail & Guardian, 19 April 1996.
32 Lane: “Exhibiting Khoisan in southern African museums”.
with the historical Khoe-San. The presence of the Coloured nationalist Kleurling Weerstandsbeweging (KWB) at the public forum, and the identification by the organization’s representatives attending the forum with Khoe-San people depicted in the exhibition, suggested the insecurity generated amongst Coloured segments by the 1994 political transition; the search for identity categories that could be deployed for political, economic, cultural and psychological repositioning in the new political order, and indicated the nationalist and separatist undercurrents (associated with the KWB) that could attend Khoe-San revivalism. The presence of a few Whites at the Miscast exhibition who also acknowledged Khoe-San ancestry, suggested a general but differential reorientation towards Africanness and indigeneity amongst South Africans.

**South African National Gallery Negotiating the Way Forward**

The Miscast exhibition enhanced Pippa Skotnes’ reputation as a scholar and artist and the reputation of the South African National Gallery “as an institution of international influence and significance”. The exhibition also “offended and alienated many South Africans”. Thus, in response to issues and concerns raised by the exhibition, the National Gallery organized a public forum, Negotiating the Way Forward, on 7 September 1996. The public was invited to assist in “mapping the way forward”, thus reflecting a democratic pulse in state heritage and academic institutions encouraging Khoe-San activists to (attempt to) use state heritage institutions and academics for the promotion of Khoe-San socio-economic, cultural and political aspirations. On the panel was Mansell Upham representing the Kranshoek based GNC, Paulus de Wet representing Nama of the Richtersveld, Martin Engelbrecht of the Khoisan Representative Council, as well as Lavona George from the National Gallery.

As reflected by the address of Mansell Upham at the 7 September forum, Khoe-San representatives expressed concern about the re-appropriation of Khoe-San material culture; they also expressed a desire for Khoe-San consultation and involvement in regard to Khoe-San representations and for museums and academic conferences on the Khoe-San to promote Khoe-San rights. Thus, Khoe-San representatives wanted museum and academic conferences dealing with the Khoe-San heritage to also promote their identity politics. They also took strong exception with the engagement with Khoe-San history and heritage for the personal benefit of academics or for the benefit of national political agendas that did not necessarily benefit the Khoe-San.

Dealing directly with the theme of the meeting, Upham suggested that the issue was

> ostensible redistribution of power in a grossly unequal relationship. Therein lies the inherent danger of tokenism, prescription, paternalism, materialism, abuse of power, might is right, and non-indigenous majoritarianism.

Upham reasserted concerns about intellectual neo-colonization and re-appropriation of Khoe-San material culture and also expressed concern about the implementation of official ideology in state heritage institutions and the continual marginalization of the Khoe-San; he expressed concern about the Pippa Skotnes, the University of Cape Town, the South African Museum and the South African National Gallery being induced to implement official ideology:

> Are they not perhaps unaccountably resurrecting KHOISAN material culture for purposes of privileged political and ideological abuse?

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35 GCPO, March 1997, p. 22.
To what extent are the National Gallery, SA Museum and UCT compelled or induced to implement the so-called *New Patriotism* and *Nation-building* myths of the Government-of-the-day and its political compromises made as legal successor to the *Apartheid* State?

As an artist, can we challenge Pippa Skotnes’ individual right to artistic expression in a *nation-state* Institution such as the National Gallery trading on spoils from the still non-extinct KHOISAN?36

Upham also expressed concern that the National Gallery and academic gatherings that dealt with the Khoe-San did not advance their rights satisfactorily, if at all:

What really is being done to promote indigenous peoples’ rights? It appears that we are content to limit ourselves to safe and still-born historical, anthropological, academic activities – but what about REALISING legal rights?

What about treaties, international law, common law, aboriginal titles etc etc?

The way forward, according to Upham, was for the Khoe-San to be accommodated in actual negotiations in an equal manner. Such equality required Khoe-San “consultation right from the very beginning” and the active redressing of “their neglected historic, legal and human rights”.37

The *Miscast* exhibition manifested very much a process of identity rethinking, re-evaluation and repositioning within Coloured and longstanding Khoe-San communities activated by the democratic transition. The exhibition also manifested changes in the representation of historically marginalized communities in state heritage institutions and an altering relation between academics and historically marginalized communities – that were the subject of academic studies. Representations in state heritage institutions were becoming more representative. Dehumanizing representations of historically marginalized communities were also subject to change. Community involvement and consultation became important to give a humanizing, developmental and democratic face to state-heritage and academic projects.38 Khoe-San invited to the *Miscast* exhibition were apparently meant to reinforce the anti-colonial and humanizing projections of the exhibition, and to generate a sense of democratic participation, community involvement in, and approval of the exhibit. Khoe-San representatives and activist, however, attempted to use the exhibit and subsequent academic events on the Khoe-San to advance their own identity politics, with the neo-Khoe-San also becoming more prominent at these events after 1996.

**Khoisan Identities and Cultural Heritage Conference**

On Saturday 12 July 1997 two sheep were slaughtered at the South African Cultural History Museum as an offering to God at the opening of the *Khoisan Identities and Cultural Heritage Conference*. Later in the afternoon choir-singing, notably by Nama and Griqua, as well as ‘Khoe-San’ dancing, drama and story-telling were carried out. The exhibition of culture was calculated to affirm that there was still an indigenous Khoe-San culture in South Africa. With about 300 people – many of whom claimed a Khoe-San heritage – at the opening of the conference, the occasion was regarded as “the coming to age of the Khoisan”.39 At the conference opening a few people were introduced as the present chiefs of groups claiming a connection to some of the Khoekhoe groups present at the Cape at the time of Jan van Riebeeck in the 1650s. Speeches by Khoe-San identity claimants about reclaiming their heritage were well supported by the audience.40

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38 On the impact of the democratic transition on state heritage institutions see e.g. Patricia Davidson: “Museums and the reshaping of memory”, in Sarah Nuttall and Carli Coetzee (eds.): *Negotiating the past: the making of memory in South Africa* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 143-160.
39 *Cape Argus*, 13 July 1997, p. 3.
From 1997 neo-Khoekhoe connected to the Cape Cultural Heritage and Development Council were increasingly present at forums on the Khoe-San. The emergence of newer Khoe-San sections was especially brought to public attention though the international *Khoisan Identities and Cultural Heritage Conference* held at the South African Museum in Cape Town between 12 and 16 July 1997. The conference not only brought the neo-Khoe-San to public attention but provided a further stimulus for Khoe-San revivalism and attendant demands for restitution.

The conference was intended to deal with the continuing economic and cultural collapse of Khoe-San communities and to help to curb the loss of Khoe-San folklore, traditional medicine, field craft, technology and heritage. Claiming Khoe-San ancestry, Professor Henry Bredekamp of the University of the Western Cape’s Institute for Historical Research, chairperson of the conference organizing committee, hoped that the conference would help to highlight where the Khoe-San communities fitted into the new South Africa. He hoped that the conference would “start a debate in South Africa about the people indigenous to this region and what their rights are as people”. Dr Janette Deacon, a member of the conference organizing committee and a National Monuments Council official, expressed hope that the conference would help instil awareness and pride in Khoe-San heritage amongst Khoe-San descendants. The preparation of the conference and the conference itself contributed to the affirmation of pride in Khoe-San cultural heritage and to demands for the promotion of their indigenous languages and cultures. Just prior to conference, Elsie Vaalbooi, a #Khomani resident at Rietfontein in the Northern Cape, appealed to President Mandela and his government to “do something … to save” her language and culture. Elsie and her son, Petrus Vaalbooi, also called on Mandela, via the media, to openly declare his “San” roots, Petrus reasoning that that would reduce the stigma attached to San communities and their languages.

Khoe-San representatives were invited to participate in the conference at various levels thus giving the conference a sense of democratic involvement. Khoe-San were involved in organization and planning. They participated in cultural events. They delivered speeches and made demands at special Khoe-San discussion forums. Khoe-San delegates also participated in the more formal academic sessions at which White institutional scholars in the main presented papers. Both older and more recent Khoe-San organizations were invited to the conference. Represented at the conference were the CCHDC, East Griqualand Pioneers Council, Kranshoek GNC, Khoisan Representative Council, Nama Representative Council, !Xu and the Khwe Development Trust, WIMSA, Karretjie Mense from the Karroo (believed to be largely !Xam descendants), and the #Khomani from the Kalahari. There were also Khoe-San representatives from Botswana and Namibia. The conference marked a departure from earlier academic conferences on the Khoe-San as both academics and members of Khoe-San communities were present. This was the first academic conference on the Khoe-San with a significant Khoe-San presence and involvement, with community representatives outnumbing academics. Having been drawn into the conference by academic organizers, Khoe-San were enabled to intervene in scholarly representations of Khoe-San people. Khoe-San representatives also attempted to influence academics to promote Khoe-San identity politics and Khoe-San ‘indigenous rights’.

Partly funded by the Department of Arts, Culture, Sciences and Technology (DACST), the conference provided a meeting-point for government officials and Khoe-San representatives. Reflecting an attempt at channelling Khoe-San revivalism in line with broader trans-ethnic nation-building in South Africa, Mandela sent a message expressing his approval of the conference. He indicated that the conference would contribute to the renewal of the nation and continent. The minister of DACST, Lionel Mtshali, delivered the opening address and expressed
support for the promotion of Khoe-San cultures.\(^47\) Indeed, Khoe-San delegates hoped that the conference would encourage serious engagement with the government. A spokesperson of the Kranshoek based GNC indicated that his organization wanted to use the conference as a platform to engage in serious negotiations with the government concerning their aspirations and demands.\(^48\)

Whilst providing for the expression of Khoe-San concerns to the public and the government, the conference was also an opportunity for Khoe-San leaders to position themselves in the Khoe-San socio-political landscape. Older organizations attempted to consolidate their position through the conference. Aspirant leaders attempted to impress conferees and the media in their attempts to position themselves as leaders within the Khoe-San socio-political landscape and on the national arena. Neo-Khoekhoe chiefs in particular were driven to wear clothing with indigenous motifs in their attempt to project themselves as creditable chiefs, in contrast to leaders of longstanding Khoekhoe communities whose legitimacy was less suspect and who were consequently less inclined to reinforce their claims of being indigenous with clothing with indigenous motifs. For example, neo-Khoekhoe Chief Joseph Little, who was on a mission “[t]o foster unity among historically coloured people and [to] give them pride in their [indigenous] origin”, was very conspicuous with his cloak and headband with leopard motifs, captivating both delegates and media agents. “Little sprang into the public eye” at the conference. Dressed and acting to impress, a journalist described him as a “flamboyant, energetic character” who had “a band of cheetah skin around his neck” with “faux leopard-skin tails dangling from his head-band”.\(^49\)

Khoe-San delegates expressed their aspirations and demands during special discussions forums at the conference, with appeals being made for, *inter alia*, the promotion of Khoe-San languages and Khoe-San identities; the restitution of land, as well as for Khoe-San cooperation and unity. A desire was also expressed for a unity structure. Statements delivered by individual delegates were very much suggestive of their location in regard to the Brown, Coloured, Khoekhoe, San, and Khoe-San categories and to the international First Nation rights discourse.

Many delegates used the terms ‘Khoekhoe’, ‘San’ or ‘Khoe-San’ in reference to themselves, thus reflecting the extent to which terms that were already current academically prior to 1994, had been popularized in some sections of society. There was also a general disavowal of the Coloured category.\(^50\) J Little suggested very much the relation between neo-Khoe-San and Coloured anxiety generated by the democratic transition, the search for identity categories that could be deployed in the new order, and the delimitation of neo-Khoe-Sanness by Colouredness. His assertions also reflected the articulation between narrow ethno-national discourses and the official trans-ethnic nation-building discourse in South Africa:

> Our very first objective in the Cape Cultural Heritage Organization is to create a spirit of unity among all South Africans, especially those under the statutory title as Coloured South Africans.\(^51\) … In 1994 everybody got a shock and everybody was in a subdued mode because all of a sudden we were going to have a black government. … [T]he coloured people were looking for their identity along the Khoisan lines which we, I think at this stage, also are halfheartedly, from my point of view, are willing to accept … . \(^52\)

Even though old and new Khoe-San expressed rejection of the Coloured category, they identified very much with people under the Coloured category. However, in referring to the broad community identified with, some preferred to use the term ‘Brown’ instead of ‘Coloured’.\(^53\)

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\(^{48}\) Bank: *Khoisan Identities & Cultural Heritage Conference*, pp. 6-7.


\(^{50}\) Bank: "Khoisan Identities & Cultural Heritage Conference", pp. 6-14.


\(^{52}\) Bank: *Khoisan Identities & Cultural Heritage Conference*, p. 35.

Assertions by Cecil le Fleur, chairperson of the executive council of the Kranshoek based GNC and cousin of paramount chief A le Fleur II heading the Kranshoek based GNC, reflected the early appropriation of the international indigenous rights discourse by the Kranshoek based GNC leadership. Among the South African delegates, C le Fleur was notable in the use of the term “inheemse eerste nasie” as a self-referential category during Conference sessions. Mansell Upham, the GNC advisor, used the terms “aboriginal”, “Khoisan First Nation” and “indigenous rights” most extensively. He also referred to a “Khoisan Indigenous Rights Movement in this country that preceded and helped shaped this conference”. C le Fleur also reflected the GNC and broader Khoe-San (or Khoekhoe) aspiration for unity:

Ons, die Griekwa, is ’n inheemse eerste nasie in hierdie land en ons is ontsettend trots daarop. Ons het ernstige pogings aangewend om ons volk te beskerm en ons identiteit te beker. Ons het gegaan en ons het ons as Griekwas op die verhoog van die Verenigde Volke gaan bekendstel. Benewens dit het ons ook voortgebou op dit wat Adam Kok destyds gedoen het om die verbrokkelende Khoistamme byeekaar te maak en onder een vandel saam te snoer. Aangevuur deur hierdie aspirasies uit ons verlede het ons verdrae gaan onderteken met ander Khoi volke soos die Nama van die Richtersveld …. Ons het selfs buite ons landsgrense gegaan na ons Khoi broers en susters wat eue gelede saam met ons hier in Suider-Afrika een volk was. Ons wil hierdie stelsel van verdragtekening uitbrei sodat ons uiteidelik tot een volk en tweedens om ook om ons ander Khoi volke saam met die Griekwas onder een Khoisambreel saam te bring.

With the Khoisan Identities and Cultural Heritage Conference being utilized for positioning within the Khoe-San socio-political landscape, tension between old factions as well as tension between leaders from old organizations and those from newer ones became evident. Leaders of the Kranshoek based GNC were, for example, disturbed by the antics and leadership claims of some of the new chiefs, fearing that they could trivialized their own claims.

Whilst aspiration for Griqua unity was expressed, unity and cooperation was at the same time undermined by contestation over Griqua paramount-chieftainship. Supporters of Adam Kok V from Griqualand West attempted to bolster his position as their royal leader. Martin Engelbrecht, the main figure behind the positioning of Adam Kok V as a Griqua royal leader, reactivated an intra-Griqua dispute around leadership legitimacy when he insisted that Adam Kok V was regarded by Griqua of the Northern Cape as their paramount chief. His spokesperson, Joe Fletcher, stated that the key to the conference’s success was the restoration of the Griqua monarchy and that he and Kok V had travelled from Griqualand West to ensure that other Khoe-San delegates did not use the five-day conference to attempt to achieve unity without resolving the question of the Griqua monarchy. Fletcher maintained that

[a]ccording to birthright, Adam Kok V is the ruler of the Griqua people but he has not been recognized as such. We expect the conference to address the question of his claims as king before any moves to unite the Khoisan are made.

Delegates from the Kranshoek based GNC, which had members throughout South Africa, took exception to the view that Adam Kok V was the rightful paramount chief of the Griqua, as they regarded Andrew Abraham Stockenström le Fleur II as their paramount chief. They were inclined to believe that after the death of Adam Kok III, who had no male descendants, his Kapteinsraad asked AAS le Fleur I (who married the daughter of a

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54 Among the South African delegates representing Khoe-San organizations terms like “inheemse nasie” are only found in the transcripts of Cecil le Fleur and Mansall Upham. The conference transcripts are included in Bank: *Khoisan Identities & Cultural Heritage Conference*.
59 Cape Argus, 14 July 1997, p. 5.
potential heir of Kok in 1886), to become the paramount chief of the Griqua. Thus, at the same time as moves were made for Griqua as well as broader Khoe-San unity, rivalry cropped up and undermined attempts to achieve unity.

As suggested before, Khoe-San attendance of scholarly events dealing with Khoe-San heritage served to confer relevance and a sense of legitimacy on these events through generating a sense of democratic participation and community involvement at a time when the objectification of historically marginalized communities by (especially White) scholars for purposes not benefiting these communities became more problematic and financially difficult to sustain (at least through government funding). Social relevance and community involvement became important for the acquisition of government funding for research and scholarly conferences. With the attendance of Khoi-San secured, academic conferences on the Khoi-San could be projected as departing from past trends in which Khoi-San and other marginalized communities featured merely as study objects for White academics. Thus, the Khoisan Identities and Cultural Heritage Conference was described by Andrew Bank, a member of its organizing committee, as having “begun a process of breaking down the barriers between the Khoisan as objects of study and the Khoisan as agents in knowledge production, between the debates of scholars and the ongoing political struggles of the Khoisan.” Participation of Khoi-San community representatives in academic events allowed for the establishment of links between academics and Khoi-San communities thus facilitating academic access to Khoi-San communities for research purposes, with Khoi-San representatives in turn attempting to use academics for their own benefit.

National Khoisan Consultative Conference

A significant platform was again provided in 2001 through the National Khoisan Consultative Conference (NKCC) for Khoi-San from a wide range of organizations and communities to publicly articulate their aspirations and concerns. Like the 1997 Khoisan Identities and Cultural Heritage Conference reflecting academic intervention and involvement in Khoi-San revivalism, the NKCC was initiated by Professor Henry Bredekamp who claimed on the opening day that the conference was the outcome of a vision that he received in Gaborone, Botswana, a few years before.

Held in Oudtshoorn between 29 March and 1 April, the NKCC was the biggest contemporary gathering of South African Khoi-San in terms of the numbers of delegates present and communities and organizations represented. The conference was attended by more than 500 people of whom around 440 were delegates from over 30 Khoi-San organizations and groupings from across the country. Khoi-San organizations and groupings represented at the conference included the following: Attaqua, Cochoqua, Chainoqua, Gorachoqua, Goringhaiqua, Griqua (Adam Kok V Royal House, East Griqualand Development Committee, East Griqualand Pioneers Council, Knysna based Griqua National Conference, Kransehoek based Griqua National Conference, Barendse Griqua House, United Griquas, Waterboer Royal House), Gonaqua, Hessequa, Inqua, Karretjie Mense, Khoisan Awareness Initiative, #Khomani, Khwe Traditional House, Korana (Korana First Nation, Korana Royal House, Free State Korana), Nama (Gauteng Nama, Steinkopf Nama Vereniging, Steinkopf Stamraad), and the !Xu Traditional House. Observers included a small number of government officials, officials from the South African Heritage Resource Agency, academics, and the media. The conference was intended to

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60 Burger, 16 July 1997, p. 10.
62 The attempt by Khoi-San activist to use academics for the promotion of Khoi-San rights and identity politics was clearly manifested at the 4th World Archaeological Congress held at the University of Cape Town in January 1999. The congress was attended by nearly 1000 delegates from more than 70 countries including representatives of Griqua, Korana, Nama, San and the CCHDO. See Burger, 12 January 1999, p. 3; Cape Argus, 13 January 1999, p. 8; Daily News, 28 January 1999, p. 16; Sunday Times, 17 January 1999, p. 11.
63 This section draws much on personal observation at the 2001 NKCC and prior conference preparations. For prepared conference presentations, see “National Khoisan Consultative Conference, Oudtshoorn: 29 March to April 2001” (UWC Institute for Historical Research, 2001).
advance Khoe-San unity and cooperation and to create a forum where Khoe-San from various communities and organizations could deliberate on their situation in South Africa. The conference was also intended to reaffirm and publicize the existence of the Khoe-San and to demonstrate that they had a unique existing culture, hence the invitation of the media to the conference.

In preparation for the conference Bredekamp organized Khoe-San workshops in the Western, Northern, and Eastern Cape where Khoe-San concerns were identified and the idea raised of a national Khoe-San conference where their concerns could be discussed. Common concerns around identity, culture and education, land rights, Khoe-San unity and political and economic empowerment were identified in different regions as issues that should be advanced at a national Khoe-San conference. Regional representatives were elected to form a national organizing committee. Once formed the organizing committee was chaired by Bredekamp. It was envisaged that resolutions would be formulated at the national conference that would have to be carried out. That is, the necessity of a post-conference structure to carry out conference resolutions was anticipated, reminiscent of the first Griqua National Conference organized by AAS le Fleur I in 1920.

There were attempts within the conference organizing committee to project the conference and the attended promotion of Khoe-San identities and Khoe-San unity, as not being in discord with the broader government driven trans-ethnic nation-building process in South Africa. Government support and representation was also sought in order to reinforce the importance of the conference. The government on its part provided a measure of support for the reclamation and promotion of Khoe-San identities, also providing funding for the organization of the conference and for the travel and accommodation expenses of Khoe-San delegates.

Ethnic and trans-ethnic dynamics in South Africa were reflected both in the conference theme and by the expressions of delegates during the conference. The conference theme, “Khoisan Diversity in National Unity”, reflected both Khoe-San aspiration of forging a sense of nationhood and unity amongst themselves and the aim of the government to cultivate a national identity amongst diverse ethnic communities. Reflecting an attempt at reconciling Khoe-San ethnicity to the broader process of nation-building in the country, the theme suggested both the advancement of unity amongst the Khoe-San and as well as the advancement of an overarching South African national identity.

The conference clearly manifested the desire for geographic rootedness, a sense of belonging, group security, self-esteem, ethno-cultural specificity, legitimacy and unity amongst Coloureds who rejected a Coloured category in favour of Khoe-San categories. Affording an opportunity for the demonstration of the presence of the Khoe-San, the conference manifested a process of re-evaluation, re-articulation, reconstitution, (re)invention and (re)affirmation in the realms of identity and culture. Great pride was expressed in being Khoe-San. Delegates enthusiastically embraced Khoe-San identity and culture. The official opening of the conference was preceded with singing by a choir of the Kranshoek based GNC and a Nama choir from Riemvasmaak, followed with dancing (projected as Khoekhoe) by neo-Inqua (Khoekhoe) children from the Eastern Cape. Traditional Khoe-San dancing, singing and speech in Khoe-San languages like Nama and !Xu, were greatly applauded. Cultural performances were meant to indicate to South Africa and the world that there were Khoe-San in South Africa and that they had a genuine and unique indigenous culture. Many delegates wore clothing with indigenous motifs, with the leopard motif being especially prominent on clothing. A very small number of men also donned animal skins.

The conference was a result of Khoe-San revivalism: there could not have been such a conference if there was no revival. The conference was also a significant contribution to the revival. The conference generated and reinforced pride in being indigenous and Khoe-San. It also provided an opportunity for Khoe-San to network and to foster a common vision and approach to the future. Aspirations for Khoe-San unity and a common

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64 Burger, 29 March 2001, p. 4.
approach to the future led to the establishment of the National Khoisan Consultative Conference Council shortly before the close of the conference.

The conference provided the Khoe-San of South Africa an opportunity to talk about issues of concern to them. It was, however, not possible for all who wanted to articulate themselves to do so. The conference was organized into sessions for specific issues and individuals were given a time-limit to articulate themselves. Many would indeed have liked to talk longer. Although many did not get the opportunity to talk during sessions, key issues of concern were reflected in resolutions made during a group discussion workshop on the 31st attended only by official delegates. However, the tight organization of sessions generated (or strengthened) suspicion amongst some delegates that there was some manipulation by organizers at the conference that promoted certain goals.

Opening ceremony
The conference was opened on the 29th by the Deputy President Jacob Zuma who appeared very positive and supportive of the conference and the affirmation of Khoe-San identities. His positive sentiments were much appreciated by delegates. He characterized the conference as very historical; as a reflection of the progress that had been made in post-apartheid South Africa, and as a contribution to nation-building. Indicating his support of a trans-ethnic nation-building friendly Khoe-San revivalism, Zuma further stated that the conference would be seen, in years to come, as a watershed for the following reasons:

• Firstly, it was the first time that people of Khoisan descent have set aside their differences and come together to discuss their future … .
• Secondly, this conference demonstrates that not even 350 years of harsh colonial rule and apartheid policies could have crushed the Khoisan spirit … .
• Thirdly, the strong cultural and social focus of this conference will provide significant inspiration for the African Renaissance movement … .
• Fourthly, the growing sense of pride amongst people of Khoisan descent about their roots in Southern Africa will bring increased benefits.

Given perceptions by Khoe-San activists of their (continued) socio-cultural and economic marginalization, government representatives were inclined to attempt to dispel such perceptions and to stress the work that the government had done and was still doing for the benefit of the Khoe-San. Zuma affirmed the support of his government for the advancement of Khoe-San people, thus reflecting the attempt to channel Khoe-San revivalism in line with the broader nation-building process. He promised the conference that the government would continue to do all it could “to ensure that the struggle of the Khoe-San people for a better life bears fruition”. He also referred to government initiatives to meet the needs and interests of the Khoe-San, for example, the work of the Pan South African Language Board; the National Khoisan Council; the Integrated Khoisan Status Quo report commissioned by the Department of Constitutional Development (renamed Department of Provincial and Local Government); the Khoisan Legacy Project; the envisaged multi-purpose


66 Funded by the Department of Arts, Science, Culture and Technology (DACST), and managed by the South African Heritage Resource Agency (SAHRA) on behalf of DACST, the Khoisan Legacy Project was launched by in 2000 as the tenth national legacy project. The other national legacy projects were: Albert Luthuli, Anglo-Boer/SA War Centenary, Blood River/Ncome Battlefield, Constitutional Hill, Freedom Park, Freedom Square, Nelson Mandela Museum, Samora Machel, and the Womens’ Memorial. The establishment of these legacy projects were resolved at Cabinet level to promote nation-building and to fill gaps in South Africa’s heritage resources created by past colonial and apartheid policies. Khoe-San representatives resolved in Kimberley in December 2000 that the Khoisan Legacy Project should be developed around a national Khoe-San heritage route linking Khoe-San heritage sites in different provinces.
community centres in rural Khoe-San communities, and the granting of land to some Khoe-San communities in terms of the land restitution process. Zuma also referred to the significance of the South African Heritage Resource Agency in ensuring access to heritage sites, and to the involvement of the Department of Arts Culture, Science and Technology through Professor Phillip Tobias, as well as the South African Embassy in France, in attempts to secure the return of the remains of Sarah Bartmann from France. However, attempts by other relatively minor government officials on the second day of the conference at reassuring Khoe-San delegates about the earnestness of the government in dealing with their concerns were readily met with doubt and suspicion by many at the conference, reflecting thus the significance of the presence of a figure like Zuma at the conference for generating faith in the government. Zuma’s presence at the conference was, however, only confined to the opening ceremony.

The closing of the opening ceremony with a prayer by Reverend Mario Mahongo of Schmidtsdrift in his !Xu language, and the start of discussion sessions on the 30th with a prayer by Deborah Cloete of Steinkopf in the Nama language, were indicative of the religious and spiritual dimension of the conference or the religiosity of the conferees. These were also at the same time significant acts of cultural, linguistic and psychological affirmation.

Conference issues
The attempt at forging Khoe-San unity and cooperation was manifested in the spread of speakers. An effort was made by conference organizers at getting speakers from prominent Khoe-San organizations and communities. Conference themes were aimed at covering the broad range of Khoe-San concerns. The presentation of papers reflected the significant role of Griqua in the Khoe-San socio-political landscape as well as the prominent role that the CCHDC and its affiliates had come to play in Khoe-San politics. The numerical majority of Khoekhoe identity claimants in South Africa compared to San identity claimants was also reflected at the conference; the vast majority were Khoekhoe as opposed to San identity claimants. Only one San representative delivered papers. Khoekhoe were, however, also inclined locate themselves as Khoe-San and to make cultural, political and economic demands as Khoe-San, thus reflecting a strategic symbolic appropriation of Sanness which reinforced claims to ultra-indigeneity in South Africa (stemming from the perception that the San were in South Africa long before the arrival of Khoekhoe herders). The conference was very much about Khoe-San self-affirmation and multi-dimensional empowerment, that is, affirmation and empowerment in the economic, political, cultural and psychological realms. Assertions about empowerment, and criticism of forms of disempowerment and marginalization, generated great applause. Affirmation of the Khoe-San as a first indigenous people/nation (“volk”/”nasie”) also generated great applause.

Religion, culture and identity
Reflecting moves towards the recuperation of ‘ancient’ cultural-religious elements that could confer indigenous qualities on present cultural-religious practices, Dr Willem Boezak, a neo-Khoekhoe from Cape Town linked to the CCHDC, who was also chaplain of the National Council of Khoikhoi Chiefs, presented a paper on Khoe-San religion appealing for the retrieval of aspects of old Khoe-San spirituality. He stressed that the Khoe-San had a true religion before the arrival of Europeans that they should not be ashamed of. He advanced three challenges or questions for discussion:


67 In 2000 the Department of Arts, Science, Culture and Technology availed funds for poverty alleviation to a limited number of rural based Khoe-San communities for the establishment of multi-purpose community centres promoting sustainable art, craft, culture and heritage initiatives. Three communities were eventually identified for funding by the Institute for Historical Research (at the University of the Western Cape) and the South African Heritage Resource Agency, that is, Griqua from Vryburg, Griqua from Kokstad and Nama from Steinkopf.
Should a Khoe-San Christian Church be established where all the elements of the ancient Khoe-San belief system can be incorporated?
Would churches like the Griqua Independent Church not be the appropriate communities of faith to salvage something from the past (i.e. ancient Khoe-San spirituality)?
Should church authorities not be challenged to include Khoe-San symbolism in existing liturgies and sacraments?

In a similar vein to Boezak’s emphasis of Khoe-San religiosity, Dr George Brink, also a CCHDC linked neo-Khoekhoe from Cape Town, delivered a paper on Khoe-San culture and insisted that “the Khoe and San people had culture long before the Europeans came to South Africa”. Chief Basil Coetzee, another CCHDC linked neo-Khoekhoe from Cape Town, delivered a paper on Khoe-San identity. He attributed the loss of Khoe-San identity very much to White missionaries. He also linked identity loss to land deprivation. Freedom, for Coetzee, was very much linked to the recovery of a true identity. Suggesting that a Coloured identity was as a false identity, he urged that “we stand up and ... take our true identity. You do not have to be a false person. We are true Khoe-San”.

Economic development and land rights
Reflecting the centrality of land claims in the Khoe-San identity politics, Dr William Langeveldt, a Griqua from the North West province, delivered a paper on land and economic empowerment. Like the former three Khoekhoe identity claimants who presented papers at the conference, Langeveldt also stressed how colonialism ruptured Khoe-San communities. He projected prosperity on pre-colonial Khoe-San; identified the devastating economic and psychological effects of colonialism on the Khoe-San, and expressed a desire for the self-determination and economic advancement. He argued that colonialism generated a robbery (rooysuittige) society with destructive psycho-social effects, for example, distrust, alienation between people, self-alienation and poor self-image. He stressed the significance of land-ownership for Khoe-San advancement. “Without our land (‘grond’) we are dependant on other people”. Langeveldt affirmed the need for unity in the struggle to get access to land.

Education and Khoe-San women
The only San to deliver papers at the conference was Reverend Mario Mahongo, a member of the !Xu community from the Northern Cape. Mahongo delivered a paper on !Xu education and their educational marginalization. Mahongo also delivered a paper on !Xu and Khwe lamenting their educational marginalization. Mahongo also delivered a paper on !Xu and Khwe women. Grahamstown based Chief Jean Burgess of the neo-Gonaqua (Khoekhoe), was the only Khoe-San woman to present a paper. Her presentation was also on Khoe-San women. Though only one Khoe-San woman presented a paper, the need for gender equity, which was increasingly raised within the government and in the business field, was also expressed in the Khoe-San movement and in the conference session on gender. Mahongo specifically urged that there should be greater focus on women from marginalized communities. Burgess lamented the fact that there was only one Khoe-San woman to deliver a paper at the conference. It was for her “the biggest sign of the disempowerment of our Khoe-San women”.

International networking
Reflecting the significant role of the Kranshoek based GNC in connecting Khoe-San to the international First Nation movement, Cecil le Fleur brought the attention of delegates to the importance of international networking and encouraged them to use international instruments for ‘indigenous peoples’. He cited for example, the significance of the Indigenous Peoples of Africa Coordinating Committee; the Permanent Forum for ‘indigenous peoples’ at the UN; the International Labour Organisation Convention 169, and the UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

Delegates’ response
Delegates in the audience were given an opportunity to respond to papers presented at the conference and in doing so reflected shared positions on cultural revival and economic empowerment. Some support was given to
the re-appropriation of the religion of Khoe-San ancestors but problems were envisaged in regard to the revisiting of Khoe-San the ancestral religion and in establishing a Khoe-San Christian church. Concern was expressed about cultural survival and cultural imperialism; inadequate exposure of youth to Khoe-San culture; teachers not being prepared to deal with Khoe-San knowledge; Khoe-San exploitation in film-making, and the land restitution process. The need for a Khoe-San unity structure was also emphasized.

After the presentation of papers on Khoe-San religion, culture, identity, economic development, education and international networking, government officials were given opportunity to report on Khoe-San related government projects, manifesting thus attempts at making the government more responsive to Khoe-San concerns as well as attempts at involving Khoe-San identity claimants in Khoe-San related government projects.

**Khoisan heritage**

Pumla Madiba, CEO of the South African Heritage Resource Agency, delivered a report on the Khoisan Legacy Project. The aspirations for Khoe-San unity and for a national South African identity – suggested in the conference theme – were expressed throughout the conference but were especially elevated in the session on Khoe-San heritage and in the one on constitutional accommodation. Like Zuma, Madiba expressed support for Khoe-San revivalism and manifested an attempt at channelling the revivalism in line with trans-ethnic nation-building. She stressed the support that the government had given to the Khoe-San and also suggested continued government support. She explained that the Khoisan Legacy Project

is one is one of the nine Legacy Projects and [that] it commemorates and ... acknowledges the neglected and marginalized heritage of the Khoe-San people. ... [T]his project attempts to revive or to conserve and promote the culture, the history, the layers of experiences of the Khoe-San people that [have] shape[d] them through the centuries.

Madiba emphasized, in trans-ethnic national-building spirit, that it

is important ... that the Khoe-San people should not see themselves as a nation separated from the ... South African nation. This is why we are calling this the Khoisan National Legacy Project. They will lead the process but it must log onto other processes and other projects because it is in the interest of the nation that part of the culture is conserved and promoted amongst other cultures since we are such a diverse nation.

Madiba also stressed the importance of unity among the Khoe-San, of them coming to consensus about what they wanted and of them speaking in one voice, reflecting thus a push towards Khoe-San unity by government functionaries in order to ease communication made difficult through leadership rivalry. Alicia Monis, the deputy director of DACST, likewise explicated the Khoisan Heritage Project in trans-ethnic nation-building spirit:

[It] is a national project. ... That means that it is there for all South Africans because it is a national heritage. We do not say it does not belong to the Khoe-San people. It belongs to the Khoe-San people. The department and the government must be able to maintain it for our descendants. ... [On a national level] heritage resources are protected for all of us.

Attempts by Madiba and Monis to promote Khoe-San heritage as belonging both to the Khoe-San and the South African nation induced Khoekhoe activists to affirm the specificity of the Khoe-San as a volk and nation. Chief Margaret Coetzee, a CCHDC linked neo-Khoekhoe from the Eastern Cape, affirmed that the conference was a gathering of a volk. She asserted, with much applause from the audience that “we are not only a community ... we are today here as a nation”. Concern was expressed by delegates about government sincerity in engaging seriously with the needs and demands of the Khoe-San.
Reflecting, to an extent, the political anxiety of Coloured/Brown segments generated by the democratic transition, the subject of constitutional accommodation, slotted at the end of the ‘open’ discussion sessions, proved to be a very sensitive issue that could easily raise emotions. Khoe-San political concerns or concerns about their ability to exert significant government sanctioned authority, was much reflected in this session. Anthony le Fleur, volkspresident of the Knysna based GNC, presented a paper in the session, with Zam Titus, director-general in the Department of Provincial and Local Government, also giving an input. Speaking with a very strong voice, A le Fleur raised the emotions of delegates who shared his view that the government did not do enough to meet the constitutional needs of the Khoe-San.

Much like his counterpart Cecil le Fleur from the rival Kranshoek based GNC, A le Fleur manifested the deployment of the international ‘indigenous’ rights discourse for the benefit of the Khoe-San and invoked UN declarations and covenants promoting the rights of First Nations. Whilst acknowledging constitutional advances made in South Africa, A le Fleur, however, emphasized what he deemed as deficiencies from a Khoe-San perspective. Suggesting the legacy of colonialism and apartheid on policy disqualifying Khoe-San from qualifying for a traditional authority system, A le Fleur expressed concern with the argument that the Khoe-San did not qualify for such a traditional authority institution (provided for in the constitution) because they did not maintain a system of indigenous law and tribal authority institutions. He regarded such a disqualification as unacceptable because “there was system of indigenous law that was … maintained by the Griqua”. A le Fleur reasoned further that Khoe-San communities were deprived of their systems of indigenous law through colonialism and apartheid, and that apartheid promoted systems of indigenous law amongst communities which were not Khoe-San (but which presently qualified for a constitutional traditional authority institution).

Much applauded by the audience, A le Fleur insisted that “provision should be made within the framework of international conventions for an authority structure of indigenous people (‘mense’) that is subject to the constitution and the democratically elected parliament of South Africa. … The structure that is requested is a council of Khoe-San people in which our people can be represented. It must include in its highest hierarchy the head (“hoof”) leaders of our different peoples (“volke”); [it must include] each group that historically lay claim on its Khoe-San identity”. A le Fleur recommended that the government ratify International Labour Organization Convention no. 169 as soon as possible.

After the presentation of A le Fleur, Zam Titus gave an input on Khoe-San constitutional accommodation. Like Zuma, Madiba, and Monis, Titus was also inclined to attempt to dispel the idea that the government marginalized the Khoe-San. Aware about the religiosity of many delegates, Titus began his input in a Christian religious tone that immediately, albeit only momentarily, eased the mood stirred by A le Fleur. He mentioned that he was speaking as a South African and greeted those who were present in the name of God. He further stated that “all of us are South Africans, all of us without exception were created in the image of the one and only, and that is our maker”. Titus lauded the South Africa constitution and stressed the ideal of the South African nation as a unity of diversity.

In response to delegates’ disappointment with the government’s response to Khoe-San concerns, Titus reminded them that “Rome was not built in one day” and that “[y]ou can’t … undo centuries of subjugation … within … five years, six years”. He stressed the need for unity and for cooperation, in line with the democratic ideals and national vision in the South African constitution. He also emphasized the constitutional ideals of healing the divisions of the past, the establishment of a society “based democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights”, the improvement of the quality of life of all citizens, and the freeing of the potential of each person. He stressed the government’s willingness to deal with Khoe-San concerns in line with UN principles. He also affirmed that the government was committed to a consultative process in regard to Khoe-San issues and referred specifically to the consultative process involving the National Khoisan Council.
After representations by Anthony le Fleur and Zam Titus, members of the audience were once again given an opportunity to express their views. The need for the recognition of the Khoe-San as the First Indigenous People/Nation of South Africa was re-emphasized and desire for Khoe-San constitutional protection expressed. Delegates also expressed concern about manipulation by conference organizers promoting certain views within the Khoe-San landscape (e.g. pro-government views). Conferees also indicated that the government was likely to attempt to manipulate the Khoe-San and that the views expressed by government officials should therefore not be taken at face value.

In a calculated balancing act right at the end of the sensitive session on constitutional accommodation Cecil le Fleur commended the (former) Department of Constitutional Development under Minister Valli Moosa for what it had done for the Khoe-San and for making the government more responsive to “indigenous communities”. He also commended the government for doing much to promote the rights of the “first indigenous peoples in South Africa” and for its role in the dissemination of information on policy issues and research processes in regard to “indigenous peoples”.

After the conclusion of the open discussion sessions, a workshop was held by officials from Khoe-San bodies affiliated to the NKCC for the preparation of resolutions. Resolutions were finally taken in respect to Khoe-San religious values, identity, education and heritage; Khoe-San women; Khoe-San representation in the media; constitutional accommodation, land restitution and economic empowerment; global networking, and Khoe-San intellectual property rights and indigenous knowledge, thus reflecting the broad range of social issues activated by the 1994 democratic transition.

Officials resolved, inter alia: that church officials from various churches be requested to include Khoe-San symbols in their liturgy at special occasions; “that Khoisan identity be recognized constitutionally”; “that Khoisan languages and history be included in the school curricula; that negotiations with the government be entered into on the repatriation of Sarah Bartmann as well as other Khoe-San human remain; that Khoe-San women be given “equal representation on all levels of society”; “that the Conference requests the ratification of ILO Convention 169 within the UN proclaimed decade of Indigenous Peoples (1995-2004)”; “that a Khoisan National Land Claims Commission ... be established as a matter of urgency to address the matter of land restitution and access to ancestral lands”; “that a consultative NGO be established with a view on national and international networking”; “that our cultural and intellectual property be protected through copyright and that exploitation of these assets cease”, and “that a Truth Commission be established to deal with matters of genocide committed on Khoisan Peoples from 1652 to the present”.

Officials agreed on the establishment of a council that would carry out the resolutions that were taken. Officials from each of the ten Khoe-San regions that were identified elected two representatives to be on the NKCC Council. Cecil le Fleur was elected as chairperson of the NKCC Council. Khoe-San delegates afterwards sanctioned the resolutions of officials during a report back session.68

Though a significant move in forging Khoe-San unity and cooperation, some Khoe-San leaders rejected the National Khoisan Consultative Conference and the council appointed on 31 March 2001. The realization of the Conference’s theme of “Khoisan unity in national diversity” was indeed a

68 The NKCC Council resolved later after the conference to use the abbreviated name of the organization primarily in Afrikaans, that is, NKOK (Nasionale KhoiSan Oorlegplegende Konferensie) in order to prevent complication and confusion that could be generated by using the name both in English and Afrikaans. The selection of the Afrikaans version reflected the preponderance of Afrikaans first language speakers amongst the Khoe-San of South Africa. The NKCC Council also resolved to replace “Khoisan” with “KhoiSan”, in light of concerns among the San that the Khoe-San landscape was dominated by Khoekhoe and that the San were also linguistically subordinated in the term “Khoisan”.
daunting task. There were not only divisions between Khoekhoe and San, but also inter-Khoekhoe as well as inter-San divisions. Whilst the NKCC was held in Oudtshoorn, some San leaders affiliated to SASI were at a San Cultural Heritage Committee meeting in Windhoek held under the auspices of the WIMSA.69 SASI was not represented at the Oudtshoorn conference. San communities from South Africa were, however, represented at the Oudtshoorn conference. The fact that there were San at the historic NKCC and that the San Cultural Heritage Committee meeting was held at the same time as the Oudtshoorn conference reflected an ambivalent relation between the Khoekhoe and the San; it reflected a measure of tension between Khoekhoe and San communities, organizations, and leaders; it also reflected the subjection of Kho-San to pressure for both unity and separation. Later in April 2001, San delegates attending another gathering in Windhoek held under the auspices of WIMSA rejected the term “Khoisan”, reasoning that it demeaned “the San by labeling them as only a part of the larger Khoi group”, which did “not share any of their languages or culture”.70

The NKCC was criticized by both Khoekhoe and San identity claimants, especially by some on the National Khoisan Council (NKC) that was in dialogue with the government in regard to the constitutional accommodation of traditional Kho-San leaders. Some on the NKC feared that their organization could be challenged or displaced by the NKCC. Some on the NKCC were, however, instrumental in the organization of the Oudtshoorn conference and were also elected to the NKCC Council. NKC members who opposed the NKCC reasoned that the NKC was the only authoritative Kho-San body to enter into dialogue with the government over Kho-San affairs.71

WSSD Indigenous Pre-Summit

The NKCC succeeded to be regarded as a legitimate Kho-San representative body by both the government and non-governmental organizations. The NKCC also developed an international reputation as a body representing First Nations of South Africa, thus further fuelling tension between it some members of the NKC.

The rivalry with the NKC was manifested in events involving Kho-San communities, for example, the preparation for the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) held in Johannesburg at the end of August 2002. Both the NKCC Council and the leadership of the NKC argued that their respective bodies were the appropriate one to represent the Kho-San at the Civil Society Indaba. Contestation also unfolded over the organization of the Indigenous People’s International Summit on Sustainable Development, organized to allow First Peoples of the world to adopt a common strategy for the four-day Johannesburg WSSD.72 It was eventually decided that the NKCC should organize the indigenous people’s pre-Summit in Platfontein near Kimberley. The contradictory elements within Kho-San communities came to light at the pre-summit on 20

70 Mail & Guardian, 26 April 2001.
71 Neo-San Reverend Johannes Lawrence, paramount chief of the San Diaspora and media officer of the National Khoisan Council as well as member of the Northern Cape Khoisan Council, NKC maintained that:
   Traditional leaders in the Northern Cape, who are represented on the National Khoisan Council (NKC) … wish to state that the NKCC was launched without the NKC being consulted in this matter. The NKC are the only authoritative body which represents Khoisan affairs and self-determination needs in dialogue with central Government.
72 Diamond Fields Advertiser, 16 August 2002, p. 4.
August. The pre-summit was an opportunity for the NKCC to reinforce its position as an important national Khoe-San umbrella body. It provided another platform for the staging of indigeneity, for the reclaiming of Khoe-San heritage, and for criticizing the government. Attempts at Coloured/Brown repositioning in the changed South African political order were manifested at the pre-summit. Intra-Khoe-San tensions were also manifested. The pre-summit thus became another platform for the manifestation of intra-Khoe-San tension reflecting attempts at positioning within the new political order and within the Khoe-San socio-political landscape.

Khoe-San lamentations of loss and deprivation and demands and aspirations for empowerment and unity were repeated at the pre-summit. Provincial and organizational biases and suspicion were also manifested. The NKCC as well as the government were both criticized by some Khoe-San activists. Neville Greef, spokesperson for the Northern Cape based Khoisan Youth Movement and his associates criticized both the government and the NKCC for supposedly marginalizing their community. Greef stated that members of the local community felt sidelined by members of the Eastern and Western Cape who, in his view, organized the pre-summit: “It’s as if we are incapable of doing things for ourselves”. Members of the Khoisan Youth Movement indicated at the summit that the community was disadvantaged because they were still landless, poverty-stricken and uneducated. They also complained that

the government promised to give us land in September 2000. We are still living in rural houses. They gave us R14-million to purchase alternative land but we have no input into the matter.

Dissatisfaction was also expressed by neo-Korana representatives after the pre-summit. Richard Hoogstander claimed that the NKCC abused the Northern Cape Khoe-San during the pre-summit. Some Khoe-San delegates were also dissatisfied that their hopes of benefiting materially, or being compensated for their loss, after helping organizing the pre-summit were not met, as indicated by Hoogstander:

Many of us provided transport, accommodation and meals for the WSSD delegates out of our own pockets. My car bumper is broken from driving delegates to and from the venue on extremely bad roads from Upington to Kimberley. My costs amounted to about R1 000 and the NKCC told me that they do not have the money to reimburse me. They also promised the youths who performed during the summit that they would be paid but they have simply been abused.

Hoogstander called for the disbandment of the NKCC as it, in his view, only promoted the interests of certain Khoe-San groups:

The Northern Cape Khoisan were not included in the group to attend the WSSD. However, provision was made for Eastern and Western Cape and Griqua representatives to attend the conference. We feel excluded and are concerned that our problems will not be addressed because we are not fully represented.

Hoogstander’s accusation of the marginalization of the Northern Cape Khoe-San were rejected by Barend van Wyk (formerly Barend van Staden), one of the Northern Cape representatives on the NKCC Council and a member of the pre-summit organizing committee. Van Wyk affirmed that

The Koranna indigenous people were actively involved in the pre-summit. They drafted the declaration that recognises the Khoi-San as the rightful inhabitants of South Africa and takes cognisance of the legislation regarding their claims. Eighteen delegates from across the Province were nominated to attend the WSSD based on their expertise and input. The delegates attending raised funds to provide for their expenses.

74 Diamond Fields Advertiser, 21 August 2002, p. 3.
Thus, the ‘indigenous’ peoples pre-summit for the WSSD manifested intra-Khoe-San tensions, provincialism, and competition within Khoe-San communities for leadership and official leadership recognition. It also manifested Khoe-San tensions generated by competition for some of the potential economic benefits accruing from the affirmation of Khoe-San identities, and as such reflected the broader context of identity re-articulation in a country marked by extreme economic class and ethno-‘racial’ differentials in wealth, high unemployment levels among historically marginalized communities, and thus a high degree of competition for the attention and responsiveness of the government to demands for socio-economic resources.

**Contesting Bartmann**

Public forums and conferences on the Khoe-San were utilized for the promotion of sectional interests; at the same time competitors made pronouncements for unity and cooperation as well as demands on behalf of the broader Khoe-San population. Despite rivalry manifested at public forums, the attendance of public forums and conferences by Khoe-San promoted networking and unity, and brought about a confluence of interests and commonality in strategies to advance shared objectives.

Unity moves and intra-Khoe-San tension manifested at different forums were also manifested in the deployment of Sarah Bartmann as a symbol. Bartmann became an important symbol for various Khoe-San organizations and communities, being nationally and internationally used to assert their presence and demands. Bartmann was also deployed to promote Khoe-San unity. With some people being inclined to project Bartmann as a national symbol, notably government officials, and with many Khoekhoe being inclined to deploy Bartmann more narrowly as a Khoe-San symbol, her deployment manifested some of the tensions between Khoe-San identity politics and the trans-ethnic nation-building process and thus the disillusionment of Khoe-San with their position in the new political order. First deployed by the Kranshoek based GNC that initiated a campaign for the return and burial of her remains in 1995, other Khoe-San organizations later joined the campaign for the return of her remains, deploying her as a symbol to advance their own concerns.

**Repatriation campaign**

Concerns about marginalization at the onset of the democratic order in 1994 inclined leaders of the Kranshoek based GNC to attempt to develop a national international profile and to highlight the position of the South African Khoe-San in international forums like the United Nations. The GNC saw Sarah (or Saartjie) Bartmann, whose remains (comprising her complete skeleton, bottled brains and genitalia, as well as the complete cast of her body) – were held at the Musee de l’Homme (Museum of Man) in Paris after her death around 1815, as a symbol that they could use to raise awareness about the South African Khoe-San, nationally and internationally. The GNC also saw Bartmann as a symbol that they could use in developing a national and international profile as the leading representative of the South African Khoe-San.

Bartmann symbolized for the Kranshoek based GNC, and later for other Khoe-San groupings, Khoe-San material and spiritual violations in the past and in the present, as well as the yearning for restoration. The GNC

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77 Born around 1789 on the banks of the Gamtoos River in the Eastern Cape, Sarah Bartmann was apparently persuaded around 1810 to go to Britain on the promise of enrichment. Whilst in Britain she was paraded around as a freak having to display her physical appearance viewed by many Europeans as abnormal. Bartmann was taken to Paris in 1814 where she was again paraded. She died at the end of 1815. Her remains were then displayed at the Musee de l’Homme in Paris. On Bartmann’s background and life in Europe see e.g. PR Kirby: “The Hottentot Venus”, *Africana Notes and News*, 6, 3 (June 1949), pp. 55-62; PR Kirby: “More about the Hottentot Venus”, *Africana Notes and News* 10, 4 (September 1953), pp. 124-134; PR Kirby: “The ‘Hottentot Venus’ of the Musee de l’Homme, Paris”, *South African Journal of Science* 50, 12 (July 1954), pp. 319-322; PR Kirby: “A further note on the “Hottentot Venus,” Africana Notes and News 11, 5 (December 1954), pp. 165-6.

projected her as having been held in "custody" in violation of her dignity and posthumous rights.\textsuperscript{79} Her position in France thus reflected, for the GNC, the perpetuation of European colonial hegemony and the violation of the rights and dignity of other peoples.\textsuperscript{80} She embodied "the colonially-induced diaspora and dismemberment of the aboriginal GRIQUA and their continued vulnerability, marginalisation and disempowerment".\textsuperscript{81} Her return could thus signify the acknowledgement and affirmation of her humanity as well as the presence, dignity and rights of the Khoe-San.

The leadership of the Kranshoek based GNC perceived a range of potential benefits in the return of the remains of Bartmann and her burial in South Africa. Her return and burial would "create an important precedent" that affirmed the human right to burial" and "other post mortem human rights for all"; it would "assert the rights of descendants"; advance the "disclosure on human remains and other artifacts"; it would also serve to create "memory as a rallying point for dispossessed indigenous Khoesan"; create "symbols for the Khoesan peoples, South Africa and Africa"; it would highlight "the European objectification of the Other etc."; advance "Affirmative Action against the cultural and economic hegemony of former colonial powers", and advance "scientific and academic accountability" as well as "state and government accountability".\textsuperscript{82}

In January 1995 Kranshoek based GNC advisor, advocate Mansell Upham, launched the campaign for the return and burial of the remains of Bartmann. The GNC provided detail on the background of Bartmann’s as well as the aims of having her remains returned to South Africa to the media. A documentary on Bartmann was subsequently shown on a South African Broadcasting Corporation television channel which was followed a panel discussion that included the Upham.\textsuperscript{83}

**French government**

The GNC communicated their concerns about Bartmann to the Museum of Man, with Upham unsuccessfully attempting to discuss the return of her remains with staff of the museum on a personal visit late in 1995.\textsuperscript{84} A ‘protest-note’ was also given to the French government through the French embassy in Pretoria. Reflecting the GNC positioning as a leading Khoe-San body, and an attempt at bolstering its demands through self-projection as a bearer and custodian of an uninterrupted indigenous cultural heritage, the protest-note claimed that the GNC was

the legitimate representative body of the aboriginal Khoikhoi and Griqua in South Africa. ... THE GRIQUA NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SOUTH AFRICA, under the Paramount Chieftaincy of His Excellency, Andrew Abraham Stockenstrom le Fleur II ... has the honour to request the Government of the Republic of France to surrender to the autochthonous, aboriginal and indigenous GRIQUA, in their capacity as a FIRST NATION of South Africa and as guardians and custodians of continuous, uninterrupted and unbroken Cape aboriginal Khoikhoi heritage, language and identity, the remains of the late Miss Sarah Bartmann (alias Saartje Baartman) for appropriate burial in her native land, and the consequent, but belated, restitution of her dignity and that of the aboriginal Khoikhoi and their descendants, the Griqua.

In their ‘protest-note’ the GNC identified Bartmann with the plight of the Khoe-San and the respect of her posthumous rights with respect of Griqua and Khoe-San rights and the restoration of their. The GNC also appealed to international declarations on human rights and the rights of ‘indigenous peoples’. The letter thus called

\textsuperscript{79} GCPO, March 1997, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{80} GCPO, March 1997, p. 17.
\textsuperscript{81} GCPO, March 1997, p. 14.
\textsuperscript{82} GCPO, March 1997, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{83} GCPO, March 1997, pp. 12, 14.
\textsuperscript{84} Star, 13 December 1995, p. 11.
on the Government of the Republic of France to restore ... the human rights denied both the late Miss Bartmann and the Khoisan aboriginal and Griqua people in terms of ... the French Revolution-inspired Déclaration des droits de l’homme; ... the Code Civil; ... the European Convention of Human Rights; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; ... the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; and ... the International Decade of the World’s Indigenous People (1995-2004) proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly .... .

The GNC made the content of the ‘protest-note’ available to the media, the South African embassy in France and the South African President’s Office. The South African embassy in Paris subsequently made unofficial enquiries at the French ministry of foreign affairs on Bartmann. The French government avoided communicating directly with the GNC but opted instead to communicate with the South African government.85

Inter-governmental negotiations
In light of the campaign of the GNC, the minister of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology, Dr Ben Ngubane undertook on 15 December 1995 to ensure the return of the remains of Bartmann.86 In a meeting with French Cooperation Minister Dr Jaques Godfrain, on 31 January 1996, Ngubane raised the issue of the return of the remains of Bartmann.87 Reflecting the appropriation and projection of Bartmann as a national symbol, Ngubane stated in nation-building mould that “the return of South Africa to the international community marked the beginning of the process of healing and restoring of our national dignity and humanity” and that “the process would not be complete while Sartjie Baartman’s remains were still kept in a museum”.88

From 1996 negotiations were conducted by Professor Philip Tobias from the University of the Witwatersrand on behalf of the South African government (in particular DACST), and Dr Henry de Lumley, Director of the Museum of Man and the National Museum of Natural History in Paris for the return of the remains of Bartmann to South Africa. The South African embassy in France also approached the National Museum of Natural History (which together with the Museum of Man claimed ownership of Bartmann’s remains) on several occasions in regard to the return of Bartmann’s remains.89 However, by 2000 a breakdown in the negotiations between Tobias and the Museum of Man and the National Museum of Natural History had taken place. De Lumley was no longer in charge of the two French museums. Negotiations consequently had to start anew. Ben Ngubane then undertook to ask President Thabo Mbeki to facilitate negotiations with the French government.90

Pressures for the return of the remains of Bartmann finally paid off in 2002. In 2001 Dr Audrey van Zyl, a New National Party parliamentarian, raised the Bartmann case with Dr Nicholas About, a French senator. N About subsequently came across a poem on Bartmann by Diana Ferrus from Cape Town – expressing hope of her return to her homeland91 – that had a significant impact on 29 January 2002 when N About read a French translation on delivering a motion in the upper house (Senate) of the French parliament for the return of Bartmann’s remains to South Africa. The Senate voted in favour of a bill proposing that her remains be repatriated to South Africa. The return of Bartmann’s remains would be definite once the lower house (National Assembly) approved the bill.92 On 21 February 2002, the National Assembly voted unanimously to return her remains to South Africa.93

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85 GCPO, March 1997, pp. 12-15
88 Mail & Guardian, 2 February 1996, p. 5.
90 Star, 10 October 2000, p. 6.
Old and new Khoekhoe individuals and organizations were delighted when they realized early in 2002 that Batmann’s remains could soon be returned. Plans were then made on how to effectively use the return of her remains to advance Kho-San interests. In this process provincialism, old tensions between the Kranshoek based GNC and neo-Khoekhoe groupings under the CCHDC, as well as tension between the national and more narrow ethnic appropriation and deployment of Bartmann were manifested. Attempts at projecting Kho-San unity and establishing consensus were also manifested, with public expressions of Kho-San unity tending to obscure behind-the-scenes tension between the Kranshoek based GNC and neo-Khoekhoe under the CCHDC.

Reflecting neo-Khoekhoe positioning within the Kho-San socio-political landscape, CCHDC-linked neo-Cochoqua Willem Boezak acknowledged the significance of Bartmann for Kho-San in general and expressed the hope that Bartmann would advance Kho-San unity. He indicated late in January 2002 that

\[\text{her return} \quad \ldots \quad \text{will give new impetus to the struggle of the Khoisan population in SA.} \quad \ldots \quad \text{We are feeling very positive and exited about the prospect of her coming back.} \quad \ldots \quad \text{Because of her sad story she became a symbol for us \ldots \text{of the subjugation and humiliation all the ages.}} \quad \ldots \quad \text{(When) we celebrate her homecoming it will be a spiritual ceremony \ldots \text{it will be a reburial. It will not be a Cape Town thing, it will not be a Griqua thing, it will be a national [Kho-San?] thing.}\]

In projecting the significance of the return of the remains of Bartmann, Boezak not only suggested that the Griqua were not more important than other Kho-San constituencies but he also, at times, appropriated and projected the campaign that the Kranshoek based GNC initiated in 1995 for the return of her remains as the act of the “Khoisan nation of South Africa”:

\[\text{This is a very, very long story. One of the first things that the Khoisan nation of South Africa put before Nelson Mandela in 1995 was the repatriation of the human remains of Saartjie Baartman} \quad \ldots \quad \text{she has become a symbol for us, a symbol of the subjugation and humiliation of Khoisan women through all the ages.}^{94}\]

In the spirit of Kho-San unity, Roderick Williams of the Kranshoek based GNC insisted that Bartmann’s “final resting place should not be to the advantage of a specific party or organization”.

\[\text{Ons glo \ldots \text{dat die finale hoofstuk in die geskiedenis van hierdie besondere vrou \ldots \’n oorwinning is vir alle inheemse mense van Suider-Afrika, hul afstammelinge en die inheemse bevolkings die wêreld oor.}}^{96}\]

On 27 April 2002 the deputy minister of DACST, Bridgitte Mabandla, left with a government delegation to fetch the remains of Bartmann in France. The delegation included Diane Ferrus and Henry Bredekamp. Bedekamp and Ferrus, like many neo-Khoekhoe, hoped that the return of the remains of Bartmann would encourage Coloureds to revisit and embrace their reputed Kho-San heritage. On 29 April 2002 the French minister of research, Roger-Gehard Schwartzenberg, and Bernard Chevassus-au-Louis, the director of France’s Natural History Museum, formally handed over the remains of Bartmann to South Africa’s ambassador to France, Thuthukile Skweyiya.

\[94 \text{Cape Times, 31 January 2002, p. 1.}\]
\[95 \text{Quote translated from Burger, 26 February 2002, p. 14.}\]
\[96 \text{Burger, 26 February 2002, p. 14.}\]
\[97 \text{Cape Times, 26 April 2002, p. 6.}\]
\[98 \text{Cape Times, 30 April 2002, p. 5.}\]
Bartmann arrival
The bodily remains of Bartmann, together with a full body cast, finally arrived in a coffin at Cape Town International Airport on 3 May 2002 where a homecoming reception ceremony was prepared.\textsuperscript{99} The reception manifested both the particularistic Khoekhoe concerns and the trans-ethnic nation-building concerns of the government. In line with the spirit of nation-building Patrick MacKenzie, the Western Cape minister of Cultural Affairs, Sport and Recreation, requested Kho-San representatives who wanted to take part in the reception to get two Coloured/Khoe-San children, two Bantu-speaking children, and two White children to flank Bartmann’s coffin as it was moved into the reception venue on 3 May 2002. Even before the reception neo-Khoekhoe individuals, especially those connected to the CCHDC, expressed dissatisfaction with the role of the government in the reception as well as prominence of the Kranshoek based GNC in the planned reception. The neo-Khoekhoe wished to feature more prominently in the ceremony.

Provincial ministers as well as Brigitte Mabandla and members of Khoe-San communities, including nine Khoe-San chiefs, were at the reception at Cape Town airport. The reception was another opportunity for the new and long-standing Khoekhoe to demonstrate their presence and their possession of a culture of their own; it was another opportunity Khoekhoe/San identity entrepreneurs to promote an ‘indigenous’ identity. People cheered and played purported indigenous music as the coffin carrying the remains of Bartmann was carried from the runway. A naval band and a Griqua choir also gave a musical performance. Six Griqua and Coloured/neo-Khoekhoe children in white clothes accompanied the coffin, which was covered with the South African flag, as it was carried into the venue where the reception was held.\textsuperscript{100} The reception prompted Western Cape Premier Peter Marais to publicly affirm his Kho-San heritage. Marais told the audience that he was a Griqua.\textsuperscript{101} He also suggested the significance of the return of Bartmann’s remains for Kho-San revivalism:

\begin{quote}
[Bartmann se terugkoms is] meer as net die terugkeer van ’n vrou, dis die terugkeer van ’n hele nasie. Saartjie se tuiskoms simboliseer die lied van ’n volk se ontwakking.\textsuperscript{102}
\end{quote}

Marais maintained that “[t]he return of Saartjie Baartman is going to give rise to the rediscovery of the pride of the Khoisan people”.\textsuperscript{103} He also joined a Kranshoek based GNC choir singing “Juig, aarde, juig!”

Dr Willem Boezak, who delivered a prayer at the reception, used the occasion to demonstrate how in tune some neo-Khoekhoe were with some qualities associated with indigenous African spirituality, particularly the invocation of ancestors:

\begin{quote}
Sy kan nou voortgaan op haar geestelike reis op pad na vrede. Ons roep die teenwoordigheid van ons grootouers, Autshomao [sic] en Krotoa, om dié geleentheid met ons te deel.
\end{quote}

Like some other new and longstanding Khoekhoe were inclined to reason, Boezak also indicated (momentarily) that Bartmann’s restless soul could now finally come to rest.\textsuperscript{104}

Reflecting a measure of disillusionment with the new order, neo-Khoekhoe activists were suspicious and even resentful about the projection of Bartmann as a national symbol and as an African by government officials, especially because their demands and aspirations for constitutional accommodation, land restitution and cultural revival were not addressed by the government to their satisfaction. There was some inclination to tie perceived

\textsuperscript{99} On departure from Cape Town International Airport Bartmann’s remains were stored at 2 Military Hospital mortuary in Wynberg (Cape Town), where they were kept until decision was made on their burial place.


\textsuperscript{101} \textit{Argus}, 4 May 2002, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{102} \textit{Burger}, 4 May 2002, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{103} \textit{Star}, 4 May 2002, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{104} \textit{Burger}, 4 May 2002, p. 2.
marginalization of the Khoe-San to the supposedly continued restlessness of Bartmann’s soul, despite the return of her remains. In the words Boezak:

[D]it was vir my ’n besondere eer om die gebed te doen by die roerende ontvangsplegtigheid van Baartman se oorskot. Dat sy ’n “nasionale simbool”, ’n “ikon” en “Afrikaan” is, het later soos ’n refrein in die toesprake geklink. Dit het in my ’n mengsel van harteer, vreugde en woede losgemaak. ... Wat ... ontstellend is, is dat Baartman teruggebring is na ’n land waar haar lewende nakomelinge se leiers en instellings geen amptelike erkennings geniet nie. Wat ’n kontras. Dis dus redelik om te vra: Wat is dan die motiewe van al hierdie besorgde regeringslui? Is sy eintlik maar net ’n ekonomiese inspuiting? Hoe is dit dan moontlik dat daar soveel kommers oor haar getoon word, maar haar nasate moet maar voortleef (oorleef!) sonder grond of enige kulturele regte – verarm en verbitterd. Intussen is dieselfde regering wel erg bekommerd wanneer lede van die Nasionale Raad van Tradisionele Leiers (Kontralesa) brom oor ingekorte gesag, ensovoorts, terwyl dié swart traditionele leiers al jare lank leef van die vettigheid van die land? Ook hierdie “broers” swyg oor die lank vergete konstitusionele posisie van die eerste inheemse nasie van Suid-Afrika. Nee, so lank as wat die Khoisan in kettings gehou word, sal Baartman ook nie werlik vry wees nie. Ons is al lewensmoeg van mooiklinkende politieke praatjies wat op niks uitloop nie.105

Professor Hein Wilemse, head of the Afrikaans department at the University of Pretoria, and himself presumably of part Khoe-San descent, aptly captured the ethnic politicking of neo-Khoekhoe activists through the symbol of Bartmann:

In hul haas om Saartjie as die versinnebeelding van Khoi-identiteit of die verlies aan identiteit voor te hou, wil vandag se Khoi-kultuursmouse haar nagedagtenis vir hul stambou-doeleindes opeis. ... In die verlede het die strategiese maar tog weslikkens vereenvoudigde, tweeledige opposisie swart-wit ander mense (buite daardie kategorieë) se belewing onderdruk. Daarom behoort die aspirasies van mense van Khoi-afkoms gestalte te kry. Die weslikkens gevaar bestaan eger dat Saartjie as ikoon aangewend gaan word in ’n erg, inwaarts kykende, etniese identiteit wat die breër betekenis van haar lewe en lyding gaan ontkn.106

With Bartmann deployed for the promotion of Khoe-San identity politics, Khoekhoe activists hoped that she would function as a symbol of Khoe-San unity and that the campaign for the return of her remains would activate a re-evaluation of Khoe-San heritage among Coloureds.107 Khoekhoe activists were, however, disappointed by the very little (positive) identification expressed among Coloureds with Bartmann.108

Initially deployed by the Kranshoek based GNC and subsequently by other Khoe-San groupings to highlight their perceived marginalization in South Africa, the projection of Bartmann as a national symbol and an African and thus as an indigenous symbol transcending Coloureds and Khoe-San Africans, tampered her narrow ethnic symbolism. In light of continued Khoe-San concerns, the disassociation of Bartmann with narrow ethnic concerns and the centrality of the government in ceremonies relating to the return and burial of her remains, the government was perceived as opportunistically intruding and projecting its own values on Bartmann and on ceremonies around the return and burial of her remains. Bartmann was thus a highly contested symbol, manifesting intra-Khoe-San, and more specifically Khoekhoe tension, as well as tension between Khoe-San and the government.

**Burial dispute**

Even before Bartmann’s remains had arrived in Cape Town, competition had unfolded amongst Khoe-San as to where her remains should be finally kept. The Kranshoek based GNC leadership reasoned (publicly) that her final place should not be to the benefit of any specific party or organization and that the supposedly

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internationally known historical Dutch East Indian Company gardens in Cape Town was therefore ideal. They also favoured the Cape Town gardens as Cape Town was the place where Bartmann was “taken out of South Africa”.\(^{109}\) Patrick MacKenzie, the Western Cape minister of Cultural Affairs, Sport and Recreation was also in favour of the burial of Bartmann in the Cape Town gardens where she, as a national symbol, would be accessible to a wide range of people.\(^{110}\)

The neo-Inqua from the Eastern Cape insisted that Bartmann should be buried in the Eastern Cape as she was born there in the vicinity of the Gamtoos River valley. Oudtshoorn based neo-Attaqua Chief Poem Mooney expressed disapproval over quarrelling over Bartmann’s final resting place but suggested that her place of birth, in the vicinity of the Gamtoos River, should be her final ‘resting’ place. Mooney argued, however, that the Gamtoos River region where she was born was not the Eastern Cape Gamtoos River valley. In attempting to prove his position Mooney argued that old maps of the Little Karoo in the vicinity of Oudtshoorn indicated a Gamtoos mountain and a Gamtoos River that had long since dried up.\(^{111}\) Nama activists Maggie Oewies-Shongwe maintained that Bartmann’s remains should be buried in Paarl where she supposedly grew up and resided just before she left the country. Cape Town based neo-Khoekhoe Paramount Chief Calvyn Cornelius also supported the view that Bartmann’s remains should be buried in Paarl.

DACST appointed a national reference group to consider the place, site and date of Baartmann’s interment and the type of burial ceremony. Even before the group was appointed Khoekhoe activists, including NKCC chairperson Cecil le Fleur, insisted that the reference group be representative of the Kho-San community.\(^{112}\) Manifesting wide but differential subjective reorientations within Coloured communities towards an African heritage, a Muslim group from Cape Town that sought representation on the reference group also voiced its concern about the composition of the reference group. In the words of Noor Davids from the Retreat Muslim Forum:

Ek doen ’n beroep op die owerhede om nie die Kaapse Moslems oor te sien en uit te sluit van ’n deel van die geskiedenis wat gedeelde erfenis is en waarop hulle geboortereg het nie. Saartjie Baartman se simboliese waarde vir nasiebou sal nie sy volle potensiaal bereik as Moslems nie erkenning kry en ingesluit word by die groep nie.

Davids insisted that the Cape Muslims (many of whom claimed a Malay or more generally Eastern heritage) were an ‘integral part’ of the Khoekhoe, being of partial Khoekhoe descent:

[Die “Kaapse Moslems” ag hulle as die gemengd nageslag van] vroeë slawe, die Khoi en kolonialiste wat hulle in die 17de eeu aan die Kaap gevestig het. Die Kaapse Moslems se aanspraak dat hulle deel is van die inheemse Suid-Afrikaanse gemeenskap, word verder versterk deurdat hulle geen geboortereg of aanspraak op enige ander land van oorsprong het nie. Die mite dat hulle van Maleisiese of Javaanse oorprong is, is lankal deur navorsers verworp. ... [D]ie feit dat die Kaapse Moslems deel is van histories benadeelde Suid-Afrikaners, is genoeg bewys van hulle voorvaderlike aanspraak en verbintenis met die Khoi. As ’n integrale deel van die Khoi het die Kaapse Moslems ook ’n groot rol gespeel in die taalkundige ontwikkeling aan die Kaap, soos die vestiging van Afrikaans as taal.\(^{113}\)

The diverse appropriations of Bartmann were especially pronounced during her ‘enrobement’ and burial ceremonies. Like her reception at Cape Town airport on 3 May 2002, Bartmann’s ‘enrobement’ ceremony in Cape Town and the burial of her remains were given a multicultural and national flavour, much in line with the government’s trans-ethnic nation-building ideal but much to the resentment of neo-Khoekhoe nationalists.

\(^{113}\) *Burger*, 4 July 2002, p. 5.
‘Enrobement’ ceremony

The deputy minister of DACST announced on 24 July 2002 that Bartmann’s remains would be buried in Hankey in the Eastern Cape on Woman’s Day, 9 August 2002. After it was decided that the remains of Bartmann would be buried in the Eastern Cape, DACST decided, apparently in response to calls from women, that an ‘enrobement’ ceremony would be held in the Cape Town Civic Centre on 4 August 2002 for the restoration of Bartmann’s dignity and to honour her as a symbol of human rights and national unity. DACST saw the return, ‘enrobement’ ceremony, and burial of Bartmann’s remains, very much in terms of official nation-building goals. In the words of Brigitte Mabandla:

These are happy, auspicious events that should draw all South Africans together, proudly, as we acknowledge not the evils of our colonialist past. It is a remarkably positive event for all South Africans that shows we are finally expunging the past and walking with our heads held high down a national road supported by human rights.

In line with the official trans-ethnic nation-building process, Bartmann’s ‘enrobement’ ceremony was also conceived as a celebration of Western Cape cultural diversity. Prominent female African National Congress politicians like Lulu Xingwana, the speaker of the national parliament Frene Ginwala; Lynn Brown, the speaker the Western Cape provincial government, and Thandi Modise were invited to pay homage to Bartmann. Also invited were the Retreat Muslim Choir, the (Xhosa) Thembalethu Adult Choir from Khayelitsha, a (Coloured) choir from Uitsig, as well as renowned musicians like Sylvia Mdunyelwa, Abdullah Ibrahim and Robbie Jansen, the ceremony being thus marked by performances by people from diverse ethno-cultural communities. Manifesting tension and contestation between the national and ethnic deployments of Bartmann and attempts at resolving them, women chiefs and politicians, as well as a number of the city’s municipal police, formed a guard of honour as the coffin, draped in the South African flag, was wheeled into the venue for the ‘enrobement’ ceremony. The coffin was later decorated with flowers whilst ‘Khoi-goed’ (i.e. herbs) were burned and songs sung.

Bartmann was variously projected by Khoekhoe and non-Khoekhoe speakers at the ceremony as an ancestor; a mother and a sister who was finally home and with her people, and as a symbol of what Africans and especially African women had to endure. She was also projected as symbol of Khoe-San and national unity. The return of her remains was projected as representing the restoration of her dignity as well as the dignity of women, Khoe-San, South Africans and the South African nation.

Piet Meyer, provincial minister of Health who represented the Western Cape government, stated very much in trans-ethnic nation-building fashion that

We are here to restore the dignity not only of Sarah Bartmann but of the Khoe-San and everyone who calls himself a proud South African. Sarah Bartmann is the personification of the struggle of many South Africans for dignity … and a symbol of freedom.

South Africa’s ambassador to France, Thuthukile Skweyiya, not only projected Bartmann as a symbol of the emancipation of South Africans but also as a symbol of freedom in Africa. Makhosazana Njobe stated in a similar vein that the return of Bartmann “bring dignity to Khoe-San people, [and] to South Africans in general”.

A Muslim cleric referred to Bartmann as a “symbol of our common African roots”. He thanked God for

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114 This section draws much on personal observation.
Sarah our ancestral mother [who] brought us all together in whose honour we are gathering. Sister Sarah we, your family are with you today. … You brought us together ... and have given us hope for the future.

At times the attempt to harmonize the various contending projections and deployments of Bartmann was threatened. Some neo-Khoekhoe activists attempted to de-emphasize the projection of the ceremony as a national event and to highlight the Khoe-San aspect of the ceremony. For example, CCHDC-linked neo-Attaqua Felicity Smith greeted only “Kho-San brothers and sisters” and referred to Bartmann as a “mother and figure of the First Nation of South Africa”. Smith asserted that “today we are here as one big family, one big Khoe-San family … remembering our great mother Sarah Bartmann”. She was applauded as she stated “Dit is tyd dat die Khoi-San huis toe kom” and that “our history must be told from generation to generation”.

Dressed in garments typical of neo-Khoekhoe leaders at Khoe-San related events, Willem Boezak and neo-Cochoqua Chief Basil Coetzee also attempted jointly to highlight the Khoi-San, particularly the Khoekhoe aspect of the ceremony. Whilst Boezak was giving the closing prayer Coetzee invoked the names of historical Khoekhoe leaders in a loud voice and saluted by lifting his right arm with a clenched fist symbolizing power and resistance with each name that he shouted out.

The sentiments expressed towards the end of the ceremony by Cecil le Fleur, in his capacity as chairperson of NKCC, were, predictably, conciliatory. He referred to Bartmann both as a Khoekhoe woman and as a South African woman. He referred to her return as a “victory against suffering endured by the Khoi-San” and as a “victory for the struggle against women abuse”. He also linked her return to “other successes of South Africa’s democracy” and advised that “[w]e must all adopt the spirit of reconciliation despite our cultural and ethnic differences”. Le Fleur also thanked the government for the way in which it brought the Bartmann case to finality.

The uses and projections of Bartmann in Cape Town were again repeated with the arrival of her remains in the Eastern Cape and their burial in Hankey. Leaders of neo-Khoekhoe groupings linked to the CCHDC, national and regional government representatives, as well as members of the public waited for the arrival of her remains at Port Elizabeth airport on 8 August. Typical of their clothing at public events on the Khoi-San, neo-Khoekhoe leaders wore garments with leopard motifs. Bartmann’s coffin was again draped in the national flag. In line with postulations about old Khoekhoe practices, animal skins, buchu and aloe herbs were placed on the floor where the reception ceremony was conducted by Joseph Little. Around 200 school pupils “from all sectors of society” formed a guard of honour while a children’s choir from the Bethelsdorp Mission Church welcomed Bartmann in song. Neo-Khoekhoe leaders from the Eastern Cape pushed the coffin over a red carpet to the reception ceremony hall.

As an act of acknowledgement of the familial link between the neo-Khoekhoe and Bartmann on the part of the government manifesting the balancing of government’s trans-ethnic drives and narrow Khoi-San identity politics, Makhosazana Njobe officially handed over Bartmann’s remains to Margaret Coetzee, the neo-Inqua chief.120 Njobe mentioned on handing over the remains that

[b]y this ceremonial welcoming back of Sarah, her dignity has brought back the culture of the Khoi-San – a culture that almost disappeared under colonialist rule. Sarah’s dignity has also brought back the dignity of women in general.121

After the official handing-over of Bartmann’s remains, J Little enacted what he projected as a traditional Khoekhoe ritual by burning buchu and aloe herbs (Khoe-goed) and by sprinkling buchu water over the coffin, thus supposedly ‘atonning’ Sarah Bartmann’s spirit. Some of the burning branches were placed around and on

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top of the coffin. J Little also covered the coffin with the dried skin of an eland, as if to superimpose Khoekhoe symbolism on the national symbol represented by the South African flag. Whilst smoke from the burning herbs filled the room, scripture from the Bible was read and a prayer delivered.122

**Burial ceremony - Hankey**123

Projections of cultural in-tune-ness, ethno-posturing and the ritualism of 4 and 8 August were repeated on the burial day on 9 August in Hankey. Around 10 000 people, comprising mainly Coloureds/Brown people, neo-Khoekhoe, and Nguni-speaking Africans, attended the burial ceremony at a sports field near Hankey Secondary School. Neo-Khoekhoe chiefs were again dressed in clothing with indigenous motifs to such an extent that they could have been seen as being more in tune with their indigenous heritage than Khoe-San leaders from longstanding Khoe-San communities who were not dressed to impress their indigeneity. Some government organizers also attempted to project, via the media, an air of cultural affirmation by Khoe-San and Nguni-speaking Africans at the ceremony; they tried, with much difficulty and limited success, to get the people who were dressed in traditional clothing to fill front rows, in their attempt to get the media to project images celebrating Africanness.

The national deployment of Bartmann was very much underscored in the status of her burial as a state-funeral. Tension between the national and ethnic deployment of Bartmann, exacerbated by government involvement in the burial ceremony, nearly led to the derailment of the burial ceremony by some neo-Khoekhoe chiefs just after the arrival of President Thabo Mbeki at the burial ceremony. Resenting the national appropriation and deployment of Bartmann, some neo-Khoekhoe leaders were reluctant to carry Bartmann’s coffin towards the make-shift stage where it would be seen by those attending the ceremony. Some neo-Khoekhoe chiefs refused to participate in proceedings and to carry the coffin of Bartmann towards the stage when requested to do so after the arrival of Mbeki. The ceremony, however, went ahead as planned after the reluctant neo-Khoekhoe chiefs were eventually persuaded to carry the coffin to the stage arena. Although the Kranshoek based GNC was represented amongst those carrying Bartmann’s coffin to the stage, most of the carriers were CCHDC-linked chiefs, reflecting thus the success of neo-Khoekhoe chiefs in tampering the pre-eminence of the GNC leadership in the Khoe-San socio-political landscape and a measure of success in positioning themselves as significant Khoe-San players, despite the numerical weakness of the neo-Khoekhoe (compared to longstanding Khoe-San communities like the Griqua).

The ceremony was characterized by cultural performances by participants from different communities (Nama, neo-Khoekhoe, Nguni and Indian). ‘Khoekhoe herbs’ were burnt by neo-Khoekhoe women just before singing by a well applauded Nama choir in the Nama language. After the singing of the national anthem, dancing was performed by a group of Nama children, a group of neo-Khoekhoe children, a Xhosa group, as well as two Indian females. All the groups were dressed in traditional clothing representing their respective communities. While a specific group gave a performance, other groups also danced in the background.

Neo-Khoekhoe staging received verbal rewards at the burial ceremony. Eastern Cape Premier Makhenkesi Stofile welcomed people at the service on behalf of the province. Stofile explicitly welcomed the leaders of Khoe-San “tribes” as “royal highnesses”. Ben Ngubane, minister of DACST, also greeted the “royal families and leadership of the Khoe-San people”. Speeches at the burial ceremony reflected Khoe-San revivalist, trans-ethnic nation-building and reconciliation dynamics. Stofile referred to Khoe-San “as the descendants of the First Indigenous Nation” and mentioned that

123 This section draws much on personal observation.
124 The terms Coloured and Brown were hardly used by speakers at the Bartmann burial ceremony.
the burial of the remains of ouma Sarah Bartmann marks an important element of the restoration of human dignity. The dignity of Black people in general and of the Khoisan nation and women in particular is being restored today.\textsuperscript{125}

Neo-Inqua Chief Margaret Coetzee expressed gratitude to the South African government and the government of France on behalf of the Khoe-San for the return of the remains of Bartmann and mentioned that “we want to embrace all the nations in this event [burial ceremony]. … Today mama Saartjie has called all our African nations together, especially the African women and children who are the most abused”. Coetzee’s message was, however, double-edged, also having a narrow neo-Khoekhoe ethno-political dimension. She was eagerly applauded by some neo-Khoekhoe when she called on the Khoe-San to stand up for their rights:

Ek vra Khoe-San manne wat nog nie heetemal bevry is in Suid-Afrika en nog ’n groot mate mishandel word en in ’n hoekie gedryf word, ek sê staan op vir jou rete. Jong manne en vroue staan op en neem aan die voorbeeld van Saartjie Bartmann om julle self los te maak van onderdrukking. Niemand kan dit vir julle doen. Net julle moet dit self doen.

Coetzee also delivered a poem calling on God to restore Khoe-San land and to “liberate all your ancient volk”.\textsuperscript{126}

Mbeki’s speech also reflected the variety of symbolism that Bartmann had come to assume. It suggested his support of a nation-building friendly Khoe-San resurgence. His speech also suggested his desire to link the Khoe-San at the level of identity with a broader African identity. Despite the use of Bartmann by Khoe-San activists to project their concerns about past and present marginalization, Mbeki highlighted the evils done by Whites as exemplified by the experience of Bartmann, and, like other government officials, located the Khoe-San within a broad African category in a manner that underplayed their concerns about marginalization by Bantu-speaking Africans. Reflecting both the particular Khoe-San and broader national and continental significance that Bartmann had come to assume, Mbeki projected Bartmann as both a Khoe-San and an African:

To this day, 186 years after she died, we feel the pain of her intolerable misery because she was of us and we, of her. When we turn away from this grave of a simple African woman, a particle of each one of us will stay with the remains of Sarah Bartmann. … [T]oday, the gods would be angry with us if we did not, on the banks of the Gamtoos River, at the grave of Sarah Bartmann, call out for the restoration of the dignity of Sarah Bartmann, of the Khoi-San, of the millions of Africans who have known centuries of wretchedness. Sarah Bartmann should never have been transported to Europe. Sarah Bartmann should never have been robbed of her name and relabelled Sarah Bartmann.

The burial of Bartmann provided Mbeki with an opportunity to level criticism against past dispossession and present racist thinking and inequality affected by past ‘racial’ policies. In delivering his criticism, Mbeki also affirmed a shared history of racist oppression experienced by Khoe-San and other Africans, thus encouraging or inviting Khoe-San identity claimants to identify with, and embrace a broader African community:

The story of Sarah Bartmann is the story of the African people of our country in all their echelons. It is a story of the loss of our ancient freedom. It is a story of our dispossession of the land and the means that gave us an independent livelihood. It is a story of our reduction to the status of objects that could be owned, used and disposed of by others, who claimed for themselves a manifest destiny ‘to run the empire of the globe’. It is an account of how it came about that we ended up being defined as a people without a past, except a past of barbarism, who had no capacity to think, who had no culture, no value system to speak of, and nothing to contribute to human civilization … . To understand the meaning of all these things, we need only start here, on the

\textsuperscript{126} Translated from Afrikaans.
banks of the Gamtoos River and advance to the rest of our country. We need to cast our eyes back to a period less than ten years ago. Then, the state ideology, whatever the garments in which it was clothed, was firmly based on the criminal notion that some had been called upon to enlighten and tame the hordes of barbarians, as Sarah Bartmann was enlightened and tamed. The legacy of those centuries remain with us, both in the way in which our society is structured and in the ideas that many in our country continue to carry in their heads, which inform their actions on important matters.

The end of Mbeki’s speech reflected operative post-apartheid, social empowerment, ‘non-racial’, non-sexist and nation-building ideals as well as his support of a nation-building friendly Khoe-San revivalism:

[W]e still have an important task ahead of us – to carry out the historic mission of restoring the human dignity of Sarah Bartmann, of transforming ours into a truly non-racial, non-sexist and prosperous country, providing a better life for all our people. A troubled and painful history has presented us with the challenge and possibility to translate into reality the noble vision that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white. When that is done, then will it be possible for us to say that Sarah Bartmann has truly come home. The changing times tell us that she did not suffer and die in vain. Our presence at her graveside demands that we act to ensure that what happened to her should never be repeated. This means that we must act to restore the dignity and identity of the Khoi and San people as a valued part of our diverse nation. It means that we must act firmly and consistently to eradicate the legacy of apartheid and colonialism in all its manifestations. It means that we must not relent in the struggle to build a truly non-racial society in which black and white shall be brother and sister. Our presence at this grave demands that we join in a determined and sustained effort to ensure respect for the dignity of the women of our country, gender equality and women’s emancipation. It demands that we defend our democratic order and our regime of human rights with all necessary means. It requires that everything we do should focus on advancing the interests of the ordinary people of our country.  

Just before the interment of the remains of Bartmann a religious service was conducted that included singing by Griqua and neo-Attaqua choirs. Those regarded as important, that is, government officials and Khoe-San leaders, were given the privilege of putting stones on the grave of Bartmann, supposedly in line with Khoekhoe burial tradition.

Many people, notably non-Khoe-San, were at the Bartmann’s burial ceremony because of the involvement of the ANC government in the organization of the ceremony. Numerous ANC supporters sang freedom songs on their way to the ceremony and at the ceremony itself in a manner that linked the return of Bartmann’s bodily remains with the empowerment ideals of the ANC, many being oblivious to Khoe-San restitution aspirations and demands behind the campaign for the return and burial of her bodily remains. The attempt to make Bartmann’s ceremony a national event also drew many people who did not know who she was. A number of people made utterances about her that offended those who identified with her, for example, that she was a prostitute. Some made fun when visuals of Bartmann were shown on a big screen. Some of those who were offensive were also intoxicated. A television cameraman also managed to generate excitement amongst sections of the people at the burial ceremony by focussing his camera on them. Thus, the attempt to make Bartmann’s burial a national event also brought carnival-like and farcical elements into what was envisioned (at least by some) as a serious occasion.

After the interment of Bartmann, people were provided with free food. The allocation of food, and the easy acceptance of the allocation by Khoekhoe chiefly claimants, suggested some of the less ‘noble’ drives behind neo-Khoe-San chiefly staging; it suggested that many neo-Khoe-khoe chiefs were, like many politicians and government officials, social-status seekers inclined towards elitism and self-enrichment; that many were, at

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least in part, promoting an indigenous identity as a tool for personal material enrichment, and that many were predisposed to collude with government officials if material incentives were offered. The vast majority of ‘key’ Khoe-San figures preferred to be served food separately with the ‘dignitaries’, that is, government officials, Khoe-San leaders, and organizers of the burial ceremony. Dinning with government officials was a means of affirming status. Some ‘commoners’ might also have thought that it was befitting for their chiefs to dine separately with government officials. The ‘dignitaries’, as well as their associates, were provided with sumptuous food and fine drinks by a White owned catering company at a tent set up in a scenic public garden. The ‘commoners’ were provided food without drinks at a school some distance away from the ‘dignitaries’ that was fairly basically prepared in big pots, which they had to eat in the open air. Whilst the dignitaries set comfortably in their tent, the ‘commoners’ had to jostle for food in a ‘never-ending line’ and share water from a tap if they wanted any to drink.

The demands that Khoe-San made to the government were sustained by the hope that they could be realized. Hope of the realization of their demands thus encouraged public staging of indigeneity. Some key Khoe-San demands were, however, unmet by 2004, notably the accommodation of Khoe-San chiefs in a government sanctioned authoritative traditional leadership structure. Protracted negotiation on the accommodation of Khoe-San leaders in an official traditional leadership structure, together with declining hope that key demands would be satisfactorily addressed, had the potential to sap some of the energy behind the staging of Khoe-San indigeneity. Unmet demands also perpetuated a sense of being marginalized, as Cecil le Fleur indicated early in 2004:

Te midde van ... positiewe verwikkelings moet die leemtes in ons verwagtinge wat steeds rede tot kommer en frustrasie gee ook uitgewys word. ... Ons grootste kopspore bly ... die amptelike erkenning van ons onderskeie leierskappe en ons konstitusionele insluiting wat ons identiteit en inheemse regte moet verseker in die land van ons oorsprong. Die traagheid van die regering om hierdie sewe jaar lange proses af te handel, bring uiteraard groot frustrasie mee, want voordat dit afgehandel is, sal ons altyd op ’n manier vreemd voel in die land waarin ons voorsa te die eerste inwoners was. Maar miskien wag daar eersdaags ’n verrassende aankondiging uit regeringskringe oor dié kwessies, wie sal weet?129

Although disillusionment with the government’s response to key Khoe-San demands had the potential to sap some of the energy behind the public staging of Khoe-San indigeneity, an ongoing perception that Coloureds were marginalized economically and politically in favour of Bantu-speaking Africans, continued to provide an impetus to Coloureds repositioning as ‘indigenous’, African and Khoe-San.130

Conclusion
From 1995 the Kranhoek based Griqua National Conference and other Khoe-San organizations campaigned for, inter alia, recognition as indigenous peoples, constitutional accommodation of their chiefs, promotion of their languages and cultures and land restitution, using conferences and public events on the Khoe-San to publicize their presence and their demands. Whilst Khoekhoe and San from longstanding communities were conspicuous at the Miscast exhibition of 1996, neo-Khoe-San assumed increasing prominence in subsequent Khoe-San related conferences and public events. The preponderance of neo-Khoekhoe during the reception, ‘enrobement’ and burial ceremonies of Sarah Bartmann, manifested the reconfigured Khoe-San socio-political landscape; the success of neo-Khoekhoe from the rather numerically weak Cape Cultural Heritage Development Council in significantly inserting themselves in the campaign for the return of the remains of Bartmann (initiated by the

130 This was exemplified by the creation of the Movement Against Domination of African Minorities (MADAM) in Cape Town late in 2004 by four senior Western Cape correctional services officials (Cape Argus, 3 December 2004, p. 9). The organization expressed concern about the promotion of Bantu-speaking warders and correctional services officials in the Western Cape at the expense of Coloureds. MADAM encouraged Coloureds to discard a Coloured identity and to assume a Khoe-San identity.
Kranshoek based GNC), and their success in altering the pre-eminence of the Kranshoek based GNC and in positioning themselves as significant players in the Khoe-San socio-political landscape.

Khoe-San stagings and attendant demands reflected attempts at reshaping the new order or the nature of transformation to meet individual and collectivized ethno-racialized concerns. Although heightened Khoe-San ethnic expressions could fuel ethnic competition for resources, they also manifested an attempt at creating psychological, political and material security, and thus in a sense, manifested an attempt at resolving or dealing with differential Coloured/Khoe-San disillusionment and ambivalence in regard to the new order.

The reclamation or invention of Khoe-San identities could indeed yield a range of advantages. Affirmation of indigeneity could generate a profound sense of belonging. Khoe-San identification had the potential to provide a deep sense of rootedness in southern Africa. Affirmation of Khoe-Sanness could thus generate a profound sense of ownership of selfhood, space, the past and the future. Affirmation of Khoe-San indigeneity could also generate a profound sense of entitlement. Khoe-San revivalism was partly influenced by competition for socio-economic resources or by attempts to access resources. After the displacement of a White government in 1994 by a government in which Bantu-speaking Africans predominated, segments from Coloured communities were more open to acknowledge and affirm an African heritage. However, a number opted not only for identities that suggested their Africanness or indigeneity, but for identities that allowed them to outdo Bantu-speaking Africans, Whites and other communities in their claims to indigenousness and entitlement to resources in South Africa, thus manifesting a re-ethno-racialization of competition for resources. However, the proclivity to associate Khoe-Sanness with Colouredness and to define Khoe-Sanness against Bantu-speaking African and European/White categories, together with the sense of Coloured-neo-Khoe-San entitlement generated by their projected pre- eminent aboriginality, could be challenged or troubled by people associated with Bantu-speaking and European/White (as well as other) categories also acknowledging, (re)affirming, (re)claiming or inventing a Khoe-San heritage, a process that indeed took place at a relatively small scale after the 1994 democratic transition.
Summation

The dissertation showed how different socio-political landscapes in South Africa fostered particular relations between cultures, discourses, ideologies affecting subjective orientations and identity articulations. It showed general identity shifts and cultural, discursive and ideological orientation and reorientation engendered by shifting political landscapes, as well as shifts in identity articulation engendered by changes within specific political orders.

Griqua pre-history reflected the multiplicity and fluidity of identities of pre-colonial and early colonial hunter-gathering and pastoral groups of southern Africa that were radically altered through European colonialism. Colonialism spurned broader categories of ‘Hottentot’ and ‘Bushman’ contributing to broader identification amongst Khoe-San descendants. Categorized as ‘Hottentot’, San incorporated into the colonial labour force were also liable to assume a ‘Hottentot’ identity. The inferior social status conferred on ‘Bushman’ and ‘Hottentots’ inclined many Khoe-San descendants to assumed alternative Christian and Bastaard identities.

The emergence of Griqua polities in the early 1800s allowed for the maintenance of an awareness of a Khoekhoe indigenous heritage and the development of communities in which elements of traditional Khoekhoe cultures and traditions were varyingly maintained and fused with elements derived from the Cape colony. The varying incorporation of non-Griqua into Griqua communities (e.g. Khoekhoe, San, Bastaard, former slaves and their descendants, and Bantu-speakers), led to the varying infusion of elements of their cultures into Griqua communities, contributing thus to intra-Griqua contestations around cultural, political and economic ideals. However, by the 1850s Western derived religious, cultural and economic ideals had become decisively entrenched within Griqua captaincies. Though Griqua invoked Adam Kok I as the symbolic father of the Griqua people, the emergence of different power bases and captaincies allowed for the development of Griqua identities connected to specific leaders, notably Barend Barends (Danielskuil and Boetsap), Andries Waterboer I (Griquatown), Cornelius Kok II (Campbell), Adam Kok III (Philippolis and East Griqualand). Early rivalry between Griqua leaders, notably between Andries Waterboer I and some members of the Kok family, were liable to be invoked by later leaders and rivals to legitimate their leadership claims.

Griqua livelihoods, self-identification, values, ideologies, and cultural configuration and reconfiguration were much influenced by power relations between the colonized and colonizers and the broader socio-political and legal orders. Emerging at an African and European cultural juncture, the multi-cultural and multi-discursive constitution of the Griqua (and their identities) opened them to divergent socio-political directions giving rise to ambivalence that has characterized Griqua politics. The appropriation of colonial culture and values and their ascendance within Griqua polities had a decisive impact on Griqua interaction with non-Griqua, influencing attempts at overlordship over Khoe-San and Bantu-speaking Africans and contributing to Griqua awe of colonial authorities and to the conservatism that characterized Griqua communities after Griqua polities lost their semi-independence in the late 1800s. However, the initial coalescence of Griqua identification around Griqua captaincies and membership of semi-independent Griqua polities, both in Griqualand West and East
Griqualand, facilitated the varying incorporation of outsiders such as Bastaards, Korana, San, as well as Bantu-speaking Africans, former slaves and their descendants, allowing thus, at varying stages, for dissected, bifurcated or multiple identities. Though the Griqua identity was initially primarily predicated on being a burgher in a Griqua polity, an ethnic dimension was suggested from the onset of the re-adoption of the Griqua name in 1813; there was a perception among the adherents of the Kok and Barends families, that most were descendant from a person called Griqua. That is, despite the multiple ethnic heritages of the Griqua, there was nevertheless a perception of a shared narrow Khoekhoe ancestry in 1813.

The consolidation of colonial control over semi-independent Griqua polities heightened the ambivalence of Griqua politics and their relation to Bantu-speakers. Direct colonial control over East Griqualand in the 1870s and the increasing socio-economic and political marginalization of Griqua as well as Bantu-speakers in the region led to attempts at alliances that were at the same time undermined through ethno-‘racial’ differentiation, discrimination, distrust and suspicion – amongst subordinated communities. Whilst some Griqua found common cause with Bantu-speaking Africans they were at the same time concerned about being slotted officially together with Africans of Bantu-speaking origin as ‘Native’ and being subjected to laws and regulations applicable to ‘Natives’. The terms ‘Native’ and ‘Aboriginal’ were by the 1890s being redefined and increasingly associated with notions of purity, by Whites as well as by sections of subordinated communities (e.g. Griqua, Khoekhoe and Bantu-speakers) who thereby attempted to show that they could not by virtue of the purported infusion of ‘European blood’ be categorized as ‘Native’, in a context in which those categorized as ‘Native’ were being increasingly subjected to restrictive measures. The threat of being categorized ‘Native’ made it important for the Griqua to emphasize biological and cultural proximity to Europeans.

Socio-political ambivalence and contradictions amongst ethno-‘racial’ underclasses in East Griqualand in general and amongst the Griqua in particular were manifested sharply in Andrew Abraham Stockenström le Fleur I who was subjected to different and often contradictory social pressures. From the mid-1890s Le Fleur came to be seen by many within subordinated communities in East Griqualand as the heir of Adam Kok III and as a leader through whom lost land and independence would be restored. Le Fleur, like a number of his Griqua contemporaries, displayed both aspirations for differentiation and unity of Griqua and Bantu-speakers and manifested both pro-establishment and anti-establishment tendencies. The Griqua land claims campaign of the late 1890s in which Le Fleur played a significant role necessarily reinforced Griqua identity, having been accompanied by differentiation between the Griqua and other social categories perceived to inhibit the realization of Griqua land claims, for example, Europeans and Bantu-speakers – perceived to be illegitimately occupying Griqua land. However, dissatisfaction with the response of the government to Griqua land claims allowed for the development of trans-ethnic cooperation and for the cultivation of an alternative social vision in which Griqua and Bantu-speakers were (future) land owners in a shared liberated space.

The multi-cultural and multi-discursive shaping of the Griqua was acutely manifested in Le Fleur whose thinking combined elements from different discourses. Le Fleur was imbued with Griqua ideals for landownership and independence that, in the early 1900s, articulated with nationalists, African self-reliance and segregation discourses. He also wrestled with alternative identity categories that he could use in the promotion of his self-help and farming resettlement schemes. His twentieth century resettlement schemes manifested a reworking of the Griqua ideal of landownership in the context of White domination and segregation. His identity options were, to an extent, influenced by his locational shifts between Griqua and Coloured environments. His discursive shifting was also much influenced by his contexts and audiences.

Whilst he attempted between 1920 and 1941 to reform and unify Coloureds under a Griqua identity category, and to organize them into ordered law abiding and self-reliant and proud Griqua ethno-national Christian subjects, Le Fleur’s relation to a Coloured identity category remained rather ambivalent. Le Fleur felt that the Coloured category lacked the ethno-national specificity that the Griqua category conferred. The Coloured category was nevertheless an integral part of his promotional activities and his own self-identification. Le Fleur had to use the Coloured category in order to mobilize Coloureds, hoping that they would ultimately be turned
into Griqua, and in so doing he also reinforced the association of the Griqua category with a Coloured category. The association of Griqua with ‘Natives’ in some laws also inclined Le Fleur and other Griqua to affirm that Griqua were Coloureds; that they were of mixed ‘racial’ descent with partial European ancestry. Thus, in their interaction with government officials, Griqua played a role in the shaping and reshaping of the meanings of ‘Native’, and ‘Coloured’ categories in their attempt to give content to Griquanness and to position themselves socially and economically. Attempting to counter a perception that the Griqua belonged in the ‘Aboriginal Native’ category in which Bantu-speakers, ‘Bushmen’ and ‘Hottentots’, were also liable to be included, Le Fleur and other Griqua located the Griqua as a non-‘Aboriginal Native’ category within the Coloured category and reinforced the association of Griquanness and Colouredness with ‘racial’ mixing, even as they cultivated consciousness of an indigenous Khoekhoe heritage.

Through his attempts to unite Coloureds under a Griqua category Le Fleur led to the expansion of the Griqua population during a period in which the affirmation of indigenous Khoe-San identities was severely undermined. Reflecting the colonial juncture in which Griqua and Coloureds were constituted – a juncture characterized by the erosion of Khoe-San cultures, and the appropriation and ascendance of colonial culture and values amongst sections of the colonized – Le Fleur cultivated a Griqua identity and awareness of Khoekhoe heritage but at the same time drew much on Christian and European cultural values.

Through the promotion of a Griqua category amongst Coloureds, Le Fleur reconnected Coloureds of Khoekhoe descent with their Griqua-mediated Khoekhoe past, even though GNC leaders sought prevent Griqua being located legally in an ‘Aboriginal Native’ category. Through promoting a Griqua category amongst Coloureds, Le Fleur and his associates also cultivated identification with a Khoekhoe heritage amongst Coloureds who might not necessarily have been of Khoekhoe or San descent. Through including some people of Bantu-speaking origin in his organizational structures and settlement schemes, Le Fleur also made it possible for them to be classed as Griqua and Coloured. During the twentieth century Le Fleur drew his adherents into an ethno-national cultural and religious system that cultivated reliance on God and respect for the church and government authorities, and promoted cooperation and consultation with the government and discouraged violent confrontation. Le Fleur thus predisposed the government to be more sympathetic and responsive to the aspirations of Griqua, particularly after his death in 1941.

Although subjected to contradictory influences Griqua were during the apartheid period generally acquiescent, with various leaders consistently projecting the Griqua as loyal subjects. Griqua ethno-national aspirations, which dovetailed with, and were reinforced by apartheid, and their demonstrated loyalty to the government and identification with aspects of apartheid, made the government sensitive to their identity concerns, thus reinforcing their loyalty. Although much in line with the operative apartheid ideology, the articulation of Griqua identities and Griqua social aspirations were also, to some extent, influenced by anti-apartheid discourses. Whilst the articulation of Griqua identities often fell in line with apartheid ideology, social relations between Griqua and non-Griqua (notably Bantu speakers and Coloureds) and the permeability of Griqua boundaries could also at the same time frustrate the application of the apartheid classification regime and related policies. Crossing historically the ‘Native’ and Coloured identity categories, Griquanness remained socially paradoxical. Some Griqua identity claimants were liable to be slotted into the ‘Native’ category and to be subjected to attendant discrimination, notably those perceived by White officials to have strong somatic and cultural attributes associated with Bantu-speaking African communities. Many were also slotted officially as Coloured.

Although the association between Griqua identity and the Coloured identity category became reinforced officially during apartheid, the two categories coexisted ambivalently in the self-identity of many Griqua. With the Griqua category officially firmly linked with the Coloured category, some Griqua leaders became more open to attempt to have the Griqua category being applied officially separate from the Coloured one, without the measure of fear of the pre-1950 period of being consequentially slotted into the ‘Native’ category. The promotion of the Griqua as a volk distinct from Coloureds was attended with appeals for ethno-specific resource allocation, notably land. Whilst some Griqua leaders became inclined to promote the Griqua as a distinct ethnic
and ‘racial’ group, others continued to locate Griqua within the Coloured category. Though Griqua identity and Griqua socio-political positioning by Griqua leaders often fell in line with apartheid discourse, Griqua leaders being inclined to reaffirm Griqua loyalty to the government and to support apartheid ethno-national and ‘racial’ segmentation, interaction, inter-marriages or unions with Coloureds and people of Bantu-speaking origin led to inter-ethnic movement and attendant shifting and multiple identities that undermined apartheid ethno-‘racial’ segmentation.

Participation in Coloured political parties from the 1960s provided a means for Griqua to attempt to realize their diverse interests, with rival leaders attempting to bolster their positions by associating with contending political parties. The participation of Griqua leaders in Coloured political parties in turn subjected them to contending apartheid and anti-apartheid discourses that varyingly influenced their social, economic and political expressions – which were consistently within constitutional parameters. The association of Paramount Chief Andrew le Fleur II, leader of the Kranshoek based GNC, with the Federal Party reinforced the pro-government inclination of his GNC faction whilst the association of Volkspresident Eric le Fleur, leader of the Knysna based GNC, with the Labour Party inclined him to assume a more critical approach to the government.

Differences between A le Fleur and E le Fleur in regard to apartheid, homelands, and Coloured identity reflected differences within the broader Griqua socio-political landscape. The Kranshoek based GNC leadership favoured the establishment of a Griqua homeland during the apartheid period, although the appeal for a homeland was rather moderated in the 1980s. The East Griqualand Pioneers Council also favoured the establishment of a homeland, albeit a Griqua-Coloured homeland. Representatives of the Kranshoek based GNC in particular tended to express support for the idea of the Griqua category being applied officially separately from the Coloured category during the apartheid period. E le Fleur and Paramount Chief Daniel Kanyiles, the leader of the Griekwa Volks Organisasie from Griqualand West and Albanie, were inclined during the 1970s and 1980s to oppose the establishment of a specifically Griqua homeland.

Whilst participation in Coloured political parties provided Griqua nationalists a forum for articulating longstanding identity and land aspirations, Griqua leaders tended to fit uneasily in Coloured political parties. Although Coloured parties at times expressed support for Griqua demands, they were averse to Griqua identity aspirations perceived to be encouraging Coloured fragmentation. E le Fleur’s membership of the Labour Party in the 1970s inclined him to subdue his Griqua nationalist sentiments and reinforced his promotion of a broad Coloured identity, with the Griqua as a sub-group. Griqua nationalist extremists like A le Fleur were inclined, notably from the late 1970s, to articulate Griqua separatist aspirations that undermined the ideal of Coloured unity promoted by the Federal Party of which he was a member.

The articulation of Griqua identities and Griqua representations of their past during the early 1980s were manifested and at the same time influenced by government inquiries into the Griqua established during a process of constitutional change. Prospects of social and economic upliftment and the acquisition of land contributed to the reaffirmation of the specificity of the Griqua as a distinct ethnic group with its own culture, religion and historical land. Griqua representations to the Constitutional Committee of the President’s Council in 1983 reflected very much the Griqua political landscape and the articulation of Griquanness in the 1980s. Representations pertaining to identity and land re-manifested longstanding concerns that continued to be expressed in the post-apartheid period. Some representations also revealed marginal elements attendant to the articulation of Griqua identities that became prominent in the early post-apartheid period, for example, the positioning of the Griqua as Khoekhoe and as a First-Nation, and the call for the constitutional accommodation of Griqua chieftainship. The uneasiness expressed by Griqua representatives with the Coloured category also mirrored post-apartheid uneasiness with the category. However, the rejection of the category by Griqua representatives (from different factions) and among Khoe-San organizations in the post-apartheid period would be less ambiguous and more forthright.
There was in the 1980s greater consensus amongst leaders of different Griqua factions, notably the heads of the two GNC’s, on the need to promote a distinct Griqua identity. The Griqua nationalism of Eric le Fleur that was suppressed or eroded during the 1970s came more to the fore after he left the Labour Party in 1980. E le Fleur did, however, not move to the extreme position of the Kranshoek based GNC leadership by advocating separate Griqua residential areas and educational institutions. The unfavourable response of the government to the idea of a Griqua homeland led to the modification of the Griqua the nationalist’s position, and their disavowal of a Griqua homeland (at least before official inquiries into the Griqua), thus bringing them more in line with longstanding opponents of a Griqua homeland like Daniel Kanyiles and E le Fleur. Griqua nationalists continued, however, to promote moderated separatist ideals in calling for the creation of Griqua farming areas, separate Griqua residential areas and separate educational institutions. Shared concern about the position of the Griqua in the 1984 tri-cameral parliamentary dispensation (for Coloureds, Indians and Whites), and concern about Griqua disregard in a Coloured dominated government representative body, also generated calls from leaders from different Griqua factions that their representation in the new tri-cameral constitutional dispensation be secured. Shared concern about domination in the Coloured tri-cameral representative body prepared the ground for a brief Griqua political unity forged in light of the 1984 House of Representative elections. Failure at securing the desired representation in the tri-cameral parliament reinforced disillusionment with the new constitutional order and encouraged the re-manifestation of factional differences which have characterized the Griqua socio-political landscape.

The 1994 democratic transition brought a measure of uncertainty and anxiety amongst Griqua segments about the present and future. It also encouraged new ways of relating to the past and thus some shifts in the articulation of Griqua identities, aspirations and demands. Concerns about the present and future encouraged a rethinking of the past; a shift in the relation of elements historically associated with Griquaness (or a shift in the emphasis of these elements), and the development of identity representations that were potentially empowering in the new order. Thus, disassociating themselves anew from a Coloured identity, and repositioned as Khoekhoe, as an ‘indigenous’ volk, as a First Nation, and as African, Griqua segments embarked from 1995 on campaigns to have their demands for the recognition of their identity (as an indigenous group), traditional leaders, land claims and ‘self-determination’ addressed by the government of the new democratic South Africa. These identity re-articulations were both necessitated and facilitated by the changed constitutional and political environment which opened Griqua to develop an indigenous identity drawing on previously marginal indigenous elements or associations of the Griqua category which were further reinforced by an international ‘indigenous’ or First Nation indigenous rights discourse that was deployed to exert pressure on the government to deal with their demands.

The response of longstanding Khoe-San communities and organizations, notably those from Griqua communities, to the democratic transition influenced both the emergence of neo-Khoe-San and their organizations and the strategies that they pursued. Affirmation of Khoe-San identities was, like the re-articulation of Griqua identities, activated and facilitated by the changed constitutional and political environment which unsettled Coloured identities, opening some Coloureds to the construction of an indigenous identity drawing on previously marginal indigenous associations of Coloured category which were also reinforced by an international First Nation rights discourse. With the ending of apartheid, and the attendant reconfiguration of political, cultural, discursive and ideological relations, the Coloured category lost much of the psychological, socio-economic, ideological and political value it previously conferred, further predisposing Griqua and some Coloureds to distance themselves from a Coloured identity; to (re)affirm an indigenous heritage, and to promote Khoe-San identities engendering and conferring the geographic rootedness, sense of belonging, group security, self-esteem, sense of entitlement and ownership, and ethno-cultural specificity, legitimacy, integrity and unity they desired.

Whilst Khoe-San identity claimants disassociated themselves from a Coloured category, the post-1994 reaffirmation of Khoekhoe and San identities manifested very much attempts at finding identity terms that were useful for the promotion of Coloured socio-economic, political and psychological concerns which delimited the
articulation of Khoe-San identities, tying them to Colouredness at the same time as the affirmation of Khoe-San identities challenged a Coloured identity. The Khoe-San category that Khoe-San identity claimants presented as an alternative to the Coloured category was continually invested with a Coloured/Brown quality, with the two categories tending to be articulated in a manner that placed them on a similar differential location in relation to other principal racialized categories (that is, Bantu-speaking African/Black and European/White) against which both categories were defined, thus reinforcing the association and entanglement of the two categories. This association and entanglement reflected the Coloured background of the many Khoe-San identity claimants in South Africa and the strong historical association of Coloureds with partial Khoe-San ancestry.

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### Appendix 1

#### Griqua leadership lines

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<tr>
<td>Barend</td>
<td>Andries Waterboer I</td>
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<td>Barens</td>
<td>Adam II (1871-1835)</td>
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<td>Abraham</td>
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<td>Rachel (1870-1947)</td>
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<td>Jan</td>
<td>AAS le Fleur I</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jacobus Waterboer</td>
<td>[Daniel Kanyiles (1925-2003)]</td>
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<td>Abraham</td>
<td>Abraham</td>
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<td>Minnie-Barens-</td>
<td>Johannes Waterboer (1955-)</td>
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#### Le Fleur leadership lines

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<td>Andrew Abraham Stockenström le Fleur I (1867-1941) + Rachel Susanna Kok</td>
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<td>Abraham (1906-1964)</td>
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<td>Andrew (1967-)</td>
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<td>Allan (1967-)</td>
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Appendix 2.1

AAS le Fleur I (centre) with followers at the Kokstad jail, 1898 (Source: Cape Town Archives, AG 1545).
Appendix 2.2

AAS le Fleur I and family, 1925

Back, left to right: Dorothea le Fleur, Paramount Chief AAS le Fleur I, Lodewyk Kok, Abraham le Fleur, Annie le Fleur. Front: Adam Johannes le Fleur, Annie Kok, Thomas Lodewyk le Fleur, Rachel Susanna le Fleur with Rachel le Fleur in front of her, and Charlotte le Fleur with AAS le Fleur II (Source: Le Fleur Collection, Unisa).
Appendix 2.3

Right to left: AAS le Fleur Fleur II, Roderick Williams, both from the Kranshoek based GNC, carrying the coffin of Sarah Bartmann in Hankey on 9 August 2002 with neo-Khoekhoe chiefs Joseph Little (behind Williams), Poem Mooney, Sharon Leng and (front-left) Basil Coetzee (Picture from Cape Argus, 10 August 2002).
Appendix 3.1
Appendix 3.3
East Griqualand (Source: J Bartholomew and Son, 1922)

Appendix 3.4
East East Griqualand, 1870s (Source: Cape colonial government commission G 58-1879)

Appendix 4
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<th>Province</th>
<th>Black African</th>
<th>Coloureds</th>
<th>Indian or Asian</th>
<th>White</th>
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<td>3 994 405</td>
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<td>4 293 640</td>
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SAMENVATTING

Dit proefschrift behandelt de veranderingen in de wijze waarop de Zuid-Afrikaanse Khoe-San uitging hebben gegeven aan hun identiteit. De nadruk ligt daarbij op de figuur van A.A.S. Le Fleur I (1867-1941), op de Griqua's en op de renaissance onder de Khoe-San in de jaren na de apartheid. Er wordt duidelijk gemaakt hoe verschuivingen in de politieke, culturele, discursieve en ideologische machtsrelaties bepalend waren voor de wijze waarop de Khoe-San uiting gaven aan hun identiteit en bij uitbreiding ook voor de subjectieve gevoelens van de etno-'raciale' onderklassen. Daarbij wordt er gewezen op de complexiteit van de subjectieve gevoelens van de Griqua's (en van hun sociaal-politiek gedrag), zoals die ontstonden en een nieuwe vorm kregen in interculturele omgevingen waarin zij bloot stonden aan diverse, in een onderlinge wedijver verwikkelde soorten van discours. Heel sterk komt dit tot uiting in de persoon van A.A.S. Le Fleur.

Enerzijds leidde de somatische en culturele discriminatie door de kolonisatoren ertoe dat men zich distantiende van het Khoe-Sanschap en zich alternatieve identiteiten aanmat (christelijk, bastaard en kleurling), anderzijds stond de opkomst van Griqua gemeenschappen en identiteiten in het begin van de negentiende eeuw er borg voor dat er een besef van een inheems Khoekhoe patrimonium in stand bleef.

Bredere ontwikkelingen op sociaal-politiek en wetgevend terrein beïnvloedden de vorming en hergroepering van elementen in de identiteit van de Griqua's, waarbij, al naargelang de historische periode of het desbetreffende politieke regime, telkens andere aspecten van hun erfgoed de nadruk kregen. Onder invloed van de discriminatie van ‘natives’ binnen de kolonies en (na 1910) de Unie van Zuid-Afrika stelden de Griqua's dat hun patrimonium niet-inheems was en dat zij moesten worden ingedeeld bij de kleurlingen. Daarmee suggereerden ze dat hun afstand tot de inheemsen groter was dan tot de blanken, terwijl het Khoekhoe patrimonium in wisselende mate erkening kreeg.

De officiële consolidatie van de band tussen de categorieën ‘Griqua's’ en ‘kleurlingen’, gaf nationalistische Griqua's de mogelijkheid om ten tijde van de apartheid (1948-1993) op dubbelzinnige wijze de categorie Griqua los te koppelen van die der kleurlingen en te werven voor het etno-nationale specifieke karakter van de Griqua's.

Toen er een einde kwam aan de apartheid en in het kielzog daarvan de politieke, culturele, discursieve en ideologische relaties gehergroepeerd werden, verloor de categorie ‘kleurlingen’ veel van de psychologische, sociaal-economische, ideologische en politieke waarde die er voorheen aan kon worden ontleend. Dit bracht de Griqua's en sommige kleurlingen ertoe om zich van de kleurlingenidentiteit te distantiëren, zich (opnieuw) een inheemse erfenis aan te meten en Khoe-San-identiteiten te propageren om zodoende de door hen zozeer gewenste geografische wortels, het gevoel om ergens bij te horen, het gevoel van recht en bezit, groepszekerheid, eigenwaarde en van een etno-culturele eigenheid, legitimiteit en eenheid te bewerkstelligen.
Curriculum Vitae
Michael Paul Besten was born in Roma, Lesotho on 7 July 1969. He enrolled for a BA degree at the University of the Western Cape (UWC) in 1992, completing it 1994. He completed an MA degree in History at UWC in 1999.